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AJORESS BY
HONORABLE FARRIS BRYANT
JIRECTOR
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
BEFORE THE
REGION VII CONFERENCE OF THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
APRIL 20, 1967
hat controls -- particularly consumer
ontrols such as wages and prices and
ationing -- are imminent. Nothing could
e farther from the truth.
The fact is our economy over the last
ear has been shown to be amazingly
esilient and robust. It is meeting the
emands of Vietnam and maintaining our
ivilian requirements at one and the same
ime. Obviously there are strains and
tresses. Shortage of highly-skilled labor
as been found in some areas. (That, I
ight add, is a problem even in peacetime
rosperity.) Occasionally, we run into a
ight situation with important metals and
inerals. But sometimes the problems them-
elves become inflated and out of per-
pective.
Our growth rate now appears to be
running at a steadier level. Labor shortages
____________________________________________J
10
are not quite as severe as they were just
a few months ago.
This is not to say that our problems
are solved. Neither can we foretell the
future in Vietnam.
For all that we do at home is agains
the background of the war in Vietnam and
efforts of the President to secure an earl
and honorable conclusion.
The newspapers and airways are full
today, and they have been for months past,
of expressions of concern over the con-
tinuance of the war, of criticism with all
the wisdom of 20/20 hindsight of the con-
duct of Presidents and Secretaries of Stat
under whose leadership the existing
circumstances have developed, of advice
from experts, real and fancied, official
and non-official, secular and divine, on
11
hat course this Government should pursue.
The ears of the President are not
losed to any advice. Its value is not
etermined by its genealogy. But there are
ertain elementary propositions that
annot be ignored:
1. We are committed to the support
f the people of South Vietnam in their
ffort to achieve a government of their
wn choosing through free elections.
2. We would welcome "negotiations
ithout preconditions," as called for by
7 nonaligned nations on April 1, 1965.
3. We would welcome "unconditional
iscussions," as called for by President
ohnson on April 7, 1965. If the other side
ill not come to a conference, we are pre-
ared to engage in discussions through an
ntermediary.
4. We are prepared to order a
12
. cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam
the moment we are assured -- privately or
otherwise -- that this step will be
answered promptly by a correspondingly
appropriate de-esoalation on the other sid
About three weeks ago it was dis-
closed that President Johnson has backed
his public appeals for a conference with
private initiatives to the leaders in
. Hanoi. Last February 2, as the new year
holiday in Viet Nam approached, the
President offered to stop bombing North
Viet Nam and to halt augmentation of U. S.
troops already in'me area as soon as in-
filtration into South Viet Nam by land an
sea had ceased. This, the President
asserted, would provide a beginning for
. "serious and private discussions leading
toward an early peace."
13
Today, we know Ho Chi Minh's savage
nd unreasoning answer. He said "No" in a
iatribe of invective that offends in tone
nd substance the most elemental courtesies
f diplomatic communication.
The episode shows how wrong and in-
dequately informed the impatient among us
an be. President Johnson has, in fact,
aken every conceivable step to create
onditions which would de-escalate and,
opefully, end the war.
Just last week the intransigence of
he Hanoi Regeme was again demonstrated to
he Nations of the world. This time the
ebuff was directed against the United
ations, an organization of 122 members.
ecretary General Thant put forward a
roposal for a "general standstill truce"
o be followed by preliminary peace talks
and a reconvening of the Geneva conference
14
on Indochina.
President Johnson promptly accepted
the broad outlines of this proposal. From
the foreign ministry in Hanoi came a nega
response couched in the same vituperative
tone and insisting "the United Nations ha
absolutely no right to interfere in anywa
Despite hese past failures, the
President will continue to seek peace.
We do not seek the unconditional
surrender of North Vietnam; what we do
seek is to secure the right of South
Vietnam to determine its own destiny --
free of force.
But having said all of this, we are
not prepared for unilateral action which
will strengthen the other side and expose
to ever greater danger the lives of our
own men in the field.
We are not prepared to create a
15
nctuary from which the other side can
port its aggression with impunity and
nduct the war in relative comfort.
We are not prepared to repeat the
istakes of other generations who have let
gression go unchecked until the price
at must be paid is almost too heavy to
ar.
We are not prepared to run away from
r commitments. If ever the nations of the
rld doubt our national will, we will
deed stand alone. If we cannot be counted
, who can? If we do not stand for
eedom, who will?
I wish that I could provide a time-
ble for the end of this tragic conflict.
wish that I could say tomorrow Hanoi will
ke up with the knowledge it is not going
push us out of Vietnam.
Whenever that day arrives, and it will,
18
we shall know that strength and stamina
werethe deciding factors. It takes one an
a half workers to support each soldier,
sailor and marine in the Armed Forces. Th
same qualities which undergird our soldie
in the field, are needed on the home fron
As Executive Reservists you best
exemplify that spirit at home.
You are testimony to the patriotism
' of American industry, labor and agricultu
to the willingness of our most successful
men and women in every discipline to plac
their talents at the disposal of the Nati
in times of emergency.
I am delighted you are here. I am
honored to stand among you today.
It is a pleasure and a privilege to
attend this Regional Conference of the
National Defense Executive Reserve here
in Los Angeles, California.
A pleasure because i have the oppor-
tunity to meet a corps of trained men and
women -- men and women with skills, and
capabilities -- who would staff the
emergency functions of government in a crisb.
A privilege because i realize full {
well that the Region 7 pool of 38S Reservks
is among the most dedicated in the Nation.
In a very literal sense, you are the modern
counterpart of the American minuteman.
I can't think of a more appropriate
lace to hold this Conference than in Los
ngeles.
We are encouraged that so many of you
ould attend this conference -- and we
elcome your active participation in our
workshop sessions. I do not intend to
intrude upon the excellent briefings you
heard today; certainly I would not wish t
echo the thunder of my very able staff,
who this afternoon examined in depth the
various elements of defense mobilization
which make up OEP's program.
But I can say this. Ten years ago
the National Defense Executive Reserve
was little more than a dream -- a concept
spelled out in a 1955 amendment to the
Jefense Production Act. Its first con-
tingent of top executives totaled fifty
people. Today nearly 3,900 Executive
Reservists serve twelve government
departments and bureaus.
That is a remarkable record. It is
and certainly it should be -- a source of
pride to those who serve in this importan
capacity. Your willingness to accept this
3
critical assignment from your government
is another example of a trait which is
historically characteristic of Americans --
a personal identification with the security
and welfare of our country.
America has been cast in a role of
leadership perhaps in spitetf itself. We
can imagine no result more to be desired
than to be insulated from the claims of I
the world and the demands upon our leader-
ship. But that is not to be. We stand for
freedom, and on that stand we are being
put to the test once again in Vietnam.
It is not the first time we have been
asked to do so, nor will it be the last.
There were similar tests for freedom in
post-war Europe. There were tests in the
Formosa Straits, in Lebanon, in Greece (
and Turkey, in Korea and in Cuba.
4
Each time we took risks, sometimes
made sacrifices. Each time our will and
courage were not found wanting. Nobody
likes what we are compelled to do in
Vietnam. We much prefer the conference
table to conflict.
In one sense, the entire post-World
War ii period is a history of our determi
nation to resist aggression, to make the
enemy pay dearly for his assaults on the
forces of freedom, and to substitute
civilized conferences for savage clashes
in the settlement of international disput
Those who view the results with a
cynical eye have failed the test of
objectivity. Communism was checked in
Western Europe and in Greece and Turkey
even though the pessimists saw only a
steamroller that could not be stopped.
Formosa remains a bastion of freedom
5
in the Far East despite the threat and
bluster. South Korea remains a free and
independent republic.
Too often we tend to underrate our
achievements as a Nation when, in fact,
under many Presidents, we have been con-
sistently successful in the conduct of
our foreign affairs.
A good portion of that success springs
from our mobilization capacity -- our
ability to deliver the goods as only a
free system can.
That is precisely why we are here
today.
We want to assure a state of readiness
which would enable us to place all our
resources in the service of the Nation
should an emergency occur. A simple state-
ment of our aim is to make certain that
our resources -- human and material --
6
would be available for the right purposes
in the right amounts at the right time an
at the right locations.
The task, however, is not as simple
as that statement might imply. On the
contrary, it is horrendously complex. One
needs only to remember World War II and,
to a lesser degree, Korea, to appreciate
the difficulties of managing a free
economy in wartime. One needs only to
think about all the conflicting pressures
for materials and priorities -- both
civilian and military -- to grasp the
scope of the task. One needs only to reca
the proliferation of wartime control
agencies in Washington to recognize how
difficult economic mobilization can becom
Then, having conjured up this visio
from memories, one needs only to place it
in the context of today's world -- a vastly,
more complicated economy, enormous new
potential in weapons and delivery systems,
quantum-jump advances in technology -- and
you have the most compelling reasons to
have prepared in advance the methods and
mechanisms we hope shall never be required.
Thus, you have heard today something
of a blueprint called "The Office of
Jefense Resources." It is a concept, not
an agency. It would be activated only
upon the direction of the President.
Originally conceived as a blueprint for
dealing with the prospect of nuclear war,
ODR is now being recast to satisfy what-
ever requirements might be imposed upon
us in limited war.
The purpose of 03R is to provide a
central programming mechanism to help
determine national priorities and to
d'rect the use of our resources in a
g'__
8
widespread conflict. In other words, 00R
would be a clearing house and a criteria-
setter for the Federal establishment, whil
actual operations would still, for the mos
part, reside with the other agencies. This
OJR concept has advanced to the point wher
an organizational structure has been laid
out and orientation of personnel has begun
This new agency, when and if activated,
would serve as a nerve center for the
President in the entire mobilization field
I would make it clear that we look
upon 00R and all the economic mobilization
measures it embodies, as a last resort.
We hope we can avoid controls of any kind
for we recognize full well that a free
economy functions best with the fewest
possible restraints.
There is a tendency, when meetings
such as this are held, to draw the inference
PAGE 1
AJJRESS BY HONORABLE FARRIS BRYANT DIRECTOR OFFICE OF EMERGENCY FLANNING BEFORE THE REGION VIll CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL JEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE LOS ANGELES, CAL IFORNIA AFRIL 20, 1937
PAGE 2
that controls -particularly consumer controls such as wages and prices and rationing -are imminent. Nothing could -be farther from the truth. The fact is our economy over the last ear has teen stown to he amazingly esitient and robust. It in nenting the demanJs of Vietnam and maintaining our .civilian requirements at one and the same -me. Ihui.usly there ore rtrairs and tresses. Shortage of highly-skilled lahor las teen found in some ar 's. (That, I ight add, is a problem eve n n eacetie rosperity.) ccasionally, we run into a tight situation with important metals and Wbiinerals. But sometimes the problems themJ.seloes hocome inflated and out of perspent ice. -Our pronth rate now appears to be running at a steadier level. Labor shortages
PAGE 3
10 are not quite as severe as they were just a few months ago. This is not to say that our problems are solved. Neither can we foretell the future in Jietnam. For all that we do at home is against the background of the war in Vietnam and efforts of the President to secure an early, and honorable conclusion. The newspapers and airways are full today, and they have been for months past, of expressions of concern over the continuance of the war, of criticism with all the wisdom of 20/20 hindsight of the conduct of Presidents and Secretar ies of State under whose leadership the existing circumstances have developed, of advice from experts, real and fancied, official and nor-official, secular and divine, on
PAGE 4
it 'what course this Government should pursue. The ears of the Fresident are not ;%losed to any advice. Its value is not determined by its geneology. But there are certain elementary propositions that cannot be ignored: 1. We are committed to the support of the people of South Vietnam in their ,ffort to achieve a government of their ,own choosing through free elections. 2. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions," as called for by 7 nonaligned nations on Apr il 1, 1965. 3. We would welcome "unconditional discussionss," as called for by President Johnson on April 7, 1965. If the other side will not come to a conference, we are prepared to enage in discussions through an ntermediary. 4. We are prepared to order a
PAGE 5
12 Patesior of 11 ht cin., of North Vietnam the moment we are assured -privately or otherwise -that thi s tl will oe answered prowetly by a correspondine-yt apororiate de-eocalotion on the other side. About three aeeks aor it was dissesed that President Johnson has hacked his pblii appas' for a r-oferenoe with private irititivea to the leaders in Ho i. Last February --toe nmw year holiday in Viet No proothes, the 'r-r-iat offered to stop ombir North Viet Now and to halt a rotation of U. S troops already in the area as roor as infiltraior ino S outh Viet Nam bv land and sea had ceased. rhis, the president aserted, would provide ,Cnirnin for "serious and private discseions lefdin t-oI or .ar.y e.
PAGE 6
Today, we know Ho Chi Minh's savage nd unreasoning answer. He said No" in a iatr ibe of invective that offends in tone nd substance the most elemental courtesies diplomat 0 on caton. The episode shows how vrona and indequately informed the enpatient among us an he. Press dent Johnson has, in fact, aken every conceivable step to create onditions which would de-escalate and, Nonefully, end the war. Just last week the intransigence of jhe Hanoi Regeme was again demonstrated to 1he Notions of the world. This tine the ebuff was directed against the United eat ions, an organization at 122 neehers. secretary General Thant put forward a roposal for a 'general standstill truce" o be followed by preliminary peace talks and a reconvening of the Geneva conference
PAGE 7
on Indoahina. President Johnson promptly accepted the broad outlines of this proposal. From the foreign ministrv in Hanoi ame a nenativ response cohed in the sane vituoerative tone an1 insistinC "the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in ony ay." despite these past failure-, the Frnpident will continue to seek peace. We do not seek the unconditionsl surrender of North lietnam; what me do seek is to snoure the rirht of Sutth Vietnam to determine its own destiny -free of force. But having said all of this, we are not prepared for unilateral action whi-h will strengthen the other side ard eoase to ever greater danger the 1 i vos of our own ton in the field. We are rot prepared to create a
PAGE 8
sanctuary from chiie the other sido ran export its aggression with impunity an conduct the war in relative comfort. We are not prepared to repeat the mistakes of other generations who have let aggression go nohecked until the price that mst be pail is almost to. heavy to bear. le are not prepared to rur away from our commitments. If ever the nations of the world doubt our national will, we will indeed stand alone. If we cannot a coOUnted on, wha can' If we do not stand for freedom, eh will? I wish that I could provide a timetable for the end of this tragic co nflict. I wish that I could say tomorrow Hano i will wake up with the knowledge it is not aoine to push ,s out of i etrm. whenever that day arrives, and it ill,
PAGE 9
wa sha' know that strength and stamina eere the dea dinC factors. It takes one and a half warhers to support each soldier, sailor and marina in the Armed Forces. The sane ual ties which under ird Our soldiers in the field, are needed on the home front. ts Executive Reservists you mesh exemplify that spirit at home. You are testimon to the matr iois,' of Tmer ian irdictry, laor and ar icultureto the willi nness of our mast ouco"rSful men and "omen in every dis ml inn to lace their talents a the Ispoam af the Nation in times of eergency. I am delighted you are here. am hananed to .toed anen va tadav.
PAGE 10
It is a pleasure and a privilege to attend this Regional Conference of the National Defense Executive Reserve here in Los Angeles, California. A pleasure because I have the opportunity to meet a corps of trained men and women -nen and women with skills, and capabilities -who would staff the emergency functions of government in a crish. A pr ivilege because I realize full Well that the Reg ion 7 pool of 385 Reservists is among the most ded icated in the Nation. In very literal sense, you are the modern ,counterpart of the American minuteman. I can't think of a more appropriate place to hold this Conference than in Los Angeles. We are encouraged that so many of you could attend this conference -and we elcome your active participation in our
PAGE 11
2 workshop sessions. I do not intend to intrude upon the excellent briefings you heard today; certainly I would not wish to echo the thunder of my very able staff, who this afternoon examined in depth the various elements of defense mohilization which make up OEP's program. But I can say this. Ten years ago the National defense Executive Reserve wan little more than a dream -a concept spelled out in a 1955 amendment to the Jefense Production Act. Its first contingent of top executives totaled fifty people. Today nearly 3,900 Executive Reservists serve twelve government departments and bureaus. That is a remarkable record. It In and certainly it should be -a source of pride to those who serve in this importan capacity. Your willingness to accept this
PAGE 12
critical assignment from your government is another example of a trait which is historically characteristic of Americans-a personal identification with the security and welfare of our country. Amer ica has been cast in a role of leadership perhaps in spite of itself. We can imagine no result more to he desired than to be insulated from the claims of the world and the demands upon our leadership. But that is not to be. We stand for freedom, and on that stand we are being put to the test ance again in lietna. It is mat the first time we have heen asked to do so, nor will it be the last. There were similar tests for freedom in post-war Europe. There were tents in the F recsa traihs, in Lehann, in Greecs and Turkey, in cores and in Cuba.
PAGE 13
4 Each time we took risks, sometimes made sacrifices. Each time our will and courage were not found wanting. Nobody likes what we are compelled to do in Vietnam. We much prefer the conference table to conflict. In one sense, the entire post-World War II period is a history of our determi nation to resist aggression, to make the enemy pay dearly for his assaults on the forces of freedom, and to substitute civilized conferences for savage clashes in the settlement of international dispute Those who view the results with a cynical eye have failed the test of objectivity. Common ism was checked in Western Europe and in Greece and Turkey even though the pessimists saw only a steamroller that could not be stopped. Formosa remains a bastion of freedom
PAGE 14
in the Far East despite the threat and tiuster. South Korea remains a free and independent republic. Too ofter we tend to underrate our achievements as a Nation when, in fact, under many Presidents, we have been conaintently suouessful in the nanduct of our foreign atfaira. A poad partien at that su.eon apr nrs from our mobilization capacity -our ahitity to deliver the poods as only a free system can. That is precisely why we are here today. We want to annu.re u cte of readineon which would enable an to plou all our resources in the service of the Nation should an emergency occur.Animple statesent of our ain is to make certain that our resources -human and material --
PAGE 15
would be available for the right purposes in the right amounts at the right t ime an at the right locations. The task, however, is not as siple as that statement might imply. On the contrary, it is horrendously complex. One needs only to remember World War I and, to a lesser degree, Korea, to appreciate the difficulties of managing a free economy in wartime. One needs only to think about all the conflicting pressures for materials and priorities -both civilian and military -to grasp the scope of the task. One needs only to re the proliferation of wartime control agencies in Washington to recognize how difficult economic mobilization can become Then, having conjured up this vision from memories, one needs only to place it in the context of today's world -a vastly
PAGE 16
more complicated economy, enormous new potential in weapons and delivery systems, quantum-Jump advances in technology -and you have the most compelling reasons to have prepared in advance the methods and mechanisms we hope shall never be required. Thus, you have heard today something of a blueprint called "The Office of Jefense Resources." It is a concept, not ,-an agency. It would be activated only ,upon the direction of the President. Originally conceived as a bluepr int for -dealing with the prospect of nuclear war, JR is now being recast to satisfy what'-ever requirements might be imposed upon us in limited war. The prose of OR is to provide a central programming mechanism to help determine national priorities and to direct the use of our resc urcs in a
PAGE 17
widespread conflict. In other words, OJR would be a clearing house and a criteriasetter for the Federal establishment, while, actual operations would still, for the most part, reside with the other agencies. This lJR concept has advanced to the point wher an organizational structure has been laid out and orientation of personnel has tegun, This new agency, when and if activated, would serve as a nerve center for the President in the entire mobilization field 1 I would make it clear that we look upon liR and all the economic mobilization measures it embodies, as a last resort. We hope we can avoid controls of any kind for we recogn ize full well that a free economy functions best with the fewest possible restraints. There is a tendency, when meetings such as this are held, to draw the inference
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