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STATEMENT BY
HONORABLE FARRIS BRYANT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION
June 16, 1967
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I welcome this opportunity to discuss our mobilization plans and
measures with you. We have made significant progress in our
mobilisation readiness in the past year. The Vietnam situation. and
the recent developments in the Middle East, have caused us to critically
review many of our policies and programs. I think that you will agree
that our state of preparedness has improved considerably and that the
goals and objectives presented in our last annual report to you have
been accomplished.
Gentlemen. we live in a troubled world that shows little signs
of quieting down. The re is no reason to believe that the next twenty
years will be less challenging than the last. The outlook for the most
powerful economic and military power in the history of the world is
for more of the same. The international involvements that are inevitable
for a nation so powerful as ours, in a world contended for by two
diametrically opposed philosophies. create continuing challenges.
Executive Order 11051 prescribes the responsibility of the Office
of Emergency Planning for providing a central point of leadership and
coordination of Government emergency preparedness activities in the
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for this stockpile objective became apparent when. during the year or
so prior to its establishment. large demands for coinage. for industrial
requirements and for speculative hoarding drew Treasury's supply of
silver to a new low point.
The United States is able to meet less than half of its industrial
requirements for silver from domestic mine production and secondary
sources of supply. Foreign trade balances have provided a large part
of the balance of U. S. needs and the remainder of U. S. supply has come from
the U. 5. Treasury. In 1964, industry acquisitions of silver from the
Treasury rose to a new peak of 146, 000, 000 ounces.
Because of the growing industrial demands which exceeded
industrial supply. it was obvious that if the stockpile objective for silver
was to be met it would have to be from the Treasury inventory.
Discussions were held with Treasury to deveIOp means for meeting the
stockpile objective.
It was made clear that in order to prevent the melting of silver
coins the Treasury was compelled to sell silver. not required as
backing for silver certificates, at $1. 293 per fine troy ounce. This is
the price at which the silver content of the silver dollar is equal to one
dollar. In half dollars, quarters and dimes, the equated price is $1. 38.
II coins were withdrawn from circulation and melted. the effect on
commerce would be disastrous. (On May 18. 1967. the Treasury
Department issued regulations prohibiting the melting, treatment or
export of silver coins. )
In the meantime. the Treasury embarked on a program to reduce
the silver content of coinage in the United States. Congressional .
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authoritv was sought and obtained to produce new silverless dimes and
quarters made of copper and nickel, and half dollars with a silver
content of 40 percent as contrasted with the previous 90 percent silver
content. It is estimated that by the end of 1967 enough of these new coins
will be in circulation to meet the needs of trade and industrv.
Because of the need to protect the circulating silver currency. the
Treasurv was unable to transfer silver to the stockpile, even though it
understood and appreciated the need for the stockpile.
In March 1967. the Secretary of the Treasury proposed Congressicmal
action to permit the Treasurv to write of! an amount of silver to offset
silver certificates which. it was estimated. will never be presented for
redemption. Your Committee approved legislation which permits this
write ~off and allows one vear for the redemption of silver certificates
with silver bullion. Thereafter. the silver certificates would no longer
be redeemable in silver.
Your Committee amended the proposed bills to require the
Secretary of the Treasury to hold as a reserve for purposes of the common
defense 165, 000, 000 ounces of silver to be transferred. at the expiration
of one vear, to the stockpile established under the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stock Piling Act. The bill has been approved by the House and
the Senate and is presently awaiting the signamre of the President.
Procurement and Upgrading
Now turning to several matters relating to stockpile administration.
during fiscal vear 1967 onlv two materials are on the eligibilitv list fer
procurement bv expenditures of cash-~jewel bearings and copper. No
copper is expected to be purchased.
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Four other materials--oxygen free high- conductivity capper,
morphine sulphate. crystalline tungsten carbide and hydrOgen-reduced
tungsten metal powder--are to be acquired by upgrading basic materials
in the stockpile.
Five commodities are currently on the barter list for acquisi-
tion in exchange for surplus agricultural commodities. These include
substantial quantities of low iron chrysotile asbestos. beryllium metal
billets. palladium, rutile and selenium.
'Revolving Fund
The cash-plus-borrowing-authority position of the DPA pragram
improved to over $200 million by December 31. 1966. principally
because of sales from the inventory. The balance may increase to over
$275 million by June 30. 1967. Most of diese funds will be needed in
future years to meet the interest payments on outstanding borrowing
from the Treasury, which are currently in excess of $2 billion.
Disposal Program
The concluding stockpile matter which I wish to bring to your
attention is that of disposal. During the past 18 months the Government
. has been successful in moving substantial quantities of surplus materials
from Government inventories into the hands of producers, processors,
and consumers. The conditions under which these disposals have been
made include: (1) avoidance of serious disruption of the usual markets
of producers, processors. and consumers; (Z) avoidance of adverse
effects on the international interests of the United States; (3) due regard
for the protection of the United States against avoidable loss; (4)
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avoidance of adverse effects upon domestic employment and labor
disputes; and (5) consultations as appropriate with the industries
concerned. The Administrator of General Services is responsible for
conducting negotiations for the sale .of all surplus materials.
Industry has played a major part and has cooperated closely
with Government in working out the many problems implicit in
large-scale disposal.
While much has been said about the existence of large
Government surpluses. some of these excesses have truly been a "life-
line" to industry this past year and a half. The increasing demands
for many materials. stimulated by the Vietnam buildup and rapidly
expanding economy, have caused critical shortages which could only
be supplied from Government inventories. As increased consumption
continued to exceed the productive capacity of many suppliers, the
Administration took necessary steps to intensify disposal programming
and increase the rate of sales of various materials---oftentimes at the
request of producers and consumers-An order to sustain military and
other essential production and relieve acute hardship. As a result,
arrangements were made for the sale of over 50 surplus commodities
from Government inventories during the last fiscal year. In fiscal year
1966 sales commitments exceeded $1 billion. The Congress played an
important role in making it possible to provide many scarce materials
to industry. The 89th Congress topped all previous records by
enacting a total of 38 measures approving the release of 46 materials
no longer needed in the stockpile.
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There has been a general decline in disposal sales during the
past few months. This has been due in part to the improvement in the
supply-demand situation of certain materials. At the present time
there are seven legislative bills authorising disposal which are awaiting
Congressional action.
During the 11 months of fiscal year 1967 ending May 31, sales
commitments have totaled about $455 million.
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CONTINGENCY PLANqu
I should now like to move from the actions demanded of us by the
world situation as it exists today and review three activities concerned
with possible future contingencies. In no case are we satisfied with
the current statue of these efforts. 0n the other hand. we do feel that
we are headed in the right direction and have made substantial progress
toward achieving a ponition of readiness.
Economic Imp_a_ct Studies
During this fiscal year. we have initiated a series of studies designed
to measure the impact on the economy of various levels of defense ex-
penditures. An ope rational mathematical model has been developed which
permits estimation of the effect on various sectors of the economy of
hypothesized levels of defense expenditures.
Work has been completed on the calculation of the economic effects
of defense expenditures at a level of 17 1/2 percent of the Gross National
Product. The results reect the multiplier effect of this level of consumer
buying power and capital investment. The results were first expressed
under an assumption of no governmental restraints through economic
controls and secondly to show how the economy might be kept in bounds
with the application of various types of controls. A comparison of these
results suggested a number of alternative courses of actions the Govern-
ment might take in assuring that defense needs are met in a greatly
expanded mobilization situation.
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The group is now making other analyses designed to pinpoint such
matters as (l) at what level and time will monetary and fiscal policy
be insufficient to restrain economic excesses such as panic buying and
inationary pressures; (2) what mix of direct and indirect controls would
best suffice to meet national goals should they be required by a major
defense adjustment in the economy; and (3) at which levels of defense
expenditures is the economy sensitive to the effects of military buying
in terms of the necessity for control measures.
From such studies, problems involving production, distribution.
consumption and other economic conditions under various contingencies
can be identified. Once these problems have been clearly set forth.
decisions can be made with respect to the best combination of direct and
indirect economic stabilization measures that can be developed to meet
a given situation.
Resources Management
Having established a basis for diagnosing the ills of an overloaded
economy resulting from a larger scale military involvement. I should
like to turn my attention to our planned response through resource manage-
ment. This requires the development of policies. an administrative
organization. and procedures required for the coordinated application
by Federal agencies of priorities, allocations and other resource control
and distribution systems in time of emergency.
l7
Proceeding in accordance with these responsibilities. OEP developed
the concept of a system and organizational structure for the management
of resources in an emergency in order to insure that. in this event, re-
sources would be used with maximum effectiveness in the national interest.
This concept, providing for the establishment of an Offic.e of Defense
Resources in an emergency, was approved by the Emergency Planning
Committee, which consists of the Deputy Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. and the
Director of 02? as Chairman, and was submitted to the President for
approval. In appmving the ODR concept the President directed the
Director to proceed with ". . .the development of the measures necessary
to bring this, and any related programs, into an early state of standby
readiness."
In carrying out the President's instructions, principal emphasis
was placed initially on implementing the concept of an Office of Defense
Resources in terms of a nuclear attack emergency. However, about the
time of the beginning of the military build-up in Vietnam in August. 1965,
the then Director of CE? Governor Ellington directed that nuclear
war planning be put on a "back burner" and that primary emphasis be
placed on deveIOping an ODR plan for limited war.
The Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited War which is available
__.___________________
to this Committee consists of a general section which states the overt-
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all procedures and policies to be followed in a full mobilizatiOn short
of nuclear war, deve10ps the necessary organizational structure (an
Office of Defense Resources), and states the relationships between this
Office and the delegate agencies. The actions which the Director.
ODR. would take are specified in an Annex A, and the actions which
the delegate agencies would take are listed in an Annex B.
The basic problem in centrally managing resources. of course,
is how to meet requirements when the needs for some resources
greatly exceed the available supplies of those resources. It is the
job of the central resource manager in such circumstances to determine
what is feasible and which programs will go ahead and which will be
cut back. Accordingly, the ODR Limited War Plan provides for the
establishment by the President of national goals. including economic
goals. with the assistance of those to whom he would normally look
for advice in such matters principally the National Security Council -
and provides for the development of the specific resource programs
necessary for the attainment of those goals. The Plan also establishes
system for doing those things which would need to be done in centrally
managing resources e. g. data collection and analysis, program
development and implementation. adjudication. etc.
It might be noted that the Defense Production Act of 1950 does
not provide authority for a full mobilization of the economy. including
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emergency contracting and requisitioning authorities, wage and price
controls, rationing and other control measures necessary for full
mobilization effort.
To date these authorities have not been needed and have not
been requested of the Congress. We do have ready for submission
to the Congress under the Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited
War, when and if needed, a draft Defense Resources Act. which is
an omnibus bill including all the authorities for a full mobilization of
resources. The Congress, of course, will make the decision as to
which authorities, if any. shall be established.
This work reflects the view that controls should always be used
on a selective basis and only to the extent necessary to meet the needs
of a particular situation. The Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited
War would permit the establishment of controls on just such a
selective basis and emphasizes that this is the way things would
probably happen. However, it does provide, as I mentioned earlier,
all of the powe rs and authorities in the draft Defense Resources Act
which would be required, subject to the authorization of Congress, to
meet a full-scale mobilization effort. including the establishment of
ODR.
The situation which would require the establishment of the whole
gamut of controls and of ODR cannot be forecast with exactitude.
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Executive Office of the President. We have endeavored to discharge this
responsibility by develoPing plans for United States reaponses in non-
military defense action to meet a series of potential. if hypothetical,
threats to our national security.
I intend to highlight those of our programs directed to this end.
When pertinent. I shall describe those of our activities which required
actions on the part of the Federal Government because a contingency
became a reality. For the remainder, I shall provide you with a status
report on our present state of readiness and our plans for future
development.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
I should like to lead off with a brief reference to our role in the
Middle East crisis.
As this Committee well knows, problems in the Middle East can
quickly lead to critical worldwide petroleum and transportation problems.
Moreover, with the U. S. controlling 54% and the U. K. 30% of this oil,
subject to continuing threats of nationalization, severe adverse effects on
our balance of payments by loss of our foreign capital investment constitute
additional concerns. The primary responsibility for develOping a Plan
of Action to deal with these oil- related problems rests with the
Department of the Interior.
To meet such an emergency we have a Voluntary Agreement Relating
to Foreign Petroleum Supply authorized under Section 708 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, as Amended. This agreement allows the
Government to form a committee of persons and companies engaged in
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However, it would appear to be that point in time at which military
requirements have become so great that they would impose such a severe
strain on the maintenance of a strong and viable civilian economy as to
jeopardize the war effort.
I believe that under present conditions. the plans and authority
now in effect are satisfactory for meeting our defense needs. If and
when the situation calls for a more extensive mobilisation program
we are ready to react to as sure that the national security interests of
the country are met.
Economic Stabilization
During peacetime conditions, CE? is the only Government agency
charged with the responsibility for planning for the application of
direct economic stabilization controls in the event that a war mobilization
should make them necessary. On the other hand, such measures must
be complemented by the development of indirect stabilization actions,
the responsibility for which is lodged in other Executive departments and
agencies such as Treasury. the Federal Reserve Board and so on.
Several separate legislative approaches have been developed with
the objective of providing maximum flexibility to meet various conditions
and levels of direct economic control requirements. Resolution of
several issues and approval by major Government agencies is needed
before the legislative documents meet the desired state of readiness.
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OEP is now developing a number of basic orders and regulations
that would be required to implement varying legislative authorities in
the area of "direct" controls. Similarly, we are working with major
Federal financial agencies in the development of emergency programs
in tax. monetary and credit fields. We are also involved with the
Departments of Labor and Commerce with respect to manpower and
production programs in their relationship to economic stabilization
programs.
OEP has a nucleus of Executive Reservists assigned to the
economic stabilization activity who. in most instances at the national
level, are also utilized as Consultants. They provide expertise not
readily available from Government sources and are involved in the
development of specialized industry orders in "boilerplate" form.
They have also agreed to serve in the event of an actual emergency.
Organizational and staffing concepts, as well as functional state-
ments, have been drafted for the Economic StabilisatiOn Agency and
its constituent agencies for Price, Rent. Wage and Salary. and Can-
sumer Rationing. The Civil Service Commission is supporting the
development of prototype specifications. including qualification standards
for classes and levels of positions considered to be .key to the staffing
of Emergency Stabilization Agencies.
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NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCE ANALYSES
As I indicated earlier one of our basic responsibilities is the
management of resources required for different degrees of mobilization.
In order to carry out this mission, certain studies or analyses must be
performed followed by the appropriate action. I will briey describe
several of these projects.
Herbicides
For example -- concerning herbicides -- we are working closely
with the Departments of Commerce and Defense and with other agencies
to identify those materials, products, or components that might require
governmental action to insure that requirements for Vietnam are met.
Early in 1966 it was found that the Department of Defense was planning
a substantial increase in the defoliation program in Vietnam. To carry
this out would require that large amounts of herbicides be channelled
to meet military orders.
After a review of the situation with representatives of the Depart
ments of Commerce, Agriculture and Defense. I directed the Department
of Commerce, utilizing the authority contained in the Defense Production
Act, to set aside 100% of the production of the herbicide Z, 4, 5T for
military use and to insure that defense priority rated orders for the
herbicide 2, 4-D we re being met. I also directed the imposition of an
export licensing system for these materials.
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The Department of Defense is currently engaged in setting up a
defense sponsored production expansion program which will increase
herbicide capacity in mid-1968 to a level to meet military and essential
civilian needs.
We are continuing to monitor the situation.
Machine Tools
The expansion in military procurement programs coupled with
the high investment rates of business in 1965 and 1966 placed a heavy
load on the machine tool industry. The value of new orders for metal
cutting tools increased from slightly under 300 million dollars in 1958
to about l. 5 billion dollars in 1966. In order to resolve problems re
lated to meeting this tremendous increase in orders. we consulted
frequently in 1966 with representatives of BDSA. the Departments of
Commerce and Labor and the machine tool industry. Training programs
initiated by the industry in cooperation with the Department of Labor
have materially assisted in raising deliveries of metal cutting tools
from a level of about 400 million in 1958 and 1959 to 1.1 billion in 1966.
BDSA, through use of the priorities and allocations authority in the
Defense Production Act, has been able to insure that defense contractors
have obtained the new machine tools they require.
We also established procedures in 1966 whereby production
equipment contained in the National Industrial Equipment Reserve can
be made available for use by defense contractors or by companies
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delivering a substantial portion of their output to priority rated
orders.
ASPHALT
As you know, the Director of OEP has the respOnsibility under
Presidential Proclamation 3279 of March 10, 1959 for maintaining
national security surveillance of imports of petroleum and its primary
derivatives. Consistent with other sectors of our vigorous economy,
the highway construction industry has increased its consumption of
asphalt. Since last year the domestic sources of supply have been
reduced. Because of possible threats of asphalt shortages in several
areas of the country, the Secretary of the Interior. in order to assure
ample supplies of finished asphalt and to protect domestic asphalt
refineries from temporary economic hardship and market dislocations.
asked the Director on April ll, 1967 to initiate an investigation to
determine the natiOnal security implications of relaxing import
restrictions on the asphaltic components of imported oils.
This investigation, initiated on April 1?. follows a review which
led to the conclusion that national security would not be impaired by
a liberalization of the controls on the importation of finished asphalt.
As a result of this conclusion. the President, on April 13. 1967,
amended Proclamation 3279 to give the Secretary of the Interior dis-
cretionary authority to place asphalt product imports into the United
States and Puerto Rico under the general form of control which applies
25
to imports of residual fuel oil into the East Coast States. Under this
authority. the level of other licensed product imports is unaffected.
The current investigation includes asphalt imports as well as
asphalt produced from imported crude and unfinished oils.
The period for initial submissions from the public is completed.
and extensive mate rial has been received from States and private
industry. A thorough review of the material will be made following
the present 30-day rebuttal period.
Rutile and Titanium
In January of this year we announced an expansion goal for the
domestic production of rutile from 5. 000 tons to 75, 000 tons annually.
Under this action, the Department of the Interior was requested to
encourage the exploration. development and mining of stockpile grade
rutile ores and concentrates and to recommend programs {or financing
under the Defense Production Act borrowing authority. The General
Services Administration was also authorised to develop a DPA domestic
purchase program for stockpile grade rutile ores and concentrates.
This expansion program was established to help overcome the
stockpile deficit created in November 1966, when, based on new
supply-requirements studies, it was determined that the rutile objective
should be increased to 200, 000 short tons from its previous level of
51, 000 tons.
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Rutile is the principal ore used to make titanium, the light weight.
high tensil metal used increasingly in jet aircraft. Rutile is also used
in the production of other essential materials such as fiber glass, welding
rods and flux, enamels, for iron-ware, ferroalloys and paint pigments.
To meet the demand in 1966, the U. S. imported 170. 000 tons of rutile,
99% of which came from Australia, 8. 000 miles away.
On June 13. 1967, we further authorized the Department of the
Interior. at the recommendation of the Secretary. to undertake a compre-
hensive research program covering domestic titanium-bearing ores.
This research program will be the initial step in the rutile expansion
program and is aimed at technological and economic problems involved
in the commercial use of rutile and other titanium bearing ores available
in this country. The overall expansion program is estimated to cost
$525. 000 and will be financed under the DPA borrowing authority.
Manpower
The objective of the manpower program is to develop the skills
required for an emergency, maintain a capability for mobilizing and
utilizing available manpower to meet military and essential civilian
requirements in an emergency, and to maximize economic recovery.
To maintain a balance between civilian and military requirements
during any major mobilization effort, we work closely with the Depart-
ment of Labor, the Department of Defense, the Selective Service
System and other Federal departments and agencies to obtain information
27
for an assessment of the effects of the military or civilian buildup so
that proper steps are taken to preserve essential skills and to prevent
anticipated shortages.
OEP coordinates Federal Government efforts in the field of
scientific and technical manpower in view of the vital relation of this
resource to any emergency. We also maintain continuous liaison with
non-government organizations to assess the impact of specialised
personnel development upon manpower capabilities for emergency pur-
poses.
OEP provides continuing guidance, assistance, and coordination
to the Department of Labor and other agencies of the Federal Govern~
ment in developing their emergency manpower or manpower-related
programs. Effort is also made to assure that manpower is also
emphasized as an element of the OE? comprehensive program.
Under OEP Defense Manpower Policy No. 4, the placement of
Government contracts and facilities in areas of substantial and persistent
unemployment is encouraged; this policy is considered important in
the maintaining of mobilization skills which would be lost through pro-
longed idleness.
Under OEP Defense Manpower Policy No. 8. the effective
utilization of scientific and technical manpower on the part of employe rs,
educational institutions and other pertinent groups. is facilitated.
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ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
National Defense Executive Reserve
The National Defense Executive Reserve was established by the
Presidentvin 1956 under authority of a 1955 amendment to the Defense
Production Act.
The Executive Reserve is composed of executives selected from
various segments of the civilian economy and government and trained
for service in key positions in the Federal Government during periods
of emergency. There are more than 3,900 Reservists enrolled in 24
units in the ten departments and agencies participating in the program.
Just yesterday, I participated with Secretary Trowbridge in the
inauguration of a new unit in the Bureau of International Commerce of
the Department of Commerce.
The membership of the Executive Reserve represents a cross-
section of national executive talent with members selected from
industry, government, labor and professional associations. educational
institutions and other segments of the economy from every State of the
Union.
Each unit of the Executive Reserve conducts training programs
through which the members of the unit are kept abreast of developments
in their assigned area. 013? sponsors periodic regional and national
training conferences at which all units of the Executive Reserve are
brought together to familiarize the Reservists with current overall
preparedness of the Nation and to complement the specialized training
conducted by the departments and agencies. In the last year, we have
29
held seven such regional conferences and are now preparing for the fifth
national conference which will be held here in Washington next October.
Executive Order Assiwents
In addition to the Office of Emergency Planning. 33 Federal
departments and agencies have emergency assignments by Executive
orders or statutes. 08? keeps these assignments up to date to reect
changes in Government organisation or changes in responsibilities.
At the present time. we are working with various Federal departments
and agencies to develop Executive order changes necessitated by such
major realignments as the creation of the Department of Transportation.
This affects assignments of other agencies such as the Department of
Comme rce.
OEP coordinates and provides guidance to the departments and
agencies in carrying out their assignments through:
1. The issuance of planning assumptions to obtain a uniformity
of assessment oithe threat.
2. The issuance of objectiVes and priorities.
3. The use of coordinating mechanisms such as the national
Interagency Emergency Planning Committee, with member-
ship from all agencies, and the Regional Preparedness
Committees, which are counterparts.
4. A Federal agency reporting system requiring annual reports.
5. A system of Federal agency reviews including field reviews.
One perennial problem which has plagued this Federal agency
program concerns the matter of nancing. The activities of the
3
foreign petroleum operations to work together in taking actions to prevent.
eliminate or alleviate any critical petroleum shortages in the Free World.
This can be used where such shortages threaten to or do adversely affect
our national security interests. To enable these individuals and companies
to work together in this manner. immunity from the anti-trust laws and the
Federal Trade Commission Act is provided. Such immunity is extended
only with respect to actions taken in accordance with a Plan of Action
which must be approved by the Director of GE? and by the Justice
Department. and accepted by participating individuals and companies.
Prior to the actual Israeli/ Arab conict, the Petroleum Security
Subcommittee (PSC) of the Foreign Petroleum supply Committee (FPSC)
had been studying alternative sources of petroleum to meet military needs
in the event normal sources might be denied. My office participated with
this Subcommittee. State. Interior and DOD in evaluating alternative
sources of supply which might be made available if needed.
When the gravity of the situation was realized. I directed that all
necessary plans be deveIOped to assure that essential petroleum needs of
the Free World were met. Petroleum supply and distribution are world-
wide and interrelated. Shortages in one nation necessarily involve adjust-
ments even in remotely distant areas. Any substantial diminuation in free
world petroleum supplies directly and adversely affects our national
security interests. We must be ready to meet and take immediate actions
to correct supply imbalances caused by substantial denial of petroleum
anywhere in the world. The Voluntary Agreement is one such measure.
In addition, there is under consideration a partial activation of the
Department of Interior's Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration.
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31
The impact of the present military Operations in Vietnam upon the
activities of many of the Federal departments and agencies make such
a'prOposed reduction from the request of almost 25 percent disastrous.
Reorganization
On March 15. 1967. I issued an order prescribing a new internal
organization for the Office of Emergency Planning to increase the
effectiveness with which we carry out our prescribed responsibilities.
This reorganisation has as its theme better service by OEP in the field
of contingency planning and the application of moderate analytical
methods to the solution of our problems.
The reorganization, and the reprogramming which accompanied
it, was accomplished without an increase in personnel. Furthermore,
we did not have a substantial turnover in personnel but reviewed the
qualifications of all staff available within OEP to make even greater use
of their talents. We have also been seeking new talent, particularly in the
fields of economics and operations analysis.
The new organization will greatly increase our capabilities to serve
the following national security objectives:
1. To provide for greater service to the President and Executive
Branch in meeting the current military and economic
situation.
2. To improve substantially the analytical and planning capability
of OEP.
3. To reduce the emphasis on nuclear war preparedness and to
increase the emphasis on preparedness for contingencies
32
short of nuclear war, without loss of nuclear preparedness
obtained to date.
The heart of our new organization is the National Resource Analysis
Center (NRAC). With the assistance of a substantial computer capability
and our extensive data bank. we are tackling major problems in a
systematic manner using the latest scientific.methods.
Computer Support
To maintain adequate levels of computational support for data
processing requirements associated with all OEP programs, we are
currently in the process of expanding very substantially our own
electronic equipment capabilities. This expansion includes a large new
computer system and associated information retrieval and communicatiOn
arrangements which will provide much more versatile and rapid me ans
for supporting OEP and other emergency planning activities located in
downtown Washington and at other points.
We are continuing our efforts to ensure appropriate operational
readiness of our own camputational and resource evaluation capabilities
and the other facilities committed to support our emergency Operating
mission. We have continued to assist other departments and agencies
in develOping self-sufficient capabilities for performing situation analysis
and resource evaluation functions at their field command points under
circumstances where the results of central computer-based assessment
and analysis might not be immediately available.
Related to our enhanced computation capability is a program of
"softwear" development which is intended to exploit the potential of the
33
new equipment for our purposes. Much of this effort is focused on
improving our means for performing economic impact studies and analyses
such as I mentioned previously.
Before concluding this brief sketch of our computational status, let
me mention a new area of effort for us -- that of providing the computa-
tional and "systems" support required in the radio-frequency allocation
activities of the OEP Directorate of Telecommunications Management.
This is a current Operation closely linked with command-continuity
concerns in an emergency and it represents a type of capability in the area
of management information support that is increasingly being recognised
as vital for all aspects of executive direction.
Health Program
We have made a comprehensive review of the emergency medical
stockpile program. This program. which was begun in 1951. includes in
Packaged Disaster Hospitals and backup supplies a total Federal invest-
ment of about $200 million. A new approach was undertaken in relating the
Packaged misaster Hospitals to presently existing community hospitals in
order to improve the readiness for use of the emergency hospitals and to
facilitate turnover of perishable supplies. New criteria were deveIOped
and are being applied for the placement of the Packaged Disaster Hospitals.
Schedules have been deveIOped for the components to be included in the
revised Packaged Disaster Hospitals and in the backup inventory. The
procurement and maintenance of these Hospitals and backup inventory
are under the direct control of the Public Health Service, DREW. under
the provisions of Executive Order 10958. August 14. 1961.
4
We are also exploring the use of priorities and allocation procedures to
meet military demands as authorized by the Defense Production Act of
l950, as Amended.
Our evaluation of the situan'on led us to the conclusion that while
an immediate emergency did not exist. a potential emergency did.
Although the petroleum needs of the continental U. S. and our military
would not be seriously affected. there could be significant problems in
EurOpe. Japan. and many of the other smaller countries in the Pacific.
The effect of this situation would, of course, depend on the length,
duration, and areas of denial. For this reason, I advised the Secretary
of the Interior that an emergency in the supply and distribution of
petroleum did threaten to affect adversely the national security of the
United States. I suggested that a Plan of Action be developed, designed
to avoid such adverse effects on our national security. The Secretary of
State provided similar advice, and the Department of Defense concurred
in this viewpoint. The Secretary of the Interior made the necessary
finding of an emergency. These actions permitted the FPSC to be called
to develop the needed Plan of Action.
We are working closely with the FPSC, Interior. State, Defense.
Justice and others in the development of an effective response to the
petroleum problem, and have had informal discussions with representatives
of some of the other countries involved. The first draft of the Plan of
Action approved by the Working Subcommittee of the FPSC has been
completed. My office will continue to participate when this draft is
reviewed by the main Committee on June 20.
5
OEP is also assisting in interagency coordination and laying the
groundwork for such actions, if necessary. as: a waiver on the use of
foreign flag tankers for U. S. coastal movements; modication of the
U. 5. import program; and production from Elk Hills Naval Reserve.
WAR IN VIETNAM
The rising tempo of the war in Vietnam has resulted in a sub-
stantial increase in requirements for military equipment and supplies.
Coming at a time when the economy is Operating at a high level, this
has produced strains on certain segments of our economy.
In addition to the sheer magnitude of the increase in defense
expenditures, it should also be noted that the type of military operations
being conducted in Vietnam has importantly changed the composition of
the defense dollar.
The extraordinary rate of ammunition use in addition to the
expected destruction of military equipment and weapons has resulted
in a much larger share of the defense procurement dollar being spent
for basic material resources such as cepper, aluminum, nickel, certain
types of steel. and the like. As a consequence. the portion of the total
domestic supply of the materials required to meet defense needs has
risen sharply, reducing the portion remaining for nonmilitary use.
For example, c0pper demands have risen from 2 percent of U. 5.
production in the first quarter 1965 to over 10 percent at the end of
1966.
Aluminum has risen from 2. 5 percent to over ll percent.
6
Nickel alloys have increased from approximately 9 percent of
U. S. consumption in the first quarter 1965 to over 25 percent by the
middle of 1967.
Defense Materials System set-asides (for military use) for alloys
and stainless steel are currently established at 6 percent of total U. S.
output. By contrast Military requirements for the first quarter of
1965 were not substantial enough to require the establishment of a
set-aside.
I am glad to report to this Committee that thus far the prepared-
ness actions taken long ago and maintained in readiness have proved to
be extraordinarily effective in cushioning the shock of meeting the
war requirements on our material resources and price structure.
The Defense Materials System, as administered by the Business
and Defense Services Administration of the Department of Commerce,
has operated to channel the necessary production and construction
materials to defense contractors in time to meet their delivery schedules.
This has been accomplished with minimal effects on the civilian economy.
Additionally, we have authorized the release of 550, 000 short tons of
copper from the National Stockpile to augment the normal domestic
supply. Sixty percent of this amount has been assigned to defense-rated
orders; the remainder was assigned to hardship cases.
We have been, and are, maintaining a close surveillance on
military prOgrams, not only to anticipate potential bottlenecks. but also
to ascertain their overall impact and the possible need for additional
controls. We believe that current defense programs can be carried out
with the powers that the Congress has provided the President.
7
A comparison of the present situation with that which prevailed
during the Korean War is illuminating. The Defense Department is planning
for an active duty milith strength level of slightly less than 3. 5 million
in fiscal year 1968. This is approximately the level of 3. 7 million that
was reached during the Korean War. During the earlier period (1953),
Government purchases of goods and services took more than 15 percent
of the Gross National Product. Currently it takes only about 10 percent.
In the Korean War we had 332. 000 military personnel engaged in the
Korean Operations. We now have 462, 000 engaged in the Southeast
Asia Operations.
Although the sc0pe of operations is larger. the growth in the
Gross National Product of the United States since 1950 permits us to
support the Defense programs with considerably less strain.
STOCKPILE POLICY AND MANAGEMENT
Since your Committee is thoroughly familiar with the purpose and
make-up of the stockpile, I shall not spend your time on those subjects.
Instead I shall discuss the stockpile objectives, briefly touch on some
problems of individual materials and conclude my discussion of the
stockpile by describing administrative and procedural matters.
Oblectives
In order to assure that current requirements are reflected in the
national stockpile. we maintain close surveillance over the materials
that are stockpiled and initiate new supply requirements analyses when-
ever our reviews indicate that the status of a particular material has
substantially changed or will change in the future. We completed a
number of such special analyses in 1966. Based on these new studies.
revised conventional war stockpile objectives were established for
eight materials-~bismuth, magnesium. molybdenum, feathers and down,
platinum, rutile, titanium and vanadium.
We are currently engaged in one of our periodic analyses of the
supply requirements status in a conventional war emergency period
for all stockpiled materials. When these are completed we will
reevaluate our conventional war stockpile objectives.
At the end of last year we announced stockpile objectives for
nuclear war. That announcement represented the culmination of three
years of study and involved the cmperation of approximately 30 Federal
departments and agencies. The results disclosed that the stockpile
objectives for nuclear war, except for one material--0pium--were less
than those for conventional war. The stockpile objectives that we have
set for conventional war, therefore, are controlling, except in the case
of opium.
In carrying out these nuclear war analyses, we develOped new
techniques for determining the goals that would be set for the various
sectors of the economy and for computing the requirements for individual
materials. The Inter-Industry Study of the American economy,
completed by the Office of Business Economics. Department of Commerce,
in November of 1964 and new data on the use of materials were important
factors in our study.
The techniques and methodology deveIOped for this study are being
used in other studies of emergency period requirements. For example,
the Department of Transportation, with our assistance, is using them in
9
a study of transportation requirements that would have to be met in
an emergency period. We and BDSA are also using them in our supply--
requirements studies for conventional war.
Comer
In March I966 the President made a finding that new purchases
or commitments to purchase copper were essential to the national
security. We then initiated a program to deve10p new and additional
cOpper production in the United States.
The Administrator of GSA was directed to deve10p a program for
the expansion of domestic production capacity of capper. the expanded
capacity to be in addition to such increases as were already contemplated
or under way by domestic producers.
GSA invited proposals for such capper expansion. A total of 142
applications were received. 0! these. only six may be considered
active. One of these is presently under negotiation for the establishment
of price, guarantees, and other terms. This mine would produce 58. 000
tons per year for the first few years and production would rise to 68, 000
tons per year thereafter. It would also produce 5. 000 tons of molybdenum
and more than 450, 000 ounces of silver per year. Production would
start in two years after agreement on a contract. The other ve
applications are still open for consideration.
Silve r
On June 3, 1965. the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning
signed Stockpile Objective Action (80A) No. 279 thereby establishing a
stockpile objective for 165. 000, 000 fine troy ounces of silver. The need
PAGE 1
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMEGENLCY PLANNING BEFORE THE JOINT "MITTEE O DEFEN PRODUCT IT I... 16, 1967 IN welcomEYYAE ti potNiy toBEdi TS ou oiNiAtn pNlanSad moii.to rednsnTh. p-s y1ar. Th. ita itain n revfew many -F9 INAENT p m. I ink that y.. gr ha r ttof prprd -shsiprovd con..iderbly -n th111e Gete ew lv natob-e -Ird tha sh.wlttl ig-s .f quieig d.-n Th-r i h .. r-s 1. b--e -ha -h next tweny y-wib. 1... chaleging than 1h. 1.Th -1-oo -o the -1s p--wer ... -cnoi -n m-l-,r p.-e i. th 1.1-y of the -Ird i. diam.t.icaly opp-sd phil .s.ph-e, -.ea. -ontnuin chalene ETeIutivE OrdEr 11051 peibICE re-psibilt A -E Off-I f Em-rgny PI r igentr pNIT Tf drhi
PAGE 2
UL. 1. T ff ... 1 91, .. .. t i pi 1bj 4ti a m 111pp w n p urigdthpyeI 3r popro to~ip pdpp itsesabi Omet larg de and forAl cifae! o idsra pe pip m nt p and fppp r sp cul atip p p arding d T p p pp y Appce Popf pifpppPly Foreign tradpepbal pn p P PaPP ro pe pp iarg Part P Aindustrifppppiffply, i wa pPbviou thitifftheiftopip P PjectPi 4o il Ia -t --he twol aet e r mteT esuyivnoy Dic h-in were --ddt rauy odvlpmas o etn h
PAGE 3
quresmd f copr d n kead hl olr ihasle N i d h 1967 ...g op th ..6f on1 deSpd andd appcatd te geedfogth fdcPide. Pp-i -d pP~dplpdppip~ip ppMac p 967 thep pecrtap of the Treppp ry prgpNIIPd CIgrd' ora t h Te ur th. ri ff a -ampip f -p. Np wrte-off nd -.-ow ne yerfrte e mtono -vr etfcte wit 1lve b.llion. Th-atr h ivrcriiae old I~-oge YorCommIte -m -dd th Ipop-e bi-l torq. r h dfne165, 000, 000 ..n-e f sil-e t. be trnferd .. t t-epiat .f ne ea, t. the -tokple --abise -ne Strategi nd Criia Mtia Stoc Piig A-t. Tebill h.. I.-n -prvd b, h os n Prc em t and Upgrdig durig fi-cl ea 1967 -1,y tw aeil ae -h lgib-ii .,it o p crmetby -xedtrso ah-jew1 b-a-ng ad copper copper 1. -xece to b, prchasd.
PAGE 4
ophine -ph.oe, -y-lln tge bido and hydrogenedueOd -g1.n mtlpwd--r o. b. .q1rd by pgrdig b Feo bo o arec.urly oth brltb, Thr qu -ubtnil q0a0te of wron y2,tie.abet,, b.ryllimm biltpaldium, -1t.l nd se-ei-m The.a-po-boowing-gutority po-ition of -he DPA p-ogr m $000 mi00ion by Thce-ber 3-, 1966,. prinipally because ,ofaleofrm th inveoory. Teblnemyices ooe $275 -l-io by Ju3e 30, 1967. M a0t bbbho Oundo wilh bodd 00 frm heTrasry hih recurety inecs f $2 blin Th. .ng -tkpm w o. bg to y-or attention0i00tha of disposl. Duringobhe poobtb0,00obbth government,, boo been succeggsfuloin movig btantia quantitie 00srls aeil frO 00o00ovenetivob,y ito70he hands of producer, procsor, dcn e.The -i dith dip h.. t -.. I te oth d ttb., (3) dregard 0f0,r0 the0prbectio 00fb the Unid State again0t avoidable 00,,; (4)
PAGE 5
d~"g~fyy~A hfl d.--. Indsty as laeda mjo prt ndha cooplrate ls 1966 --td $1 bAy .p m ... GAvernment bur luhby Aom yof~l bhys pbcebeAdb tryy beny liy yyine" yyt .ty t hp y r. dhl. Ti re n by n 8or m-ny maeilsim ltdb h Ven mbidu n ail expanding ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .ecnmhv asdciia6sotgswihcudol be ..-pdie i.mG vr m n nvnois sicrae os mt
PAGE 6
14 ThehabI,geea eciei di-p-1a --l durig t_ past -e month.. T-i a been d-e 1n Part t-h improvmen x.th suppy-d-mad --uaio -fct".n -atriAt th, preset t-m there ar 1evn.gi-laiv b-ll a-ti-ig dispoa ...Ich area.iting cmimt h-v --ald -.1u $455 mlin
PAGE 7
CONTINGENCY PLAN-Nd -. I shold nt w 1-1e doe l-h ciosdmne o sb h
PAGE 8
i-9-i y .1-p, 12 h.is d I t. i d 3 a. w. le d e pt d nm 1 -t--h .e -.f mi. iy
PAGE 9
t. .I. ..d --dR Ip Pr --.g fn P d the npt bfgp-.Ie pnd rg it a pVr Ppue fr t g mnag9en pl r u -D p OZP-gyn d onrp i i v pirp wouldpp pppb ~ -b x -ffetiv -ep in the nbtpna ip Thscnet rvdn OD phe eptabishp ntofan fd ceof pns
PAGE 10
R-b.k. b-IdIyID0I,~DW ID d D 1-1 dd a-1 u.b1lo h .d pyphenceI ayor.izatin rCtu y,1 I--h Defens -1) a ..t-e .-1 -11 b n Offce ndthedeegae genie .-eatoswicd h ietr -1R wol. tkar p ifi in.. 1. Anne A -d1h ctos h .reatly e 1-ee t .e aalbe -.11e -d th .s reso d.c. -t -i.t1, 1ut back. Acodigy thd 1. Li -.te A.r P fa pr 950e d.r..
PAGE 11
mobilizationgefford T. b1~ Cd 1111 tCCllhb. --d e reiqu-td -f -Cbng-esC Wd. h.rehdy forCshmis t. th Congres --d -h R ..rcM-biiaion P"..o Lmie W.r, whi.an if neeed .draf D--1.s -.1-rc Ail, wh1hi reore.Th. Conge., of .....e, will maetedeiinast whc uhrteif -ny ihal b. eitblished. Thi. or -e.ect the --e -1a -Intrl. -h.. -,ay.bue W-r -11l perit th e.tbli-hmen afcnros j-s iucha ---civ b.-i -n .mph--ze that thi. m, t -hiytinswo probably happen. H-w-e, it d.-s proid., aI -eni ...d -1-ie, .11 -fh p--er ad auhorie in th dr-f 1hns ...uce Act -hc wId be requrd, -ubj-c t. the -uhrztino og-e, t -DR, gamofcnrl nf ODR .....ot b. forecast -ih xcid.
PAGE 12
I --nd f hhglighh th.e f r e d. Whn p-ri--t I -hl de rbe th... of --c-vte wihreurd ..ton onhe p-rt .ft1 Feea G-1 -1ren bececotnec miDDLE EACRISI I -hud -Ie f b Midd le l ast -1riidl.E-1.. Morever -1t -h U. 1. cotoln l n he U. K. -0 of thi -i, addition c ens The p-ir re pon-Ibi, -.dvl-paPa -1Ac .o -oda ih ths i-rltdprolem r-st -ihth toFrinPtoemSuply auho -zd ndretin708 f -h IefnPrdc IA 9, yA dd g t h GoermeA ofom cm ie of per I an opneseggdi
PAGE 13
-M~2 1. b. P 1i -byo ..ff 00.. --b -hprdz th war lill 1... g -rt.. Dobeliev th.0 .nd .ipr .n 01 otho pln d t ity ohn ooowhne fh ooare oati foy foop meetigfotdfenoppfneef, 22an hoold ..lbo th-o -2--y0 .02.h 22b 0 .h o .00 ho are ready0t0d by o dtoofp -furth 0he dtional0022uity0neret02, Ecn. i -Sta.biliza-tio.n ,, i -.w d --1 .g during -h ceim -odtos -Ey i. the-.1 y Govrn n .. ge-n. y 2hr0 ---h022 r 0nb0 -2 planig 0 th02 p220 i222 s. d m00 2h00 022e2ar. 1n-th. f202002 d-,h0d00 re2 mu. be -..plme d -lby .-. --.lpmn fidrettai ti. actons Several id .p ..ra.t -eisatv app -a-e have bee d-ed wi, tho 0bf20tive of poiding maximuomo f2exibilty t00 e aiuscniin boforeothoolgioltoo docume0200meet00h deoired otato of, rdo0000.
PAGE 14
thtwo1 be requrd tI -mp-m-n -myg kegislatv uhiisi ...1-y dppp gp.Typ Ci p C he --f d r m r kglw.th m n x nag Tad c -eit d in pgdwtCh D r r C ..Th g p -proucio Ir.ram -n1rrltonhpt cnmi tblzto deel Ir -fls --dz asCnulat .The proid e eri. -n-, re-d -Y av Aal r g-Gv -en ore adaeivovdi h
PAGE 15
T ATIT A TEGUIY U-ER A-ALY-E1 I S-l -f pi rme Yopwed by -th app-ri. a.TIoI. ISA bIfly ESibe For 5551 xAmp --mon rnig herUbicde i --.wl rig lEely itthDprmet f C-m.r.nd D.-..s nd w-th .1h-raece .id tfy 1h ris produ --omp ts ta mght rqu Early i1966 it -a foun.d bh-, th. Iep.r.mnt.o D-.-ns -a pl-ig .sntl i --esI i thd .iprgra i. i .Ta this .., -.ul reqir that -9.g am .u .of herbiideb. ch.-nl-e AfUer a eie f h Stato wUI gU~IU ith repesentative DISI Phe Depart ment -f Coe, Agr-.11-r ..d D-ns.I diretd teDprmn A .d 100% f -pl duti f the hrbdId 2., 5 T l -T .d I U Iha. d Ill p Ity hebicd. 2, 4-D eebigmt1 lodrce --e -9oito of
PAGE 16
hebcd aaiyi id1968 1. .1.-1l t. ..tmliayadesnta Th ,xaso nmlitary pBourmetprogam op d with I-e g 1965 d 1966 pl d .I .b.. 1. 5 b .1 d .at 1966. r r -.bl B1 .1-yBB -db~pi yS~~ 1r.1-ve -. bou 400 mi11-o .. 1958 .nd -99 1. 1. 1 bili.n in 1966, W t dp dr S 1966 .h by p di.. m a by de se onaSto by mpas
PAGE 17
Prs dental Proclamation 3679 1 Mrch 1, 1959 9-r m-i -gaiig derivativs, Gon .istnt wit sther scts 595ur5igo9us5159m, at Si last r ... d m f s apply hvbe reduce. B -c -1e -p g I r are5sof99 th county, the Secetary o 51t5er, --r -u -.se the 1ir t 5 n Apr i 11, 1967,967 -t -Y er .1atna sitysipl-caIs -p. xing. I. p -r d As -95ul of ths conclu ion, -9e -Pr-sidn, --April 1.997, 5mne rcaain3795t5 give he Secreary sf thesIntriordis.Ssats. and Puert5 Ris sndersthe gsneral Sssrm 59cnrlwhc ple
PAGE 18
25 Th urtinve2stga inld. -pha15 i-pss -ls -sp-al prduce frm imp.rtd crd n niihdo. h.P.-usils22. ds2s5 w -h.2 Is. Teperiod for iiia ubmssos 22om the publ scom1et indu--y A -hrogh ev w f the mtrawill be mad 1llwig 1h rsn 0-day reutlPerd. d i. prd t t rm t .75, 000 1... nu U.de 1-i -ct1., Ihe D-pr -en of the I-ro -a --qistd t. encourae the eploratio, development 55 a mining,5, 52555t222kplegrad unde th Deens Production 2Act 222rrowing2 uthsrity.The Genera2 Sevie Amni5a2 o was5,2., aso authors2ed t2 devep 52DA52 meti purha 22rora sfostockpdse grade rusile s,22and concentrate. Th5exa 5onp 5ra 5a sbLsdsto hlp 5522r22me th2 2t5kil defici 22reaed inN,emb225 2922, 5wh22, based 5522new 5upply-bsequiremets22 udie 2 -,l .wa detemi 5d5 r il5 5 b5.-tive shud einrasdto20,00 hrttnsfomip-vou leeD--,Ailtb--.
PAGE 19
-1.il i. -h principal -r -d t. m-k. tianum elt weght, T. m-.t thede a i. 1966, the U. S. -m -rtd 170, DD0 I.-ofrtie nJun13, 1967, w-urhe -uth--d .he Deateto he hesv e -ac rgram coeing dmestic lihanium-beaing oreTh-ssac pormwl be the inil ltep i. the r-texpan...n in his onty Th. overal haso rga s siae ocs $5.,000 -1 wl be fina.c.d.dr ThDPA orwn atoiy Th bje--v .f the pwr rga is t. develop thkills requred or a emegeny, mintan a apa...t ..... moiliig ut.iin ...lbl mapoe b--1-ltayadeseta cvla d-ui-mnt -na mrec1hn omxmz cooi eoey
PAGE 20
...r .....m.to heefcs ftemliayo cvla bidps O EP f. cor iae FA.. ovrmn ffrsi he ed scientific ~ P11. 4nd 11.nca mppwri ie ft vt l.ltn fhIs ....rc -9ayemrec.d Ialsm -.-i -dniuosliionwt -dn-g enm t I rII ain o sesteipcto pcaie personnel ~ ~ ~ p. deeomn -pnmnoercpbltisfr -e gnypr -1 1 -d. ---, -t Ii.ld
PAGE 21
ADMIsISTRA IAPTIONI N.,s na De.. nsspxeuts I5srT11a DZPeEctIve Rsrew etIiPhed y th PreSId tsIn. -.--r IItIor I tI tiI theDePI rag brd yt. Act .-b Ju-' Ye-terda, I patcpae ih S-cr.,r Tr.-rdg. n h inaugurati-n -fhre nti heBra fItratoa o mre th-gl D -partraent o Cm rc.1 T-he mI brsi ... the Excu hv --lv epeet aco --dio by naionh ee. ietln it e br eetdfo
PAGE 22
-1? -yd -dyyy 3d~~h-dpy~y In addtign o th Office gofb EmerbbgybbPyning, 33 Federaby ores3. taue.OP ep hs ayyyyignmentbylbg s y up to b~b d tetolrefb ct phage in yy G 3ermnt gaiato by ch anbg. Thy .re........ At P tepe ntimw ar wok gwthvrosFd,.ral deate ---d .g.ist eelpE euieodercag sncsiae ys r 4.o rAlinet -decet1 no h earmn fTanprain Thi -det -sin et f te gnissc a h eat eto Comm r.... 1-E.9 -oriae .nd prvdsgudnet tedprte n
PAGE 23
(PSI) IyhP~A Sopply C,,yp(PC) yheg petroley Dy op wod tO n k g io n A toop r t Thp canpy y Ioped wherey 0 ypcyh 0hrae thrjlaten toodo 0delyafc Feodra pTpadeo Commisson Act ily pro e. uhimmniy p exene whp opyty popyolpoobypohedirco OofoEopoad by thpJupoc Deparmnadcpeyp articipating indoo vidPoto o ando ompop pane.
PAGE 24
...00 ... 0 ..... 0 0.00000 O 001 000 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ...... .....00000~0 03 00000000 00000000 ~ .000. ..0 ....00 000000000000 ..00 .0... 00.0.
PAGE 25
p, p..po-d rdcinfrthe -eus of -lm 25 p -.1n di-asIo.. On Mach ,, 106, 1 suda re rsciiganwitra .rg ..t offi f Emeg y P.ig .i h m d t lti 6f ur p.bl m .OS -17, 71, 1y77776.... 76.. .T p d withp7t an increa, i r l.7 Frt 3. T. -d h ph7,
PAGE 26
--dO d dat-. ---e NR. ih the ,.-dtae ofh a -I su -dtalcmue cpb pr -e I'g r-euirmet -shie wit l led 1 E. pgr, s wear curnl ntepoeso xanigvr usatal u w eetnceqpmncpailii hsexanidn ncpds alagene coptrsse n soitdifrmto erea n o mncto aragmnswihwl rvd uhmr estl n ai men
PAGE 27
.-.k3 ntoo d hp o -I. i.1951, l Bf oo oncld$n3 ths3 rie, kt, ppoour computati ona ta, le -eno ...ew eof -pok ..pfo --t o .o ii t omp -Thi isa crret pertio clsey lnke wihPookmad-co,,~Ntinu 3oly Sohndkrnhoin bnoeoedgonlypad it rerset ao 00ype ocpbiy nter ..d o po P-r..raI 000 c00pi33 proamooooThios progra,ic waolbgn inooo 10, poldo --d o -k-bo f $ .,00i i Oi doA ne ap oah 1a u k r g Pakge Diate opias oprsnlyeisig o m niyhoptahi I-de P--mp9o8, -1-1 14des 196 us1fteemrec opia. ad
PAGE 28
195 f, as A ffende f. .. 0-Oooo p --.y of ff0 Tb our ffa0aio ofo thef stuto ofd ufoo topfhe houfon thwh ...&.. dt g-n did --xf i00 y did. Atdug th. perlu -ed --the .....ntl ..nd ou -ltr wU o ff b f sei lly -td t fo o td b OIgnif poblmfg io Eufop, J-pan, and .anof the -oo m.-1-ffounr11. if t .Pcif fi. Th ff.of ts t i d, f --,oo~ of or dpnd on th 1-gh, duon.oo, ..d ro f1of .--f i rfo nffo advsd f heSfo etary petrfleum did fhe nt af d eroy ofd--y a9 rt00 h U td 9te hf g .'h1t..Pan o1fA ion b de lopd de0f gned findin .f .n -megeny. Thes ..t"n p. rmi-ted the FPt. becale t. develp -h n.-dd Pl.. of AciptoemProb-e ..d 1.-e ha nom1. icsin wt ereettv -fsm f -h .1onrisivled h is drif .1th Plan .f Ac Yo app 1-e -y ... W 1r.1.cmmte ofp the i di-C ha 1be co pee, My, -.,.c w-i -otiu tpatcpt hn hsdat
PAGE 29
reSSgSSSSag takS for U .coaSta S m ov .ene modfiatonoft SyrodsrV5r~sh..p~1yh~gh~srs-d. h.. U.. mport pr ram snd p 5r t s r 1s E .k s -s r. Thess sing temo ysshewa in955 Vietna ha s re shd nsu
PAGE 30
U, 17766n77mpti7n 7 the 77irs q 7rtr1965 t 77 er 6167ren by67the m 676dd97e7167697979767.7 76tpt. B7y h-nt 77t M.-ita-y req 6re 7nt 7 .r7t767r6 qu1-t -77 7965677re7not 7ub,7an7ia7 7nogh7ore7ie77e77 t67769n1 t b.17 s-h ...
PAGE 31
fo natv uy .il -9ar strngt lee f 1-ghl les han 3. 1 -11-o in 7 A-1 ye196. T i. i7 approimatey77 h 7 evel7717 .7 m1 7 th7 w 7. reVc7.d d n hK.. D g r r rd ) G77ern 7n p .r....71 ...g..d. ardevic7777kmoe7tan177percent -feG 7N7i 7rdut.Cur l .... ..k.. .r .b. p In77777 rAn a7 mity peg dn STOCKPILE -1LIY AN MANGEEN SInc yorCo mteei .t-oghty -amiha -ih the pupe -i 7ak777p 777 h777777kp777,7I77777 p t I-t 7 7 7ha7i7usth777kieobetiebrel7t7h7n7 -rb'by individual 7materia 7 d 777 yi777, 77ockpi7777y7d.s77ib7g77dmini7trative17nd pr7cedur7l ma7ter77 ...t.. .77 7 I777r17 777717777777h77 7r777m. 7r77777177777 natinalstokpil, w mantai clse urvi llneh vrtemaei
PAGE 32
revise conent hna warst..l betve eeet ih d d.,. r rely e-g.gd r i k .f 1 he s-Ply ---reure et -tatu -n-cnetonlwreege y perid .-evl-at Tr ..nen...a w. Itcpl betvs f tdy .d i -d h patif app -ia ly 30 F ederal objecti-Ps orncerw ,ex ptfr ne at ia--opiu ---r les t an hoefor onei al wa.The stockpale objives tahat wehav get I., -.ndh brnr i, cp -inha a ofdy fp ......... Taa aaa-aa daaaapadfaa-aha...ad-aaa-. a g aDIni c arrigou h ee nucearawar a aly ifawa dvea pd e .ec.r ---g --,d -cnm 1-d -or -optn thbeureet -idvda daer.. h I-d -nd ty .Stuy ofte -rca coo y comPleedbyth fic B ins Ecnmc.Dp etof Co mece
PAGE 33
b, p-95, hs-sos I em g p.r. o pId oR r -d tI .n u ly..pp Copper sos.O hs l~' oyfsss pr fommmnsfpuc s opoowreooonti6.fste atona800 oeuiy.W hsnmtae a~ol pr~s~offfogrmt fdvlp e ndadonalo T s f Admnitrto of O1,s 0t oo p g mor sos sA invikp ed Oosas for ouc (9 ppe) ex0 in Atta .4 ppiain wrercive. --l .h1e .nly .i1nyb cniee --tde Onep 0f1,-peetyude eoitinfrteesalsmn
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