Citation
Leeward Islands gazette

Material Information

Title:
Leeward Islands gazette
Creator:
Leeward Islands (West Indies)
Place of Publication:
[Antigua
Publisher:
Gov. Printing Office]
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Politics and government -- Leeward Islands (West Indies) ( lcsh )
Law
Leeward Islands (Federation)
Montserrat
Genre:
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )
Official gazettes ( fast )
Gazettes ( fast )
newspaper ( marcgt )

Notes

Dates or Sequential Designation:
1- , 1872-
General Note:
Two pages per frame.
General Note:
Supplements, issued with some numbers, contain departmental reports, Meteorological registers, ordinances, statutory rules and orders, etc., of Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands.
General Note:
Weekly
General Note:
Published by Authority, <27th March, 1941>-28th June, 1956.
General Note:
Open access via Digital Library of the Caribbean.
General Note:
Some issues called "extraordinary."
General Note:
Occasionally issued with "Supplement to the Leeward Islands gazette."
General Note:
Vol. 18, no. 10 (13th March 1890); title from caption (viewed July 10, 2023).
General Note:
Vol. 84, no. 30 (28th June, 1956) (viewed July 10, 2023).

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is presumed to be in the public domain. The University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not claim any copyright interest in this item. Users of this work have responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions may require permission of the copyright holder. The Smathers Libraries would like to learn more about this item and invite individuals or organizations to contact Digital Services (UFDC@uflib.ufl.edu) with any additional information they can provide.
Resource Identifier:
001724221 ( ALEPH )
AJD6739 ( NOTIS )

Related Items

Succeeded by:
Antigua, Montserrat and Virgin Islands gazette

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Full Text


Notices,

It igs hereby notified for general

, information that His Excellency the

Governor has issued a Commission to

» the Hon. P. D. MACDONALD, C.M.G.,

appointing him to be Governor’s

Deputy during his absence from

Antigua whilst visiting Montserrat

5 from the 12th to the 17th January,
1956.

The Secretarial,
Antigua.
9th January, 1956.

13/00283



’ In pursuance of the powers con-
ferred upon him by Section 3 (2) of
the Antibiotics and Therapeutics
Substances Act, 1950, No. 9 of 1950,
and Section 29 of the Interpretation
and General Clauses Act, 1955, No. 12
of 1955, the Governor has appointed
the Senior Medical Officer, Antigua,
to be the Licensing Authority in
the Presidency of Antigua for the
purposes of the Antibiotics and The-
rapeutic Substances Act, 1950, as
from the 12th January, 1956.

The Secretartat,
Antigua.
6th January, 1956.

51/00102.

It is hereby notified that Mr.S. E.
‘MERCIER has been appointed to be
a Justice of the Peace in and for the
Presidency of Antigua.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
Leeward Islands.
Sth January, 1956.

43/00005,.

It ig notified for general informa-
tion that the tender for the supply
of 5,000 half-bags of flour for the
month of February, 1956, has been
awarded to Megsrs. 8. R. MENDES
Ltd. Agents for the St. Lawrence
Flour Mills Co. Ltd. of Montreal,
Canada, in respect of the Daily
Bread brand of flour at $4.56 (Can.)

. per bag C. I. F. Antigua.

Administrator's Office,
Antigua. /

5th January, 1956. x




VOL. LXXXIV.

AAW ARD ISLANDS
GAZETTE.

ublished by Authority.

Ae lzTH JANUARY, 1956. . No. 3.





It igs notified for general informa-
tion that the Reports of the British
Caribbean Pre-Federal Commissions
have been released for publication on
the 2nd January, 1956.

2. Copies of the Reports are
available on sale at the office of His
Honour the Administrator in Antigua
and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and the

Commissioner of Montserrat at the
following prices:—
Pre-Federal Fiscal Commission

Report— 72 cents;

Pre-Federal Civil Service Commis-
sion Report— 72 cents;

Pre-Federal Judicial Commission
Report— 36 cents.

Administrator's Office,
Antigua.
2nd January, 1956.
C. 18/00038.

Application for Naturalization
as a British Subject.

Notice is hereby given that AN-
THONY JOSEPH EID of George Street,
Plymouth, Montserrat, is applying to
the Governor for naturalization, and
that any person who knows any
reason why naturalization should not
be granted, should send a written and
signed statement of the facts to the
Commissioner of Montserrat on or
before the 3lst January, 1956.

By Order,
Js. H. CARROTT,

Ohief Clerk.

Commissioner’s Office,
Plymouth, Moniserrat.
22nd December. 1955.



OONFIRMATION
No. 4.

The Secretary of State for the
Colonies has informed the Governor
that the power of disallowance will
not be exercised in respect of the
undermentioned Ordinances:—

OF ORDINANCES,

St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla.

No. 5 of 1955, “The Liquor
Licence (Amendment) Ordinance,
1955.”

No. 11 of 1955, “The Factories

Ordinance, 1955.”

BrE.7>Fr
CYF7 KX



No. 5.

The Governor has, this day, been
pleased to assent to the undermen-
tioned Ordinances:—

Montserrat.

No. 10 of 1955, ‘The Prisons

Ordinance, 1955.” Jan. 7
Virgin Islands.

No. 13 of 1955, ‘“‘ The Interpreta-
tion of Laws (Amendment) Ordi-
nance, 1955.” Dec, 30, 1955

No. 6.



The following Ordinance, Statutory
Rules and Orders and Public Service
Commission Instructions, Antigua,
1956, are circulated with this Gazette
and form part thereof: —

ORDINANCE.
Virgin Islands.

No. 9 of 1955, ‘“‘“The Protection of
Trees und Conservation of Soil and
Water (Amendment) Ordinance,
1955. 3 pp. Price 5 cents.

STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS.

General Government.

No. 1 of 1956, ‘The Leeward
Islands Federal Executive Council
(Cessation) Order, 1956.

1 pp. Price 3 cents.

No. 2 of 1956, ‘The Pensionable
Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956.”

1 pp. Price 3 cents

Antigua.
No. 4 of 1956, ‘‘ The Public Service
Commission Regulations, 1956.”
5 pp. Price 8 cents
“The Public Service Commission
Instructions, Antigua, 1956.
9 pp. Price 15 cents

Saint Christopher Nevis & Anguilla.
No. 5 of 1956, “‘ Proclamation dated
12th January, 1956, bringing into
operation the Saint Christopher Nevis
and Anguilla Constitution and Elec-
tions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956.”
1 pp Price 3 cents
No. 6 of 1956, “ Proclamation dated
12th January, 1956, bringing into
operation the Public Service Com-
mission Ordinance, 1956.
1 pp. Price 3 cents



MONTSERRAT. LEEWARD ISLANDS.

THE LAND sean enn
AC
(No. 11 of 1944).

DECLARATION
Declaration dated December 21,
1955, made under section 3 of the



8 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE.

Land Acquisition Act, 1944 (No. 11
of 1944) for the acquisition of certain
lots of land in the Presidency of
Montserrat required for public pur-
poses.

IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that
the Governor in Council with the
approval of the Legislative Council
of the Presidency of Montserrat con-
siders that the lots of land described
in the Schedule hereto, being portions
of Trants Estate situate in the parish
of Saint George, in the said Presi-
dency, should be acquired for public
purposes, namely, for the erection of
an airfield in the said Presidency, for
the construction of an approach road
to the said airfield, and for the
erection of the necessary air port
buildings.

/ SCHEDULE.
Lot 1.

ALL that lot piece or parcel of
land being a portion of Trants Estate
situate in the parish of Saint George
in the Presidency of Montserrat and
containing by estimation 17.22 acres
and measuring and bounded on the
north-west side, measuring 3,000 feet
and bounded thereon by lands of the
said T'rants Estate, on the south-west
measuring 250 feet and bounded by
the sea, on the south-west measuring
3,000 feet and bounded by lands of
the said Trants Estate and on the
north-west measuring 250 feet and
bounded by lands of the said Trants
Estate, or howsoever otherwise the

same may be abutted, bounded,
known, distinguished or described.
Lot 2.

ALL that lot piece or parcel of
land being a portion of Trants Estate
situate in the parish of Saint George
in the Presidency of Montserrat and
containing by estimation 1.06 acres
and measuring and bounded on the
north-east 356 feet and bounded
thereon by lands of Trants Estate, on
the west measuring 400 feet and
bounded by lands of the said Trants
Estate and on the sonth-west measur-
ing 260 feet and bounded by lands of
the said Trants Estate, or howsoever
otherwise the same may be abutted,
bounded, known, distinguished or
described.

Lot 3.

ALL that lot piece or parcel of
land being a portion of Trants Estate
situate in the parish of Saint George
in the Presidency of Montserrat and
containing by estimation 0.86 acres
and measuring and bounded from the
main public road known as Trants
Byway 1315 feet long and 20 feet
wide bearing 75 degrees to an exist-
ing windbreak, and thon 563 feet and
20 feet wide to Lot 2. This road is
bounded on both sides of its entire
length by the lands of the said Trants
Estate, or howsoever the same may
be abutted, bounded, known, distin-
guished or described.

Js. H. CARROTT,
Clerk to the Legislative Council.
Ref. Ne, 7/00123.

TRADE MARKS OFFICE,
ANTIGUA, 29th December, 1955.

THE ARBORITE COMPANY
LIMITED of 385 Lafleur Avenue,
Town of LaSalle, Province of Quebec,
Canada, have applied for Registration
of one Trade Mark consisting of the
following :—

ARBORITE

in Class 17, that ig to say:— Decora-
tive surfacing panels for surfacing
walls or other surfaces such as counter
or table tops, or other articles of
furniture.

The Applicants claim that they
have used the said Trade Mark in
respect of the said goods for six
years before the date of their said
Application.

Any person may within three
months from the date of the first
appearance of this Advertisement in
the Leeward Islands Gazette, give
notice in duplicate at the Trade
Marks Office, Antigua, of opposition
to registration of the said Trade
Mark.

CECIL O. BYRON,
Acting Registrar of Trade Marks.



In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.





ANTIGUA CIRCUIT.
A.D. 1956.

Notice is hereby given that in pur-
suance of Rules made by the Chief
Justice under Section 16 of the Wind-
ward Islands and Leeward Islands
(Courts) Order in Council, 1939, and
duly approved as therein provided on
the 16th day of October A.D. 1941,
the Honourable the Puisne Judge
selected for the sitting of the Court in
the Antigua Circuit has appointed the
day of the month on which the
ensuing Circuit Court shall git as
follows, that is to say:—

The Antigua Circuit on Monday
the 30th January, 1956, at 10 o’clock
in the forenoon.

Dated the 6th day of January, 1956.

CECIL O. BYRON,
Acting Registrar of the Supreme
Court.



INCOME TAX NOTICE.

The Income Tax Ordinance No.
7 of 1945 (as amended).

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND PENSIONERS.

Any public officer or pensioner
liable to pay income tax whose
income including that of his wife
consists solely of his and/or her
emoluments as a public officer or
pensioner or other allowance from

[12 January, 1956.

public funds, shall deliver a true
and correct return of his whole
income to the Commissioners not
later than the 3lst day of January,
1956. (Section 67 and 8. R. & O.
1946, No. 13).

OTHER PERSONS.

Every person (including a com-
pany) liable to pay income tax shall
deliver atrue and correct return of
hig whole income not later than the
31st day of March, 1956 (Section 67
and 8. R. & O. 1946, No. 13).

AGENTS, TRUSTEES, ETC.

Any person haying the direction,.

control or management of any
property or concern, or being in
receipt of income; on behalf of any
person, whether resident or non-
resident, as attorney, factor, agent,
trustee, curator or committee
should make and deliver to the
Commissioners a return in respect
of such property, concern or income
not later than the 3lst day of March,
1956. (Sections 28 and 29).

GENERAL.

Any person may be considered to
be “liable to pay income tax” if his
income from all sources exceeds one
hundred and twelve pounds ($537.60).

All claimg for deduction from
income tax must Fe substantiated by
the production of receipts or other
bona fide evidence.

PENALTIES.

Any person liable to pay income
tax who fails to make or deliver a
return within the prescribed period
shall be guilty of an offence against
this Ordinance and shall be liable on
conviction to a penalty not exceed-
ing one hundred pounds, and in
default of payment to imprisonment
with or without hard labour for a
term not exceeding six months.
Section 68.

Any person who makes or delivers
a false return or keeps or prepares
any false accounts or particulars
concerning any income on which
tax is payable shall be guilty of
an offence and shall be liable on
conviction to a fine not exceeding
five hundred pounds, or to imprison-
ment with or without hard labour
for a term-not exceeding six months.
(Section 64).

E. G. O. M. BERRIDGE,
for the Commisstoners.



RAINFALL FIGURES.

Centra] Experiment Station,



Antigua.
Month. 1952, 1953. 1954, 1055, 1956.
Jan.to 7th .30 64 92 186 3.64

»



12 January, 1956.] THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. | 9

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND
LEEWARD ISLANDS.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS
AND LEEWARD ISLANDS.

APPELATE JURISDICTION.

Between:—
Ivan Epwarpbs Appellant.
vs.
JosePpH E. Byron
Inspector of Police Respondent.
1954. No. 1—ANTIGUA.
Before:—

JACKSON C.J.
GORDON J.
LEWIS J. (Acting)
1955. December 12, 15.
Mr. S. T. Crristian for the appellant.

Mr. R. H. Lockgarrt for the respondent.
JUDGMENT.

This appeal is from a judgment and order of Date, J., affirming the conviction and sentence of
the appellant by the Magistrate, District A, on a charge that he on the 18th May, 1953, being the driver
of a motor car when abont to stop did fail to draw up us close as possible to the side of the road so as to
allow aclear roadway for passing traffic contrary to Reg. 19 (11) of the Vehicles and Road Traffic
Regulations 1946.

The charge arose out of a collision in Market Street on the 18th May, 1953, between two
vehicles, motor car A.G. 808 driven by the appellant in a southerly direction and motor truck A.G. 159
driven by one Ernest Joseph in the opposite direction. Ernest Joseph was charged with driving
without due care and attention under Sec. 53 of the Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance 1946.

Both cases were heard together by consent of the parties. At the close of the case for the
prosecution, after a submission by Counsel for the appellant, that there was no case to answer, had been
overruled, the defendant Ernest Joseph gave evidence. The appellant, relying on the submission made
earlier, declined to give any evidence and was convicted and fined $5.00 or 14 days Hard Labour.

In his judgment the learned Judge adopted the findings of fact by the Magistrate which,
inter alia were as follows:—

(i) In the position where vehicle A.G. 808 stopped there was a space of 7ft. between the left
front wheel and the Bast kerb of Market Street and a space of 7ft. 10 inches between the left rear wheel
and the East kerb.

(ii) That there was no evidence that at the time of stopping, there was any reason why
A.G. 808 could not have pulled up next to its left hand kerb instead of 7ft. away from it.

(iii) That A.G. 808 came to a halt just before the collision 1.e. that when the front of A.G. 159
passed the front of A.G. 808 the latter was at a standstill.

It is clear from the reasons given by the Magistrate that the conviction was based on the fact
as found by him that the appellant stopped his car Just before the other vehicle reached him. In
arriving at this conclusion he relied on the evidence of Sgi. Roberts and James Dor.

It would appear that the learned Judge was also of the opinion that the evidence established a
prima facie case against the appellant and accordingly dismissed the appeal. A close examination
however reveals that the evidence of Sgt. Roberts and Dor does not lend support to the conclusion at
which the Magistrate arrived. Whether the appellant’s car stopped before or after the two vehicles
came into contact, is a vital point in the case.



10 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [12 January, 1956,

Sgt. Roberts in his evidence stated that in the course of his investigations on the spot
immediately after the accident, that both the appellant and the other defendant told him that the vehicles
collided in passing. James Dor in his examination in chief stuted ....... “As they came together Edwards
(appellant) stopped, truck went on—I called on Goodwin and I saw truck hit against car. When cur
stopped I saw the driver looking in shop........ The head of the truck had passed the head of the car
before the car stopped.” The sworn statement of Goodwin, another witness for the prosecution, that
when the appellant’s car stopped the truck was about 30 ft. away, was contradicted by the witness Dor
and the Magistrate appears quite rightly to have disregurded Goodwin's evidence on this point.

The accepted evidence shows that the appellants’s car stopped after the two vehicles had come
into contact. In these circumsances, if the appellant is guilty of an offence it would incline more to that
of driving without due care and attention than to the offence of which he has been convicted.

In this appeal the notes of evidence sent up by the Magistrate omitted the evidence led for
the Defence in the case against Joseph. We wish to emphasise that in cases where persons are tried

together the whole of the evidence has to be considered on the appeal and should form part of the record.

The appeal is allowed the Judgment and Order of the learned Judge reversed and the
conviction and sentence set aside.

The appellant shall have his costs here and in the Courts below fixed at twenty guineas.

Donatp Jackson.
Chief Justice.

K. L. Gorpon,
Puisne3 Judge.

A, M. Lewis,

Acting Puisne Judge.
15th December, 1955.



ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islunds, by Z, M, BLACKMAN,
Government Printer —By Authority,
1956

[Price 64 cents including Supplement.}



Supplement to the Leeward Islands Gazette

Of Thursday, the 12th of January, 1956.







IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD ISLANDS.

ANTIGUA CIRCUIT.

Suit No. 45/1955.

Between:

JoserpH Rrynorp O’Nkeat and

GERTRUDE O’NEAL

and

Vere Cornwati Birp
Epmunp Hawkins Laker
NoveiLe Ricwarps
Ernest WILitAmMs
Brapiry Carrorr
Joun IrELAND

Levi JOsErH

JOSEPH SAMUEL and
Lionri Hurst

Before:— DATE, J.

Plaintiffs.

Defendants.

HY. ee

K. E. Harney and H. L. Haryry for plaintiffs.

i. Barrow for defendants.

JUDGMENT.

The two plaintiffs carry on business in part-
nership under the name of O’Neal’s Drug Store
at the corner of Long and Thames Streets in the
City of St. John; in the adjacent building, at the
corner of High and Thames Streets, the plaintitf
Gertrude O’Neal also runs a curio shop.

All the defendants, with the exception of
Joseph Samuel, are members of the Executive
Committee of The Antigua Trades and Labour
Union, a union registered under the Trade Unions
Act, 1939.

The plaintiffs’ Indorsement of Claim is for
(1) an injunction restraining the defendants, their
servants and agents from unlawfully watching
and besetting the business places of the plaintiffs;
(2) damages for injury to the plaintiffs’ trade by
conspiracy in pursuance of which unlawful means
were used.

Before coming to the other pleadings I will
set out a general history of the case to provide
the appropriate background to the issues which
have now been joined between the parties to
this suit.

In May 1949 one Avery] Winter was employ-
ed as a clerk at the Drug Store on a weekly basis.
She continued working there until Saturday 11th
June, 1955, when she was summarily dismissed
by the plaintiff Gertrude O’Neal and paid one
week's wages in lieu of notice; no reason was
given for the dismissal.

Sunday 12th June was, of course, a dies non.

On Monday 13th June the defendant Ireland,
a Field Officer of The Antigua Trades & Labour
Union of which Miss Winter is a Member, went
to Miss O’Neal and asked for the reasons for
Miss Winter’s dismissal. Miss O’Neal refused to
give any. Thereupon, according to Miss O’Neal,
Mr. Ireland demanded one year’s pay for Miss
Winter, and this also was refused.

Representations were then made by the
Union to the Labour Commissioner of Antigua
about Miss Winter’s dismissal, and conciliation
meetings under his chairmanship were held at the
Labour Department between representatives of
the Drug Store and representatives of the Union
on 28rd June and 7th July. At both meetings
the Union’s representatives asked for the reinstate-
ment of Miss Winter. The representatives of the
Drug Store said that in dismissing Miss Winter
without giving reasons and paying her a week’s
wages in lieu of notice they were acting within
their legal rights, and that they were not prepared
to consider the claim for reinstatement. At the
second meeting a written undertaking was signed
by Miss Winter to the effect that nothing said
there would be used by her in any case of slander
or libel; the representatives of the Drug Store
then stated five reasons which they said were
the only reasons for the dismissal. These were
examined and severely criticized by the Union’s,
representatives, who expressed the view that they



proved nothing against Miss Winter and did not
justify her dismissal. As the representatives of
the Drug Store persisted in their refusal to
reinstate Miss Winter, the Chairman inquired
whether they would be prepared to consider
settling the matter on a basis other than reinstate-
ment, to which they replied in the negative.

The voluntary negotiations having broken
down, the Union approached Government for the
appointment of a Board of Inquiry under the
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act,
1939, section 8 (1) of which reads thus:

“8 (1) Where any trade dispute exists
or is apprehended the Governor may, whether
or not the dispute is reported to him under
this Act, inquire into the causes and circum-
stances of the dispute, and, if he thinks fit,
refer any matter appearing to him to be
connected with or relevant to the dispute to
a Board of Inquiry (hereinafter referred to
as the Board) appointed by him for the
purpose of such reference, and the Board
shall inquire into the matters referred to it
and report thereon to the Governor. ”

By instrument dated 16th August, 1955, the
then Acting Governor of the Leeward Islands
appointed a Board of Inquiry “to inquire into the
causes of the dispute that arose over the dismissal
of Miss Averyl Winter by the proprietors of
O’Neals’ Drug Store, St. John’s, and to report there-
on to the Governor and to submit to him such con-
clusions, recommendations and observations as the
Board sees fit.”

At the Inquiry, which was held on 24th
August, Mr. E. E. Harney, representing the
plaintiffs, submitted in limine that there was no
trade dispute between Miss Winter and the Drug
Store and that the appointment of the Board was,
consequently, invalid. The gist of his contention
was that the relationship of employer and employee
had been legally terminated by the giving of a week’s
wages to Miss Winter in lien of notice, and that
there could therefore be no trade dispute within the
meaning of the Act under which the Board was
operating. The Board ruled that “the terms of
reference contained in the instrument dated 16th
August 1955 which gave the Board its validity
showed prima facie that there was a trade dispute
existing between the proprietors of O’Neals Drug
Store and Miss Averyl Winter and therefore the
Board had full power and authority to inquire into
the dispute.” At this stage Mr. Harney sought
and was granted permission to withdraw from the
Inquiry, and the plaintiffs took no further part in
the proceedings, but the minutes of the meetings at
the Labour Department, which contained inter alia
the reasons given by Miss O'Neal for the dismissal
of Miss Winter, were produced in evidence and
closely examined.

In its report submitted to the Acting, Governor
on 31st August, 1955, the Board, after setting out
its findings, expressed the opinion that there was no
moral justification for the dismissal of Miss Winter

2

and, using “ asa norm one of the accepted principles
of good industrial relations, that is the principle of
mutual respect and tolerance of human rights
between employer and workman”’, recommended
that the proprietors of the Drug Store be asked to
pay her a sum equivalent to thirteen weeks’ wages
“as a compensation for her dismissal.”

Under cover of a letter from the Administrator
of Antigua dated 6th September, 1955, a copy
of the Report was sent to Mr. Harney for the
information of his clients and himself “and such
action with the view to a settlement of the dispute
as may be deemed advisable.” In the letter the
Administrator also informed Mr. Harney and his
clients that the Acting Governor agreed generally
with the recommendations of the Board. The
plaintiffs ignored this communication, and on 16th
September the Administrator caused the Report to
be published in the local press. The following day
the plaintiffs’ business premises were picketed. The
pickets are still there

This would, I think, be a convenient stage to
set out paragraphs 5 to 10 (the most important
paragraphs) of the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim
dated 21st October, 1955:—

“5. The first seven named and the last
named defendants and each of them wrongfully
and maliciously conspired and combined
amongst themselves (with intent to injure the
plaintiffs and thereby compel them to submit
to the demand of the Antigua Trades and
Labour Union to pay compensation to one
Avery] Winter a former clerk in O’Neal’s Drug
Store who had recently been lawfully dismissed
from her employment by the plaintiffs) wrong-
fully and without legal authority to watch and
beset or cause or procure to be watched and
beset the said business places of the plaintiffs
and the approaches and entrances thereto in
such manner as was calculated to intimidate
customers and prospective purchasers.

6. In furtherance and execution of their
said conspiracy and combination the said first
seven named and the last named defendants
and each of them wrongfully and without legal
authority caused or procured the defendant
Joseph Samuel and other persons to the num-
ber of 12 or thereabouts (hereinafter referred
to as the pickets) wrongfully and without legal
authority to watch and beset the said business
places of the plaintiffs daily from the 17th day
of September, 1955, in such a manner as is
calculated to intimidate customers and prospec-
tive purchasers and to obstruct the approaches
thereto. The first seven named and the last.
named defendants and each of them in acting
as in this paragraph stated acted for the pur-
pose of intimidating and preventing customers
and prospective purchasers from entering the
said business places and purchasing therein.

7. The first seven named and the last
named defendants on several occasions on the
17th day of September, 1955, and on divers



other occasions thereafter attended outside the
said business places of the plaintiffs or in the
vicinity thereof and gave encouragement to the
said pickets.

8. The defendant Levi Joseph and the
pickets have by threats and acts of violence
and intimidation and coercion prevented divers
customers and prospective purchasers from
entering the said business places and pur-
chasing therein. :

PARTICULARS.

(1) On the 17th day of September, 1943,
the defendant Levi Joseph led a steel
band and a number of pickets carrying
placards:to the said business places of the
plaintiffs and surrounded same blocking
the approaches and entrances thereto and
shouting in a threatening manner to per-
sons who attempted to enter the said
business places ‘* Don’t buy from O’Neal’s
Drug Store, A strike is on.”

(2) On the said 17th day of September,
1955, and on several days thereafter the
defendant Joseph Samuel who is well
known to the general public as a local
constable paraded up and down outside
the said business places ringing a bell
and shouting “ Dont buy froin O’Neal’s
Drug Store people. You no hear you
no foo buy from this Drug Store.” And
when people asked why not ? defendant
Samuel told them that the police will
lock them up.

(3) The said defendant Joseph Samuel on
the 19th day of September, 1955,
assaulted a person whose name is un-
known who was attempting to enter one
of the business places for the purpose of
purchasing therein,

(4) The said pickets carrying flags and pla-

- cards with slogans such as ‘‘ Hold the
line the workers security is challenged ”
written thereon attend daily around the
said business places and in a menacing and
threatening manner surround and obstruct
persons especially old men women and
children who attempt to enter the said
business places shouting at them ‘ Hold
the Line.”

(5) The defendant Levi Joseph on the
morning of the 24th September, 1955,
and other pickets conducted themselves
in a boisterous and disorderly manner
marching up and down in front of the
said business places shouting ‘“ Hold the
line” —“ Dont buy from this Drug
Store, Workers must be respected.”

9. In the alternative the defendants and
each of them wrongfully and maliciously cons-
pired with intent to injure the plaintiffs to
create a nuisance and did in pursuance of

their conspiracy create a nuisance by the con-
tinuous shouts and other noises of the pickets
and by obstructing the approaches to the said
business places of the plaintiffs thereby
seriously interfering with the comfort of the
plaintiffs and the ordinary enjoyment of the
said premises by them.

10. By reason of the premises the
plaintiffs have suffered damage—Loss_ esti-
mated at $500.00 up to this date has thereby
been incurred.

The plaintiffs claim against the defendants
and each of them:

(1) Damages

(2) An injunction restraining the defendants
their servants and agents from unlaw-
fully watching and besetting the business
places of the plaintiffs.”

The Defence filed denies any tortious acts on
the part of any of the defendants and continues as
follows:—

6b
Dina sis ab ateemtetetieleciela’s eis gene ibinesleses oe ewe ese casas
Tee errr rrr rere errr rrr rere ere errr eee ccceresccce

If any of the defendants or any other
person did any of the acts complained of in
the Statement of Claim and_ particularly in
paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive thereof in pursu-
ance of any conspiracy or unlawful purpose or
in any unlawful manner as alleged (which the
plaintiffs do not admit) or at all then each
and every defendant for himself denies that
such acts if any were done with his knowledge
or consent or that he authorised in any way
or connived at the same.

9. A Trade Dispute has since the 11th
day of June, 1955, existed between the
Antigua Trades and Labour Union mentioned
in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim, and
the plaintiffs. In furtherance and in respect
of the said dispute the premises of the plain-
tiffs have been picketed. Such picketing has
been at all times carried out in a lawful and
peaceful manner. None of the said pickets or
other persons mentioned in paragraphs 6 to 9
inclusive of the Statement of Claim are the
servants or agents of the defendants or any of
them. If any of the pickets or persons so
mentioned acted in any of the unlawful man-
ners alleged (which is not admitted) the
defendants deny that they or any of them
authorised or connived at or consented to or
permitted such acts to be done.”

At the trial of this action Mr. E. E. Harney,
for the plaintiffs, repeated his submission made to
the Board of Inquiry as to the non-existence of any
trade dispute within the legal meaning of that
term. Both in our Trade Unions Act, 1939, and
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act,
1939, ‘trade dispute”’ is defined thus:—



“trade dispute’? means any dispute or differ-
ence between employers and workmen, or
between workmen and workmen, connected
with the employment or non-employment, or
the terms of the employment, or with the
conditions of labour, of any person.

Mr. Harney conceded that the expression
“non-employment ” in the definition embraced a
dismissal, but argued that in order to constitute
a trade dispute over a dismissal a dispute or differ-
ence as to the dismissal must arise between the
remaining employees and the employer, and not
between the dismissed employee and the employer.
In the present case there is no dispute or difference
between the remaining employees (none of whom
are members of the Union) and the plaintiffs.

If Mr. Harney’s submission on this point is
sound, the defendants would not be entitled to the
benefit of sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Trade
Unions Act, 1939, as amended, which apply only
in the case of acts done in contemplation or fur-
therance of a trade dispute. It is important
therefore to determine whether or not a trade
dispute exists. Should such a dispute be found to
exist, it would then be necessary to consider the
real effect of. sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Statute
on the common law relating to conspiracy and
nuisance. For the time being it is sufficient to
observe that at common law a combination wilfully
to injure, which results in damage to another, is,
with certain qualifications, actionable (Sorrell v.
Smith, 1925, A.C. 742; Corbett v. Canadian
National Printing Trade Union, 1943, 4 D.L.R.
44), and that watching and besetting, if it result iu
damayve may also be actionable as a nuisance, as
an interference with the ordinary comfort of exist-
ence and the enjoyment of premises (Lyons ¢ Sons
v. Wilkins, 1899, 1 Ch. 255).

As a starting point for his submission Mr.
Harney adverted first of all to the United Kingdom
legislation as contained in the Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act, 1875 (388 & 39 Vict.,
c. 86), the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7,
c. 47), the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 & 10
Geo. 5, c. 69), and the Conditions of Employment
and National Arbitration Order, 1940 (S. R. & O.
1940, No. 1305); he drew attention to the absence
of any definition of the expressions “ trade dispute ”
or “workmen” in the 1875 Act, and to the
significant difference between the definition of
“workmen” in the 1906 Act and the definition of
“workman ”’ in the 1919 Act and 1940 8. R. & O.

In the 1906 Act ‘ workmen” is defined as
meaning “all persons employed in trade or indus-
try, whether or not in the employment of the
employer with whom a trade dispute arises”. In
the 1919 Act and the 1940 5. R. & O. “ workman”
is defined as meaning “any person who has centered
into or works under a contract with an employer,
whether the contract be by way of manual Iibour,
clerical work or otherwise, be expressed or implied,
oral or in writing and whether it be a contract of
service or of apprenticeship or 2 contract personally
to execute any work or labour.”

Mr. Harney next cited a number of cases to
show the interpretations placed by the courts on
the expressions “‘ workman” and “ trade dispute”
prior to the 1906 Act and also in cases after the
passing of the 1919 Act; he then submitted that
the definitions of “trade dispute” and “ work-
man” in the Leeward Islands legislation were the
same us those in the United Kingdom Act of 1919
and S. R. & O. of 1940; he hoped in this way to
find support for his proposition that if a dismissal
is lawful (ie., if the period of notice required by
law is given or payment in lieu thereof made) there
can be no trade dispute over it between the dis-
missed employee and the dismissing employer.

The first observation which should be made
on Mr. Harney’s submission is that while the
definitions of “trade dispute” and “ workmen”
in our Trads Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry)
Act, 1939, are substantially the same as the cor-
responding definitions in the United Kingdom Act
of 1919 and S.R.& O. of 1940, no similar
definition of “workman” or “ workmen ” is to be
found in our Trade Unions Act, 1989, which, for
the purposes of the present proceedings, is the
relevant Act. The definitions contained in our
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act,
1939, are expressly stated to be for the purposes of.
that Act, and I am unaware of any authority,
statutory or otherwise, for incorporating them into
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, which is a separate
Act altogether. The only definition of “ work-
men” in the Trade Unions Act, 1989, is that the
expression ‘includes labourers ’’.

The differences in these particular statutory
definitions do not of course have to be taken into
account in considering the cases decided prior to
the passing of the 1906 Act when there were no
such statutory definitions, but even so I can find
nothing in any of the cases cited by Mr. Harney
(whether before or after 1906) which, in my
Opinion, supports his broad legal proposition that
a trade dispute cannot arise between a dismissed
employee and his employer out of a dismissal in
accordance with law. The cases on which he relied
principally were Lyons v. Wilkins (1896) 1 Ch.
834, Quinn «. Leathem, (1901) A.C. 495, Doran v.
Lennon, (3945) LR. 815, and R. V. National
Arbitration Tribunal, Lx Parte Horatio Crowther &
Company Ltd., (1947) 2 All E.R. 693.

Now, in Lyons v. Wilkins (supra) the defend-
ants, officers of a Trade Union, after unsuccessfully
attempting to induce the plaintiffs, who were
leather bag and portmanteau manufacturers, to
raise the wages of their work-people, ordered
a strike against the plaintiffs and picketed their
works. They also endeavoured to get one
Schoenthal, who was a sub-manufacturer for the
plaintiffs, to cease to do work for the plaintiffs, and
on failing to do so they ordered a strike of and
picketed his works. The Court of Appeal held
that the picketing of Schoenthal’s works and the
strike against him for the indirect purpose of
injuring the plaintiffs were illegal acts. A. DL.
Smith L.J., at p. 834 of the report, said:



‘“Was there any trade dispute between
Mr. Schoenthal’s workmen and himself?
None at all What the Union did
was not done in furtherance of a trade
dispute between Schoenthal and his men;
but what they did was to call out
Mr. Schoenthal’s men in order to prevent
him from working for Messrs Lyons, and
thus to compel Mr. Schoenthal who was
willing to work for Messrs. Lyons not to
work for him, and by this means to
injure Messrs. Lyons in their trade if
they did not obey the edicts of the
Union.”

In Quinn v. Leathem (supra) the respondent,
a flesher, carried on business in Lisburn, having as
one of his constant customers Andrew Munse, who
kept a butcher’s shop at Belfast; and the respond-
ent had in his employ assistants who were not
members of the trade union of which the appellant
was treasurer. The members of the union amongst
themselves adopted an unregistered rule that they
would not work with non-union men nor would
they cut up meat that came froma place where
non-union hands were employed. After unsuccess-
fully attempting to compel the respondent to
employ none but union men, they compelled
Munse to stop taking meat from the respondent
under threat of calling out Munse’s men (who
were members of the union) if Munse did not cease
dealing with the respondent. Held: the words
“trade dispute between employers and workmen”
in section 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act, 1875, did not include a dispute on
trade union matters between workmen who were
members of a trade union and an employer of
non-union workmen who refused to employ
meinbers of a trade union.

The facts and decision in Doran v. Lennon
(supra) are summarised at pp. 476 and 477 of
Citrine’s Trade Union Law as tollows:—

“In Doran v. Lennon the plaintiffs were
the owners of retail drapery shops and of
2 boot shop. Asa result of their refusal
to pay statutory bonuses which the union
claimed were payable to the drapery and
boot employees, the union called a strike,
giving inadequate notice and thus causing
a breach of contract by the employees.
The strike was settled after five days,
but the terms of settlement did not cover
the defendants, who were boot employees
and to whom the plaintiffs maintained
that the bonus Order did not apply.
When the defendants presented them-
selves for work the plaintiffs refused to
reinstate them, on the ground that their
employment had been terminated by the
breach. Four months later the union,
conceding that the bonus Order did not
apply to the defendants, demanded their
reinstatement. This was refused, but
was repeated two months later. The
request was again refused and the

5

defendants proceeded to picket the plain-
tiffs’ premises. In an action by the
plaintiffs for an injunction to restrain the
defendants from ‘ watching or besetting’,
Overend, J. held that there was no trade
dispute and that the protection of the
1906 Act (sic) did not apply. He said:

‘If it were otherwise, then every
employee of a commercial firm, who
broke his contract and was dismissed for
cause, would be entitled to picket his
late master’s premises and yet claim the
protection of the statute’.”

We now come to Ex Parte Crowther and
Co. Ltd. (supra) in which workmen employed by a
company of chemical manufacturers through their
trade union had for some time been pressing for
changes in wages and conditions of service; the
company always resisted these demands; then on
26th March, 1947, the company were told by their
suppliers that their supplies of salt would be cut by
50%; on 28th March notice was given by the
company to all workmen employed on the manu-
facturing side of their business terminating their
employment as from 4th April. No question arose
as to this being in any way a notice otherwise than
in accordance with the contracts of service and the
men were discharged from the company’s service
on 4th April. The matter was then reported to
the Minister of Labour and he referred it to the
National Arbitration Tribunal under the Conditions
of Employment and National Arbitration Order,
1940, and they made an award. The company
then moved for « certiorari to remove the award
into the King’s Bench Division for the purpose of

having it quashed. Lord Goddard, C.J., said:—

“Tt was submitted by counsel for the
company that as at the date of the reference
due notice had been given to the workmen
to terminate their employment and their
employment had thereby been terminated,
there could be no trade dispute to refer,
because there could not be a dispute or
difference on any subject between these
employers and workmen as the workmen were
not in the service of the employers, and he
reinforced this argument by reference to the
definition of “ workman” which he submitted
contemplated an existing contract of service
so, as he put it, that there must be some
contract on which the reference could “ bite.”
I cannot agree with that submission. If
effect were given to it, it would mean that
any employer, or, indeed, any workman,
could nullify the whole provisions of the
Order and the object of the regulation under
which it was made by terminating the
contract of service before a reference was
ordered, or even after the matter was referred
but before the trubunal considered it, It is,
in my opinion, quite clear that there was
here a trade dispute existing at any rate
down to the date of the dismissal of the
workmen. That is not in issue, and whether



the workmen were discharged for the bona
fide resson that supplies were cut down or
whether they were discharged because the
company ‘vere not willing to accede to their
demands is, in my opinion, immaterial. If
there was a trade dispute it can, in my
opinion, be referred to the tribunal whether
or not the dispute has resulted in workraen
being dismissed or in their having discharged
themselves. The object of the regulation
is stated to be for preventing work being
interrupted by trade disputes. If the em-
ployer locked out his workmen with a view
to obliging them to submit to the terms
which he wished to impose or the workmen
struck in an endeavour to secure their
demands, there would be, undoubtedly, a
trade dispute. True it is that, unless notice
was given to the workmen on strike or who
were locked out, the contract of service
would not determine unless and until notice
was given, but because dismissal is super-
imposed on a dispute which has existed up
to the moment of dismissal it does not seem
to me to prevent the dispute being referred,
because the dismissal of the workmen in no
way settled the dispute which had hitherto
existed. Supposing a dispute arose whether
the workers in a particular industry or
branch of an industry could be, as the
employers contended, dismissed at an hour’s
notice or whether they were entitled, as the
workers contended, to a week’s notice. There
you would have a dispute connected with the
terms of employment. It appears to me clear
that an employer could not avoid a reference
by the Minister if the matter was reported
to him by discharging his workmen and
saying: “They are no longer in my service,
whether I rightly or wrongly diamissed
them.” If an employer discharges his work-
men witheut proper notice, although the
workmen would have an action tor wrongful
dismissal, they are not from the moment of
discharge in the employer’s service, but if
the contention advanced by the employers
in this case be right the question of what
notice workers in this industry or this factory
should be given could not be settled by the
tribunal. In my opinion, there was here
a dispute which the Minister could refer to
the tribunal and on which the tribunal could
adjudicate.”

Each of these cases is, I think, easily dis-
tinguishable from the case with which we are
now dealing. In Lyons v. Wilkins thee was no
dispute or difference between the person picketed
and any of the people who were working or had
worked for him. ‘The same can be said of
Quinn v. Leathem. In Doran v. Lennon the
circumstances were peculiar; the employees’
employment was terminated by their own wilful
breach of contract, and the picketing that was
started several months later was not in further-
ance of the dispute which had caused the men

to strike. Overend, J.’s dictum, quoted above,
was Clearly limited to “every employee....... icv
who broke his contract’? and was so dismissed
for cause. In Le parte Crowther §& Co. Ltd.
(which, incidentally, was also cited by Mr.
Barrow, contra) a trade dispute was held to
exist over differences between the employees
and the company that arose long before and
down to the date of the dismissal; it seems to me
that Lord Goddard’s remarks were not intended
to apply to a case such as this; if they were,
they would, anyhow, have to be treated as obiter,
in view of the issues then before the Court.
“Tt is an abuse of authorities to extract from
judgments general statements of the law made
in relation to the facts and circumstances of
particular cases and treat them as concluding
cases in which the facts and circumstances are
entirely different and which raise questions to
which their authors were not directing their
minds at all” (Martell v. Cousett Iron Company,
1955, 2 W.LR. 468, per Jenkins L.J). This
same principle was emphasised by Lord Halsbury
in one of the very cases cited by Mr. Harney—
Quinn v. Leathem (supra)-—where he said, at
p- 506 of the report, “every judgment must be
read as applicable to the particular facts proved,
or assumed to be proved, since the generality of
the expressions which may be found there are
not intended to be expositions of the whole law,
but governed and qualified by the particular
facts of the case in which such expressions are
to be found........... .a case is only authority for
what it decides. | entirely deny that it can be
quoted for a proposition that may seem to
follow logically from it.”

In the instant case, Miss Winter had served
as a clerk at O’Neal’s Drug Store for six years;
throughout that period the only leave sl.e had was
two weeks; she was promised long leave early in
1955 but it. was postponed indefinitely by Miss
Gertrude O’Neal owing to the latter’: illness, and
the leave was never granted. When Miss Winter
was being dismissed on 11th June, 1955, she was
not given the opportunity of refuting or explaining
any of the things which caused Miss O’Neal to be
dissatisfied with her. As regards the failure to
give Miss Winter reasons for dismissing her, Miss
O’Neal admitted in evidence: ‘ There could have
been a possibility that she could have gone to the
Union; that is among my reasons for not communi-
cating the matter to Miss Winter.” In the event,
Miss Winter did go to the Union, and on the very
next working day the Union’s representative
visited Miss UO’ Neal and complained—about what ?—
about a difference over nn act done by Miss O’Neal,
as employer, against Miss Winter, as employee, on
11th June, when Miss Winter was yet at work,
relative to her non-employment thereafter. Miss
Winter cannot, in my opinion, be said to have
acquiesced in what was done on 11th June, or to
have forfeited any rights or claims, simply because
she failed to protest or make a scence the moment
Miss O’Neal spoke to her and handed her a week’s

pay in lieu of notice; she is a member of a trade



union and in such matters is entitled to be rep-
resented by the union, which has, or ought to have,
more knowledge than she about the rights, legal
and otherwise, of employees. Miss O’Neal sub-
sequently attended and took part in the conciliation
meetings held at the Labour Department.

I share the view expressed by Mr. Citrine at
pp. 476 and 477 of his admirable little book on

Trade Union Law, that the fact that a dismissal.

may be lawful does not prevent a dispute over it
from being a trade dispute, and that the legality
or otherwise of the dismissal is no more an element
for consideration than is the legality of an employer’s
refusal to improve wages or working conditions in
the normal type of trade dispute. The words
“ whether or not in the employment of the employer
with whom a trade dispute arises”’ in the definition
of “ workmen” in the 1906 U. K. Act—the signifi-
cant absence of which from our Act formed the
main plank of Mr. Harnev’s argument—relate, I
think, to sympathetic action, that is to say, action in
furtherance of a dispute not between the particular
employer and his own workmen, but between
the einployer and workmen elsewhere—e.g., where
workmen consider their own interests threatened by
something being done by another employer and
strike against their own employer to bring pressure
to hear upon that other employer.

On the evidence before ine T find that at all
times material to this action a trade dispute existed
between the plaintiffs and Averyl Winter, repre-
sented by the Antigua Trades & Labour Union.
That being so, it becomes necessary to keep in mind
the full provisions of sections 6A (2) and 7 of
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, as amended. These
sections read as follows:—

6A. (2) An act done in pursuance of
an agreement or combination by two or more
persons shall, if done in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable
unless the act if done without any such agree-
ment or combination, would be actionable.

7. It shall be lawful for one or more
persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf
of a trade union or of an individual employer
or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or
place where a person resides or works or carrics
on business or hnppens to be, if they so attend
merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or of peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from
working.

The classical definition of conspiracy is given
by Willes J. in Mulcahy v. R. (1868) L.R. 3 A.D.
306, at p.317: ‘ A conspiracy consists not merely in
the intention of two or more, but in the agreement
of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means.” Conspiracy may
be both a crime and tort. The tort is constituted
only if the agreed combination is carried into effect
in a greater or lesser degree and damage. to the
plaintiff is thereby caused.

The law with regard to the type of conspiracy
which renders actionable certain acts done by persons
in combination which (acts), if done by an individual,
would not be actionable, is complicated and has often
been the subject of lengthy discussion in the highest
courts. But it is now well settled that at common
law a combination of two or more persons wilfully
to injure another in his trade or business is unlawful,
and if it results in injury to him is actionable. If
the real or predominant purpose of the combination,
however, is not to injure another, but to forward or
defend the legitimate interests of those who enter
into it, no wrong is committed and no action will
lie, although damage to another ensues: there would
then be what has been described as “just cause or
excuse” for the action taken. The latter proposi-
tion assumes the absence of means which are in
themselves unlawful, such as violence or the vhreat
of violence (Sorrell 1. Smith, supra). The following
passage from the judgment of Viscount Simon,
L.C., in the leading case of Crofter Hand Woven
Harris Tweed Co., Ltd. and Others v. Veitch and
Another, (1942) 1 All E.R. 142, at p. 149, shows
the vital points to be considered: —

“On this question of what amounts to an
actionable conspiracy ‘to injure’ (I am assum-
ing that damage results from it), 1 would first
observe that some confusion may arise from
the use of such words as ‘motive’ and
STMEEN TONS Sicncas sere: waiipaudlaievoess There is the
further difficulty that, in some branches of the
law, ‘intention’ may be understood to cover
results which may reasonably flow from what
is deliberately done, on the principle that a
man is to be treated as intending the reasona-
ble consequence of his acts. Nothing of the
sort appears to be involved here. It is much
safer to use a word like ‘ purpose’ or ‘ object.’
The question to be answered, in determining
whether a combination to do an act which
damages others is actionable even though it
would not be actionable if done by a single

erson, is not: ‘ Did the combiners appreciate,
or should they be treated as appreciating, that
others would suffer from their action?’ It is:
‘What is the real reason why the combiners
did it?’ Or, as LORD CAVE, L.C., puts
it: ‘ What is the real purpose of the, combina-
tion?’ The test is not what is the natural
result to the plaintiffs of such combined action,
or what is the resulting damage which the
defendants realise, or should realise, will
follow, but what is in truth the object in the
minds of the combiners when they acted as
they did. It is not consequence that matters,
but purpose. The relevant conjunction is not,
‘so that,’ but, ‘in order that.’ Next, it is to
be borne in mind that there may be cases
where the combination has more than one
‘object’ or ‘purpose.’ The combiners may
feel that they are killing two birds with one
stone, and, even though their main purpose
may be to protect their own legitimate in-
terests notwithstanding that this involves
damage to the plaintiffs, they may also find a
further inducement to do what they are doing



by feeling that it serves the plaintiffs right.
The analysis of human impulses soon leads us
into the quagmire of mixed motives, and, even
if we avoid the word ‘motive,’ there may be
more than a single purpose or object. It is
enough to say that, if there is more than one
purpose actuating 2 combination, liability must
depend on ascertaining the predominant pur-
pose. If that predominant purpose is to
damage another person and damage results,
that is tortious conspiracy.. If the predomi-
nant purpose is the lawful protection or pro-
motion of any lawful interest of the combiners,
it is not a tortious conspiracy, even though it
causes damage to another person.”

Section 6A (2) of our Trade Unions Act, 1939,
provides in substance that the common law which
renders actionable per se damage resulting from #
conspiracy to injure shall not be applicable to acts,
otherwise lawful, which are done in contemplation
or furtherance of « trade dispute.
section is, I think, to relieve persons acting in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute of
the onus of showing that the predominant object
of their combination is to forward or defend their
own legitimate interests, even though there also
appear to be other objects in mind. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the protection of the
section does not extend to the adoption of means
which are in themselves unlawful, in the carrying
out of the objects of the combination.

Section 7 of our Act is identical with section 2
of the United Kingdom Trade Disputes Act, 1906,
and its protection applies only where the watching
and besetting (or the “ picketing” as it is sometimes
for convenience called) is for one or more of the
purposes mentioned; it does not apply where there
is no such purpose. The “ peaceful persuasion”
expressly authorised is confined to inducing any
person to work or abstain from working. In this
connection Mr. Citrine, at p. 439 of his book,
comments as follows: ‘“ For example, it 1s con-
sidered that it would not cover the picketing of a
theatre or retail shop with the object of persuading
patrons or customers to boycott it.” At p. 440
he adds:—

¢ Although the section does not, in terms,
authorise picketing with the object of
peacefully persuading customers to boy-
cott, this object may in effect, be accom-
plished under the provisions relating to
the obtaining or communicating of in-
formation. The section does not require
that the information should have reference
to the question of working or abstaining
from working. Thus, if pickets confine
themselves to publishing, by word of
mouth or by means of placards or
handbills, accurate information as to the
nature of the dispute, the section will
cover them in the normal way. It is
probable also that they would still be
covered by the section if they were
merely to ‘invite’, as opposed to ‘per-

The effect of the

suade’, the customers not to deal with
the establishment. The distinction be-
tween inviting and persuading is impossi-
ble of definition. It is a question of
degree, and much will depend upon the
actual conduct of the pickets and the
statements made. It is, however, sub-
mitted that the mere exhibition of a
notice setting out the facts and saying
‘In view of these facts we invite you not
to deal here’ would amount to a mere.
invitation.”

Other passages from Citrine worth quoting in
connection with this section appear at p. 427: ‘No
doubt some forms of picketing, such as continually
marching to and fro in front of a shop window,
carrying placards or chanting in unison, might
amount to common Jaw nuisances. It is in such
cases that the section is of advantage to those
picketing. In Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Com-
missioners, (1908) 2 I.R. at p. 225, Madden, J.,
summarised the position in these words: ‘The
effect of this section, read in the light of antecedent
legislation, is in my opinion perfectly clear. It
legalised for the first time by positive enactment, a
course of action which might otherwise, 7f carried
out in a certain manner, have amounted to a
nuisance at common law, provided that such a
course of action is resorted to merely for effecting
certain specified peaceful purposes ’.......... All that
can be said is that the section may be assumed to
legalise such acts as are reasonably necessary to the
carrying out of lawful picketing, even though those
acts might constitute a degree of annoyance which
would otherwise be sufficient to support an action
at common law.”

With these general observations on the law, I
will now return to the evidence in this case.

The Minutes of a meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Antigua Trades & Labour Union
held on 9th September, 1955, show that the
decision to picket the pluintiffs’ business premises
was taken at that meeting, the resolution being in
the following terms:— :

‘Be it resolved that provided up to
the time of the publication of the Board’s
award the dispute between Miss O’Neal
and the Trade Union is not settled, the
General Secretary should take the neces-
sary steps to picket the business
premises.”

These Minutes disclose that the defendants
Bird, Lake, Carrot, Levi Joseph, Richards and
Hurst attended that meeting. The defendant
Ireland, who is also a member of the Executive
Committee, was not present, but he attended
subsequent meetings when the picketing was in
progress and was disctssed, and this case has
throughout been conducted on the footing that his
responsibility for the initiation and continuance of
the picketing is no less than that of any of the
other members of the Executive Committee of the



Union. The remaining defendant, Joseph Samuel,
ig not a member of the Committee and there is
nothing to indicate that he attended any of its
meetings.

The witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiffs
were: the plaintiff Gertrude O’Neal; her sister,
Linda O'Neal, Victoria Frederick and Clarine
Knight, all of whom work as clerks in the Drug
Store; Cardigan Stevens, Comptroller of Customs,
Antigua, whose offices throughout the picketing
have been close to the plaintiffs’ premises; Iris
Barrow, clerk at Jos. Dew & Son, a firm in the
vicinity of the plaintiffs’ premises; Veronica
Harris, a school girl who was sent on an errand to

O’Neal’s Drug Store; Neville Lowen, a wood-.

carver, who sells his goods to the plaintiffs and
visits their business premises regularly; Assistant
Superintendent Blaize and Sergeant Roberts, both
of the Leeward Islands Police Force; and Clement
Neison, a carpenter, who deals with ONeal’s

Drug Store.

The witnesses for the defence were: the
defendant Hurst, General Secretary (and as such
chief executive Officer) of the Union; Joseph
Huches, a clerk of the Magistrate’s Court which
occupies the upper storey of a building opposite
O’Neal’s Drug Store; the defendant Levi Joseph,
who holds the post of Organiser in the Union;
Joseph Laurent, a former druggist of O’Neal’s
Drug Store; the defendant Lake, Second Vice-
President of the Union; Ernest Athill, a carpenter,
and Norris Abbott, estate manager, both of whom
are customers of the Drug Store.

Evidence was given by the defendants Hurst
and Levi Joseph to the effect that at some time
after the meeting of the Executive Committee of
the Union on 9th September, 1955, they engaged
six persons to picket the plaintiffs’ business
premises, and that these persons were given
directions with regard to their duties by the
defendant Hurst.

On the morning of Saturday, 17th September,
1955, at 8 o’clock, the hour at which the plaintiffs’
business premises are normally opened, the pickets
arrived outside the premises. That they were
accompanied by a steel band, playing, and a large
crowd, and posted around the premises by the
defendant Levi Joseph, is beyond dispute. A good
deal has been said about this steel band, for the
presence of which Levi Joseph disclaims all respon-
sibility. From the evidence before me I have no
doubt that the pickets and the band were led to
the premises by Levi Joseph in the manner alleged
by Gertrude O’Neal and Victoria Frederick and
that the installation of the pickets, generally, was
attended by much flourish, fanfare and noise; it
was apparently during this early phase of the
picketing that Cardigan Stevens telephoned and
complained of the din to the Commissioner of
Police. I cannot accept Levi Joseph’s statements
that even at the time of giving evidence in this
Court he knew nothing at all about how the pickets
(who had assembled at his home) happened to be
accompanied by the band, and that the band

simply passed by, without stopping outside the
plaintiffs’ premises.

The pickets were carrying placards marked:
‘Workers must be respected”; “Strike on
here. Protest against unjust dismissal” ; “ Hold
the line. The Workers’ security is challenged ” ;
and “Join the fight against injustice.” As they
walked to and fro outside the plaintiffs’ premises,
the pickets repeated the words written on the
placards, particularly the words ‘‘ Hold the line.”
The only placard to which it seems to me any
objection could seriously be taken is the one
marked “Strike on here. Protest against unjust
dismissal.” There was, in fact, no strike on.
Levi Joseph, who was cross-examined about the
wording of this placard, at first tried to justify its
use by saying: “I call a trade dispute a strike
eawawene .... Because I considered this the last resort
I considered it a strike.” His final explanation,
which was corroborated by the defendant Hurst,
was that the placards were not made specially for
this occasion; Joseph added that the Union does
not possess any placard bearing only the words
“ Protest against unjust dismissal”.

This would be a convenient point to mention
briefly, and as far as possible in their proper
sequence, a number of specific allegations. I will
make further comments on some of them at a later
stage.

Gertrude O’Neal states that on the morning
of the 17th September the pickets, in, addition to
repeating the words already mentioned, were
shouting, ‘‘ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store”;
she says she saw some of the pickets surround
people trying to enter the store and heard Tilton
Theophile, one of the pickets, threaten to knock
down several persons who were attempting to
enter; she did not see the defendant Samuel with
any bell, but on this, as on other days, she heard
him saying “ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store.
You no hear you no foo buy from the Drug
Store’’; during the afternoon, while the pickets
were around the premises, she saw the defendant
Ireland standing on the Post Office gallery just
opposite the Drug Store.

Linda O’Neal asserts that on the morning of
17th September she heard Levi Joseph shouting
“Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store, people;
don’t goin there to buy”, and that later in the
day she saw and heard the defendant Samuel ring-
ing a bell and shouting “ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s
Drug Store, people. Don’t go in there”.

Victoria Frederick says that on the 17th
September, some time after Levi Joseph had
launched the picketing, he returned and told one
of the pickets he must “shout behind people while
they are going in the Drug Store”, and that
pickets shouted accordingly and the people did not
go into the store. She further states that she saw
the defendant Ireland in the vicinity of the plain-
tiffs’ premises practically all day, and that around
2 o'clock in the afternoon the defendants Bird,
Lake, Carrott and Williams came; she saw Mr.







10

Bird speaking to the pickets and heard him tell
one of them that the Curio Shop was also included
in the picketing. After 3 o’clock she saw the
the defendants Bird, Lake and Joseph walking in
the street; they spoke to the pickets.

‘Tris Barrow testifies that on the same 17th
September she went to the Drug Store to purchase
something and one of the pickets shouted at her:
‘* Hold the line. Don’t go in.”

As regards the 19th of September, Gertrude
O’Neal says she heard some people tell the defend-
ant Samuel, who is a local constable, that they
would like to go into the Store to buy but didn’t
want to yet into trouble with the police, and that
Samuel told them they would get into trouble if
they went in; there were policemen standing
around at the time.

Another occurrence concerning the defendant
Samuel on 19th September is related by Neville
Lowen and Sergeant Roberts. They say they saw
Samuel go up to and touch a man who was about
to enter the Drug Store, and Lowen heard him say
“ Hold the line.” It is clear from the evidence of
these very witnesses, however, that there was
nothing hostile in Samuel’s act. It would appear
that he was, as he at the time explained to Sergeant
Roberts, just making fun with a friend, who sub-
sequently entered the Store. Although Lowen
visits the Store daily he has never been troubled
by any of the pickets.

In respect of the 18th of September, one
matter should be noticed, that is, an article which
appeared that day under prominent headlines on
the front page of “The Workers’ Voice”’, the
official organ of the Union. The newspaper itself
shows that it is “Printed and published by the
Antigua Trades and Labour Union at their Office,
46 North Street, St. John’s, Antigua”, and that
the defendant Richards is its Editor. At this
stage I will merely set out the article, with its
headlines: —

“THE FIGHT IS ON: JUSTICE OR
BE DAMNED.

People Must Decide if O’Neals are Above
the Right And Privileges of the
Worker.

The Executive of the Antigua Trades
and Labour Union have broken off
trade relationship with O’Neal’s Drug
Store and open conflict now wages.

Early on Saturday morning pickets were
stationed in the vicinity of the Drug Store in
an effort to demonstrate to the public the
resentment of the Union to the attitude
adopted by the O’Neals in the dismissal of
their Clerks.

Endeavoured

The Union have endeavoured right
through to bring the matter to an amicable

settlement and departed from former proce-
dures by going to the extent of asking for an
inquiry into the Dispute. Even though the
O’Neal’s recognised at first a dispute existed
and attended meeting under the Labour Com-
missioner it seemed that some last minute
adviser prompted them to ignore the whole
question.

They insulted the government by refus-
ing to attend the Board of Inquiry appointed
by the Acting Governor. They were notified
three weeks ago of the recommendations of
the Board and the Government asked the
matter be settled. ‘fo the present moment
they have even refused to acknowledge receipt
of the findings of the Board of Inquiry so
adding further insult tc injury.

Principles

Public opinion has been brought to play
in this case. If it is felt by the O’Neals and
their advisers that injustice should stand
before accepted civilised principles and that
human beings and causes should be treated
contemptuously the public of Antigua will
decide. The ‘Trades Union asked for no
trouble only sought to right a wrong. If the
O’Neals are stronger than the will of the
people the coming days or even years will
decide. The fight is on.”

The next day on which special incidents are
alleged to have occurred is Saturday, 24th Septem-
ber. It was suggested that Saturday was chosen
for special activities because in St. John’s it is the
busiest shopping day. Gertrude O’Neal, Linda
O’Neal and Iris Barrow all testified that the pickets
were particularly noisy that morning, shouting,
among other things, ‘‘ Hold the line. Don’t go
into O’Neal’s”. Iris Barrow states they shouted
that at her, and that around 4 o’clock in the after-
noon she saw a woman on the steps of the Drug
Store and heard a picket tell her “ Don’t go in there.
Don’t goin. Hold the line”, and the woman went
away. Linda O’Neal says she heard some of the
pickets threaten to beat people if they went in,
and that only a few “brave ones” dared to enter.
Victoria Frederick claims that the noise was so
great that morning that she found it “ confusing”.
Both she and Gertrude O’Neal say they heard the
defendant Levi Joseph egging on pickets to shout
louder. At one stage Gertrude O'Neal telephoned
to the Police Station and Assistant Superintendent
Blaize came to the scene. Blaize found Levi
Joseph there with two or three of the regular
pickets, at the time merely walking up and down
saying “ Hold the line”’, and told him of the report
made by Gertrude O’Neal; Joseph said he was just
substituting for a while for one of the pickets and
had not done anything save what Blaize found him
doing; that he understood pickets must not stand
up or they would be “ watching and besetting ”.
A few minutes later, when the defendant Bird was
passing in a car, Blaize apprised him of the report
made. Gertrude O’Neal says that after Assistant



Superintendent Blaize left she heard Levi Joseph
telling the pickets to make more noise, adding and
demonstrating, ‘‘ This is the way it should be
done”. Victoria Frederick says that at a certain
stage on that Saturday, after the defendant Joseph
had told the pickets to shout and they were behav-
ing very noisily, she saw the defendants Bird, Lake,
Hurst, Williams, Carrott and Ireland come to
the corner of Thames and Long Streets. ‘The
defendant Joseph went to the pickets and then to
the other defendants.

Gertrude O’Neal also alleges that one day, soon
after the commencement of the picketing, a Mrs.
Scouten, up to then a regular customer, was
approaching the Drug Store when she was stopped
by a picket and told she was not supposed to come
in; since then Mrs. Scouten has never returned.

Another incident, the precise date of which
cannot be fixed, is reported by Cardigan Stevens.
He says he was going to O’Neal’s Drug Store,
intending to enter through one of the doors facing
Thames Street, and an elderly woman of the
labouring class was ahead of him going into the
same door when two pickets (one a Dominican),
who appeared not to realise that he was behind,
“ converged ” on the woman, shouting at the top of
their voices, “‘ Hold the line”; the woman didn’t
bother with them, and they closed in behind her as
she went into the door, the Dominican shouting at
her ina most threatening and intimidating manner:
“You don’t hear what I say. I say hold the line”.

Gertrude O'Neal says that on 15th October
a young womun coming to the Drug Store was
surrounded by pickets who shouted loudly at her,
and that when the woman afterwards entered the
Store she was “‘almost in a state of collapse”.

Cardigan Stevens alleges that on 22nd October
he was at the Drug Store and saw the Dominican,
already referred to, and two other pickets approach
“in a threatening attitude” a woman who was in
the act of going into the store, the Dominican
shouting “You don’t hear what I tell you”, as
if he would strike the woman; the woman got
frightened and started to tremble and went back to
the street.

Evidence is given by a schoolgirl, Veronica
Harris, with respect to something that happened on
25th October. She says she was sent from the
Red Cross Depot to O’Neal’s Drug Store to collect
a pair of forceps, and that as she and three other
girls with her were approaching the Store one of
the pickets said ‘‘ Hold the line”’; they (the girls)
“took it as a joke and ran off laughing ”; as they
did so they “ butt on each other and fell down”;
her knee got bruised in the gutter. It appears to
me that this girl’s evidence cannot be taken as
proving anything against the pickets.

Cardiyan Stevens further states that on Ist
November he heard Assistant Superintendent Blaize
reprimanding the Dominican previously mentioned,
but did not know what for. Assistant Superinten-
dent Blaize, however, was asked nothing about this
when he was in the witness box.

Il

Clement Nelson’s testimony is about the 11th
of November; he says he was going to the Drug
Store when the defendant Samuel addressed him
thus: “ Nelson, don’t you hear you must not go
there to buy. You is a dog’. He states that
when he left the store Samuel followed him and
added: “You going to want the Union and you
burning your own coals”,

Finally, we come to an incident concerning
the 26th of November. Linda O’Neal alleges that
on that day the defendant Samuel said something
which she did not hear to Mrs. Allen of Mill Reef,
who then asked him what “ Hold the line” meant,
and that he replied it meant that nobody is
supposed to go into the Drug Store to buy; when
Mrs. Allen asked why, he said: “ Miss O’Neal
would not pay the girl the money. She is unfair.”

Turning now to the defence, I will first
dispose of the short witnesses. The evidence of
Ernest Athill and Norris Abbott was to the effect
that since the inauguration of the picketing they
have often been to O’Neal’s Drug Store and have
never been molested or in any way interfered with;
they never saw any misbehaviour by the pickets.
Joseph Laurent said he left O’Neal’s Drug Store
in June, 1955, and in late July opened his own
Drug Store in St. John’s, about quarter of a mile
away from O’Neal’s; quite a few of the customers
who dealt with O’Neal’s when he was there now
deal with him; “things slowed down (at his drug
store) around September; they improved slightly
around October and November”. Joseph Hughes,
whose work requires him to be at the Magistrate’s
Court opposite O’Neal’s Drug Store for two days
of each week, testified that that section of the Citv
is a business section and is always noisy; he has
heard shouting at all times; among other things,

he has heard ‘* Hold the line”.

The only persons called as witnesses by the
defence besides Athill, Abbott, Laurent and
Hughes, were the defendants Hurst, Levi
Joseph and Lake. They emphasised that at no
time did the Union or anyone on its behalf
demand payment of compensation in respect of
Miss Winter’s dismissal; payment of compensa-
tion was a recommendation of the Board of
Inquiry; the Executive Committee of the Union
were prepared to accepi the recommendation as
a means of settlement of the dispute, which
they had done everything in their power to have
settled in accordance with the legislative and
other machinery provided for settling such
disputes; the object of the picketing was
discussed at the meeting of the Executive Com-
mittee held on 9th September, the consensus of
opinion being that it was to pass on information
to the public with regard to the dispute so that

no one would accept employment at O’Neal’s

and so that public opinion might be brought to
bear on the matter; the duties of the pickets
were also discussed at the meeting and outlined
to the General Secretary: the pickets were to
hold placards and pass on information; the
General Secretary was also instructed to take
steps to ensure that the picketing is done ina



1;

eaceful manner; no decision has been taken as
to the duration of the picketing.

In his evidence the defendant Hurst says
he instructed the pickets in accordance with the
directions of the Executive Committee and
frequently visited them to ensure that those
instructions were being carried out; he denies
having ever directed the pickets to tell people
not to buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store.

The defendant Lake states that he also
checked up on the pickets; on two occasions he
went there specifically for that purpose; he
passed by the pickets daily on other business.
Neither he nor Hurst ever witnessed any
misbehaviour. :

As regards the article appearing in “ The
Workers’ Voice” of 18th September, 1955, both
Mr. Hurst and Mr. Lake disclaim responsibility
for its composition; they do not agree it was
intended to insinuate that damage would or
should be done to O’Neal’s trade; they under-
stand the words * broken off trade relationship ”
in the headlines of the article to mean that
“there is a trade dispute and relationship is
broken off.’ The defendant Richards, who, as
already mentioned, is the editor of the
newspaper, did not testify.

I have already made reference to certain
portions of the evidence of the defendant Levi
Joseph. He denies all the charges levelled
against him, as well as having ever given
instructions to any of the pickets as to how
they were to carry out their duties; that, he
points out, was done by the General Secretary;
he maintains that he himself acted as a picket
only on one occasion—24th September—and then
for a few minutes only, in the absence of one of
the regular pickets; he declares that he never
encouraged the pickets to shout loudly and that
he visited them daily and never saw any mis-
behaviour; that 3rd October, at the hearing of
the motion for an interim injunction in this
matter, was the first time he heard it said that
the object of the picketing was to vause people
to stop buying from O’Neal’s, and he
subsequently told the pickets and several other
people that that was not the intention, but he
did not mention it on his loud speaker.

Neither the defendant Samuel—who was
described by some of the plaintiffs’ witnesses as
the head picket, and against whom specific
charges of a serious nature were made—nor any
of the other pickets, was called by the defence.
The case for the plaintiffs is not that the
defendants or any of them were heard planning
to injure the plaintiffs, or anything of the sort;
the plaintiffs seek to prove the conspiracy
through overt acts alleged to have been com-
mitted by defendants and persons employed by
the defendants. Included in the defence is
a complete denial of most of these acts. It
would seem, therefore, that the persons said to
have committed the acts should be in a position

to furnish valuable testimony. Altogether, this
case is remarkable for the number of persons
not called as witnesses. In this connexion,
however, as also in considering other aspects of
the case, it must be borne in mind that the onus
of proof rests upon the plaintiffs. One of the
main lines of attack employed by learned
counsel for the defence was the failure of the
plaintiffs to call the majority of the persons
said to have been interfered with, or the
policemen on duty in the streets. It is common
ground that throughout the picketing there
have always been at least two policemen stationed
in the vicinity of the plaintiffs’ premises. One
explanation suggested by the plaintiff Gertrude
O’Neal is that very many people in Antigua
are afraid of the Union, Another explanation
advanced, in so far as the first group is concerned,
is that the names and addresses of some of the
persons molested are unknown. As regards the
police, it was apparent from the female plaintiff's
gestures when replying to certain questions put
to her in the witness box that she felt that the
police attitude towards the plaintiffs in this
matter was unfavourable; and she expressed
surprise that no arrests were made on 17th
or 24th September. Assistant Superintendent
Blaize testified that on 17th September, the
first day of the picketing, the Commissioner of
Police sent a message through him to the
defendant Bird complimenting the pickets “for
the manner in which the picketing was carried
on.” Exactly what that was intended to convey,
on what evidence the opinion was based, or
whether the transmission of the message became
known to the plaintiffs and in any way influenced
their assessment of the police attitude. is
not clear.

Another argument urged by Mr. Barrow
was that the witnesses called by the plaintiffs
are biased against the Union. Victoria l’rederick
once worked at the Co-operative Store run by
the Union and was dismissed; she admits that
she considered the action of the Mxecutive
Committee of the Union in dismissing her
“very unfair.” Iris Barrow is a ‘ good”
personal friend of the Misses O’Neal; some years
ago Joseph Dew & Son’s, whore she works, was
picketed; the dispute in that instance was over
the dismissal of a clerk by her brother. Clement
Nelson was at one time Chairman of the Munici-
pal Workers Section of the Union; he was
removed from office with the promise, he says,
that he would be promoted to the post of District
Steward but declined the promotion as he
“saw tricks in it’; he owns to being opposed
to the policy of the officials of the Union and
says he will do all in his power to destroy that
policy. Cardigan Stevens is another personal
friend of the O’Neal family; on one occasion,
during an altercation unconnected with this case,
he told the defendant Ireland that he considered.
the Union was doing things that were wrong;
he further states that on » certain day, after the
Dominican picket had made threats of personal
violence to Linda O’Neal because she softly



repeated ‘‘Hold the line”, he told the picket
he “would take pleasure in kicking” him.
That is hardly a remark that one would expect
from a person in Mr. Stevens’ position under
any circumstances; and it was urged by Mr.
Barrow as indicative of animosity. It should
however be remembered that the suggestion
put to Stevens under cross-examination was
that he had said he would take pleasure in
thumping the Dominican picket; it was Stevens
himself who volunteered the information that
the word he used was ‘“ kick.”. Whatever else
may be said of the matter, it does not seem to
me to point to untruthfulness on the part of
the witness.

Having given careful attention to these and
the other arguments advanced by learned counsel
for the defence, I am, nevertheless, after the
fullest consideration of the evidence of all the
witnesses I have had the opportunity of hearing
and observing, of the opinion that the particular
incidents mentioned by .me as having been
related by Gertrude O’Neal, Linda O'Neal,
Victoria Frederick, Cardigan Stevens and _ Iris
Barrow did take place, and that their accounts
of them are substantially correct; these persons
impressed me as being essentially truthful
witnesses, whatever their feelings towards the
Union. Their evidence shows, among other
things, that from the inception of the picketing
the pickets who were sent by the defendants to
carry out the objects of the picketing, and who
were instructed in their duties by the defendant
Hurst and posted and supervised by the defendant
Levi Joseph (both of whom were present when
the whole subject of the picketing was discussed
in Hxecutive Committee), have been telling
people in forceful language that they must not
buy from O’Neal’s. The same idea appears to
be insinuated by ‘The Workers’ Voice” in the
third headline to the article of 18th September

Although none of the clerks in the plaintiffs’
employment are members of the Union, and
there is no evidence to indiente that any further
clerks are required, the picketing is still on;
up to the time of the hearing of this case no
decision had been taken with regard to its
duration. The number of pickets has been
reduced to three; at a certain stave it was six,
but never as many as twelve, as suggested in
paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim.

It is clear that although the predominant
object of the picketing here is the furthering by the
defendants of their own interests, there are other
objects in mind and that unlawful means amounting
to obstruction, coercion, intimidation and threats of
personal violence have been used.

Mr. Barrow contends that even though the
pickets were employed by the defendants other
than Samuel and sent by them to picket the
plaintiffs’ premises, and even though the picketing
be held to be outside the protection of section 7 of
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, owing to the use of
illegal means, the defendants (other than Samuel

13

presumably) are not liable in law because they do
not stand in the relationship of master and servant
to the pickets and did not authorise the illegal
means in question. The implications of that
proposition, in the setting of the present case,
appear to me to be somewhat startling. It would
mean that people could employ men of straw to
picket premises and could, when damage results
and actions are brought for acts done in furtherance
of picketing, simply themselves say, ‘“‘ We authorised
the picketing in this way and not in that, therefore
we are not liable.” In my opinion the defendants
vis-a-vis the pickets do stand in the relationship of
master and servant; the pickets were engaged by
them and are subject to their control and may be
dismissed by them; these, I think, are the essential
ingredients of the relationship of master and
servant. But even if there be no such relationship,
it seems to me that on the evidence here Mr.
Barrow’s submission could not be sustained.

In Ward, Lock, and Co. (Lid.) v. The
Operative Printers’ Assistants’ Society and another,
(1906) 22 T.L.R. 827, the defendants stationed
pickets to watch the plaintiffs’ printing works and
to induce the workmen employed by the plaintiffs
to join the union and then to determine their
employment by proper notices, the object being to
compel the plaintiffs to become employers of union
men and to abstain from employing non-union
men. In an action for damages for wrongfully
and maliciously procuring and inducing workmen
employed in the plaintiffs’ printing works to break
their contracts of service with the plaintiffs, and for
nuisance and for an injunction, the Court of Appeal
held unanimously that the picketing was entirely
lawful both at common law and under the 1875
U.K. Act. Special attention has been asked to

the following passage from the judgment of
Moulton, L.J.:—

“Throughout the discussion the defend-
ants have been described as seeking to
“compel” the plaintiffs to pay union
wages and to employ union men because
they tried to get all the operatives they
could into the union, so that the plain-
tiffs would find no non-union men to
employ. If this be @ proper use of the
word ‘*compel”’, it certainly carries with
it no wrongful character. In the year
1898 the Legislature forbade the employ-
ment of children under the age of 11 as
half-timers. Supposing that prior to that
Act, a “public association” had been
formed to induce parents not to send
their children as half-timers before the
age of 11. No more legitimate, and
perhaps no more laudable object of an
association could be imagined, and it
would not lose its legitimate character by
reason of its success. But its success
would pro tanto, and its complete success
would absolutely, prevent those masters
who were desirous of employing young
half-timers at, we may presume, corres-
pondingly low wages from doing so, and
would “compel” them to employ exclu-



14

sively persons of 13 years old or upwards.
Yet no wrong would have been done to
such masters; and in, the same way no
wrong would have been done to the
plaintiffs in the present case if the
defendants had succeeded in persuading
every printers’ assistant in the country to
join the union and they had rendered it
impossible for the plaintiffs to get men to
work for them on the terms they desired.
The error arises probably out of an
incorrect use of language. It is inaccurate
to say that the masters have a right to
employ men on any specific terms. They
have only a right to employ such, if any,
as are willing to accept those terms, and
no wrong is done them by any one who
by lawful means lessens the number of
those willing to accept them. The right
of the plaintiffs to try to persuade a man
to accept and the right of the defendants
to try to persuade a man to refuse appear
to me to be rights of freedom of individual
action equally lawful and equally deserv-
ing of the protection of the law, so long
as the means employed are lawful and
right. Both become unlawful if the
means employed are wrongful.”

Ward, Lock & Co. (although decided before
the 1906 U.K. Act) is, I think, good authority for
saying that even though the effect of picketing be
to compel the plaintiffs to do something they have
a legal right to refrain from doing, that of dtsel/
would not render the picketing unlawful. But it
would be a mistake, I think, to assume that Ward,
Lock & Co. decided any more than that. In that
ease the pickets did nothing beyond obtaining or
communicating information. The ground on which
the Court allowed the appeal is indicated in a later
passage of the judgment delivered by the same
Lord Justice:

“but in my view that which decides the
question is that there is no evidence of
any improper or illegal acts, or, indeed,
of any acts whatever, by any pickets sent
by the defendants during this period.
There oan, therefore, be no pretence that
the plaintiffs have established anything
which would give to them a good cause
of action in respect of the picketing
complained of. I wish to add that, in my
opinion, there is throughout a complete
absence of evidence of anything in the
nature of picketing or besetting which
could constitute a nuisance. It appears
that the discharged workmen loitered
about for a day or two after leaving
work—a thing which is not unlikely to
happen—and that they were at times
joined by others, but there is no sugges-
tion even by the plaintiffs’ witnesses that
any annoyance or molestation took place,
and the evidence to the contrary is
overwhelming.”

This quotation from the judgment of Moulton,
L.J., shows the vast difference between the facts in
that case and the facts as I find them here. In
the present case there were acts of obstruction,
coercion und intimidation and threats of violence.
Furthermore, there is abundant evidence of “ per-
suading”’ (as opposed to “ inviting”) other than
persuasion of any person ‘to work or abstain from
working ” (q. v. sec. 7 Trade Unions Act), and the
repeated shouts and other noises of the pickets and
the degree of annoyance inflicted on the plaintiffs
by the pickets’ general behaviour clearly went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to the carry-
ing out of lawful picketing; as regards this further
aspect of the picketing, the evidence, in my opinion,
points conclusively to at least connivance on the
part of the defendants. On the first day of the
picketing one of the defendants who had attended
the Committee meeting at which the method of
picketing was discussed, instructed the pickets that
they were to “shout behind” people who were
ubout to enter the store; he himself took part in
loud shouting on more than one occasion; at a
certain stage he actually demonstrated how the
shouting should be done and made the pickets shout
more loudly than they were then doing.

‘As already mentioned, the defendant Samuel
is not a member of the Executive Committee of
the Union and did not attend the meetings of the
Committee. It is not however disputed that he
combined with the other defendants for the purposes
of the picketing of the plaintiffs’ premises.

That some damage has been caused to the
plaintiffs by the unlawful means from time to time
used in this case is manifest. But it was argued
by Mr. Barrow that the plaintiffs having failed to.
aver in their pleadings that the defendants
‘“‘threaten and intend” to repeat the illegal acts
complained of, are not entitled to an injunction.
Mr. Harney replied that the Statement of Claim
was drawn up in accordance with Form 13 at page 38
of volume 7 of Lord Atkins’ Encyclopaedia of Court
Forms and Precedents in Civil Proceedings and
that that particular Form, which is stated to be
based on the claim for conspiracy to injure by
unlawful means in the well-known case of Lyons
(J) & Sons v. Wilkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 255, contains
no such averment. Mr. Harney also invited
attention to the wording of his Statement of Claim
(dated 21st October 1955), and particularly to
paragraph 6 thereof wherein it is alleged that the
wrongful acts have been done “daily from the
17th day of September, 1955.” In my opinion a
pleader desiring an injunction should always, ea
abundanti cautela, insert the conventional words
leading to an application for an injunction, but the
authorities show that failure to insert them will
not be fatal where an intention to repeat the illegal
acts complained of can be readily inferred from the
nature of the case or the facts already pleaded.
(See, for example, Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles,
20 Ch. D. at p. 195). I think the inference can
here be drawn.



In a case of the kind now before me the
damages are at large; once actual financial loss is
proved (and that has been done), the Court may
award a sum appropriate to the whole circum-
stances of the tortious wrong inflicted (Prati v.
British Medical Association, 1919, 1 KB. 244).

As regards the extent of the pecuniary loss
suffered by the plaintiffs through the picketing,
evidence was given by Gertrude O’Neal of a
substantial decrease in the volume of their trace
since the commencement of picketing. One would
have thought that the plaintiffs, who are now
pressing for heavy damages, would have come
prepared with properly made up account books to
support their claim. Even when Mr. Barrow
called for such books, however, they failed to
produce satisfactory accounts to show their actual
sales subsequent to and immediately preceding the
institution of the picketing. The evidence of
Clarine Knight that since the picketing she has
“missed” regular customers, can hardly be
regarded as impelling. She mentioned only two
names, and there is no proof nt all as to the real
reasons of these two persons for ceasing to buy
from O’Neal’s. Mr. Barrow suggested that they
may, for reasons altogether. unconnected with the
picketing, have transferred their patronage to the
new drug store opened by Laurent, formerly
druggist at O’Neal’s. Laurent’s testimony was to

~

0

the effect that others have done so. I am not
unmindful of yet another possibility, and that is
that some people, without ever having gone near
to the pickets, may nevertheless feel that Miss
Winter’s cause merits their support and may of
their own free will have taken away their patron-
age from the plaintiffs’ stores.

There will be judgment for the plaintiffs
against the defendants jointly and severally for
£80 and an injunction will be granted restraining
the defendants their servants and agents from
watching and besetting the business places of the
plaintiffs situate at the corners of Long and Thames
Streets and High and Thames Streets, St. John’s,
The defendants must also pay the plaintiffs’ costs
excluding the costs of and incidental to the joining
of the defendant Hurst as a defendant, the Court
having already ordered that those costs should in
any event be paid by the plaintiffs, and excluding
also the costs of and incidental to the two applica-
tions for an interlocutary injunction, in respect of
which each party must bear his own costs, the
plaintiffs having failed to obtain such interlocutary
injunction partly through their own fault.

W. A. Date,
Puisne Judge.
3rd January, 1956.

ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M, BLACKMAN,
Government Printer—By Authority.
1956.

[Price 20 cenis.]



No. 9 of 1955. Protection of Trees and
Conservation of Soil and Water.

[L.8.]
I Assent,
K. W. Bracknurne,

Governor.
7th December, 1955.

VIRGIN ISiLANDS,
No. 9 of 1955.

An Ordinance ‘to amend the protection of
Trees and Conservation of Soil and Water
Ordinance, 1954.

KNACTED by the Legislature of the Virgin
Islands.

1. This Ordinance may be cited as the
Protection of Trees and Conservation of Soil and
Water (Amendment) Ordinance, 1955, and shall
be read as one with the Protection of Trees and
Conservation of Soil and Water Ordinance, 1954,
hereinafter called the Principal Ordinance.

2. Subsection (2) of section 4 of the
Principal Ordinance is hereby amended by the
insertion between the word “Council” and the
full-stop at the end of the subsection of the
following words and comma “as to the necessity
for making the order, the extent to which it
should be made and the conditions which it
should include’”’.

3. Section 8 of the Principal Ordinance is
? i _ * :
hereby amended by the deletion therefrom of the
words “after due notice has been given to the
owner or occupier thereof” and the substitution
therefor of the words ‘‘ without notice’,

VIRGIN
ISLANDS,

Short title.

8/1954.

Amendment of
seotion 4 (2)
of the Princi-
pal Ordinance,

Amendment
of section 8 of
the Principal
Ordinance,



VIRGIN 2 Protection of Trees and No. 9 of 1945.
IsLanps. Conservation of Soil and Water.

Substitution 4. The following is hereby subitituted for

ofseotion 10 section 10 of the Principal Ordinance:—
of the Prinoi-

pal Ordinance.

“Liability for 10. (1) Where after the publication of

offences coni- - : .

mitted after ®n Order declaring any private land or por-

publication of tion thereof to be a protected area or a

protection f ee 7 : 7 sth ..

orders. orestry area or a water area, as the case may
be, any person commits on the said land or
portion thereof any act contrary to the
provisions of this Ordinance, the person
committing such act and every owner or
occupier of such land or portion thereof who
in any way directly or indirectly contributes
to the commission of such act shall be guilty
of an offence.

(2) An owner or occupier of any land
or portion thereof shall be deemed to have
contributed to the commission of an offence
on the said land or portion thereof contrary to
subsection (1) of this section if he does not
with all due diligence and to the best of his
ability give such information or evidence
within his knowledge us may lead to the
discovery of the person so oltending.”’.

Amendment of 5. Subsection (1) of section 12 of the
section 12(1) Dpinas ; - bharalhe i
of the Princ, Etincipal Ordinance is hereby amended by

pal Ordinance.

(a) the insertion of the word “ author-
ised” between the word “any” and the
word ‘‘ person” appearing in line 1;

(6) the insertion of the words “ protected
area or” between the word “any” and the
word “forestry’’ appearing in line 3; and

(c) the addition after the full-stop at
the end of the subsection of the following:
“In this subsection ‘authorised person’ means
the Commissioner or the owner of the protected
area, forestry ares or water area concerned,
or such persons as they may respectively
depute. ”.



No. 9 of 1955. Protection of Trees and - _ $8 Virein
Conservation of Soil and Water. ISLANDS.

6. Section 14 of the Principal Ordinance is Amendmentof -

5 ‘ 7 section 14 of
hereby amended by the Principal

: . . Ordinance.
(a) the insertion of the words ‘and

approved” between the word “made” and
the word “under” appearing in line 1 of
subsection (3);

(6) re-numbering subsection (3) as sub-
section (+); and

(c) the insertion of the following as sub-
section (3) of the section—

(3) No regulation made under the
provisions of subsection (1) of this
section shall have effect unless und until
it has been approved by a resolution of
the Legislative Council.”.

H. A. C. Howarp,
President.

Passed the Legislative Council this 20th day
of September, 1955.

H. O. Creque,
Clerk of the Council.



ANTIGUA
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. BhnackMay, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1956.

47/00213—550—1.56. [Price 5 cents. }



LEEWARD ISLANDS.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT.

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.
1966, No. ‘1.

Orper or tHe Governor DaTeD January 9, 1956 DECLAR-
Ing THAY THE Executive CouncIL ror THE COLONY
CONSTITUTED IN PURSUANCE OF THE Roya Iystruc-
TIONS OF 1936, AS AMENDED, SHALL CEASE. TO EXIST.



1. Short Title. This Order may be cited as the
Leeward Islands Federal Executive Council (Cessation)
Order, 1956.

2, Date of Cessation of Existence of Execu-
ive Council. From the 18th day of January, 1956, the
Executive Council for the Colony of the Leeward Tslands
constituted in pursuance of the Royal Instructions mentioned
in the Schedule hereto shall cease to be the Executive Council
for the Colony.
SCHEDULE.

Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to
the Governor and Commander in Chief of the Leeward Islands and
dated the seventeenth day of November, 1936.

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the twenty-eighth day of December, 1939.
amending the aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of
November, 1936. :

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the twelfth day of July, 1943, amending the
aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936.

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the thirtieth day of December, 1950, amending the
aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936.

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the twenty-second day of February, 1952,
amending the aforessid Instructions of the seventeenth day of
November, 1936.

Dated this 9th day of January, 1956.

K. W. BrackBURYE,
Governor.



ANTIGUA,
Printed at the Governmnet Printing Oflice, Leeward Islands,
by BE. M. BhackMan, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1956.

18/00052—-500—1.56. [Price 3 cents.]



LEEWARD ISLANDS.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT.

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDEKS.
1956, No. 2.

PENSIONABLE OFFICES.

The Pensionable Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956, dated
January 11, 1956, made by the Governor in Council
under section 2(1) of the Pensions Act, 1947 (No.
12/1947).

1. SHORT TrTLe. This Order may be cited as the Pensionabte
Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956, and shall be read as one with the
Pensionable Offices Order, 1954 (S. R. & O. 1954 No. 56) hereinafter
called the Principal Order.

2, AMENDMENT OF FIRST SCHEDULE TO THE PRINCIPAL
ORDER.- The First Schedule to the Principal Order is hereby amended
as regards the Antigua Establishment as follows:—

(a) by the insertion-under the caption ‘ Administration” of
the words “ Financial Secretary’? beneath the words “Crown

ny,

Attorney ”;

(b) by the deletion of the caption ‘‘ Agriculture and Veteri-
nary” and the substitution therefor of the caption “ Agriculture,
Veterinary and Fisheries ”’;

(e) by the insertion of the words “Fishery Officer” beneath
the words “ Accountant, Peasant Development Services ”’.

Made by the Governor in Council this llth day of January,
1956. ,

A. E, PENN,
Clerk of the Council.

ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. BLACKMAN, Government Printer—By Authority.
1956, ;
59/00005 —480—1.56. [Price 3 vents.)



LEEWARD ISLANDS.

ANTIGUA.

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.
1956, No. 4



Tus Pusnic SERVICE ComMIssioON REGULATIONS DATED
3rp JANUARY, 1956, MADE BY THE (1OVERNOR UNDER
sEcTION 9 oF tHE Pupiic Service Comission OrpI-
NANCE, 1955 (No. 15/1955.)



1. Short Title. These Regulations may be cited as
the Publie Service Commission Regulations, 1256.

2. Interpretation. (1) In these Regulations unless
the context otherwise requires—

“Commission”? means the Public Service Commission
the establishment of which is provided for under
section 5 of the Publie Service Commission Ordi-
nance, 1955;

“ Instructions” means the Instructions from time to time
issued under the hand of the Governor in accordance
with regulation 6 of these Regulations;

“ ublie office’’ means any office of emolument in the
I ; ;
publ service;

“public officer” means the holder of any public office
and includes any person appointed to act in any
such office:

“public service” means the service of the Crown in
respect of the government of the Presidency.

(2) References to a member of the Commission shall,
unless the context otherwise requires, include references to
the Chairman or acting Chairman.

8. Membership of Commission. The Governor
shall by writing under his hand appoint a Chairman (not
being a public officer) and not more than two other persons
to be members of the Commission. At least one member of
the Commission shall be a person who is not a public officer
or a retired public officer.



2

4. Tenure of Office and terms of Service of
Commission. -(1) Members of the Commission shall hold
office during the Governor’s pleasure and subject thereto the
Chairman shall hold office for such period not exceeding two
years as may be prescribed in the instrament by which he is
appointed ; provided that a person shall, if qualified, be eligible
for re-appointment from time to time as a member of the
Commission.

(2) The Governor may appoint any person to act in the
place of the Chairman or any other member of the Commis-
sion in case of his temporary absence or inability to act as
such Chairman or other member.

(3) Any member of the Commission may, if he is not
a public officer, at any time, and, if he is a public officer, with
the consent of the Governor, resign his office by instrument in
writing addressed to the secretary of the Commission who
shall forthwith forward the same to the Governor through the
Administrator and from the date of the receipt by the
secretary of the Commission of such instrument such member
shall cease to be a member of the Commission and the vacancy
caused by such resignation or by the Geath of a member or by
the removal cf a member shall be filled | ry the Governor by
the appointment of another person for the remainder of the
term of office of the member whom he replaces.

(4) The appointment, removal or resignation of any
member of the Comuission or of its secretary shall be notified
in the Gacette.

(5) Out of such funds as may be ue ided by the
Legislative Council to cover the expenses of the Commission,
the Chairman or acting Chairman of the Commission shall be

. e a a * aw
paid the sum of fifteen dollars for each meeting of the Com-
mission which be attends, and every other member of the
Commission, not being a public officer, shall be paid the sum
’ I pe
of ten dollars for each meeting of the ‘Gonithission which he
attends; provided that the maximum amount payable in any
month shall, in the case of the Chairman or acting Chairman,
be sixty dollars and, in the case of any other rember, be
Yi )
forty dollars; provided further that 10 sublic officer hall he
y I
paid any remuneration as a member of the Commission.

(6) Members of the Commission, other than publie
officers, may be paid travelling and subsistence allowsaness at
such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by the



Governor for attendance at meetings of the Commission or
for travelling for other purposes connected with the functions
of the Commission.

5. Oath of Office. The Chairman and members
of the Commission shall on their appointment as such take an
oath or make an affirmation, each according to his conscience,
in the form in the Schedule to these Regulations. Such an

oath or affirmation shall be administered by or made before
a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace.

6. Issue of Instructions. The Governor may by
writing under his hand from time to time issue Instructions to
the Commission prescribing the manner in whieh it shall
perform its functions and for carrying into effect the purposes
and provisions of these Regulations.

7. Record of Meetingsand Decisions. Minutes
of all meetings of the Comrnission shall be recorded and kept
by the Secretary. Copies of such minutes duly confirmed at
a subsequent meeting shall as soon as practicable thereafter
be forwarded to the Administrator for transmission to the
Governor. All recommendations made by the Commission
shall be submitted to the Governor through the Administrator.

8. Quorum and Voting. At any meeting of the
Commission the Chairman or acting Chairman and any one
member shall form a quorum for the transaction of business.
The Chairman or acting Chairman, as the case may be, shall
have a deliberative as well as a casting vote. All decisions of
the Commission shall be by a majority. of the votes of the
members present and voting. Provided that the Chairman or
acting Chairman, as the case may be, shall have a second or
casting vote whenever the voting shall be eyual.

9. Consultation with Persons other than
Members. The Commission in considering any matter or
question referred to it for its advice may consult such Heads
of Government Departments or other public officers or other
persons as the Commission may consider proper and desirable.

10. Appointment of Secretary. The Adminis-

trator shall nppoint a Secretary to the Commission.



4

11. Protection of Members from Legal
Proceedings. The Chairman and any member of the
Commission shall have such and the like protection and
privileges in cave of vny action or suit broneht against him
for any act doe or otitted to be done or words spoken in
the execution of his duty as is by law given to any Judge of

the Supreme Court of the Windward Islands and Leeward
Islands in the exercise of his judicial office.

12, Improper Influence. Any person who other-
wise than in tie course of his duty directly or indirectly by
himself or by any other person in ‘any manner whatsoever
influences or attempts to influence any decision of the Com-
mission or of the Chairman or of any member shall be guilty
of an offence and upcit summary conviction shall be lable to
a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months; provided that nothing
in this regulation shall prolibit any person who may properly
do so from giving a certificate or testimonial to any applicant
or candidate for any public office or from supplying any
information or assistance upon formal request by the
Commission. z

15. Wilfully supplying False Information
to Commission. Auy person who, in connection with
an appieation by any person for employment or promotion
in the public vervice or with any matter upon which it is the
duty of the Comiiission to advise the Governor or any Head
of a Government Department under these Regulations, wilfully
gives to the Counnission or to any member thereof or to any
persou or body of persons appointed to axsist the Commission
in the exercise of its functions or the discharge of its duties
any Informaticn which is false by reason of the falsity of, or
by reason of the omission of, 2 inaterial particular, shall be
guilty of an offence and upon summary conviction be liable
to imprisonment for a period not execeding six months or to
a fine not exceedine one thousand dollars. ,

i4. Commencement. These Regulations shall come
ito operation on the 19th day of January, 195€,



5

SCHEDULE.
Regulation 5.

OATH OF OFFICE.









I, - , having been appointed to act as
Chairman swear
~ — of the Public Service Commission, do — —
member solemnly and sincerely





that I will freely and ithout fear or favour
declare and affirm "~~ vely @ w Mt a ,

affection or ill-will, give my counsel and advice inf connection with
all such matters as may be referred to the Public Service Commission
under the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1956, and that
I will not directly or indirectly reveal such matters to any un-

authorised persons or otherwise than in the course of duty.

SUQMATULe. cee cece eect eee eee eee ee nee e eee crane een neees
Sworn
—_____—-hefore me this day of 19
Declared

Ter err errr ere err Pere ree reer ere eee cece eee eee

Magistrate or Justice of the Pores.

Dated this 3rd day of January, 1956.

K. W. Bracksurnr,
Governor.

ANTIGUA
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. BLacxmMAN, Government Printer. _ By Authority.
1958.

A.C. 13/235—-525-—1.56. Price 8 cents.



ANTIGUA.,

The Public Service Commission In-
structions, 1956, made by the
Governor under Regulation 6 of
the Public Service Commission
Regulations, 1956, (8. R. & 0.1956
ope this 8rd day of January,
1 ;

PART I.
PRELIMINARY.

1. (1) These Instructions may be cited as
the Public Service Commission Instructions, 1956.

(2) These Instructions shall apply to all
members of the Public Service except as provided
in paragraph 15.

2. In these Instructions unless the context
otherwise requires:—

*“ Administrator” shall have the same mean-
ing as in the Ordinance;

“appointment? means the conferment of an
office of emolument in the public service,
whether or not subject to subsequent
confirmation, upon a person not in the
public service; the grant of permanent
and pensionable terms of service in 4
public office toa person recruited and
serving on contract or agreement in a
pensionable or non-pensionable public
office; the re-engagement of a person
on contract or agreement for a further
period in the same or another public
office; the permanent transfer to an
office in the public service of a member
of the Civil Service of the United
Kingdom who is serving on temporary
transfer in an office a the public
service; the paid appointment of a public
officer to act in any public office other
than the office to which he is substan-
tively appointed;

Title and
Application.

Interpreta-
tion,



2

“the Chairman” means the person appointed
under regulation 3 of the Public Ser-
vice Commission Regulations, 1956, as
Chairman of the Commission and shall
include an acting Chairman ;

“the Commission” means the Public Service
Commission appointed under the Public
Service Commission Regulations, 1956;

“Governor” shall have the same meaning as
in the Ordinance; .

“Member” means any person appointed
under the Public Service Commission
Regulations, 1956, as Chairman or
Member of the Commission, and_ shall
include any person appointed under those
Regulations to be a temporary Member;

‘office of emolument’”’ means any pensiona-
ble or non-pensionable post which is
shown under a Personal Itmoluments
sub-head in the current Hstimates of
the Presidency ;

“officer in charge of prison discipline”’, “ the
Keeper”, ‘subordinate officer” and
‘‘ Visiting Justices” shall have the same
meanings as in the Rules and Regu-
lations for the Government of Prisons
made by the Governor in Council on
the {8th day of August, 1909, -as
amended ;

“promotion ”’ means the conferment upon
a person in the public service of a public
office to which is attached a higher
salary or higher salary scale than that
attached to the public office to which he
was last substantively appointed ;

‘“ public office’, “ public officer” and “ public
service’? shall have the same meanings
as in the Ordinance;

“the secretary? means the person appointed
under the Public Service Commission
Regulations, 1946, as secretary of the
Commission ;



3

‘‘ salary ”’ means basic salary;

ce ” .
scale” means a salary scale as from time to
time set out in the Listimates of Revenue

and Expenditure;

“the Ordinance’? means the Public Service
Commission Ordinance, 1955;

‘transfer’? means the conferment, whether
permanently or on secondment upon a
person in the public service of such
publie office other than that to which
he was last substantively appointed
which involves no question of an imme-
diate promotion.

8. (1) The Commission shall advise the
Governor or the Administrator on such appoint-
ments, promotions and transfers of public officers
as are required to be submitted to the Secretary
of State, or the Governor, or the Administrator
for approval:

Provided that this function shall not in any
way affect the power and authority of the
Secretary of State to fill any post of the class
referred to in paragraph 11 (1) of these Instruc-
tions in accordance with the provisions of Colonial
Regulations.

(2) The Commission shall when required
advise the Governor or the Administrator on—

(a) disciplinary procedure in accordance
with such instructions as may be issued by
the Governor;

(b) all recommendations that an officer
should be retired on the grounds of general
inefficiency ;

(c) such other functions as are vested
in the Governor by the Ordinance.

15/1955.

Duties of the
Commission.



Control of
reoruitment,

4

Principles
relating to
selection for
first appoint-
ments and
promotions.

Advertisement
of vacaricies.

Principles and
procedure
apPplicahle to
selection for
promotion.

4
PART II.

's (INCLUDING PROMOTIONS
AND URANSFERS),

APPOINTMEN

4. In order to discharge its duties under
paragraph 3 of these Instructions the Commission
may exercise control over and may be required to
approve all schemes for admission to any public
office by examination, for the award of scholarships
for special training and facilities for courses of
instruction, and over all other methods of recruit-
ment, including the dppoinmucne snd procedure
of Boarils for the selection of candidates. It may
prescribe the manner in which applicaticns for
(rovernment appointments should be made and
arrange for such examinations as may be consid-
ered necessary to be held before any candidate is
admitted to the public service.

(1) In making recommendations for
first ae to the public service, the
Comunission shall be guided by the principle that
prior consideration shall be given to the claims
of suitably qualified local condidates.

(3) In making recommendations for pro-
motions within the public service, the Commission
shall be guided by the principle that prior
consideration shall be given to the claims of
suitably qualified public officers serving in the

Presidency.

6. Where the Commission considers it
necessary to advertise the existence of a vacancy
in the public service, the requirements of the
vacant post and the qualifications necessary for
it shall be settled by the Governor or. the
Administator. The Commission — shall publish
the advertisement, and shall consider any replies
received thereto.

7. (1) Ino making recommendations for
promotions in the public service the Commission
shall consider the clainis of public officers on the
basis of official qualifications, experience and merit.



5

(2) Recommendations for promotion shall
state whether the perscn recommended is the
senior officer in his department eligible for
promotion and where this is not the case detailed
reasons shall be given in respect of each person
in that same department over whom it is proposed
that the person recommended should be promoted.

8. Where the General Orders require that
progress to a higher point in a salary scale is
dependent on the results of an efficiency bar
examination, the Commission shall arrange and
conduct the said examination in accordance with
a syllabus prepared by the Commission and
published in the Gaceite.

9. The principles and procedure for mak-
ing recommendations for paid acting appointments
shall be the same as that prescribed in these
Instructions for making a promotion. When
recommending an acting appointment it shall be
stated whether or not the officer recommended
for acting appointment is in every way qualified
to perform all the duties of the office in which he
is to act.

10. When it is necessary to make an
appointment, promotion or transfer, the proce-
dure prescribed in paragraphs 1] and 12 of these
Instructions shall be followed except that, where
any delay involved in carrying’ out such procedure
is likely to cause serious inconveniences, the
Governor or the Administrator shall report the
matter to the Chairman who may as a matter
of urgency recommend an acting appointment
without regard to that procedure.

li. The procedure governing recommenda-
tions for appointments, promotions and transfers
in the public service shall be in accordance with
the following classification :—-

(1) Crass A--Posts of which the mitial
salary is not less than $4,800 per annum and
the filling of which reqnires the approval of
the Secretary of State.

Efficiency bar
examination.

Principles
relating to
acting
appointments.

Departure
from
procedure in
special
circumstances,

Procedure
relating to
appointments
to be filled
otherwise
than by
examination,



j

(a) As s00n as & vacancy occurs or
is known to be impending, the Governor
or the Administrator shall notify the
secretary and furnish him with details of
the requirements of the post, the qualifi-
cations necessary, and the emoluments
attached thereto.

(6) The Commission shall consider
public officers in the Presidency, in
accordance with the privciples in para-
graphs 5 and 7 of these Instructions.

(c) If in the opinion of the Commis-
sion there is no local public officer suitably
qualified for appointment to the post, the
Commission may seck the advice of the
Public Service Commission in any other
British Caribbean Territory or may con-
sider other local candidates not in the
public service.

(d) The Commission — shall make
recommendations to the Governor for
filling the post in order that the Governor
may submit his recommendations to the
Secretary of State.

(e) Tf the Commission is unable to
recommend the appointment of a candidate
it shall inform the Governor xaccordingly
stating the steps which have been taken
to ascertain whether a suitable candidate
is available and the reasons why a recom-
mendation cannot be made.

(2) Crass B— Posts above scale [ in the
Salary Scales of the Civil Service, the filling of
which requires the approval of the Governor.

(a) As soon asa vaecaney occurs or is
known to be impending, the Governor
or the Administrator shall notify the
secretary and furnish him with details of
the requirements of the post, the qualifi-
cations necessary, and the emoluments
attached thereto.



7

(6) The Commission shall consider
public officers in the Presidency, in
accordance with the principles in para-
graphs 5 (2) and 7 of these Instructions.

(c) If in the opinion of the Comnnis-
sion there is no public officer in the
Presidency who is suitably qualified to fill
the post, the Commission may then
consider other public officers outside the
Presidency and, if necessary, advertise
the post in accordance with paragraph 6
of these Instructions.

(d) The Commission shall then
make recommendations to the Governor
for filling the post.

(3) Crass C—Posts in the graded ser-
vice (scales [ to XIV in the Salary Scales
of the Civil Service) and other posts, the
filling of which requires the approval of the
- Administrator.

(a) As soon as a vacancy occurs
or is known to be impending, the
Administrator shall notify the secretary
and furnish him with details of the
requirements of the post, the qualifications
necessary, and the emoluments attached
thereto.

(6) The Commission shall consider
public officers in the Presidency, in
accordance with the principles in para-
graphs 5 (2) and 7 of these Instructions.

(c) If in the opinion of the Commis-
sion there is no public officer in the
- Presidency who is suitably qualified to fill
the post, the Commission may then con-
sider other public officers outside the
Presidency or candidates selected as a
result of examinations in accordance, with
paragraph 12 of these Instructions, or
may advertise the post.



Vacancies to
be filled by

examinations.

Representa-
tions from
individuals.

Cases not
covered,

Savine's,

8
(d) The Commission shall then

make recom mendations to the Adminis:
trator for filling the post.

12. Where vacancies are to be filled according
to the results of examinations in conformity with
any approved scheme of recruitment the procedure
set out in paragraph 11 of these Instructions shall
not apply. The Governor or the Administrator
shall notify the vacancies to the secretary and the
Commission shall arrange for the holding of neces-
sary examinutions in accordance with the scheme of
recruitinent.

PART TIL.

MISCELLANEOUS.

18. The Commission shall not consider
representations from individuals (including individ-
ual officers) nen when required to do so by the
Governor or the Administrator.

14. Any case not covered by these Instruc-
tions shall be reported to the secretary and the
Commission may refer the case to the Governor
who may issue instructions under his hand as to
how the case shall be dealt with, and the case shall
be dealt with accordingly.

15. Nothing in these Instructions shall—

(a) apply to any member of the Gover-
nor’s personal staff;

(6) apply to any Judge of the Supreme

Court or any Magistrate;

(¢) apply to any office or rank ina Naval,
Military or Air Force constituted by ov moued
under any enactment;

(7?) apply to any appointments to and
promotions in the Oversea Audit Service;



9

(¢) affect the powers and responsibility
conferred upon the Commissioner of Police by
the Police Act, 1951, as amended, and any 12/1951.
regulations made thereunder, in respect of
appointments, promotion and discipline of all
ranks of the Police Force below the rank of
Tuspector; or of the powers and responsibility
conferred upon the officer in charge of prison
discipline, the Keeper or the Visiting Justices
by the Rules and Regulations for the Govern-
ment of the Prisons made by the Governor
in Council on the 18th day of August, 1909,
as amended, in respect of discipline of subordi-
nate officers.

16. These Instructions shall come into Commence-
operation on the 19th day of January, 1956. cia

Dated this 8rd day of January, 1956.

K. W. Bracksurne,
(rovernor.



ANTIQUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. Buackman, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1966,
A.C, 13/235—375—1.56. [Price 15 cents.]



LEEWARD ISLANDS.
SAINT CHRISTOPHER NEVIS AND ANGUILLA

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.

1956, No. 5.

Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into

operation the Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla

Constitution and Elections (Amendment) Ordinance,
1956.



BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS.
A PROCLAMATION.

Kk. W. BLACKBURNE,
Governor.

WHEREAS hy section 6 of the Saint Christopher Nevis and
Anguilla Constitution and Elections (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956
(No. 2 of 1956) it is provided that the said Ordinance shall come into
operation on a day to be appointed by the Governor by Proclamation
published in the Gazette:

NOW, THEREFORE, 1, KENNETH WILLIAM BLACKBURNE,
a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael
and Saint George. an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British
Empire, Governor and Commander in Chief in and over the Colony of
the Leeward Islands and Vice Admiral of the same, do by this my
Proclamation declare that the said Ordinance shall come into operation
on the 19th day of January, 1956.

AND all Her Majesty’s officers and loving subjects in the Presi-
dency of Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla and all others whom it
may concern are hereby required to take due notice hereof and to give
their ready obedience accordingly.

GIVEN at the Government House, Antigua, this 12th day of
January, 1956, and in the fourth year of Her Majesty’s
reign.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!

Printed at the Governmnet Printing Office, Leeward Islands.
by BE. M. BLACKMAN, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1956,
~~ 480—1.46. (Price 3 cents.)



,
ae

Â¥.

LEEWARD ISLANDS.
SAINT CHRISTOPHER NEVIS AND ANGUILLA

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.

1956, No. 6.

Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into
operation the Public Service Commission Ordinance,
1956.

BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS.
A PROCLAMATION.

Kk. W. BLACKBURNE,
Governor.

WHEREAS by section 1 of the Public Service Commission
Ordinance, 1956 (No. 3 of 1956) it ig provided that the said Ordinance
shall eome into operation on a day to be appointed by the Governor by
Proclamation published in the Gazette:

NOW, THEREFORE, 1, KENNETH WILLIAM BLACKBURNE, a
Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael
and Saint George, an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British
Empire, Governor and Commander in Chief in and over the Colony of
the Leeward Islands and Vice Admiral of the same, do hy this my
Proclamation declare that the said Ordinance shall come into operation
on the 19th day of January, 1956.

AND all Her Majesty’s officers and loving subjects in the Presi-
dency of Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla and all others whom it
may concern are hereby required to take due notice hereof and to give
their ready obedience accordingly.

“ GIVEN at the Government House, Antigua, this 12th day of
January, 1956, and in the fourth year of Her Majesty's
reign.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!



ANTIQUA.
Prinved at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands.
by E. M. Buackman, Government Printer.— hy Authority.
1956
—480-—1.56. | Price 3 cents}
-

a.

—_ os



Full Text


Notices,

It igs hereby notified for general

, information that His Excellency the

Governor has issued a Commission to

» the Hon. P. D. MACDONALD, C.M.G.,

appointing him to be Governor’s

Deputy during his absence from

Antigua whilst visiting Montserrat

5 from the 12th to the 17th January,
1956.

The Secretarial,
Antigua.
9th January, 1956.

13/00283



’ In pursuance of the powers con-
ferred upon him by Section 3 (2) of
the Antibiotics and Therapeutics
Substances Act, 1950, No. 9 of 1950,
and Section 29 of the Interpretation
and General Clauses Act, 1955, No. 12
of 1955, the Governor has appointed
the Senior Medical Officer, Antigua,
to be the Licensing Authority in
the Presidency of Antigua for the
purposes of the Antibiotics and The-
rapeutic Substances Act, 1950, as
from the 12th January, 1956.

The Secretartat,
Antigua.
6th January, 1956.

51/00102.

It is hereby notified that Mr.S. E.
‘MERCIER has been appointed to be
a Justice of the Peace in and for the
Presidency of Antigua.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
Leeward Islands.
Sth January, 1956.

43/00005,.

It ig notified for general informa-
tion that the tender for the supply
of 5,000 half-bags of flour for the
month of February, 1956, has been
awarded to Megsrs. 8. R. MENDES
Ltd. Agents for the St. Lawrence
Flour Mills Co. Ltd. of Montreal,
Canada, in respect of the Daily
Bread brand of flour at $4.56 (Can.)

. per bag C. I. F. Antigua.

Administrator's Office,
Antigua. /

5th January, 1956. x




VOL. LXXXIV.

AAW ARD ISLANDS
GAZETTE.

ublished by Authority.

Ae lzTH JANUARY, 1956. . No. 3.





It igs notified for general informa-
tion that the Reports of the British
Caribbean Pre-Federal Commissions
have been released for publication on
the 2nd January, 1956.

2. Copies of the Reports are
available on sale at the office of His
Honour the Administrator in Antigua
and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and the

Commissioner of Montserrat at the
following prices:—
Pre-Federal Fiscal Commission

Report— 72 cents;

Pre-Federal Civil Service Commis-
sion Report— 72 cents;

Pre-Federal Judicial Commission
Report— 36 cents.

Administrator's Office,
Antigua.
2nd January, 1956.
C. 18/00038.

Application for Naturalization
as a British Subject.

Notice is hereby given that AN-
THONY JOSEPH EID of George Street,
Plymouth, Montserrat, is applying to
the Governor for naturalization, and
that any person who knows any
reason why naturalization should not
be granted, should send a written and
signed statement of the facts to the
Commissioner of Montserrat on or
before the 3lst January, 1956.

By Order,
Js. H. CARROTT,

Ohief Clerk.

Commissioner’s Office,
Plymouth, Moniserrat.
22nd December. 1955.



OONFIRMATION
No. 4.

The Secretary of State for the
Colonies has informed the Governor
that the power of disallowance will
not be exercised in respect of the
undermentioned Ordinances:—

OF ORDINANCES,

St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla.

No. 5 of 1955, “The Liquor
Licence (Amendment) Ordinance,
1955.”

No. 11 of 1955, “The Factories

Ordinance, 1955.”

BrE.7>Fr
CYF7 KX



No. 5.

The Governor has, this day, been
pleased to assent to the undermen-
tioned Ordinances:—

Montserrat.

No. 10 of 1955, ‘The Prisons

Ordinance, 1955.” Jan. 7
Virgin Islands.

No. 13 of 1955, ‘“‘ The Interpreta-
tion of Laws (Amendment) Ordi-
nance, 1955.” Dec, 30, 1955

No. 6.



The following Ordinance, Statutory
Rules and Orders and Public Service
Commission Instructions, Antigua,
1956, are circulated with this Gazette
and form part thereof: —

ORDINANCE.
Virgin Islands.

No. 9 of 1955, ‘“‘“The Protection of
Trees und Conservation of Soil and
Water (Amendment) Ordinance,
1955. 3 pp. Price 5 cents.

STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS.

General Government.

No. 1 of 1956, ‘The Leeward
Islands Federal Executive Council
(Cessation) Order, 1956.

1 pp. Price 3 cents.

No. 2 of 1956, ‘The Pensionable
Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956.”

1 pp. Price 3 cents

Antigua.
No. 4 of 1956, ‘‘ The Public Service
Commission Regulations, 1956.”
5 pp. Price 8 cents
“The Public Service Commission
Instructions, Antigua, 1956.
9 pp. Price 15 cents

Saint Christopher Nevis & Anguilla.
No. 5 of 1956, “‘ Proclamation dated
12th January, 1956, bringing into
operation the Saint Christopher Nevis
and Anguilla Constitution and Elec-
tions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956.”
1 pp Price 3 cents
No. 6 of 1956, “ Proclamation dated
12th January, 1956, bringing into
operation the Public Service Com-
mission Ordinance, 1956.
1 pp. Price 3 cents



MONTSERRAT. LEEWARD ISLANDS.

THE LAND sean enn
AC
(No. 11 of 1944).

DECLARATION
Declaration dated December 21,
1955, made under section 3 of the
8 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE.

Land Acquisition Act, 1944 (No. 11
of 1944) for the acquisition of certain
lots of land in the Presidency of
Montserrat required for public pur-
poses.

IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that
the Governor in Council with the
approval of the Legislative Council
of the Presidency of Montserrat con-
siders that the lots of land described
in the Schedule hereto, being portions
of Trants Estate situate in the parish
of Saint George, in the said Presi-
dency, should be acquired for public
purposes, namely, for the erection of
an airfield in the said Presidency, for
the construction of an approach road
to the said airfield, and for the
erection of the necessary air port
buildings.

/ SCHEDULE.
Lot 1.

ALL that lot piece or parcel of
land being a portion of Trants Estate
situate in the parish of Saint George
in the Presidency of Montserrat and
containing by estimation 17.22 acres
and measuring and bounded on the
north-west side, measuring 3,000 feet
and bounded thereon by lands of the
said T'rants Estate, on the south-west
measuring 250 feet and bounded by
the sea, on the south-west measuring
3,000 feet and bounded by lands of
the said Trants Estate and on the
north-west measuring 250 feet and
bounded by lands of the said Trants
Estate, or howsoever otherwise the

same may be abutted, bounded,
known, distinguished or described.
Lot 2.

ALL that lot piece or parcel of
land being a portion of Trants Estate
situate in the parish of Saint George
in the Presidency of Montserrat and
containing by estimation 1.06 acres
and measuring and bounded on the
north-east 356 feet and bounded
thereon by lands of Trants Estate, on
the west measuring 400 feet and
bounded by lands of the said Trants
Estate and on the sonth-west measur-
ing 260 feet and bounded by lands of
the said Trants Estate, or howsoever
otherwise the same may be abutted,
bounded, known, distinguished or
described.

Lot 3.

ALL that lot piece or parcel of
land being a portion of Trants Estate
situate in the parish of Saint George
in the Presidency of Montserrat and
containing by estimation 0.86 acres
and measuring and bounded from the
main public road known as Trants
Byway 1315 feet long and 20 feet
wide bearing 75 degrees to an exist-
ing windbreak, and thon 563 feet and
20 feet wide to Lot 2. This road is
bounded on both sides of its entire
length by the lands of the said Trants
Estate, or howsoever the same may
be abutted, bounded, known, distin-
guished or described.

Js. H. CARROTT,
Clerk to the Legislative Council.
Ref. Ne, 7/00123.

TRADE MARKS OFFICE,
ANTIGUA, 29th December, 1955.

THE ARBORITE COMPANY
LIMITED of 385 Lafleur Avenue,
Town of LaSalle, Province of Quebec,
Canada, have applied for Registration
of one Trade Mark consisting of the
following :—

ARBORITE

in Class 17, that ig to say:— Decora-
tive surfacing panels for surfacing
walls or other surfaces such as counter
or table tops, or other articles of
furniture.

The Applicants claim that they
have used the said Trade Mark in
respect of the said goods for six
years before the date of their said
Application.

Any person may within three
months from the date of the first
appearance of this Advertisement in
the Leeward Islands Gazette, give
notice in duplicate at the Trade
Marks Office, Antigua, of opposition
to registration of the said Trade
Mark.

CECIL O. BYRON,
Acting Registrar of Trade Marks.



In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.





ANTIGUA CIRCUIT.
A.D. 1956.

Notice is hereby given that in pur-
suance of Rules made by the Chief
Justice under Section 16 of the Wind-
ward Islands and Leeward Islands
(Courts) Order in Council, 1939, and
duly approved as therein provided on
the 16th day of October A.D. 1941,
the Honourable the Puisne Judge
selected for the sitting of the Court in
the Antigua Circuit has appointed the
day of the month on which the
ensuing Circuit Court shall git as
follows, that is to say:—

The Antigua Circuit on Monday
the 30th January, 1956, at 10 o’clock
in the forenoon.

Dated the 6th day of January, 1956.

CECIL O. BYRON,
Acting Registrar of the Supreme
Court.



INCOME TAX NOTICE.

The Income Tax Ordinance No.
7 of 1945 (as amended).

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND PENSIONERS.

Any public officer or pensioner
liable to pay income tax whose
income including that of his wife
consists solely of his and/or her
emoluments as a public officer or
pensioner or other allowance from

[12 January, 1956.

public funds, shall deliver a true
and correct return of his whole
income to the Commissioners not
later than the 3lst day of January,
1956. (Section 67 and 8. R. & O.
1946, No. 13).

OTHER PERSONS.

Every person (including a com-
pany) liable to pay income tax shall
deliver atrue and correct return of
hig whole income not later than the
31st day of March, 1956 (Section 67
and 8. R. & O. 1946, No. 13).

AGENTS, TRUSTEES, ETC.

Any person haying the direction,.

control or management of any
property or concern, or being in
receipt of income; on behalf of any
person, whether resident or non-
resident, as attorney, factor, agent,
trustee, curator or committee
should make and deliver to the
Commissioners a return in respect
of such property, concern or income
not later than the 3lst day of March,
1956. (Sections 28 and 29).

GENERAL.

Any person may be considered to
be “liable to pay income tax” if his
income from all sources exceeds one
hundred and twelve pounds ($537.60).

All claimg for deduction from
income tax must Fe substantiated by
the production of receipts or other
bona fide evidence.

PENALTIES.

Any person liable to pay income
tax who fails to make or deliver a
return within the prescribed period
shall be guilty of an offence against
this Ordinance and shall be liable on
conviction to a penalty not exceed-
ing one hundred pounds, and in
default of payment to imprisonment
with or without hard labour for a
term not exceeding six months.
Section 68.

Any person who makes or delivers
a false return or keeps or prepares
any false accounts or particulars
concerning any income on which
tax is payable shall be guilty of
an offence and shall be liable on
conviction to a fine not exceeding
five hundred pounds, or to imprison-
ment with or without hard labour
for a term-not exceeding six months.
(Section 64).

E. G. O. M. BERRIDGE,
for the Commisstoners.



RAINFALL FIGURES.

Centra] Experiment Station,



Antigua.
Month. 1952, 1953. 1954, 1055, 1956.
Jan.to 7th .30 64 92 186 3.64

»
12 January, 1956.] THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. | 9

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND
LEEWARD ISLANDS.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS
AND LEEWARD ISLANDS.

APPELATE JURISDICTION.

Between:—
Ivan Epwarpbs Appellant.
vs.
JosePpH E. Byron
Inspector of Police Respondent.
1954. No. 1—ANTIGUA.
Before:—

JACKSON C.J.
GORDON J.
LEWIS J. (Acting)
1955. December 12, 15.
Mr. S. T. Crristian for the appellant.

Mr. R. H. Lockgarrt for the respondent.
JUDGMENT.

This appeal is from a judgment and order of Date, J., affirming the conviction and sentence of
the appellant by the Magistrate, District A, on a charge that he on the 18th May, 1953, being the driver
of a motor car when abont to stop did fail to draw up us close as possible to the side of the road so as to
allow aclear roadway for passing traffic contrary to Reg. 19 (11) of the Vehicles and Road Traffic
Regulations 1946.

The charge arose out of a collision in Market Street on the 18th May, 1953, between two
vehicles, motor car A.G. 808 driven by the appellant in a southerly direction and motor truck A.G. 159
driven by one Ernest Joseph in the opposite direction. Ernest Joseph was charged with driving
without due care and attention under Sec. 53 of the Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance 1946.

Both cases were heard together by consent of the parties. At the close of the case for the
prosecution, after a submission by Counsel for the appellant, that there was no case to answer, had been
overruled, the defendant Ernest Joseph gave evidence. The appellant, relying on the submission made
earlier, declined to give any evidence and was convicted and fined $5.00 or 14 days Hard Labour.

In his judgment the learned Judge adopted the findings of fact by the Magistrate which,
inter alia were as follows:—

(i) In the position where vehicle A.G. 808 stopped there was a space of 7ft. between the left
front wheel and the Bast kerb of Market Street and a space of 7ft. 10 inches between the left rear wheel
and the East kerb.

(ii) That there was no evidence that at the time of stopping, there was any reason why
A.G. 808 could not have pulled up next to its left hand kerb instead of 7ft. away from it.

(iii) That A.G. 808 came to a halt just before the collision 1.e. that when the front of A.G. 159
passed the front of A.G. 808 the latter was at a standstill.

It is clear from the reasons given by the Magistrate that the conviction was based on the fact
as found by him that the appellant stopped his car Just before the other vehicle reached him. In
arriving at this conclusion he relied on the evidence of Sgi. Roberts and James Dor.

It would appear that the learned Judge was also of the opinion that the evidence established a
prima facie case against the appellant and accordingly dismissed the appeal. A close examination
however reveals that the evidence of Sgt. Roberts and Dor does not lend support to the conclusion at
which the Magistrate arrived. Whether the appellant’s car stopped before or after the two vehicles
came into contact, is a vital point in the case.
10 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [12 January, 1956,

Sgt. Roberts in his evidence stated that in the course of his investigations on the spot
immediately after the accident, that both the appellant and the other defendant told him that the vehicles
collided in passing. James Dor in his examination in chief stuted ....... “As they came together Edwards
(appellant) stopped, truck went on—I called on Goodwin and I saw truck hit against car. When cur
stopped I saw the driver looking in shop........ The head of the truck had passed the head of the car
before the car stopped.” The sworn statement of Goodwin, another witness for the prosecution, that
when the appellant’s car stopped the truck was about 30 ft. away, was contradicted by the witness Dor
and the Magistrate appears quite rightly to have disregurded Goodwin's evidence on this point.

The accepted evidence shows that the appellants’s car stopped after the two vehicles had come
into contact. In these circumsances, if the appellant is guilty of an offence it would incline more to that
of driving without due care and attention than to the offence of which he has been convicted.

In this appeal the notes of evidence sent up by the Magistrate omitted the evidence led for
the Defence in the case against Joseph. We wish to emphasise that in cases where persons are tried

together the whole of the evidence has to be considered on the appeal and should form part of the record.

The appeal is allowed the Judgment and Order of the learned Judge reversed and the
conviction and sentence set aside.

The appellant shall have his costs here and in the Courts below fixed at twenty guineas.

Donatp Jackson.
Chief Justice.

K. L. Gorpon,
Puisne3 Judge.

A, M. Lewis,

Acting Puisne Judge.
15th December, 1955.



ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islunds, by Z, M, BLACKMAN,
Government Printer —By Authority,
1956

[Price 64 cents including Supplement.}
Supplement to the Leeward Islands Gazette

Of Thursday, the 12th of January, 1956.







IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD ISLANDS.

ANTIGUA CIRCUIT.

Suit No. 45/1955.

Between:

JoserpH Rrynorp O’Nkeat and

GERTRUDE O’NEAL

and

Vere Cornwati Birp
Epmunp Hawkins Laker
NoveiLe Ricwarps
Ernest WILitAmMs
Brapiry Carrorr
Joun IrELAND

Levi JOsErH

JOSEPH SAMUEL and
Lionri Hurst

Before:— DATE, J.

Plaintiffs.

Defendants.

HY. ee

K. E. Harney and H. L. Haryry for plaintiffs.

i. Barrow for defendants.

JUDGMENT.

The two plaintiffs carry on business in part-
nership under the name of O’Neal’s Drug Store
at the corner of Long and Thames Streets in the
City of St. John; in the adjacent building, at the
corner of High and Thames Streets, the plaintitf
Gertrude O’Neal also runs a curio shop.

All the defendants, with the exception of
Joseph Samuel, are members of the Executive
Committee of The Antigua Trades and Labour
Union, a union registered under the Trade Unions
Act, 1939.

The plaintiffs’ Indorsement of Claim is for
(1) an injunction restraining the defendants, their
servants and agents from unlawfully watching
and besetting the business places of the plaintiffs;
(2) damages for injury to the plaintiffs’ trade by
conspiracy in pursuance of which unlawful means
were used.

Before coming to the other pleadings I will
set out a general history of the case to provide
the appropriate background to the issues which
have now been joined between the parties to
this suit.

In May 1949 one Avery] Winter was employ-
ed as a clerk at the Drug Store on a weekly basis.
She continued working there until Saturday 11th
June, 1955, when she was summarily dismissed
by the plaintiff Gertrude O’Neal and paid one
week's wages in lieu of notice; no reason was
given for the dismissal.

Sunday 12th June was, of course, a dies non.

On Monday 13th June the defendant Ireland,
a Field Officer of The Antigua Trades & Labour
Union of which Miss Winter is a Member, went
to Miss O’Neal and asked for the reasons for
Miss Winter’s dismissal. Miss O’Neal refused to
give any. Thereupon, according to Miss O’Neal,
Mr. Ireland demanded one year’s pay for Miss
Winter, and this also was refused.

Representations were then made by the
Union to the Labour Commissioner of Antigua
about Miss Winter’s dismissal, and conciliation
meetings under his chairmanship were held at the
Labour Department between representatives of
the Drug Store and representatives of the Union
on 28rd June and 7th July. At both meetings
the Union’s representatives asked for the reinstate-
ment of Miss Winter. The representatives of the
Drug Store said that in dismissing Miss Winter
without giving reasons and paying her a week’s
wages in lieu of notice they were acting within
their legal rights, and that they were not prepared
to consider the claim for reinstatement. At the
second meeting a written undertaking was signed
by Miss Winter to the effect that nothing said
there would be used by her in any case of slander
or libel; the representatives of the Drug Store
then stated five reasons which they said were
the only reasons for the dismissal. These were
examined and severely criticized by the Union’s,
representatives, who expressed the view that they
proved nothing against Miss Winter and did not
justify her dismissal. As the representatives of
the Drug Store persisted in their refusal to
reinstate Miss Winter, the Chairman inquired
whether they would be prepared to consider
settling the matter on a basis other than reinstate-
ment, to which they replied in the negative.

The voluntary negotiations having broken
down, the Union approached Government for the
appointment of a Board of Inquiry under the
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act,
1939, section 8 (1) of which reads thus:

“8 (1) Where any trade dispute exists
or is apprehended the Governor may, whether
or not the dispute is reported to him under
this Act, inquire into the causes and circum-
stances of the dispute, and, if he thinks fit,
refer any matter appearing to him to be
connected with or relevant to the dispute to
a Board of Inquiry (hereinafter referred to
as the Board) appointed by him for the
purpose of such reference, and the Board
shall inquire into the matters referred to it
and report thereon to the Governor. ”

By instrument dated 16th August, 1955, the
then Acting Governor of the Leeward Islands
appointed a Board of Inquiry “to inquire into the
causes of the dispute that arose over the dismissal
of Miss Averyl Winter by the proprietors of
O’Neals’ Drug Store, St. John’s, and to report there-
on to the Governor and to submit to him such con-
clusions, recommendations and observations as the
Board sees fit.”

At the Inquiry, which was held on 24th
August, Mr. E. E. Harney, representing the
plaintiffs, submitted in limine that there was no
trade dispute between Miss Winter and the Drug
Store and that the appointment of the Board was,
consequently, invalid. The gist of his contention
was that the relationship of employer and employee
had been legally terminated by the giving of a week’s
wages to Miss Winter in lien of notice, and that
there could therefore be no trade dispute within the
meaning of the Act under which the Board was
operating. The Board ruled that “the terms of
reference contained in the instrument dated 16th
August 1955 which gave the Board its validity
showed prima facie that there was a trade dispute
existing between the proprietors of O’Neals Drug
Store and Miss Averyl Winter and therefore the
Board had full power and authority to inquire into
the dispute.” At this stage Mr. Harney sought
and was granted permission to withdraw from the
Inquiry, and the plaintiffs took no further part in
the proceedings, but the minutes of the meetings at
the Labour Department, which contained inter alia
the reasons given by Miss O'Neal for the dismissal
of Miss Winter, were produced in evidence and
closely examined.

In its report submitted to the Acting, Governor
on 31st August, 1955, the Board, after setting out
its findings, expressed the opinion that there was no
moral justification for the dismissal of Miss Winter

2

and, using “ asa norm one of the accepted principles
of good industrial relations, that is the principle of
mutual respect and tolerance of human rights
between employer and workman”’, recommended
that the proprietors of the Drug Store be asked to
pay her a sum equivalent to thirteen weeks’ wages
“as a compensation for her dismissal.”

Under cover of a letter from the Administrator
of Antigua dated 6th September, 1955, a copy
of the Report was sent to Mr. Harney for the
information of his clients and himself “and such
action with the view to a settlement of the dispute
as may be deemed advisable.” In the letter the
Administrator also informed Mr. Harney and his
clients that the Acting Governor agreed generally
with the recommendations of the Board. The
plaintiffs ignored this communication, and on 16th
September the Administrator caused the Report to
be published in the local press. The following day
the plaintiffs’ business premises were picketed. The
pickets are still there

This would, I think, be a convenient stage to
set out paragraphs 5 to 10 (the most important
paragraphs) of the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim
dated 21st October, 1955:—

“5. The first seven named and the last
named defendants and each of them wrongfully
and maliciously conspired and combined
amongst themselves (with intent to injure the
plaintiffs and thereby compel them to submit
to the demand of the Antigua Trades and
Labour Union to pay compensation to one
Avery] Winter a former clerk in O’Neal’s Drug
Store who had recently been lawfully dismissed
from her employment by the plaintiffs) wrong-
fully and without legal authority to watch and
beset or cause or procure to be watched and
beset the said business places of the plaintiffs
and the approaches and entrances thereto in
such manner as was calculated to intimidate
customers and prospective purchasers.

6. In furtherance and execution of their
said conspiracy and combination the said first
seven named and the last named defendants
and each of them wrongfully and without legal
authority caused or procured the defendant
Joseph Samuel and other persons to the num-
ber of 12 or thereabouts (hereinafter referred
to as the pickets) wrongfully and without legal
authority to watch and beset the said business
places of the plaintiffs daily from the 17th day
of September, 1955, in such a manner as is
calculated to intimidate customers and prospec-
tive purchasers and to obstruct the approaches
thereto. The first seven named and the last.
named defendants and each of them in acting
as in this paragraph stated acted for the pur-
pose of intimidating and preventing customers
and prospective purchasers from entering the
said business places and purchasing therein.

7. The first seven named and the last
named defendants on several occasions on the
17th day of September, 1955, and on divers
other occasions thereafter attended outside the
said business places of the plaintiffs or in the
vicinity thereof and gave encouragement to the
said pickets.

8. The defendant Levi Joseph and the
pickets have by threats and acts of violence
and intimidation and coercion prevented divers
customers and prospective purchasers from
entering the said business places and pur-
chasing therein. :

PARTICULARS.

(1) On the 17th day of September, 1943,
the defendant Levi Joseph led a steel
band and a number of pickets carrying
placards:to the said business places of the
plaintiffs and surrounded same blocking
the approaches and entrances thereto and
shouting in a threatening manner to per-
sons who attempted to enter the said
business places ‘* Don’t buy from O’Neal’s
Drug Store, A strike is on.”

(2) On the said 17th day of September,
1955, and on several days thereafter the
defendant Joseph Samuel who is well
known to the general public as a local
constable paraded up and down outside
the said business places ringing a bell
and shouting “ Dont buy froin O’Neal’s
Drug Store people. You no hear you
no foo buy from this Drug Store.” And
when people asked why not ? defendant
Samuel told them that the police will
lock them up.

(3) The said defendant Joseph Samuel on
the 19th day of September, 1955,
assaulted a person whose name is un-
known who was attempting to enter one
of the business places for the purpose of
purchasing therein,

(4) The said pickets carrying flags and pla-

- cards with slogans such as ‘‘ Hold the
line the workers security is challenged ”
written thereon attend daily around the
said business places and in a menacing and
threatening manner surround and obstruct
persons especially old men women and
children who attempt to enter the said
business places shouting at them ‘ Hold
the Line.”

(5) The defendant Levi Joseph on the
morning of the 24th September, 1955,
and other pickets conducted themselves
in a boisterous and disorderly manner
marching up and down in front of the
said business places shouting ‘“ Hold the
line” —“ Dont buy from this Drug
Store, Workers must be respected.”

9. In the alternative the defendants and
each of them wrongfully and maliciously cons-
pired with intent to injure the plaintiffs to
create a nuisance and did in pursuance of

their conspiracy create a nuisance by the con-
tinuous shouts and other noises of the pickets
and by obstructing the approaches to the said
business places of the plaintiffs thereby
seriously interfering with the comfort of the
plaintiffs and the ordinary enjoyment of the
said premises by them.

10. By reason of the premises the
plaintiffs have suffered damage—Loss_ esti-
mated at $500.00 up to this date has thereby
been incurred.

The plaintiffs claim against the defendants
and each of them:

(1) Damages

(2) An injunction restraining the defendants
their servants and agents from unlaw-
fully watching and besetting the business
places of the plaintiffs.”

The Defence filed denies any tortious acts on
the part of any of the defendants and continues as
follows:—

6b
Dina sis ab ateemtetetieleciela’s eis gene ibinesleses oe ewe ese casas
Tee errr rrr rere errr rrr rere ere errr eee ccceresccce

If any of the defendants or any other
person did any of the acts complained of in
the Statement of Claim and_ particularly in
paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive thereof in pursu-
ance of any conspiracy or unlawful purpose or
in any unlawful manner as alleged (which the
plaintiffs do not admit) or at all then each
and every defendant for himself denies that
such acts if any were done with his knowledge
or consent or that he authorised in any way
or connived at the same.

9. A Trade Dispute has since the 11th
day of June, 1955, existed between the
Antigua Trades and Labour Union mentioned
in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim, and
the plaintiffs. In furtherance and in respect
of the said dispute the premises of the plain-
tiffs have been picketed. Such picketing has
been at all times carried out in a lawful and
peaceful manner. None of the said pickets or
other persons mentioned in paragraphs 6 to 9
inclusive of the Statement of Claim are the
servants or agents of the defendants or any of
them. If any of the pickets or persons so
mentioned acted in any of the unlawful man-
ners alleged (which is not admitted) the
defendants deny that they or any of them
authorised or connived at or consented to or
permitted such acts to be done.”

At the trial of this action Mr. E. E. Harney,
for the plaintiffs, repeated his submission made to
the Board of Inquiry as to the non-existence of any
trade dispute within the legal meaning of that
term. Both in our Trade Unions Act, 1939, and
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act,
1939, ‘trade dispute”’ is defined thus:—
“trade dispute’? means any dispute or differ-
ence between employers and workmen, or
between workmen and workmen, connected
with the employment or non-employment, or
the terms of the employment, or with the
conditions of labour, of any person.

Mr. Harney conceded that the expression
“non-employment ” in the definition embraced a
dismissal, but argued that in order to constitute
a trade dispute over a dismissal a dispute or differ-
ence as to the dismissal must arise between the
remaining employees and the employer, and not
between the dismissed employee and the employer.
In the present case there is no dispute or difference
between the remaining employees (none of whom
are members of the Union) and the plaintiffs.

If Mr. Harney’s submission on this point is
sound, the defendants would not be entitled to the
benefit of sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Trade
Unions Act, 1939, as amended, which apply only
in the case of acts done in contemplation or fur-
therance of a trade dispute. It is important
therefore to determine whether or not a trade
dispute exists. Should such a dispute be found to
exist, it would then be necessary to consider the
real effect of. sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Statute
on the common law relating to conspiracy and
nuisance. For the time being it is sufficient to
observe that at common law a combination wilfully
to injure, which results in damage to another, is,
with certain qualifications, actionable (Sorrell v.
Smith, 1925, A.C. 742; Corbett v. Canadian
National Printing Trade Union, 1943, 4 D.L.R.
44), and that watching and besetting, if it result iu
damayve may also be actionable as a nuisance, as
an interference with the ordinary comfort of exist-
ence and the enjoyment of premises (Lyons ¢ Sons
v. Wilkins, 1899, 1 Ch. 255).

As a starting point for his submission Mr.
Harney adverted first of all to the United Kingdom
legislation as contained in the Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act, 1875 (388 & 39 Vict.,
c. 86), the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7,
c. 47), the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 & 10
Geo. 5, c. 69), and the Conditions of Employment
and National Arbitration Order, 1940 (S. R. & O.
1940, No. 1305); he drew attention to the absence
of any definition of the expressions “ trade dispute ”
or “workmen” in the 1875 Act, and to the
significant difference between the definition of
“workmen” in the 1906 Act and the definition of
“workman ”’ in the 1919 Act and 1940 8. R. & O.

In the 1906 Act ‘ workmen” is defined as
meaning “all persons employed in trade or indus-
try, whether or not in the employment of the
employer with whom a trade dispute arises”. In
the 1919 Act and the 1940 5. R. & O. “ workman”
is defined as meaning “any person who has centered
into or works under a contract with an employer,
whether the contract be by way of manual Iibour,
clerical work or otherwise, be expressed or implied,
oral or in writing and whether it be a contract of
service or of apprenticeship or 2 contract personally
to execute any work or labour.”

Mr. Harney next cited a number of cases to
show the interpretations placed by the courts on
the expressions “‘ workman” and “ trade dispute”
prior to the 1906 Act and also in cases after the
passing of the 1919 Act; he then submitted that
the definitions of “trade dispute” and “ work-
man” in the Leeward Islands legislation were the
same us those in the United Kingdom Act of 1919
and S. R. & O. of 1940; he hoped in this way to
find support for his proposition that if a dismissal
is lawful (ie., if the period of notice required by
law is given or payment in lieu thereof made) there
can be no trade dispute over it between the dis-
missed employee and the dismissing employer.

The first observation which should be made
on Mr. Harney’s submission is that while the
definitions of “trade dispute” and “ workmen”
in our Trads Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry)
Act, 1939, are substantially the same as the cor-
responding definitions in the United Kingdom Act
of 1919 and S.R.& O. of 1940, no similar
definition of “workman” or “ workmen ” is to be
found in our Trade Unions Act, 1989, which, for
the purposes of the present proceedings, is the
relevant Act. The definitions contained in our
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act,
1939, are expressly stated to be for the purposes of.
that Act, and I am unaware of any authority,
statutory or otherwise, for incorporating them into
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, which is a separate
Act altogether. The only definition of “ work-
men” in the Trade Unions Act, 1989, is that the
expression ‘includes labourers ’’.

The differences in these particular statutory
definitions do not of course have to be taken into
account in considering the cases decided prior to
the passing of the 1906 Act when there were no
such statutory definitions, but even so I can find
nothing in any of the cases cited by Mr. Harney
(whether before or after 1906) which, in my
Opinion, supports his broad legal proposition that
a trade dispute cannot arise between a dismissed
employee and his employer out of a dismissal in
accordance with law. The cases on which he relied
principally were Lyons v. Wilkins (1896) 1 Ch.
834, Quinn «. Leathem, (1901) A.C. 495, Doran v.
Lennon, (3945) LR. 815, and R. V. National
Arbitration Tribunal, Lx Parte Horatio Crowther &
Company Ltd., (1947) 2 All E.R. 693.

Now, in Lyons v. Wilkins (supra) the defend-
ants, officers of a Trade Union, after unsuccessfully
attempting to induce the plaintiffs, who were
leather bag and portmanteau manufacturers, to
raise the wages of their work-people, ordered
a strike against the plaintiffs and picketed their
works. They also endeavoured to get one
Schoenthal, who was a sub-manufacturer for the
plaintiffs, to cease to do work for the plaintiffs, and
on failing to do so they ordered a strike of and
picketed his works. The Court of Appeal held
that the picketing of Schoenthal’s works and the
strike against him for the indirect purpose of
injuring the plaintiffs were illegal acts. A. DL.
Smith L.J., at p. 834 of the report, said:
‘“Was there any trade dispute between
Mr. Schoenthal’s workmen and himself?
None at all What the Union did
was not done in furtherance of a trade
dispute between Schoenthal and his men;
but what they did was to call out
Mr. Schoenthal’s men in order to prevent
him from working for Messrs Lyons, and
thus to compel Mr. Schoenthal who was
willing to work for Messrs. Lyons not to
work for him, and by this means to
injure Messrs. Lyons in their trade if
they did not obey the edicts of the
Union.”

In Quinn v. Leathem (supra) the respondent,
a flesher, carried on business in Lisburn, having as
one of his constant customers Andrew Munse, who
kept a butcher’s shop at Belfast; and the respond-
ent had in his employ assistants who were not
members of the trade union of which the appellant
was treasurer. The members of the union amongst
themselves adopted an unregistered rule that they
would not work with non-union men nor would
they cut up meat that came froma place where
non-union hands were employed. After unsuccess-
fully attempting to compel the respondent to
employ none but union men, they compelled
Munse to stop taking meat from the respondent
under threat of calling out Munse’s men (who
were members of the union) if Munse did not cease
dealing with the respondent. Held: the words
“trade dispute between employers and workmen”
in section 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act, 1875, did not include a dispute on
trade union matters between workmen who were
members of a trade union and an employer of
non-union workmen who refused to employ
meinbers of a trade union.

The facts and decision in Doran v. Lennon
(supra) are summarised at pp. 476 and 477 of
Citrine’s Trade Union Law as tollows:—

“In Doran v. Lennon the plaintiffs were
the owners of retail drapery shops and of
2 boot shop. Asa result of their refusal
to pay statutory bonuses which the union
claimed were payable to the drapery and
boot employees, the union called a strike,
giving inadequate notice and thus causing
a breach of contract by the employees.
The strike was settled after five days,
but the terms of settlement did not cover
the defendants, who were boot employees
and to whom the plaintiffs maintained
that the bonus Order did not apply.
When the defendants presented them-
selves for work the plaintiffs refused to
reinstate them, on the ground that their
employment had been terminated by the
breach. Four months later the union,
conceding that the bonus Order did not
apply to the defendants, demanded their
reinstatement. This was refused, but
was repeated two months later. The
request was again refused and the

5

defendants proceeded to picket the plain-
tiffs’ premises. In an action by the
plaintiffs for an injunction to restrain the
defendants from ‘ watching or besetting’,
Overend, J. held that there was no trade
dispute and that the protection of the
1906 Act (sic) did not apply. He said:

‘If it were otherwise, then every
employee of a commercial firm, who
broke his contract and was dismissed for
cause, would be entitled to picket his
late master’s premises and yet claim the
protection of the statute’.”

We now come to Ex Parte Crowther and
Co. Ltd. (supra) in which workmen employed by a
company of chemical manufacturers through their
trade union had for some time been pressing for
changes in wages and conditions of service; the
company always resisted these demands; then on
26th March, 1947, the company were told by their
suppliers that their supplies of salt would be cut by
50%; on 28th March notice was given by the
company to all workmen employed on the manu-
facturing side of their business terminating their
employment as from 4th April. No question arose
as to this being in any way a notice otherwise than
in accordance with the contracts of service and the
men were discharged from the company’s service
on 4th April. The matter was then reported to
the Minister of Labour and he referred it to the
National Arbitration Tribunal under the Conditions
of Employment and National Arbitration Order,
1940, and they made an award. The company
then moved for « certiorari to remove the award
into the King’s Bench Division for the purpose of

having it quashed. Lord Goddard, C.J., said:—

“Tt was submitted by counsel for the
company that as at the date of the reference
due notice had been given to the workmen
to terminate their employment and their
employment had thereby been terminated,
there could be no trade dispute to refer,
because there could not be a dispute or
difference on any subject between these
employers and workmen as the workmen were
not in the service of the employers, and he
reinforced this argument by reference to the
definition of “ workman” which he submitted
contemplated an existing contract of service
so, as he put it, that there must be some
contract on which the reference could “ bite.”
I cannot agree with that submission. If
effect were given to it, it would mean that
any employer, or, indeed, any workman,
could nullify the whole provisions of the
Order and the object of the regulation under
which it was made by terminating the
contract of service before a reference was
ordered, or even after the matter was referred
but before the trubunal considered it, It is,
in my opinion, quite clear that there was
here a trade dispute existing at any rate
down to the date of the dismissal of the
workmen. That is not in issue, and whether
the workmen were discharged for the bona
fide resson that supplies were cut down or
whether they were discharged because the
company ‘vere not willing to accede to their
demands is, in my opinion, immaterial. If
there was a trade dispute it can, in my
opinion, be referred to the tribunal whether
or not the dispute has resulted in workraen
being dismissed or in their having discharged
themselves. The object of the regulation
is stated to be for preventing work being
interrupted by trade disputes. If the em-
ployer locked out his workmen with a view
to obliging them to submit to the terms
which he wished to impose or the workmen
struck in an endeavour to secure their
demands, there would be, undoubtedly, a
trade dispute. True it is that, unless notice
was given to the workmen on strike or who
were locked out, the contract of service
would not determine unless and until notice
was given, but because dismissal is super-
imposed on a dispute which has existed up
to the moment of dismissal it does not seem
to me to prevent the dispute being referred,
because the dismissal of the workmen in no
way settled the dispute which had hitherto
existed. Supposing a dispute arose whether
the workers in a particular industry or
branch of an industry could be, as the
employers contended, dismissed at an hour’s
notice or whether they were entitled, as the
workers contended, to a week’s notice. There
you would have a dispute connected with the
terms of employment. It appears to me clear
that an employer could not avoid a reference
by the Minister if the matter was reported
to him by discharging his workmen and
saying: “They are no longer in my service,
whether I rightly or wrongly diamissed
them.” If an employer discharges his work-
men witheut proper notice, although the
workmen would have an action tor wrongful
dismissal, they are not from the moment of
discharge in the employer’s service, but if
the contention advanced by the employers
in this case be right the question of what
notice workers in this industry or this factory
should be given could not be settled by the
tribunal. In my opinion, there was here
a dispute which the Minister could refer to
the tribunal and on which the tribunal could
adjudicate.”

Each of these cases is, I think, easily dis-
tinguishable from the case with which we are
now dealing. In Lyons v. Wilkins thee was no
dispute or difference between the person picketed
and any of the people who were working or had
worked for him. ‘The same can be said of
Quinn v. Leathem. In Doran v. Lennon the
circumstances were peculiar; the employees’
employment was terminated by their own wilful
breach of contract, and the picketing that was
started several months later was not in further-
ance of the dispute which had caused the men

to strike. Overend, J.’s dictum, quoted above,
was Clearly limited to “every employee....... icv
who broke his contract’? and was so dismissed
for cause. In Le parte Crowther §& Co. Ltd.
(which, incidentally, was also cited by Mr.
Barrow, contra) a trade dispute was held to
exist over differences between the employees
and the company that arose long before and
down to the date of the dismissal; it seems to me
that Lord Goddard’s remarks were not intended
to apply to a case such as this; if they were,
they would, anyhow, have to be treated as obiter,
in view of the issues then before the Court.
“Tt is an abuse of authorities to extract from
judgments general statements of the law made
in relation to the facts and circumstances of
particular cases and treat them as concluding
cases in which the facts and circumstances are
entirely different and which raise questions to
which their authors were not directing their
minds at all” (Martell v. Cousett Iron Company,
1955, 2 W.LR. 468, per Jenkins L.J). This
same principle was emphasised by Lord Halsbury
in one of the very cases cited by Mr. Harney—
Quinn v. Leathem (supra)-—where he said, at
p- 506 of the report, “every judgment must be
read as applicable to the particular facts proved,
or assumed to be proved, since the generality of
the expressions which may be found there are
not intended to be expositions of the whole law,
but governed and qualified by the particular
facts of the case in which such expressions are
to be found........... .a case is only authority for
what it decides. | entirely deny that it can be
quoted for a proposition that may seem to
follow logically from it.”

In the instant case, Miss Winter had served
as a clerk at O’Neal’s Drug Store for six years;
throughout that period the only leave sl.e had was
two weeks; she was promised long leave early in
1955 but it. was postponed indefinitely by Miss
Gertrude O’Neal owing to the latter’: illness, and
the leave was never granted. When Miss Winter
was being dismissed on 11th June, 1955, she was
not given the opportunity of refuting or explaining
any of the things which caused Miss O’Neal to be
dissatisfied with her. As regards the failure to
give Miss Winter reasons for dismissing her, Miss
O’Neal admitted in evidence: ‘ There could have
been a possibility that she could have gone to the
Union; that is among my reasons for not communi-
cating the matter to Miss Winter.” In the event,
Miss Winter did go to the Union, and on the very
next working day the Union’s representative
visited Miss UO’ Neal and complained—about what ?—
about a difference over nn act done by Miss O’Neal,
as employer, against Miss Winter, as employee, on
11th June, when Miss Winter was yet at work,
relative to her non-employment thereafter. Miss
Winter cannot, in my opinion, be said to have
acquiesced in what was done on 11th June, or to
have forfeited any rights or claims, simply because
she failed to protest or make a scence the moment
Miss O’Neal spoke to her and handed her a week’s

pay in lieu of notice; she is a member of a trade
union and in such matters is entitled to be rep-
resented by the union, which has, or ought to have,
more knowledge than she about the rights, legal
and otherwise, of employees. Miss O’Neal sub-
sequently attended and took part in the conciliation
meetings held at the Labour Department.

I share the view expressed by Mr. Citrine at
pp. 476 and 477 of his admirable little book on

Trade Union Law, that the fact that a dismissal.

may be lawful does not prevent a dispute over it
from being a trade dispute, and that the legality
or otherwise of the dismissal is no more an element
for consideration than is the legality of an employer’s
refusal to improve wages or working conditions in
the normal type of trade dispute. The words
“ whether or not in the employment of the employer
with whom a trade dispute arises”’ in the definition
of “ workmen” in the 1906 U. K. Act—the signifi-
cant absence of which from our Act formed the
main plank of Mr. Harnev’s argument—relate, I
think, to sympathetic action, that is to say, action in
furtherance of a dispute not between the particular
employer and his own workmen, but between
the einployer and workmen elsewhere—e.g., where
workmen consider their own interests threatened by
something being done by another employer and
strike against their own employer to bring pressure
to hear upon that other employer.

On the evidence before ine T find that at all
times material to this action a trade dispute existed
between the plaintiffs and Averyl Winter, repre-
sented by the Antigua Trades & Labour Union.
That being so, it becomes necessary to keep in mind
the full provisions of sections 6A (2) and 7 of
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, as amended. These
sections read as follows:—

6A. (2) An act done in pursuance of
an agreement or combination by two or more
persons shall, if done in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable
unless the act if done without any such agree-
ment or combination, would be actionable.

7. It shall be lawful for one or more
persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf
of a trade union or of an individual employer
or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or
place where a person resides or works or carrics
on business or hnppens to be, if they so attend
merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or of peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from
working.

The classical definition of conspiracy is given
by Willes J. in Mulcahy v. R. (1868) L.R. 3 A.D.
306, at p.317: ‘ A conspiracy consists not merely in
the intention of two or more, but in the agreement
of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means.” Conspiracy may
be both a crime and tort. The tort is constituted
only if the agreed combination is carried into effect
in a greater or lesser degree and damage. to the
plaintiff is thereby caused.

The law with regard to the type of conspiracy
which renders actionable certain acts done by persons
in combination which (acts), if done by an individual,
would not be actionable, is complicated and has often
been the subject of lengthy discussion in the highest
courts. But it is now well settled that at common
law a combination of two or more persons wilfully
to injure another in his trade or business is unlawful,
and if it results in injury to him is actionable. If
the real or predominant purpose of the combination,
however, is not to injure another, but to forward or
defend the legitimate interests of those who enter
into it, no wrong is committed and no action will
lie, although damage to another ensues: there would
then be what has been described as “just cause or
excuse” for the action taken. The latter proposi-
tion assumes the absence of means which are in
themselves unlawful, such as violence or the vhreat
of violence (Sorrell 1. Smith, supra). The following
passage from the judgment of Viscount Simon,
L.C., in the leading case of Crofter Hand Woven
Harris Tweed Co., Ltd. and Others v. Veitch and
Another, (1942) 1 All E.R. 142, at p. 149, shows
the vital points to be considered: —

“On this question of what amounts to an
actionable conspiracy ‘to injure’ (I am assum-
ing that damage results from it), 1 would first
observe that some confusion may arise from
the use of such words as ‘motive’ and
STMEEN TONS Sicncas sere: waiipaudlaievoess There is the
further difficulty that, in some branches of the
law, ‘intention’ may be understood to cover
results which may reasonably flow from what
is deliberately done, on the principle that a
man is to be treated as intending the reasona-
ble consequence of his acts. Nothing of the
sort appears to be involved here. It is much
safer to use a word like ‘ purpose’ or ‘ object.’
The question to be answered, in determining
whether a combination to do an act which
damages others is actionable even though it
would not be actionable if done by a single

erson, is not: ‘ Did the combiners appreciate,
or should they be treated as appreciating, that
others would suffer from their action?’ It is:
‘What is the real reason why the combiners
did it?’ Or, as LORD CAVE, L.C., puts
it: ‘ What is the real purpose of the, combina-
tion?’ The test is not what is the natural
result to the plaintiffs of such combined action,
or what is the resulting damage which the
defendants realise, or should realise, will
follow, but what is in truth the object in the
minds of the combiners when they acted as
they did. It is not consequence that matters,
but purpose. The relevant conjunction is not,
‘so that,’ but, ‘in order that.’ Next, it is to
be borne in mind that there may be cases
where the combination has more than one
‘object’ or ‘purpose.’ The combiners may
feel that they are killing two birds with one
stone, and, even though their main purpose
may be to protect their own legitimate in-
terests notwithstanding that this involves
damage to the plaintiffs, they may also find a
further inducement to do what they are doing
by feeling that it serves the plaintiffs right.
The analysis of human impulses soon leads us
into the quagmire of mixed motives, and, even
if we avoid the word ‘motive,’ there may be
more than a single purpose or object. It is
enough to say that, if there is more than one
purpose actuating 2 combination, liability must
depend on ascertaining the predominant pur-
pose. If that predominant purpose is to
damage another person and damage results,
that is tortious conspiracy.. If the predomi-
nant purpose is the lawful protection or pro-
motion of any lawful interest of the combiners,
it is not a tortious conspiracy, even though it
causes damage to another person.”

Section 6A (2) of our Trade Unions Act, 1939,
provides in substance that the common law which
renders actionable per se damage resulting from #
conspiracy to injure shall not be applicable to acts,
otherwise lawful, which are done in contemplation
or furtherance of « trade dispute.
section is, I think, to relieve persons acting in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute of
the onus of showing that the predominant object
of their combination is to forward or defend their
own legitimate interests, even though there also
appear to be other objects in mind. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the protection of the
section does not extend to the adoption of means
which are in themselves unlawful, in the carrying
out of the objects of the combination.

Section 7 of our Act is identical with section 2
of the United Kingdom Trade Disputes Act, 1906,
and its protection applies only where the watching
and besetting (or the “ picketing” as it is sometimes
for convenience called) is for one or more of the
purposes mentioned; it does not apply where there
is no such purpose. The “ peaceful persuasion”
expressly authorised is confined to inducing any
person to work or abstain from working. In this
connection Mr. Citrine, at p. 439 of his book,
comments as follows: ‘“ For example, it 1s con-
sidered that it would not cover the picketing of a
theatre or retail shop with the object of persuading
patrons or customers to boycott it.” At p. 440
he adds:—

¢ Although the section does not, in terms,
authorise picketing with the object of
peacefully persuading customers to boy-
cott, this object may in effect, be accom-
plished under the provisions relating to
the obtaining or communicating of in-
formation. The section does not require
that the information should have reference
to the question of working or abstaining
from working. Thus, if pickets confine
themselves to publishing, by word of
mouth or by means of placards or
handbills, accurate information as to the
nature of the dispute, the section will
cover them in the normal way. It is
probable also that they would still be
covered by the section if they were
merely to ‘invite’, as opposed to ‘per-

The effect of the

suade’, the customers not to deal with
the establishment. The distinction be-
tween inviting and persuading is impossi-
ble of definition. It is a question of
degree, and much will depend upon the
actual conduct of the pickets and the
statements made. It is, however, sub-
mitted that the mere exhibition of a
notice setting out the facts and saying
‘In view of these facts we invite you not
to deal here’ would amount to a mere.
invitation.”

Other passages from Citrine worth quoting in
connection with this section appear at p. 427: ‘No
doubt some forms of picketing, such as continually
marching to and fro in front of a shop window,
carrying placards or chanting in unison, might
amount to common Jaw nuisances. It is in such
cases that the section is of advantage to those
picketing. In Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Com-
missioners, (1908) 2 I.R. at p. 225, Madden, J.,
summarised the position in these words: ‘The
effect of this section, read in the light of antecedent
legislation, is in my opinion perfectly clear. It
legalised for the first time by positive enactment, a
course of action which might otherwise, 7f carried
out in a certain manner, have amounted to a
nuisance at common law, provided that such a
course of action is resorted to merely for effecting
certain specified peaceful purposes ’.......... All that
can be said is that the section may be assumed to
legalise such acts as are reasonably necessary to the
carrying out of lawful picketing, even though those
acts might constitute a degree of annoyance which
would otherwise be sufficient to support an action
at common law.”

With these general observations on the law, I
will now return to the evidence in this case.

The Minutes of a meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Antigua Trades & Labour Union
held on 9th September, 1955, show that the
decision to picket the pluintiffs’ business premises
was taken at that meeting, the resolution being in
the following terms:— :

‘Be it resolved that provided up to
the time of the publication of the Board’s
award the dispute between Miss O’Neal
and the Trade Union is not settled, the
General Secretary should take the neces-
sary steps to picket the business
premises.”

These Minutes disclose that the defendants
Bird, Lake, Carrot, Levi Joseph, Richards and
Hurst attended that meeting. The defendant
Ireland, who is also a member of the Executive
Committee, was not present, but he attended
subsequent meetings when the picketing was in
progress and was disctssed, and this case has
throughout been conducted on the footing that his
responsibility for the initiation and continuance of
the picketing is no less than that of any of the
other members of the Executive Committee of the
Union. The remaining defendant, Joseph Samuel,
ig not a member of the Committee and there is
nothing to indicate that he attended any of its
meetings.

The witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiffs
were: the plaintiff Gertrude O’Neal; her sister,
Linda O'Neal, Victoria Frederick and Clarine
Knight, all of whom work as clerks in the Drug
Store; Cardigan Stevens, Comptroller of Customs,
Antigua, whose offices throughout the picketing
have been close to the plaintiffs’ premises; Iris
Barrow, clerk at Jos. Dew & Son, a firm in the
vicinity of the plaintiffs’ premises; Veronica
Harris, a school girl who was sent on an errand to

O’Neal’s Drug Store; Neville Lowen, a wood-.

carver, who sells his goods to the plaintiffs and
visits their business premises regularly; Assistant
Superintendent Blaize and Sergeant Roberts, both
of the Leeward Islands Police Force; and Clement
Neison, a carpenter, who deals with ONeal’s

Drug Store.

The witnesses for the defence were: the
defendant Hurst, General Secretary (and as such
chief executive Officer) of the Union; Joseph
Huches, a clerk of the Magistrate’s Court which
occupies the upper storey of a building opposite
O’Neal’s Drug Store; the defendant Levi Joseph,
who holds the post of Organiser in the Union;
Joseph Laurent, a former druggist of O’Neal’s
Drug Store; the defendant Lake, Second Vice-
President of the Union; Ernest Athill, a carpenter,
and Norris Abbott, estate manager, both of whom
are customers of the Drug Store.

Evidence was given by the defendants Hurst
and Levi Joseph to the effect that at some time
after the meeting of the Executive Committee of
the Union on 9th September, 1955, they engaged
six persons to picket the plaintiffs’ business
premises, and that these persons were given
directions with regard to their duties by the
defendant Hurst.

On the morning of Saturday, 17th September,
1955, at 8 o’clock, the hour at which the plaintiffs’
business premises are normally opened, the pickets
arrived outside the premises. That they were
accompanied by a steel band, playing, and a large
crowd, and posted around the premises by the
defendant Levi Joseph, is beyond dispute. A good
deal has been said about this steel band, for the
presence of which Levi Joseph disclaims all respon-
sibility. From the evidence before me I have no
doubt that the pickets and the band were led to
the premises by Levi Joseph in the manner alleged
by Gertrude O’Neal and Victoria Frederick and
that the installation of the pickets, generally, was
attended by much flourish, fanfare and noise; it
was apparently during this early phase of the
picketing that Cardigan Stevens telephoned and
complained of the din to the Commissioner of
Police. I cannot accept Levi Joseph’s statements
that even at the time of giving evidence in this
Court he knew nothing at all about how the pickets
(who had assembled at his home) happened to be
accompanied by the band, and that the band

simply passed by, without stopping outside the
plaintiffs’ premises.

The pickets were carrying placards marked:
‘Workers must be respected”; “Strike on
here. Protest against unjust dismissal” ; “ Hold
the line. The Workers’ security is challenged ” ;
and “Join the fight against injustice.” As they
walked to and fro outside the plaintiffs’ premises,
the pickets repeated the words written on the
placards, particularly the words ‘‘ Hold the line.”
The only placard to which it seems to me any
objection could seriously be taken is the one
marked “Strike on here. Protest against unjust
dismissal.” There was, in fact, no strike on.
Levi Joseph, who was cross-examined about the
wording of this placard, at first tried to justify its
use by saying: “I call a trade dispute a strike
eawawene .... Because I considered this the last resort
I considered it a strike.” His final explanation,
which was corroborated by the defendant Hurst,
was that the placards were not made specially for
this occasion; Joseph added that the Union does
not possess any placard bearing only the words
“ Protest against unjust dismissal”.

This would be a convenient point to mention
briefly, and as far as possible in their proper
sequence, a number of specific allegations. I will
make further comments on some of them at a later
stage.

Gertrude O’Neal states that on the morning
of the 17th September the pickets, in, addition to
repeating the words already mentioned, were
shouting, ‘‘ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store”;
she says she saw some of the pickets surround
people trying to enter the store and heard Tilton
Theophile, one of the pickets, threaten to knock
down several persons who were attempting to
enter; she did not see the defendant Samuel with
any bell, but on this, as on other days, she heard
him saying “ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store.
You no hear you no foo buy from the Drug
Store’’; during the afternoon, while the pickets
were around the premises, she saw the defendant
Ireland standing on the Post Office gallery just
opposite the Drug Store.

Linda O’Neal asserts that on the morning of
17th September she heard Levi Joseph shouting
“Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store, people;
don’t goin there to buy”, and that later in the
day she saw and heard the defendant Samuel ring-
ing a bell and shouting “ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s
Drug Store, people. Don’t go in there”.

Victoria Frederick says that on the 17th
September, some time after Levi Joseph had
launched the picketing, he returned and told one
of the pickets he must “shout behind people while
they are going in the Drug Store”, and that
pickets shouted accordingly and the people did not
go into the store. She further states that she saw
the defendant Ireland in the vicinity of the plain-
tiffs’ premises practically all day, and that around
2 o'clock in the afternoon the defendants Bird,
Lake, Carrott and Williams came; she saw Mr.




10

Bird speaking to the pickets and heard him tell
one of them that the Curio Shop was also included
in the picketing. After 3 o’clock she saw the
the defendants Bird, Lake and Joseph walking in
the street; they spoke to the pickets.

‘Tris Barrow testifies that on the same 17th
September she went to the Drug Store to purchase
something and one of the pickets shouted at her:
‘* Hold the line. Don’t go in.”

As regards the 19th of September, Gertrude
O’Neal says she heard some people tell the defend-
ant Samuel, who is a local constable, that they
would like to go into the Store to buy but didn’t
want to yet into trouble with the police, and that
Samuel told them they would get into trouble if
they went in; there were policemen standing
around at the time.

Another occurrence concerning the defendant
Samuel on 19th September is related by Neville
Lowen and Sergeant Roberts. They say they saw
Samuel go up to and touch a man who was about
to enter the Drug Store, and Lowen heard him say
“ Hold the line.” It is clear from the evidence of
these very witnesses, however, that there was
nothing hostile in Samuel’s act. It would appear
that he was, as he at the time explained to Sergeant
Roberts, just making fun with a friend, who sub-
sequently entered the Store. Although Lowen
visits the Store daily he has never been troubled
by any of the pickets.

In respect of the 18th of September, one
matter should be noticed, that is, an article which
appeared that day under prominent headlines on
the front page of “The Workers’ Voice”’, the
official organ of the Union. The newspaper itself
shows that it is “Printed and published by the
Antigua Trades and Labour Union at their Office,
46 North Street, St. John’s, Antigua”, and that
the defendant Richards is its Editor. At this
stage I will merely set out the article, with its
headlines: —

“THE FIGHT IS ON: JUSTICE OR
BE DAMNED.

People Must Decide if O’Neals are Above
the Right And Privileges of the
Worker.

The Executive of the Antigua Trades
and Labour Union have broken off
trade relationship with O’Neal’s Drug
Store and open conflict now wages.

Early on Saturday morning pickets were
stationed in the vicinity of the Drug Store in
an effort to demonstrate to the public the
resentment of the Union to the attitude
adopted by the O’Neals in the dismissal of
their Clerks.

Endeavoured

The Union have endeavoured right
through to bring the matter to an amicable

settlement and departed from former proce-
dures by going to the extent of asking for an
inquiry into the Dispute. Even though the
O’Neal’s recognised at first a dispute existed
and attended meeting under the Labour Com-
missioner it seemed that some last minute
adviser prompted them to ignore the whole
question.

They insulted the government by refus-
ing to attend the Board of Inquiry appointed
by the Acting Governor. They were notified
three weeks ago of the recommendations of
the Board and the Government asked the
matter be settled. ‘fo the present moment
they have even refused to acknowledge receipt
of the findings of the Board of Inquiry so
adding further insult tc injury.

Principles

Public opinion has been brought to play
in this case. If it is felt by the O’Neals and
their advisers that injustice should stand
before accepted civilised principles and that
human beings and causes should be treated
contemptuously the public of Antigua will
decide. The ‘Trades Union asked for no
trouble only sought to right a wrong. If the
O’Neals are stronger than the will of the
people the coming days or even years will
decide. The fight is on.”

The next day on which special incidents are
alleged to have occurred is Saturday, 24th Septem-
ber. It was suggested that Saturday was chosen
for special activities because in St. John’s it is the
busiest shopping day. Gertrude O’Neal, Linda
O’Neal and Iris Barrow all testified that the pickets
were particularly noisy that morning, shouting,
among other things, ‘‘ Hold the line. Don’t go
into O’Neal’s”. Iris Barrow states they shouted
that at her, and that around 4 o’clock in the after-
noon she saw a woman on the steps of the Drug
Store and heard a picket tell her “ Don’t go in there.
Don’t goin. Hold the line”, and the woman went
away. Linda O’Neal says she heard some of the
pickets threaten to beat people if they went in,
and that only a few “brave ones” dared to enter.
Victoria Frederick claims that the noise was so
great that morning that she found it “ confusing”.
Both she and Gertrude O’Neal say they heard the
defendant Levi Joseph egging on pickets to shout
louder. At one stage Gertrude O'Neal telephoned
to the Police Station and Assistant Superintendent
Blaize came to the scene. Blaize found Levi
Joseph there with two or three of the regular
pickets, at the time merely walking up and down
saying “ Hold the line”’, and told him of the report
made by Gertrude O’Neal; Joseph said he was just
substituting for a while for one of the pickets and
had not done anything save what Blaize found him
doing; that he understood pickets must not stand
up or they would be “ watching and besetting ”.
A few minutes later, when the defendant Bird was
passing in a car, Blaize apprised him of the report
made. Gertrude O’Neal says that after Assistant
Superintendent Blaize left she heard Levi Joseph
telling the pickets to make more noise, adding and
demonstrating, ‘‘ This is the way it should be
done”. Victoria Frederick says that at a certain
stage on that Saturday, after the defendant Joseph
had told the pickets to shout and they were behav-
ing very noisily, she saw the defendants Bird, Lake,
Hurst, Williams, Carrott and Ireland come to
the corner of Thames and Long Streets. ‘The
defendant Joseph went to the pickets and then to
the other defendants.

Gertrude O’Neal also alleges that one day, soon
after the commencement of the picketing, a Mrs.
Scouten, up to then a regular customer, was
approaching the Drug Store when she was stopped
by a picket and told she was not supposed to come
in; since then Mrs. Scouten has never returned.

Another incident, the precise date of which
cannot be fixed, is reported by Cardigan Stevens.
He says he was going to O’Neal’s Drug Store,
intending to enter through one of the doors facing
Thames Street, and an elderly woman of the
labouring class was ahead of him going into the
same door when two pickets (one a Dominican),
who appeared not to realise that he was behind,
“ converged ” on the woman, shouting at the top of
their voices, “‘ Hold the line”; the woman didn’t
bother with them, and they closed in behind her as
she went into the door, the Dominican shouting at
her ina most threatening and intimidating manner:
“You don’t hear what I say. I say hold the line”.

Gertrude O'Neal says that on 15th October
a young womun coming to the Drug Store was
surrounded by pickets who shouted loudly at her,
and that when the woman afterwards entered the
Store she was “‘almost in a state of collapse”.

Cardigan Stevens alleges that on 22nd October
he was at the Drug Store and saw the Dominican,
already referred to, and two other pickets approach
“in a threatening attitude” a woman who was in
the act of going into the store, the Dominican
shouting “You don’t hear what I tell you”, as
if he would strike the woman; the woman got
frightened and started to tremble and went back to
the street.

Evidence is given by a schoolgirl, Veronica
Harris, with respect to something that happened on
25th October. She says she was sent from the
Red Cross Depot to O’Neal’s Drug Store to collect
a pair of forceps, and that as she and three other
girls with her were approaching the Store one of
the pickets said ‘‘ Hold the line”’; they (the girls)
“took it as a joke and ran off laughing ”; as they
did so they “ butt on each other and fell down”;
her knee got bruised in the gutter. It appears to
me that this girl’s evidence cannot be taken as
proving anything against the pickets.

Cardiyan Stevens further states that on Ist
November he heard Assistant Superintendent Blaize
reprimanding the Dominican previously mentioned,
but did not know what for. Assistant Superinten-
dent Blaize, however, was asked nothing about this
when he was in the witness box.

Il

Clement Nelson’s testimony is about the 11th
of November; he says he was going to the Drug
Store when the defendant Samuel addressed him
thus: “ Nelson, don’t you hear you must not go
there to buy. You is a dog’. He states that
when he left the store Samuel followed him and
added: “You going to want the Union and you
burning your own coals”,

Finally, we come to an incident concerning
the 26th of November. Linda O’Neal alleges that
on that day the defendant Samuel said something
which she did not hear to Mrs. Allen of Mill Reef,
who then asked him what “ Hold the line” meant,
and that he replied it meant that nobody is
supposed to go into the Drug Store to buy; when
Mrs. Allen asked why, he said: “ Miss O’Neal
would not pay the girl the money. She is unfair.”

Turning now to the defence, I will first
dispose of the short witnesses. The evidence of
Ernest Athill and Norris Abbott was to the effect
that since the inauguration of the picketing they
have often been to O’Neal’s Drug Store and have
never been molested or in any way interfered with;
they never saw any misbehaviour by the pickets.
Joseph Laurent said he left O’Neal’s Drug Store
in June, 1955, and in late July opened his own
Drug Store in St. John’s, about quarter of a mile
away from O’Neal’s; quite a few of the customers
who dealt with O’Neal’s when he was there now
deal with him; “things slowed down (at his drug
store) around September; they improved slightly
around October and November”. Joseph Hughes,
whose work requires him to be at the Magistrate’s
Court opposite O’Neal’s Drug Store for two days
of each week, testified that that section of the Citv
is a business section and is always noisy; he has
heard shouting at all times; among other things,

he has heard ‘* Hold the line”.

The only persons called as witnesses by the
defence besides Athill, Abbott, Laurent and
Hughes, were the defendants Hurst, Levi
Joseph and Lake. They emphasised that at no
time did the Union or anyone on its behalf
demand payment of compensation in respect of
Miss Winter’s dismissal; payment of compensa-
tion was a recommendation of the Board of
Inquiry; the Executive Committee of the Union
were prepared to accepi the recommendation as
a means of settlement of the dispute, which
they had done everything in their power to have
settled in accordance with the legislative and
other machinery provided for settling such
disputes; the object of the picketing was
discussed at the meeting of the Executive Com-
mittee held on 9th September, the consensus of
opinion being that it was to pass on information
to the public with regard to the dispute so that

no one would accept employment at O’Neal’s

and so that public opinion might be brought to
bear on the matter; the duties of the pickets
were also discussed at the meeting and outlined
to the General Secretary: the pickets were to
hold placards and pass on information; the
General Secretary was also instructed to take
steps to ensure that the picketing is done ina
1;

eaceful manner; no decision has been taken as
to the duration of the picketing.

In his evidence the defendant Hurst says
he instructed the pickets in accordance with the
directions of the Executive Committee and
frequently visited them to ensure that those
instructions were being carried out; he denies
having ever directed the pickets to tell people
not to buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store.

The defendant Lake states that he also
checked up on the pickets; on two occasions he
went there specifically for that purpose; he
passed by the pickets daily on other business.
Neither he nor Hurst ever witnessed any
misbehaviour. :

As regards the article appearing in “ The
Workers’ Voice” of 18th September, 1955, both
Mr. Hurst and Mr. Lake disclaim responsibility
for its composition; they do not agree it was
intended to insinuate that damage would or
should be done to O’Neal’s trade; they under-
stand the words * broken off trade relationship ”
in the headlines of the article to mean that
“there is a trade dispute and relationship is
broken off.’ The defendant Richards, who, as
already mentioned, is the editor of the
newspaper, did not testify.

I have already made reference to certain
portions of the evidence of the defendant Levi
Joseph. He denies all the charges levelled
against him, as well as having ever given
instructions to any of the pickets as to how
they were to carry out their duties; that, he
points out, was done by the General Secretary;
he maintains that he himself acted as a picket
only on one occasion—24th September—and then
for a few minutes only, in the absence of one of
the regular pickets; he declares that he never
encouraged the pickets to shout loudly and that
he visited them daily and never saw any mis-
behaviour; that 3rd October, at the hearing of
the motion for an interim injunction in this
matter, was the first time he heard it said that
the object of the picketing was to vause people
to stop buying from O’Neal’s, and he
subsequently told the pickets and several other
people that that was not the intention, but he
did not mention it on his loud speaker.

Neither the defendant Samuel—who was
described by some of the plaintiffs’ witnesses as
the head picket, and against whom specific
charges of a serious nature were made—nor any
of the other pickets, was called by the defence.
The case for the plaintiffs is not that the
defendants or any of them were heard planning
to injure the plaintiffs, or anything of the sort;
the plaintiffs seek to prove the conspiracy
through overt acts alleged to have been com-
mitted by defendants and persons employed by
the defendants. Included in the defence is
a complete denial of most of these acts. It
would seem, therefore, that the persons said to
have committed the acts should be in a position

to furnish valuable testimony. Altogether, this
case is remarkable for the number of persons
not called as witnesses. In this connexion,
however, as also in considering other aspects of
the case, it must be borne in mind that the onus
of proof rests upon the plaintiffs. One of the
main lines of attack employed by learned
counsel for the defence was the failure of the
plaintiffs to call the majority of the persons
said to have been interfered with, or the
policemen on duty in the streets. It is common
ground that throughout the picketing there
have always been at least two policemen stationed
in the vicinity of the plaintiffs’ premises. One
explanation suggested by the plaintiff Gertrude
O’Neal is that very many people in Antigua
are afraid of the Union, Another explanation
advanced, in so far as the first group is concerned,
is that the names and addresses of some of the
persons molested are unknown. As regards the
police, it was apparent from the female plaintiff's
gestures when replying to certain questions put
to her in the witness box that she felt that the
police attitude towards the plaintiffs in this
matter was unfavourable; and she expressed
surprise that no arrests were made on 17th
or 24th September. Assistant Superintendent
Blaize testified that on 17th September, the
first day of the picketing, the Commissioner of
Police sent a message through him to the
defendant Bird complimenting the pickets “for
the manner in which the picketing was carried
on.” Exactly what that was intended to convey,
on what evidence the opinion was based, or
whether the transmission of the message became
known to the plaintiffs and in any way influenced
their assessment of the police attitude. is
not clear.

Another argument urged by Mr. Barrow
was that the witnesses called by the plaintiffs
are biased against the Union. Victoria l’rederick
once worked at the Co-operative Store run by
the Union and was dismissed; she admits that
she considered the action of the Mxecutive
Committee of the Union in dismissing her
“very unfair.” Iris Barrow is a ‘ good”
personal friend of the Misses O’Neal; some years
ago Joseph Dew & Son’s, whore she works, was
picketed; the dispute in that instance was over
the dismissal of a clerk by her brother. Clement
Nelson was at one time Chairman of the Munici-
pal Workers Section of the Union; he was
removed from office with the promise, he says,
that he would be promoted to the post of District
Steward but declined the promotion as he
“saw tricks in it’; he owns to being opposed
to the policy of the officials of the Union and
says he will do all in his power to destroy that
policy. Cardigan Stevens is another personal
friend of the O’Neal family; on one occasion,
during an altercation unconnected with this case,
he told the defendant Ireland that he considered.
the Union was doing things that were wrong;
he further states that on » certain day, after the
Dominican picket had made threats of personal
violence to Linda O’Neal because she softly
repeated ‘‘Hold the line”, he told the picket
he “would take pleasure in kicking” him.
That is hardly a remark that one would expect
from a person in Mr. Stevens’ position under
any circumstances; and it was urged by Mr.
Barrow as indicative of animosity. It should
however be remembered that the suggestion
put to Stevens under cross-examination was
that he had said he would take pleasure in
thumping the Dominican picket; it was Stevens
himself who volunteered the information that
the word he used was ‘“ kick.”. Whatever else
may be said of the matter, it does not seem to
me to point to untruthfulness on the part of
the witness.

Having given careful attention to these and
the other arguments advanced by learned counsel
for the defence, I am, nevertheless, after the
fullest consideration of the evidence of all the
witnesses I have had the opportunity of hearing
and observing, of the opinion that the particular
incidents mentioned by .me as having been
related by Gertrude O’Neal, Linda O'Neal,
Victoria Frederick, Cardigan Stevens and _ Iris
Barrow did take place, and that their accounts
of them are substantially correct; these persons
impressed me as being essentially truthful
witnesses, whatever their feelings towards the
Union. Their evidence shows, among other
things, that from the inception of the picketing
the pickets who were sent by the defendants to
carry out the objects of the picketing, and who
were instructed in their duties by the defendant
Hurst and posted and supervised by the defendant
Levi Joseph (both of whom were present when
the whole subject of the picketing was discussed
in Hxecutive Committee), have been telling
people in forceful language that they must not
buy from O’Neal’s. The same idea appears to
be insinuated by ‘The Workers’ Voice” in the
third headline to the article of 18th September

Although none of the clerks in the plaintiffs’
employment are members of the Union, and
there is no evidence to indiente that any further
clerks are required, the picketing is still on;
up to the time of the hearing of this case no
decision had been taken with regard to its
duration. The number of pickets has been
reduced to three; at a certain stave it was six,
but never as many as twelve, as suggested in
paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim.

It is clear that although the predominant
object of the picketing here is the furthering by the
defendants of their own interests, there are other
objects in mind and that unlawful means amounting
to obstruction, coercion, intimidation and threats of
personal violence have been used.

Mr. Barrow contends that even though the
pickets were employed by the defendants other
than Samuel and sent by them to picket the
plaintiffs’ premises, and even though the picketing
be held to be outside the protection of section 7 of
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, owing to the use of
illegal means, the defendants (other than Samuel

13

presumably) are not liable in law because they do
not stand in the relationship of master and servant
to the pickets and did not authorise the illegal
means in question. The implications of that
proposition, in the setting of the present case,
appear to me to be somewhat startling. It would
mean that people could employ men of straw to
picket premises and could, when damage results
and actions are brought for acts done in furtherance
of picketing, simply themselves say, ‘“‘ We authorised
the picketing in this way and not in that, therefore
we are not liable.” In my opinion the defendants
vis-a-vis the pickets do stand in the relationship of
master and servant; the pickets were engaged by
them and are subject to their control and may be
dismissed by them; these, I think, are the essential
ingredients of the relationship of master and
servant. But even if there be no such relationship,
it seems to me that on the evidence here Mr.
Barrow’s submission could not be sustained.

In Ward, Lock, and Co. (Lid.) v. The
Operative Printers’ Assistants’ Society and another,
(1906) 22 T.L.R. 827, the defendants stationed
pickets to watch the plaintiffs’ printing works and
to induce the workmen employed by the plaintiffs
to join the union and then to determine their
employment by proper notices, the object being to
compel the plaintiffs to become employers of union
men and to abstain from employing non-union
men. In an action for damages for wrongfully
and maliciously procuring and inducing workmen
employed in the plaintiffs’ printing works to break
their contracts of service with the plaintiffs, and for
nuisance and for an injunction, the Court of Appeal
held unanimously that the picketing was entirely
lawful both at common law and under the 1875
U.K. Act. Special attention has been asked to

the following passage from the judgment of
Moulton, L.J.:—

“Throughout the discussion the defend-
ants have been described as seeking to
“compel” the plaintiffs to pay union
wages and to employ union men because
they tried to get all the operatives they
could into the union, so that the plain-
tiffs would find no non-union men to
employ. If this be @ proper use of the
word ‘*compel”’, it certainly carries with
it no wrongful character. In the year
1898 the Legislature forbade the employ-
ment of children under the age of 11 as
half-timers. Supposing that prior to that
Act, a “public association” had been
formed to induce parents not to send
their children as half-timers before the
age of 11. No more legitimate, and
perhaps no more laudable object of an
association could be imagined, and it
would not lose its legitimate character by
reason of its success. But its success
would pro tanto, and its complete success
would absolutely, prevent those masters
who were desirous of employing young
half-timers at, we may presume, corres-
pondingly low wages from doing so, and
would “compel” them to employ exclu-
14

sively persons of 13 years old or upwards.
Yet no wrong would have been done to
such masters; and in, the same way no
wrong would have been done to the
plaintiffs in the present case if the
defendants had succeeded in persuading
every printers’ assistant in the country to
join the union and they had rendered it
impossible for the plaintiffs to get men to
work for them on the terms they desired.
The error arises probably out of an
incorrect use of language. It is inaccurate
to say that the masters have a right to
employ men on any specific terms. They
have only a right to employ such, if any,
as are willing to accept those terms, and
no wrong is done them by any one who
by lawful means lessens the number of
those willing to accept them. The right
of the plaintiffs to try to persuade a man
to accept and the right of the defendants
to try to persuade a man to refuse appear
to me to be rights of freedom of individual
action equally lawful and equally deserv-
ing of the protection of the law, so long
as the means employed are lawful and
right. Both become unlawful if the
means employed are wrongful.”

Ward, Lock & Co. (although decided before
the 1906 U.K. Act) is, I think, good authority for
saying that even though the effect of picketing be
to compel the plaintiffs to do something they have
a legal right to refrain from doing, that of dtsel/
would not render the picketing unlawful. But it
would be a mistake, I think, to assume that Ward,
Lock & Co. decided any more than that. In that
ease the pickets did nothing beyond obtaining or
communicating information. The ground on which
the Court allowed the appeal is indicated in a later
passage of the judgment delivered by the same
Lord Justice:

“but in my view that which decides the
question is that there is no evidence of
any improper or illegal acts, or, indeed,
of any acts whatever, by any pickets sent
by the defendants during this period.
There oan, therefore, be no pretence that
the plaintiffs have established anything
which would give to them a good cause
of action in respect of the picketing
complained of. I wish to add that, in my
opinion, there is throughout a complete
absence of evidence of anything in the
nature of picketing or besetting which
could constitute a nuisance. It appears
that the discharged workmen loitered
about for a day or two after leaving
work—a thing which is not unlikely to
happen—and that they were at times
joined by others, but there is no sugges-
tion even by the plaintiffs’ witnesses that
any annoyance or molestation took place,
and the evidence to the contrary is
overwhelming.”

This quotation from the judgment of Moulton,
L.J., shows the vast difference between the facts in
that case and the facts as I find them here. In
the present case there were acts of obstruction,
coercion und intimidation and threats of violence.
Furthermore, there is abundant evidence of “ per-
suading”’ (as opposed to “ inviting”) other than
persuasion of any person ‘to work or abstain from
working ” (q. v. sec. 7 Trade Unions Act), and the
repeated shouts and other noises of the pickets and
the degree of annoyance inflicted on the plaintiffs
by the pickets’ general behaviour clearly went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to the carry-
ing out of lawful picketing; as regards this further
aspect of the picketing, the evidence, in my opinion,
points conclusively to at least connivance on the
part of the defendants. On the first day of the
picketing one of the defendants who had attended
the Committee meeting at which the method of
picketing was discussed, instructed the pickets that
they were to “shout behind” people who were
ubout to enter the store; he himself took part in
loud shouting on more than one occasion; at a
certain stage he actually demonstrated how the
shouting should be done and made the pickets shout
more loudly than they were then doing.

‘As already mentioned, the defendant Samuel
is not a member of the Executive Committee of
the Union and did not attend the meetings of the
Committee. It is not however disputed that he
combined with the other defendants for the purposes
of the picketing of the plaintiffs’ premises.

That some damage has been caused to the
plaintiffs by the unlawful means from time to time
used in this case is manifest. But it was argued
by Mr. Barrow that the plaintiffs having failed to.
aver in their pleadings that the defendants
‘“‘threaten and intend” to repeat the illegal acts
complained of, are not entitled to an injunction.
Mr. Harney replied that the Statement of Claim
was drawn up in accordance with Form 13 at page 38
of volume 7 of Lord Atkins’ Encyclopaedia of Court
Forms and Precedents in Civil Proceedings and
that that particular Form, which is stated to be
based on the claim for conspiracy to injure by
unlawful means in the well-known case of Lyons
(J) & Sons v. Wilkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 255, contains
no such averment. Mr. Harney also invited
attention to the wording of his Statement of Claim
(dated 21st October 1955), and particularly to
paragraph 6 thereof wherein it is alleged that the
wrongful acts have been done “daily from the
17th day of September, 1955.” In my opinion a
pleader desiring an injunction should always, ea
abundanti cautela, insert the conventional words
leading to an application for an injunction, but the
authorities show that failure to insert them will
not be fatal where an intention to repeat the illegal
acts complained of can be readily inferred from the
nature of the case or the facts already pleaded.
(See, for example, Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles,
20 Ch. D. at p. 195). I think the inference can
here be drawn.
In a case of the kind now before me the
damages are at large; once actual financial loss is
proved (and that has been done), the Court may
award a sum appropriate to the whole circum-
stances of the tortious wrong inflicted (Prati v.
British Medical Association, 1919, 1 KB. 244).

As regards the extent of the pecuniary loss
suffered by the plaintiffs through the picketing,
evidence was given by Gertrude O’Neal of a
substantial decrease in the volume of their trace
since the commencement of picketing. One would
have thought that the plaintiffs, who are now
pressing for heavy damages, would have come
prepared with properly made up account books to
support their claim. Even when Mr. Barrow
called for such books, however, they failed to
produce satisfactory accounts to show their actual
sales subsequent to and immediately preceding the
institution of the picketing. The evidence of
Clarine Knight that since the picketing she has
“missed” regular customers, can hardly be
regarded as impelling. She mentioned only two
names, and there is no proof nt all as to the real
reasons of these two persons for ceasing to buy
from O’Neal’s. Mr. Barrow suggested that they
may, for reasons altogether. unconnected with the
picketing, have transferred their patronage to the
new drug store opened by Laurent, formerly
druggist at O’Neal’s. Laurent’s testimony was to

~

0

the effect that others have done so. I am not
unmindful of yet another possibility, and that is
that some people, without ever having gone near
to the pickets, may nevertheless feel that Miss
Winter’s cause merits their support and may of
their own free will have taken away their patron-
age from the plaintiffs’ stores.

There will be judgment for the plaintiffs
against the defendants jointly and severally for
£80 and an injunction will be granted restraining
the defendants their servants and agents from
watching and besetting the business places of the
plaintiffs situate at the corners of Long and Thames
Streets and High and Thames Streets, St. John’s,
The defendants must also pay the plaintiffs’ costs
excluding the costs of and incidental to the joining
of the defendant Hurst as a defendant, the Court
having already ordered that those costs should in
any event be paid by the plaintiffs, and excluding
also the costs of and incidental to the two applica-
tions for an interlocutary injunction, in respect of
which each party must bear his own costs, the
plaintiffs having failed to obtain such interlocutary
injunction partly through their own fault.

W. A. Date,
Puisne Judge.
3rd January, 1956.

ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M, BLACKMAN,
Government Printer—By Authority.
1956.

[Price 20 cenis.]
No. 9 of 1955. Protection of Trees and
Conservation of Soil and Water.

[L.8.]
I Assent,
K. W. Bracknurne,

Governor.
7th December, 1955.

VIRGIN ISiLANDS,
No. 9 of 1955.

An Ordinance ‘to amend the protection of
Trees and Conservation of Soil and Water
Ordinance, 1954.

KNACTED by the Legislature of the Virgin
Islands.

1. This Ordinance may be cited as the
Protection of Trees and Conservation of Soil and
Water (Amendment) Ordinance, 1955, and shall
be read as one with the Protection of Trees and
Conservation of Soil and Water Ordinance, 1954,
hereinafter called the Principal Ordinance.

2. Subsection (2) of section 4 of the
Principal Ordinance is hereby amended by the
insertion between the word “Council” and the
full-stop at the end of the subsection of the
following words and comma “as to the necessity
for making the order, the extent to which it
should be made and the conditions which it
should include’”’.

3. Section 8 of the Principal Ordinance is
? i _ * :
hereby amended by the deletion therefrom of the
words “after due notice has been given to the
owner or occupier thereof” and the substitution
therefor of the words ‘‘ without notice’,

VIRGIN
ISLANDS,

Short title.

8/1954.

Amendment of
seotion 4 (2)
of the Princi-
pal Ordinance,

Amendment
of section 8 of
the Principal
Ordinance,
VIRGIN 2 Protection of Trees and No. 9 of 1945.
IsLanps. Conservation of Soil and Water.

Substitution 4. The following is hereby subitituted for

ofseotion 10 section 10 of the Principal Ordinance:—
of the Prinoi-

pal Ordinance.

“Liability for 10. (1) Where after the publication of

offences coni- - : .

mitted after ®n Order declaring any private land or por-

publication of tion thereof to be a protected area or a

protection f ee 7 : 7 sth ..

orders. orestry area or a water area, as the case may
be, any person commits on the said land or
portion thereof any act contrary to the
provisions of this Ordinance, the person
committing such act and every owner or
occupier of such land or portion thereof who
in any way directly or indirectly contributes
to the commission of such act shall be guilty
of an offence.

(2) An owner or occupier of any land
or portion thereof shall be deemed to have
contributed to the commission of an offence
on the said land or portion thereof contrary to
subsection (1) of this section if he does not
with all due diligence and to the best of his
ability give such information or evidence
within his knowledge us may lead to the
discovery of the person so oltending.”’.

Amendment of 5. Subsection (1) of section 12 of the
section 12(1) Dpinas ; - bharalhe i
of the Princ, Etincipal Ordinance is hereby amended by

pal Ordinance.

(a) the insertion of the word “ author-
ised” between the word “any” and the
word ‘‘ person” appearing in line 1;

(6) the insertion of the words “ protected
area or” between the word “any” and the
word “forestry’’ appearing in line 3; and

(c) the addition after the full-stop at
the end of the subsection of the following:
“In this subsection ‘authorised person’ means
the Commissioner or the owner of the protected
area, forestry ares or water area concerned,
or such persons as they may respectively
depute. ”.
No. 9 of 1955. Protection of Trees and - _ $8 Virein
Conservation of Soil and Water. ISLANDS.

6. Section 14 of the Principal Ordinance is Amendmentof -

5 ‘ 7 section 14 of
hereby amended by the Principal

: . . Ordinance.
(a) the insertion of the words ‘and

approved” between the word “made” and
the word “under” appearing in line 1 of
subsection (3);

(6) re-numbering subsection (3) as sub-
section (+); and

(c) the insertion of the following as sub-
section (3) of the section—

(3) No regulation made under the
provisions of subsection (1) of this
section shall have effect unless und until
it has been approved by a resolution of
the Legislative Council.”.

H. A. C. Howarp,
President.

Passed the Legislative Council this 20th day
of September, 1955.

H. O. Creque,
Clerk of the Council.



ANTIGUA
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. BhnackMay, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1956.

47/00213—550—1.56. [Price 5 cents. }
LEEWARD ISLANDS.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT.

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.
1966, No. ‘1.

Orper or tHe Governor DaTeD January 9, 1956 DECLAR-
Ing THAY THE Executive CouncIL ror THE COLONY
CONSTITUTED IN PURSUANCE OF THE Roya Iystruc-
TIONS OF 1936, AS AMENDED, SHALL CEASE. TO EXIST.



1. Short Title. This Order may be cited as the
Leeward Islands Federal Executive Council (Cessation)
Order, 1956.

2, Date of Cessation of Existence of Execu-
ive Council. From the 18th day of January, 1956, the
Executive Council for the Colony of the Leeward Tslands
constituted in pursuance of the Royal Instructions mentioned
in the Schedule hereto shall cease to be the Executive Council
for the Colony.
SCHEDULE.

Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to
the Governor and Commander in Chief of the Leeward Islands and
dated the seventeenth day of November, 1936.

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the twenty-eighth day of December, 1939.
amending the aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of
November, 1936. :

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the twelfth day of July, 1943, amending the
aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936.

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the thirtieth day of December, 1950, amending the
aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936.

Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet and dated the twenty-second day of February, 1952,
amending the aforessid Instructions of the seventeenth day of
November, 1936.

Dated this 9th day of January, 1956.

K. W. BrackBURYE,
Governor.



ANTIGUA,
Printed at the Governmnet Printing Oflice, Leeward Islands,
by BE. M. BhackMan, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1956.

18/00052—-500—1.56. [Price 3 cents.]
LEEWARD ISLANDS.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT.

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDEKS.
1956, No. 2.

PENSIONABLE OFFICES.

The Pensionable Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956, dated
January 11, 1956, made by the Governor in Council
under section 2(1) of the Pensions Act, 1947 (No.
12/1947).

1. SHORT TrTLe. This Order may be cited as the Pensionabte
Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956, and shall be read as one with the
Pensionable Offices Order, 1954 (S. R. & O. 1954 No. 56) hereinafter
called the Principal Order.

2, AMENDMENT OF FIRST SCHEDULE TO THE PRINCIPAL
ORDER.- The First Schedule to the Principal Order is hereby amended
as regards the Antigua Establishment as follows:—

(a) by the insertion-under the caption ‘ Administration” of
the words “ Financial Secretary’? beneath the words “Crown

ny,

Attorney ”;

(b) by the deletion of the caption ‘‘ Agriculture and Veteri-
nary” and the substitution therefor of the caption “ Agriculture,
Veterinary and Fisheries ”’;

(e) by the insertion of the words “Fishery Officer” beneath
the words “ Accountant, Peasant Development Services ”’.

Made by the Governor in Council this llth day of January,
1956. ,

A. E, PENN,
Clerk of the Council.

ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. BLACKMAN, Government Printer—By Authority.
1956, ;
59/00005 —480—1.56. [Price 3 vents.)
LEEWARD ISLANDS.

ANTIGUA.

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.
1956, No. 4



Tus Pusnic SERVICE ComMIssioON REGULATIONS DATED
3rp JANUARY, 1956, MADE BY THE (1OVERNOR UNDER
sEcTION 9 oF tHE Pupiic Service Comission OrpI-
NANCE, 1955 (No. 15/1955.)



1. Short Title. These Regulations may be cited as
the Publie Service Commission Regulations, 1256.

2. Interpretation. (1) In these Regulations unless
the context otherwise requires—

“Commission”? means the Public Service Commission
the establishment of which is provided for under
section 5 of the Publie Service Commission Ordi-
nance, 1955;

“ Instructions” means the Instructions from time to time
issued under the hand of the Governor in accordance
with regulation 6 of these Regulations;

“ ublie office’’ means any office of emolument in the
I ; ;
publ service;

“public officer” means the holder of any public office
and includes any person appointed to act in any
such office:

“public service” means the service of the Crown in
respect of the government of the Presidency.

(2) References to a member of the Commission shall,
unless the context otherwise requires, include references to
the Chairman or acting Chairman.

8. Membership of Commission. The Governor
shall by writing under his hand appoint a Chairman (not
being a public officer) and not more than two other persons
to be members of the Commission. At least one member of
the Commission shall be a person who is not a public officer
or a retired public officer.
2

4. Tenure of Office and terms of Service of
Commission. -(1) Members of the Commission shall hold
office during the Governor’s pleasure and subject thereto the
Chairman shall hold office for such period not exceeding two
years as may be prescribed in the instrament by which he is
appointed ; provided that a person shall, if qualified, be eligible
for re-appointment from time to time as a member of the
Commission.

(2) The Governor may appoint any person to act in the
place of the Chairman or any other member of the Commis-
sion in case of his temporary absence or inability to act as
such Chairman or other member.

(3) Any member of the Commission may, if he is not
a public officer, at any time, and, if he is a public officer, with
the consent of the Governor, resign his office by instrument in
writing addressed to the secretary of the Commission who
shall forthwith forward the same to the Governor through the
Administrator and from the date of the receipt by the
secretary of the Commission of such instrument such member
shall cease to be a member of the Commission and the vacancy
caused by such resignation or by the Geath of a member or by
the removal cf a member shall be filled | ry the Governor by
the appointment of another person for the remainder of the
term of office of the member whom he replaces.

(4) The appointment, removal or resignation of any
member of the Comuission or of its secretary shall be notified
in the Gacette.

(5) Out of such funds as may be ue ided by the
Legislative Council to cover the expenses of the Commission,
the Chairman or acting Chairman of the Commission shall be

. e a a * aw
paid the sum of fifteen dollars for each meeting of the Com-
mission which be attends, and every other member of the
Commission, not being a public officer, shall be paid the sum
’ I pe
of ten dollars for each meeting of the ‘Gonithission which he
attends; provided that the maximum amount payable in any
month shall, in the case of the Chairman or acting Chairman,
be sixty dollars and, in the case of any other rember, be
Yi )
forty dollars; provided further that 10 sublic officer hall he
y I
paid any remuneration as a member of the Commission.

(6) Members of the Commission, other than publie
officers, may be paid travelling and subsistence allowsaness at
such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by the
Governor for attendance at meetings of the Commission or
for travelling for other purposes connected with the functions
of the Commission.

5. Oath of Office. The Chairman and members
of the Commission shall on their appointment as such take an
oath or make an affirmation, each according to his conscience,
in the form in the Schedule to these Regulations. Such an

oath or affirmation shall be administered by or made before
a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace.

6. Issue of Instructions. The Governor may by
writing under his hand from time to time issue Instructions to
the Commission prescribing the manner in whieh it shall
perform its functions and for carrying into effect the purposes
and provisions of these Regulations.

7. Record of Meetingsand Decisions. Minutes
of all meetings of the Comrnission shall be recorded and kept
by the Secretary. Copies of such minutes duly confirmed at
a subsequent meeting shall as soon as practicable thereafter
be forwarded to the Administrator for transmission to the
Governor. All recommendations made by the Commission
shall be submitted to the Governor through the Administrator.

8. Quorum and Voting. At any meeting of the
Commission the Chairman or acting Chairman and any one
member shall form a quorum for the transaction of business.
The Chairman or acting Chairman, as the case may be, shall
have a deliberative as well as a casting vote. All decisions of
the Commission shall be by a majority. of the votes of the
members present and voting. Provided that the Chairman or
acting Chairman, as the case may be, shall have a second or
casting vote whenever the voting shall be eyual.

9. Consultation with Persons other than
Members. The Commission in considering any matter or
question referred to it for its advice may consult such Heads
of Government Departments or other public officers or other
persons as the Commission may consider proper and desirable.

10. Appointment of Secretary. The Adminis-

trator shall nppoint a Secretary to the Commission.
4

11. Protection of Members from Legal
Proceedings. The Chairman and any member of the
Commission shall have such and the like protection and
privileges in cave of vny action or suit broneht against him
for any act doe or otitted to be done or words spoken in
the execution of his duty as is by law given to any Judge of

the Supreme Court of the Windward Islands and Leeward
Islands in the exercise of his judicial office.

12, Improper Influence. Any person who other-
wise than in tie course of his duty directly or indirectly by
himself or by any other person in ‘any manner whatsoever
influences or attempts to influence any decision of the Com-
mission or of the Chairman or of any member shall be guilty
of an offence and upcit summary conviction shall be lable to
a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months; provided that nothing
in this regulation shall prolibit any person who may properly
do so from giving a certificate or testimonial to any applicant
or candidate for any public office or from supplying any
information or assistance upon formal request by the
Commission. z

15. Wilfully supplying False Information
to Commission. Auy person who, in connection with
an appieation by any person for employment or promotion
in the public vervice or with any matter upon which it is the
duty of the Comiiission to advise the Governor or any Head
of a Government Department under these Regulations, wilfully
gives to the Counnission or to any member thereof or to any
persou or body of persons appointed to axsist the Commission
in the exercise of its functions or the discharge of its duties
any Informaticn which is false by reason of the falsity of, or
by reason of the omission of, 2 inaterial particular, shall be
guilty of an offence and upon summary conviction be liable
to imprisonment for a period not execeding six months or to
a fine not exceedine one thousand dollars. ,

i4. Commencement. These Regulations shall come
ito operation on the 19th day of January, 195€,
5

SCHEDULE.
Regulation 5.

OATH OF OFFICE.









I, - , having been appointed to act as
Chairman swear
~ — of the Public Service Commission, do — —
member solemnly and sincerely





that I will freely and ithout fear or favour
declare and affirm "~~ vely @ w Mt a ,

affection or ill-will, give my counsel and advice inf connection with
all such matters as may be referred to the Public Service Commission
under the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1956, and that
I will not directly or indirectly reveal such matters to any un-

authorised persons or otherwise than in the course of duty.

SUQMATULe. cee cece eect eee eee eee ee nee e eee crane een neees
Sworn
—_____—-hefore me this day of 19
Declared

Ter err errr ere err Pere ree reer ere eee cece eee eee

Magistrate or Justice of the Pores.

Dated this 3rd day of January, 1956.

K. W. Bracksurnr,
Governor.

ANTIGUA
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. BLacxmMAN, Government Printer. _ By Authority.
1958.

A.C. 13/235—-525-—1.56. Price 8 cents.
ANTIGUA.,

The Public Service Commission In-
structions, 1956, made by the
Governor under Regulation 6 of
the Public Service Commission
Regulations, 1956, (8. R. & 0.1956
ope this 8rd day of January,
1 ;

PART I.
PRELIMINARY.

1. (1) These Instructions may be cited as
the Public Service Commission Instructions, 1956.

(2) These Instructions shall apply to all
members of the Public Service except as provided
in paragraph 15.

2. In these Instructions unless the context
otherwise requires:—

*“ Administrator” shall have the same mean-
ing as in the Ordinance;

“appointment? means the conferment of an
office of emolument in the public service,
whether or not subject to subsequent
confirmation, upon a person not in the
public service; the grant of permanent
and pensionable terms of service in 4
public office toa person recruited and
serving on contract or agreement in a
pensionable or non-pensionable public
office; the re-engagement of a person
on contract or agreement for a further
period in the same or another public
office; the permanent transfer to an
office in the public service of a member
of the Civil Service of the United
Kingdom who is serving on temporary
transfer in an office a the public
service; the paid appointment of a public
officer to act in any public office other
than the office to which he is substan-
tively appointed;

Title and
Application.

Interpreta-
tion,
2

“the Chairman” means the person appointed
under regulation 3 of the Public Ser-
vice Commission Regulations, 1956, as
Chairman of the Commission and shall
include an acting Chairman ;

“the Commission” means the Public Service
Commission appointed under the Public
Service Commission Regulations, 1956;

“Governor” shall have the same meaning as
in the Ordinance; .

“Member” means any person appointed
under the Public Service Commission
Regulations, 1956, as Chairman or
Member of the Commission, and_ shall
include any person appointed under those
Regulations to be a temporary Member;

‘office of emolument’”’ means any pensiona-
ble or non-pensionable post which is
shown under a Personal Itmoluments
sub-head in the current Hstimates of
the Presidency ;

“officer in charge of prison discipline”’, “ the
Keeper”, ‘subordinate officer” and
‘‘ Visiting Justices” shall have the same
meanings as in the Rules and Regu-
lations for the Government of Prisons
made by the Governor in Council on
the {8th day of August, 1909, -as
amended ;

“promotion ”’ means the conferment upon
a person in the public service of a public
office to which is attached a higher
salary or higher salary scale than that
attached to the public office to which he
was last substantively appointed ;

‘“ public office’, “ public officer” and “ public
service’? shall have the same meanings
as in the Ordinance;

“the secretary? means the person appointed
under the Public Service Commission
Regulations, 1946, as secretary of the
Commission ;
3

‘‘ salary ”’ means basic salary;

ce ” .
scale” means a salary scale as from time to
time set out in the Listimates of Revenue

and Expenditure;

“the Ordinance’? means the Public Service
Commission Ordinance, 1955;

‘transfer’? means the conferment, whether
permanently or on secondment upon a
person in the public service of such
publie office other than that to which
he was last substantively appointed
which involves no question of an imme-
diate promotion.

8. (1) The Commission shall advise the
Governor or the Administrator on such appoint-
ments, promotions and transfers of public officers
as are required to be submitted to the Secretary
of State, or the Governor, or the Administrator
for approval:

Provided that this function shall not in any
way affect the power and authority of the
Secretary of State to fill any post of the class
referred to in paragraph 11 (1) of these Instruc-
tions in accordance with the provisions of Colonial
Regulations.

(2) The Commission shall when required
advise the Governor or the Administrator on—

(a) disciplinary procedure in accordance
with such instructions as may be issued by
the Governor;

(b) all recommendations that an officer
should be retired on the grounds of general
inefficiency ;

(c) such other functions as are vested
in the Governor by the Ordinance.

15/1955.

Duties of the
Commission.
Control of
reoruitment,

4

Principles
relating to
selection for
first appoint-
ments and
promotions.

Advertisement
of vacaricies.

Principles and
procedure
apPplicahle to
selection for
promotion.

4
PART II.

's (INCLUDING PROMOTIONS
AND URANSFERS),

APPOINTMEN

4. In order to discharge its duties under
paragraph 3 of these Instructions the Commission
may exercise control over and may be required to
approve all schemes for admission to any public
office by examination, for the award of scholarships
for special training and facilities for courses of
instruction, and over all other methods of recruit-
ment, including the dppoinmucne snd procedure
of Boarils for the selection of candidates. It may
prescribe the manner in which applicaticns for
(rovernment appointments should be made and
arrange for such examinations as may be consid-
ered necessary to be held before any candidate is
admitted to the public service.

(1) In making recommendations for
first ae to the public service, the
Comunission shall be guided by the principle that
prior consideration shall be given to the claims
of suitably qualified local condidates.

(3) In making recommendations for pro-
motions within the public service, the Commission
shall be guided by the principle that prior
consideration shall be given to the claims of
suitably qualified public officers serving in the

Presidency.

6. Where the Commission considers it
necessary to advertise the existence of a vacancy
in the public service, the requirements of the
vacant post and the qualifications necessary for
it shall be settled by the Governor or. the
Administator. The Commission — shall publish
the advertisement, and shall consider any replies
received thereto.

7. (1) Ino making recommendations for
promotions in the public service the Commission
shall consider the clainis of public officers on the
basis of official qualifications, experience and merit.
5

(2) Recommendations for promotion shall
state whether the perscn recommended is the
senior officer in his department eligible for
promotion and where this is not the case detailed
reasons shall be given in respect of each person
in that same department over whom it is proposed
that the person recommended should be promoted.

8. Where the General Orders require that
progress to a higher point in a salary scale is
dependent on the results of an efficiency bar
examination, the Commission shall arrange and
conduct the said examination in accordance with
a syllabus prepared by the Commission and
published in the Gaceite.

9. The principles and procedure for mak-
ing recommendations for paid acting appointments
shall be the same as that prescribed in these
Instructions for making a promotion. When
recommending an acting appointment it shall be
stated whether or not the officer recommended
for acting appointment is in every way qualified
to perform all the duties of the office in which he
is to act.

10. When it is necessary to make an
appointment, promotion or transfer, the proce-
dure prescribed in paragraphs 1] and 12 of these
Instructions shall be followed except that, where
any delay involved in carrying’ out such procedure
is likely to cause serious inconveniences, the
Governor or the Administrator shall report the
matter to the Chairman who may as a matter
of urgency recommend an acting appointment
without regard to that procedure.

li. The procedure governing recommenda-
tions for appointments, promotions and transfers
in the public service shall be in accordance with
the following classification :—-

(1) Crass A--Posts of which the mitial
salary is not less than $4,800 per annum and
the filling of which reqnires the approval of
the Secretary of State.

Efficiency bar
examination.

Principles
relating to
acting
appointments.

Departure
from
procedure in
special
circumstances,

Procedure
relating to
appointments
to be filled
otherwise
than by
examination,
j

(a) As s00n as & vacancy occurs or
is known to be impending, the Governor
or the Administrator shall notify the
secretary and furnish him with details of
the requirements of the post, the qualifi-
cations necessary, and the emoluments
attached thereto.

(6) The Commission shall consider
public officers in the Presidency, in
accordance with the privciples in para-
graphs 5 and 7 of these Instructions.

(c) If in the opinion of the Commis-
sion there is no local public officer suitably
qualified for appointment to the post, the
Commission may seck the advice of the
Public Service Commission in any other
British Caribbean Territory or may con-
sider other local candidates not in the
public service.

(d) The Commission — shall make
recommendations to the Governor for
filling the post in order that the Governor
may submit his recommendations to the
Secretary of State.

(e) Tf the Commission is unable to
recommend the appointment of a candidate
it shall inform the Governor xaccordingly
stating the steps which have been taken
to ascertain whether a suitable candidate
is available and the reasons why a recom-
mendation cannot be made.

(2) Crass B— Posts above scale [ in the
Salary Scales of the Civil Service, the filling of
which requires the approval of the Governor.

(a) As soon asa vaecaney occurs or is
known to be impending, the Governor
or the Administrator shall notify the
secretary and furnish him with details of
the requirements of the post, the qualifi-
cations necessary, and the emoluments
attached thereto.
7

(6) The Commission shall consider
public officers in the Presidency, in
accordance with the principles in para-
graphs 5 (2) and 7 of these Instructions.

(c) If in the opinion of the Comnnis-
sion there is no public officer in the
Presidency who is suitably qualified to fill
the post, the Commission may then
consider other public officers outside the
Presidency and, if necessary, advertise
the post in accordance with paragraph 6
of these Instructions.

(d) The Commission shall then
make recommendations to the Governor
for filling the post.

(3) Crass C—Posts in the graded ser-
vice (scales [ to XIV in the Salary Scales
of the Civil Service) and other posts, the
filling of which requires the approval of the
- Administrator.

(a) As soon as a vacancy occurs
or is known to be impending, the
Administrator shall notify the secretary
and furnish him with details of the
requirements of the post, the qualifications
necessary, and the emoluments attached
thereto.

(6) The Commission shall consider
public officers in the Presidency, in
accordance with the principles in para-
graphs 5 (2) and 7 of these Instructions.

(c) If in the opinion of the Commis-
sion there is no public officer in the
- Presidency who is suitably qualified to fill
the post, the Commission may then con-
sider other public officers outside the
Presidency or candidates selected as a
result of examinations in accordance, with
paragraph 12 of these Instructions, or
may advertise the post.
Vacancies to
be filled by

examinations.

Representa-
tions from
individuals.

Cases not
covered,

Savine's,

8
(d) The Commission shall then

make recom mendations to the Adminis:
trator for filling the post.

12. Where vacancies are to be filled according
to the results of examinations in conformity with
any approved scheme of recruitment the procedure
set out in paragraph 11 of these Instructions shall
not apply. The Governor or the Administrator
shall notify the vacancies to the secretary and the
Commission shall arrange for the holding of neces-
sary examinutions in accordance with the scheme of
recruitinent.

PART TIL.

MISCELLANEOUS.

18. The Commission shall not consider
representations from individuals (including individ-
ual officers) nen when required to do so by the
Governor or the Administrator.

14. Any case not covered by these Instruc-
tions shall be reported to the secretary and the
Commission may refer the case to the Governor
who may issue instructions under his hand as to
how the case shall be dealt with, and the case shall
be dealt with accordingly.

15. Nothing in these Instructions shall—

(a) apply to any member of the Gover-
nor’s personal staff;

(6) apply to any Judge of the Supreme

Court or any Magistrate;

(¢) apply to any office or rank ina Naval,
Military or Air Force constituted by ov moued
under any enactment;

(7?) apply to any appointments to and
promotions in the Oversea Audit Service;
9

(¢) affect the powers and responsibility
conferred upon the Commissioner of Police by
the Police Act, 1951, as amended, and any 12/1951.
regulations made thereunder, in respect of
appointments, promotion and discipline of all
ranks of the Police Force below the rank of
Tuspector; or of the powers and responsibility
conferred upon the officer in charge of prison
discipline, the Keeper or the Visiting Justices
by the Rules and Regulations for the Govern-
ment of the Prisons made by the Governor
in Council on the 18th day of August, 1909,
as amended, in respect of discipline of subordi-
nate officers.

16. These Instructions shall come into Commence-
operation on the 19th day of January, 1956. cia

Dated this 8rd day of January, 1956.

K. W. Bracksurne,
(rovernor.



ANTIQUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. Buackman, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1966,
A.C, 13/235—375—1.56. [Price 15 cents.]
LEEWARD ISLANDS.
SAINT CHRISTOPHER NEVIS AND ANGUILLA

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.

1956, No. 5.

Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into

operation the Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla

Constitution and Elections (Amendment) Ordinance,
1956.



BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS.
A PROCLAMATION.

Kk. W. BLACKBURNE,
Governor.

WHEREAS hy section 6 of the Saint Christopher Nevis and
Anguilla Constitution and Elections (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956
(No. 2 of 1956) it is provided that the said Ordinance shall come into
operation on a day to be appointed by the Governor by Proclamation
published in the Gazette:

NOW, THEREFORE, 1, KENNETH WILLIAM BLACKBURNE,
a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael
and Saint George. an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British
Empire, Governor and Commander in Chief in and over the Colony of
the Leeward Islands and Vice Admiral of the same, do by this my
Proclamation declare that the said Ordinance shall come into operation
on the 19th day of January, 1956.

AND all Her Majesty’s officers and loving subjects in the Presi-
dency of Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla and all others whom it
may concern are hereby required to take due notice hereof and to give
their ready obedience accordingly.

GIVEN at the Government House, Antigua, this 12th day of
January, 1956, and in the fourth year of Her Majesty’s
reign.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!

Printed at the Governmnet Printing Office, Leeward Islands.
by BE. M. BLACKMAN, Government Printer.—By Authority.
1956,
~~ 480—1.46. (Price 3 cents.)
,
ae

Â¥.

LEEWARD ISLANDS.
SAINT CHRISTOPHER NEVIS AND ANGUILLA

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.

1956, No. 6.

Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into
operation the Public Service Commission Ordinance,
1956.

BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS.
A PROCLAMATION.

Kk. W. BLACKBURNE,
Governor.

WHEREAS by section 1 of the Public Service Commission
Ordinance, 1956 (No. 3 of 1956) it ig provided that the said Ordinance
shall eome into operation on a day to be appointed by the Governor by
Proclamation published in the Gazette:

NOW, THEREFORE, 1, KENNETH WILLIAM BLACKBURNE, a
Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael
and Saint George, an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British
Empire, Governor and Commander in Chief in and over the Colony of
the Leeward Islands and Vice Admiral of the same, do hy this my
Proclamation declare that the said Ordinance shall come into operation
on the 19th day of January, 1956.

AND all Her Majesty’s officers and loving subjects in the Presi-
dency of Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla and all others whom it
may concern are hereby required to take due notice hereof and to give
their ready obedience accordingly.

“ GIVEN at the Government House, Antigua, this 12th day of
January, 1956, and in the fourth year of Her Majesty's
reign.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!



ANTIQUA.
Prinved at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands.
by E. M. Buackman, Government Printer.— hy Authority.
1956
—480-—1.56. | Price 3 cents}
-

a.

—_ os