Citation
Leeward Islands gazette

Material Information

Title:
Leeward Islands gazette
Added title page title:
Supplement to the Leeward Islands gazette
Creator:
Leeward Islands (West Indies)
Place of Publication:
[Antigua
Publisher:
Gov. Printing Office]
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Politics and government -- Leeward Islands (West Indies) ( lcsh )
Law
Leeward Islands (Federation)
Montserrat
Genre:
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )
Official gazettes ( fast )
Gazettes ( fast )
newspaper ( marcgt )

Notes

Dates or Sequential Designation:
1- , 1872-
General Note:
Two pages per frame.
General Note:
Supplements, issued with some numbers, contain departmental reports, Meteorological registers, ordinances, statutory rules and orders, etc., of Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands.
General Note:
Weekly
General Note:
Published by Authority, <27th March, 1941>-28th June, 1956.
General Note:
Open access via Digital Library of the Caribbean.
General Note:
Some issues called "extraordinary."
General Note:
Occasionally issued with "Supplement to the Leeward Islands gazette."
General Note:
Vol. 18, no. 10 (13th March 1890); title from caption (viewed July 10, 2023).
General Note:
Vol. 84, no. 30 (28th June, 1956) (viewed July 10, 2023).

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is presumed to be in the public domain. The University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not claim any copyright interest in this item. Users of this work have responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions may require permission of the copyright holder. The Smathers Libraries would like to learn more about this item and invite individuals or organizations to contact Digital Services (UFDC@uflib.ufl.edu) with any additional information they can provide.
Resource Identifier:
001724221 ( ALEPH )
AJD6739 ( NOTIS )

Related Items

Succeeded by:
Antigua, Montserrat and Virgin Islands gazette

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certs
Published by Authority” ~
VOL. LXXXII. THURSDAY, lire FEBRUARY, 1954. No. 9.





Notices.

International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea.

The Collision Regulations (Ships
and Seaplanes on the water) and
Signals of Distress (Ships) Order,
1953, 8. I. 1953 No. 1557 made under
Section 418 of the Merchant Ship-
ping Act, 1894 (a) came into opera-
tion on the Ist January, 1954.

2. The British Ships to which,
wherever they may be, the Collision
Regulations apply include, among
others :—

(a) Ships registered in the Colo-
nies under the Merchant Shipping
Act 1804.

(0) Ships registered under sec-
tion 88 «f the Merchant Shipping
Act 1594.

(c) Siips registered in Colonies
ete., which have their own Mer-
chant Shipping Legislation and
have repealed section 418 (1) of
the Merchant Shipping Act 1894,
in its application to such ships, in
exercise of the powers conferred
by section 735 (1) of the Merchant
Shipping Act 1894.

8. Paragraph 3 of Article 1 of
the new Order revokes certain pro-
visions relating to aircraft on the
surface of the water which are con-
tained in the Air Navigation Order,
1949, and the Colonial Air Naviga-
tion Order, 1949, as subsequently
amended. The revoked provisions
are indicated in Piri II of the Third
Schedule to the Order. When the
Order comes into «peration on the
Ist January, 1954 these provisions
~ will no longer be nerded as seaplanes
on the surface of the water (except so
far as distress signals are concerned)
will thereafter be dealt with in the
Collision Regulations set out in the
First Schedule to the Order. Signals
of distress for aircraft are at present
dealt with in Schedule II of the Air
Navigation Order, 1949 and Sched-
ule II of the Colonial Air Navigation
Order, 1949 and these provisions will
be re-enacted in the new Air Naviga-
tion Order which is at present in
preparation and in the corresponding
Colonial Air Navigation Order.”

‘4. The following are some of the
more important changes: —
(i) They apply to seaplanes on the
water as well as to ships.

328, 7A97
LYPTR

(ii) Under the existing Regulations
a second white masthead light is
optional. Under the new Regu-
lations the second light becomes
compulsory for power-driven
vessels under way except for
vessels less than 150 feet in
length and for vessels engaged
in towing.

(iii) The lights shown by fishing
vessels when fishing must be
visible at a distance of at least
two miles.

(iv) The stern light which under
the existing Regulations ig
optional becomes compulsory,
and its range of visibility is in-
creased from one to two miles.

(v) The range of visibility of
anchor lights is increased for all
vessels under 150 feet in length
from one to two miles and for
vessels of 150 feet in length and
over from one to three miles.
In day time vessels at anchor
must carry a black ball not less
than two feet in diameter in the
fore part of the vessel. Vessels
aground must carry in daytime
three black balls, placed in a
vertical line one over the other
and not less than six feet apart.

(vi) Vessels of more thin 350 feet
in length when at anchor in fog,
mist, falling snow, heavy rain-
storms or any other condition
similarly restricting visibility
must, in addition to ringing a
bell in the forepart of the vessel,
sound in the after part a gong or
or other instrument, the tone and
sounding of which cannot be
confused with that of the bell.

(vii) A new sound signal (one pro-
longed blast of the whistle) is
prescribed for a power-driven
vessel nearing a bend in a chan-
nel where another power-driven
vessel might be approaching
from the other direction but
cannot be seen.

(viii) When a power-driven vessel
which, under the Regulations,
has to keep course and speed is
in sight of another vessel and is
in doubt whether the other vessel
is taking sufficient action to avert
collision, she may indicate her
doubt by giving at least five
short and rapid blasts on the
whistle.

5. The International Conference
on the Satety of Life At Sea, 1948
which approved the Regulations also

adopted the following recommenda-
tions:—

The Conference, while recognising
that the recent advances in radar
and electronic navigational aids
are of great service to shipping,
is of the opinion that the posses-
sion of any such device in no
way relieves the Master of a ship
from his obligations strictly to
observe the requirements laid
down in the International Regu-
lations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, and in particular the
obligations contained in Rules
15 and 16 of those Regulations.

Copies of the Order (Price 6d.)
may be obtained from :—

Her Majesty’s Stationery Gifice,

York House, Kingsway,
London, W.C, 2.
Ref. No. A. 70/44.

Workmen’s Compensation Act.



The attention of persons in Anti-
gua employing workmen, defined by
the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
1937, is directed to the notice dated
12th February, 1953 published in
the Leeward Islands Gazette on the
26th February, 1953 whereby such
persons are required to render, on or
before the 15th day of February in
every year to the Labour Comumis-

. sioner, a correct return in respect of
the preceding calendar year specify-
ing:—

(a) The total number of injuries
to workmen during the year in
respect of which compensation has
been paid;

(b) The number of fatal injuries
included under (a);

(c) The total amount paid in full
settlement of claim for compensa-
tion in respect of non-fatal injuries;

(ad) The total amount paid to
dependents in respect of fatal in-
juries:

(e) The number of non-fatal in-
juries which have been classified
as of a permanent nature;

(f) Full details respecting any
payment of compensation being
made on account of temporary dis-
ablement under section (4) (7) (d).
Dated the 5th day of February,

1954.
R. St. J. O. WAYNE.
Administrator.
Ref. No, A 47/8.



28 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE.

In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.

ANTIGUA CIRCUIT.

In the matter of the Lunatics Act,
Cap. 111.

GENERAL ORDERS

In exercise of the powers conferred
on me by section 9 of the Lunatics
Act { hereby order that where, upon
any appeal under the said section, the
issuc whether the person alleged to
be « !unatic is or is not a lunatic and
@ proper subject of confinement is to
be tried by a jury, the following pro-
eedure shall be adopted :—



(1) The provisions of ‘the Jurics
Act, Cap. 56, relative to the trial by
corinon jury in the Supreme Court
of ai y person charged with felony
other than treason or murder, shall
be applied mutatis niutandis.

(2) Vhe trial shall take place at the
first practicable sitting of the Supreme
Court in its criminal jurisdiction
after notice of appeal has been filed.

(3) The respondent shall have the
right to require the appellant to sub-
mit himself to medical examination
by one or more doctors either before
evidence is taken or during the
course of the trial.

(4) The evidence of the respondent
and his witnesses shall be taken
before that of the appellant and his
‘witnesses: Provided that the presi-
ding Judge may, in his discretion,
allow evidence in rebuttal to be
given at any-stage of the proceedings.

(5) In all other respects the pro-
cedure shall be as nearly as possible
in accordance with the procedure
from time to time in force for the
tria! of indictable offences in the
Supreme Court.

Maile this 8th day of February,
1954.
; W. A. DATE,
Puisne Judge.



Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950.



In pursuance of the requirements
of section 3 (2) (a) of the Aid to
Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1950,
it ig hereby notified for general in-
formation that the Governor in
Council proposes to make the under-
mentioned Order under section 3 (1)
of the said Ordinance.

-2. Any person who objects to
the making of such Order shall give
notice in writing of his objection and
of the grounds on which he relies in
support thereot to the Clerk of the
Executive Council on or before the
22nd day of February, 1954.

J. L. ROBINSON,
Clerk of Executive Council.

The Aid to Pioneer Industries (Manu-
facture of Malt Liquors) Order,
1954 dated made
by the Governor in Council under
section 3 (1) of the Aid to Pioneer
Industries Ordinance, 1950 (Wo. 9
of 1950).

ORDER IN COUNCIL

1. Crrarion. This Order may
be cited as the Aid to Pioneer In-
dustries (Manufacture of Malt Li-
quors) Order, 1954.

2, MANUFACTURE OF MALT LI-
QUORS DECLARED A PIONEER IN-
DUSTRY. The manufacture of Malt
Liquors is hereby declared to be a
pioneer industry for the purposes of
the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordi-
nance, 1950, and the following pro-
ducts are hereby declared to be
pioneer products for the said pur-
poses:-—

Beer
Ale
Stout
Porter,

Made by the Governor in Council
this day of 1954.

Clerk of Hxecutive Council.

Ref. No. A 42/57.

Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950.

In pursuance of the requirements
of section 3 (2) (a) of the Aid to
Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1950,
it is hereby notified for general infor-
mation that the Governor in Council
proposes to make the undermentioned
Order under section 3 (1) of the said
Ordinance.

2. Any person who objects to the
making of such Order shall give
notice in writing of his objection and
of the grounds on which he relies
in support thereof to the Clerk of the
Executive Council on or before the
22nd day of February, 1954.

J. lL. ROBINSON,
Clerk of Hxecutive Council.

The Aid to Pioneer Industries (Pro-
cessing of Meat) Order, 1954,
dated made by the
Governor in Council under section
3 (1) of the Aid to Pioneer Indus-
tries Ordinance 1950 (No. 9 of
1950).

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

1. OrraTion. This Order may be
cited as the Aid to Pioneer Industries
(Processing of Meat) Order, 1954.

2. PROCESSING OF MBAT DE-
CLARED A PIONEER INDUSTRY. The
processing of Meat is hereby declared
to be a pioneer incustry for the pur-
poses of the Aid to Pioneer Industries

[11 February, 1954.

Ordinance, 1950, and the following
products are hereby declared to be
pioneer products for the said pur-
poses—

Processed Meat
Sausages

Salami

Faggots

Brawn, and

Bone meal fertilizer.

Made by the Governor in Council
this dey of 1954.

Clerk of Ececutive Counetl.

Ref. No. 42/57.

Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950.

In pursuance of the requirements
of section 3 (2) (a) of the Aid to
Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1950,
it is hereby notified for general infor-
mation that the Governor in Council
proposes to make the undermentioned
Order under section 3 (1) of thesaid
Ordinance.

2. Any person who objects to the
making of such Order shall give
notice in writing of his objection and
of the grounds on which he relies in
support thereof to the Clerk of the
Executive Council on or before the
22nd day of February, 1954.

J. L. ROBINSON,
Clerk of Executive Council.

The Aid to Pioneer Industries (Manu-
facture of Vegetable Oil) Order,
1954, dated made
by the Governor in Council under
section 3 (1) of the Aid to Pioneer
Industries Ordinance, 1950 (No. 9
of 1950).

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

1. CrraTIoN. This Order may be
cited as the Aid to Pioneer [Industries
(Manufacture of Vegetable Oil) Order,
1954.

2. MANUFACTURE OF VEGETABLE
OIL DECLARED A PIONEER INDUS-
TRY. The extraction and refining of
vegetable oil is hereby declared to be
a pioneer industry for the purposes
of the Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950, and. the following
product is hereby declared to be a
pioneer prodnct for the said-
purposes :-—

Vegetable Oil.

Made by the Governor in Couneil
this day of 1954.

Merk of Executive Council.

Ref. No. 42/58.



11 February, 1954.]

Token Imports Scheme.





After consultation between Colo-
nial Governments concerned H.M.
Government and Canadian and Ameri-
can Authorities it has been decided
to place the following items forth-
‘with on open general licence:—

News Print, Kraft Paper, Fish

(Dried, Smoked, Pickled & Salted)

Onions, Potatoes, Animal Feeding

Stuffs (except in British Guiana),

Cheese, Powdered & Canned Milk,

Split Peas, Meat, Canned Fish.

The first 6 items which have
hitherto been included in Canadian
Token Imports Scheme will now be
deleted from list of items covered by
this Scheme.

Administrator's Office,
Antigua.
9th February, 1954.
Ref. No. S.A, 40/82—-IT.

No. li.

The Secretary of State for the
Colonies has informed the Governor
that the power of disallowance will
not be exercised in respect of the
undermentioned Ordinance:—

Virgin, Islands.
No. 5 of 1953, **The Income Tax
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1993.”



No. 12.

The following Ordinance is circu-
lated with this Gazette and forms
part thereof:—

Antigua.

No. 18 of 1953, ‘‘ The Watercourses
and Water Works (Abolition of Water
Board) Ordinance, 1953”.

4 pp. Price 6 cents.

In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.

SAINT CHRISTOPHER CIRCUIT.
A.D. 1954.

NOTICE is hereby given that in
pursuance of Rules made by the Chief
Justice under Section 16 of the
Windward Islands and Leeward
Islands (Cenrts) Order-in-Council
1939, and duly approved as therein
provided on the 16th day of October,
A.D. 194], The Honourable the
Puisne Judge selected for the sitting
of the Court in the Saint Christopher

THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE.

Circuit has appointed the day of the
month on which the ensuing Cirenit
Court shall sit as follows, that is
to say :-—

The Saint Christopher Circuit on
FRIDAY the 26th day of FEBRU-
ARY, 1954 at 10 o’clock in the fore-
noon. ,

Dated the 25th day of January,
1954.
D. S. BROOKEs,
Registrar of the Supreme Court.

Re death of EMANUEL GOVIA,
late of St. Paul’s Village, in
the island of Saint Christo-
pher, a workman lately em-
ployed at Belmont Estate,
which death occurred on the
13th day of January, 1954.

COMPENSATION in the above
matter having been deposited with
me under Section 8 of the Work-
men’s Compensation Act, the De-
pendants of the said HMANUEL
GOVIA, deceased, are hereby required
to appear before the Commission-
er on SATURDAY, the 27th day of
FEBRUARY, 1954, at 10 oclock in
the forenoon at the Court House
Basseterre, when the Commissioner
will proceed to determine the distri-
bution thereof.

PROOF of relationship of depen-
dants to the deceased will be required
by the Commissioner to be furnished
by the claimants at the enquiry, such
proof to be im the form of Certificates
of Birth and Marriage as in the cir-
cumstances be necessary.

A CLAIMANT for funeral ex-
penses of the deceased must submit
and prove his claim to the Registrar
before the 26th day of February,
1954.

Dated
L954.

the 26th day of January,

D. S. BROOKES,
Registrar of the Supreme Court.
Ref. No. A 36/00004.

RAINFALL FIGURES.
Centra} Experiment Station,



Antigua.
1950. 1951. 1952. 1963. 1954,
Jan. 23 5.41 38.60 2.41 1.98 3.04
Feb. 6 1.52 — .69 62 40
“G93 360 310 255 3.44







nO

9

In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.

NEVIS CIRCUIT.
A.D.1954.

NOTICE is hereby given that in
pursnance of Rules made by the
Chief Justice under Section 16 of the
Windward Islands and Leeward
Islands (Courts} Order-in-Council,
1939 and duly approved as therein
provided on the 16th day of October,
A.D. 1941, The Honourable the
Puisne Judge selected for the sitting
of Court in the NEVIS CIRCUIT
has appointed the day of the month
on which the ensuing Circuit Court
shall sit as follows, that is to say:—

THE NEVIS CIRCUIT on Monday
the 12th day of April, 1954 at 10
o’clock in the forenoon.



Dated the 25th day of Januaty,
1954.
D. 8S. BROOKES,
Registrar of the Supreme Court.
Ref. No. 26/00002.

TRADE MARKS OFFICE,
ANTIGUA, 2nd February, 1954.

STABILIMENTI DEMANIALI
RECOARO SOCIETA PER AZIONI
of Via Carlo Poerio No. 39, Milan;
Italy have applied for Registration of
one Trade Mark consisting of the
following :—

CHINOTTO RECOARO

in class 44 that is to say:-—
Non alcoholic beverages

The Applicants claim that they
have used the said Trade Mark in
respect of the said goods for seven
years before the date of their said
Application.

Any person may within three
months from the date of the first
appearance of this Advertisenient in
the Leeward Islands Gazette, give
notice in duplicate at the Trade
Marks Office, Antigua, of opposition
to registration of the said Trade
Mark.

A. R. MEADE,
Acting Registrar of Trade Marks,



30 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. {11 February, 1954.

TRADE MARKS OFFICE,
Antigua, 2nd FEBRuaRy, 1954.

NESTLE’S PRODUCTS LIMITED of 309, North Side of Bay Street, Nassau, Bahama
Islands have applied for Registration of one Trade Mark consisting of the following: —

RRL cE AEN |
EQOA ce | A

ARIAT CNET|

RNAI IAL UGA AU AGT ORRIN Aruna
wT EQN OUANORN OL



in Class 42 that is to say:—
Milk, milk products of all kinds, including cheese and butter.

The Applicants claim that they have used the said Trade Mark in respect of the said goods
for three months before the date of their said Application.

Any person may within three months from the date of the first appearance of this
Advertisement in the Leeward Islands (razette, give notice in duplicate at the Trade Marks Office,
Antigua, of opposition to registration of the said Trade Mark.

A. R. Meapg,
Acting Registrar of Trade Marks.



11 February, 1954.) THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 31

IN THE COURT OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS
(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
Appeal No. 5 of 1952.

Between:—
NEVILLE JAMES Appellant (Defendant)
and
Tuomas H. Kersick Respondent (Complainant)
(Asst. Supt. of Police)
Before:-— DATE J.

S. T. Caristr1an for Appellant
D. A. dE Frerras, Acting Crown Attorney, for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

The appellant was convicted by the Additional Magistrate for District ‘“‘B” on two separate
charges committed on the same day: the first for making use of indecent language, contrary to section 8 (a)
of the Small Charges Act; the second for assaulting and beating John Huggins, a private of the Leeward
Islands Police Force, while in the execution of his duty, contrary to section 36 (2) of the said Act. For
the first offence the appellant was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment with hard labour, and for the
second to six months with hard labour. He has appealed against both of these convictions and sentences.

On his behalf it was submitted in this Court—
(a) that the proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court are a nullity for the reason that
Assistant Superintendent of Police Bunting, who conducted the case for the prosecu-
tion, had no authority to do so;

(b) that there was no evidence to show that the place where the offences are alleged to
have been committed is in Magisterial District ““B”’;

(c) that the convictions are against the weight of evidence;

(d) that the conviction orders are bad in that they are drawn up in the past tense and not
in the present;
(e) that the sentences imposed are excessive.

Objections (a), (0), (c) and (d) are, in my opinion, without merit.

Section 27 of the Police Act, 1951, expressly provides that where a charge is brought in the
name of one police officer “any other police officer shall have the same privileges as to addressing the
Magistrate and examining the witnesses adduced in the matter as the police officer in whose name the
charge is laid............ cc would have had.”

Submission (6) is in effect an objection to jurisdiction. No such objection was taken in the
Magistrate’s Court, and it is not competent for the appellant to raise it now.

As to submission (c), there was abundant evidence before the learned Magistrate on which he
could properly reach his findings of fact.

As regards submission (d), the conviction orders are hereby amended by substituting the word
“being” for the words “having heer” in the second line of each order.

There remains for consideration only the question of sentence. The maximum term of im-
prisonment prescribed under the Small Charges Act tor indecent language is one month; the maximum
upon summary conviction for assaulting and beating a police constable while in the execution of his duty
is twelve months. Having regard to all the circumstances I am strongly of the opinion that the sentence
imposed for the indecent language used is execessive. In passing sentence for this offence the Magis-
trate seems to have erred in taking into account the appellant’s conduct for which he was separately
charged. I accordingly direct that the sentence of thirty days imprisonment be set aside and orcer that
in lieu thereof the appellant pay a fine of $7.20 or, in default of payment, be imprisoned with hard
labour for ten days.

The sentence passed in respect of the assault and battery presents greater difficulty. Itisa
serious matter to assault a police constable in the execution of his duty, and the appellant does not
possess a clean record. Nevertheless the evidence as a whole indicates that much of the injury suffered
by P. C. Huggins was probably brought upon himeelf by his aggressive manner towards the appellant.
I think that a sentence of three months imprisonment with hard labour will meet the case; and I direct that
that sentence be substituted for the sentence of six months passed by the Magistrate.

W. A. Dare,
7th January, 1954. Puisne Judye.



32 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD
ISLANDS

(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

Appeal No. 7 of 1951

Between:—
MirceEtyt MICHAEL Appellant (Plaintiff)
and
CLaRIssA ABRAMS Respondent (Defendant)

Before:— Date, J.

C. E. Francis for Appellant.
J. R. Henry for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

The history of this case is remarkable. On 17th January, 1951, the appellant (plaintiff) filed
a suit in the Magistrate’s Court, District “A,” claiming from the respondent the sum of $18.00 paid
by the appellant on behalf of the respondent in respect of assessed city rates for 1950 on certain build-
ing land at Ottos occupied by the respondent as tenant of the appellant. The case came before the
then Acting Magistrate (Mr. B. F. Dias) on 2nd February, 1951. The only witness called on behalf
of the appellant was George Joshua, clerk to the appellant. He testified that the respondent had been
in occupation of the land since 1st February, 1948; that the rental was $3 per quarter, the respondent
being responsible for the payment of city rates; and that the respondent paid these rates for 1948 and
1949 but refused to pay for 1950 and appellant had to do so. There is nothing in Mr. Joshua’s
evidence as to the “standard rent” of the land in question, nor is there anything to indicate what the
rates were. [t was conceded by counsel in this Court—as it must have been in the Magistrate’s Court—
that in respect of each of the years 1948 and 1949 the rates amounted to $12; in 1950 they were
Increased to $18.

At the close of the appellant’s case in the Magistrate’s Court Mr. Henry, who appeared for
the respondent, submitted that there was no case to answer. The learned Magistrate agreed with him
and gave judgment for the respondent, with costs $4.20 His reasons for Decision are as follows:—

‘From the evidence before me, I have come to the conclusion that this is either an at-
tempt to increase the rent by more than fifteen per centum without the sanction of the Rent
Commissioners, and as such is forbidden, by section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance,
No. 18 of 1947 of Antigua, cr else it is the requiring ‘ payment of a fine, premium or other
like sum, or the giving of any consideration in addition to the rent’ such as is forbidden by
section 9 of the said Rent Restriction Ordinance....... From the evidence adduced for the
plaintiff, no attempt was ever made to get the Rent Commissioners to sanction such an increase.
Until the rent has been thus legally increased the tenant, according to section 8 of the said
Ordinance, can, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, recove: such eum paid by
him over and above the standard rent as increased by fifteen per cent.”

The appellant appealed, and on the 15th of October, 1951, Jackson C. J. ordered that the
ease be remitted to the Magistrate with a direction that he put the respondent to her election whether
she would lead evidence or not.

The case came before the Acting Magistrate for the second time on 30th April, 1952, and
evidence was then given by the respondent herself; whereupon the Magistrate again gave judgment for
the respondent with costs $4.20, and the appellant again appealed.

What happened subsequent to the filing of the second notice of appeal is not clear. It would
seem that owing to confusion associated with the transfer to another Colony of the Magistrate who
dealt with the case, the notes of evidence taken at the second hearing in the Magistrate’s Court were
misplaced and the appeal was not forwarded to the Registrar of this Court, Eventually, however, as a
result of un order made by Wooding J. on 13th April, 1953, the Magistrate sent in Reasons for Deci-
sion together with a certificate to the effect that a note of the respondent's evidence, as prepared by
counsel for the appellant and respondent, was true and correct. That note reads thus:

“[ live in my own house on lands of Mitchell Michael, rental $3 per quarter; I have paid
the rents in 1948 and 1949. [ paid some money for city rate because Mr. Michael told me
he would put lights and remove garbage. None of these facilities, I refused to pay the city
rate for 1950. The neighbour to the east of me does not pay city rate.





11 February, 1954. | THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 33
The first point taken by Mr. Francis (for the appellant) when the case came before me was
>that the trial Magistrate was wholly mistaken in thinking, as stated in his Reasons for Decision, that
--counsel were ‘“‘contented to leave the matter as a question of consideration.......whether or not the plain-
tiff did in fact promise the facilities which were not forthcoming, and so whether or not there was a
failure of consideration for the defendant’s promise to pay the city rates.” Mr. Francis’ statement in
~ this connection was not challenged by Mr. Henry who, throughout these proceedings, has appeared for
the respondent. Moreover, the Court record discloses that the Magistrate in preparing his Reasons for
Decision gave reasons from his “memory of the case” as he “did not have the notes of evidence availa-
ble.” This, doubtless, accounts also for his obvious misconception of the evidence given for. the ap-
pellant as regards the nature of the agreement entered into between the parties.

It is quite evident that the Magistrate has not appreciated My Lord’s reasons for remitting
_ the case to him, and that he has failed to address his mind seriously to the evidence before him. From

“the start he has been obsessed with the idea that any arrangement whereby rates and taxes are payable
by the tenant offends against the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1947. No authority
for such a proposition has been cited by him, nor has any been produced in this Court.

In the deplorable circumstances set out above this case must, I regret, once more be sent back
v4o the Magistrate’s Court, for retrial by another Magistrate.

W. A. Date,
Puisne Judge.
Ist February, 1954. . |



34 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954. .

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND
LEEWARD ISLANDS

(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)
(AprELLATE J URISDICTION)

Appeal No. 2 of 19538

Between :—
Marruew Brake Appellant (Defendant)
and
Toomas H. Kersick Respondent (Complainant)
(Assistant Superintendent of Police)
Before:— DATE. gd.

S. T. Carisrian for Appellant
C. A. Kersick (Acting Attorney General) for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

This is an appeal against a decision of the Acting Magistrate of District “A” convicting
the appellant of having upon him a certain instrument, to wit, a hatehct, with intent to commit a
felonious act, contrary to section 50 (c) of the Small Charges Act, Cap. 67. The appellant was
ordered to pay a fine of $15.00 or, in default of payment, to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour
for one month.

On behalf of the respondent it was submitted wz imine that the provisions of section 178
of the Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act, Cap. 61, had not been complied with by the appellant
and that, consequently, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain bis appeal. The relevant portion
of section 178 reads thus:



178. The appellant shall within three days ujier the day on which he served nokice of his
intention to appeal enter into a recognisance before a Magistrate with or without sureties
as the Magistrate may direct conditioned to appear before the Judge and to try the appeal
and to abide the judgment thereon of the J udge and to pay such costs as may be awarded
by him, or if the Magistrate thinks it expedient he may instead of entering into recogni-
sances give such other security by payment of money into Court or otherwise ag the
Magistrate deems sufficient.

The notice of appeal filed herein is dated 31st J anuary, 1953. There is a notation on it to
the effect that it was received by the Magistrate’s Clerk at 11.55 a.m. that day. The recognisance
is dated 30th January, 1953. [t would appear, therefore, that the recognisance was executed before
the notice of appeal was filed. Learned counsel for the appellant endeavoured to show that this
‘was not the case, but unfortunately the clerk formerly employed by him who attended to the filing
of the appeal in this matter, is at present in the United Kingdom. On the documents before me I
must, albeit reluctantly, conclude that the notice of appeal was not in the possession of the
Magistrate when the recognisance was executed. Such procedure is wroiy and was held to be fatal
in R. v. Anglesay Justices (1892), 2Q.B. 29, and R. ». Cheshire Justices (1896), 60 J.P. 585. It
cannot be excused on the ground that the M agistrates here invariably fix recognisances in the sum
of £5.0.0., the amount mentioned in the appellant’s bond. The Magistrate has a judicial
discretion to exercise; it must be exercised in each case, and in order to do so he must have before
him the notice of appeal, which contains the grounds of appeal, and all other relevant facts.

Section 193 of Cap. 61, which is similar to section 8 of Baines’ Act, empowers the court
before which the appeal is brought, in cases where the recognisance has heen entered into within
the time by law required, but is in any way invalid, to allow the sulstitution of @ new and
sufficient recognisance, and for that purpose to allow such time and make such examination and
impose such terms as to payment of costs to the respondent as shall appear just and ee
That section, however, applies only to cases where a recognisance has been catered into within the time

required by law. | |
I reeret that I am obliged to hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
reore

It is accordingly dismissed. | | |
| re ht in bringing the
ink I 5 t learned counsel for the respondent was rig g
: I think a es ae attention of the Court. It is the duty of every court to sey
defect in ane aaa tive, on the question of jurisdiction. It would therefore be most ee
eee: = OT rie Gur: knowing of an irregularity affecting its jurisdiction, to remain silen
for any oflicer 0 2 °

and allow the court to proceed to adjudication. W. A. Dare,

Puisne Judg?.

ith January, 1954



11 February, 1954.] THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 35

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND
LEEWARD ISLANDS

(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
Appeal No. 3 of 1953.

Between:—
CraupE E. FRAnNcIs Appellant (Defendant)
and
Tuomas H. Kexsick Respondent (Complainant)
(Assistant Superintendent of Police)
Before— DATE, J.,

Ii. K. Harney for Appellant
A. VF. Loursy (Acting Crown Attorney) for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

‘The appeilant was convicted under sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Vehicles and Road
Yraffic Ordinance, 1946, for failing to comply with an order of the Traffic Commissioner published.
in the local newspapers on the L9th of October, 1952, in that he parked his car on the north side of
Long Street, between Market Alley and Thames Street. The sub-section reads as follows:—

“78, (1) The Traffic Commissioner may by notice published in the Grazetfe or ina
newspaper published in the Presidency make orders as to the line to be kept by persons
driving or riding any vehicle or animal on any road and as to the manner in which
vehicles of any description shall be drawn up while waiting on any road and as to the
route to be observed by all vehicles, horses, and persons, and for preventing obstructions
on any road, in any case where such a road is liable to be thronged or obstructed; and also
may give directions to police officers for the purpose of regulating traffic in the neighbour-
hood of Courts of Law, public offices, churches, theatres, and other places of public resort;
and any person who, after being made aquainted with any orders made or directions given
under this section, shall contravene or fail to comply with such orders or directions shalk
be guilty of an offence.”

_ The facts of the case are not in dispute. On 5th January, 1953, the appellant drove his
ear, A.G. 462, into Long Street and parked on the north side of that street, in the section of the
street which lies between Thames Street and Market Alley. There was no parking space available
on the south side of the street. P. C. Prince went to the appellant and told him he could not park
there, informing him that there was a notice to that effect by the Traffic Commissioner published
in the newspapers. The appellant told the constable that the Commissioner had no power to make
law, and refused to move his car.

At the trial before the Acting Magistrate, District A, copies of the Autigua Star and the |
Workers’ Voice were produced. Each paper contained a notice in the following terms:—

“ Trarric NOTICE

' By virtue of the powers vested in me under Section 78 (1) of The Antigua Vehicles
and Road ‘Trafic Ordinance No. 4 of 1946, I make the following orders.

Until further notice—

(1) No vehicle of any description shall park in Thames Street, between
Newgate Street and Redcliffe Street.
(2) Vehicles must park on the South side only in Long Street, between
Thames Street and Market Alley.
J. R. A. Branca,
Trafic Commissioner.

17th October, 1952.

The appellant offered no evidence in the Magistrate’s Court but submitted, wifer alia, that
there was no proof that J. 8. A. Branch—the person whose name appeared at the foot of the
‘notices—was the Traffic Commissioner. Section 4 (1) of the Ordinance provides that “the
Commissioner of Police or such other person as the Administrator may appoint shall be the Trattc
Commissioner for the Presidency.” There was, however, no evidence that J. R. A. Branch was
Commissioner of Police. The learned Magistrate, in a considered decision delivered some days
later, agreed that the mere publication in the newspapers of a notice purporting to be signed by
J.R. A. Branch as Traffic Commissioner was unsuflicient. He called wpon the prosecution “ to
produce and tender the Gazelle appointing J. k. A. Branch to be Traffic Commissioner or other
lawful proof thereof” and announced that the appellant would have a further opportunity to
answer the complaint or take any objection which may be taken with regard to such production.



36 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954, .

Evidence was subsequently given by John Reginald Arthur Branch to the effect that he was
Commissioner of the Leeward Islands Police Force and Traffic Commissioner of Antigua, that it
was he who had issued the traffic notice published in the newspapers and that no other person had.
been appointed Tratfic Commissioner of Antigua.

In this Court Mr. Harney, for the appellant, urged firstly that the evidence given by John
Reginald Arthur Branch before the Magistrate was inadmissable at the stage at which it was
tendered as the prosecution bad already closed its case. To support this contention he relied
entirely upon the case of R. vr. Day. 27 Cr. App. R. 168. The headnote to that case reads thus:—

“ After the defence of a prisoner charged with forgery and obtaining money by a
forged instrument had been closed, the Judge adjourned the case and allowed the
prosecution to call a handwriting expert. Specimens of the prisoner’s admitted hand-
writing had been in the possession of the prosecution from the beginning of the proceedings.
Apart from this additional evidence, the case for the prosecution rested on the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an accomplice.

Held, that as the additional evidence did not relate to something which had arisen ez
wmprovisy in the course of the trial, but was evidence, the necessity for which should have:
been obvious from the outset, if should not have been admitted at that stage of the trial;.
and, as it was lnpossible to say that the jury must inevitably have convicted apart from
the additional evidence the conviction must be quashed.”

Day's Case, however, is remote from the present one. In A. v. Day the Court was
dealing with a point that went to the merits of the case—that was, indeed, the principal issue at
the trial. Were we are concerned only with a matter of formal proof, as was the case in Dufin v.
Markham and ancr., (A918) 26 Cox C. 0. 308. That was a prosecution before justices for an offence
under the Bread Order, 1917. The prosecuting inspector did not. put in the order itself, apparently
not being aware that he ought to do so; thereupon, the case for the prosecution having been closed,
the solicitor for the defendants successfully took the objection that no proof of the order had been
given and that no proof couid then be given to remedy the defect. On appeal to the King’s Bench
Division Avory, J., in the course of his judgment said this:



In holding that after the close of the case for the prosecution no proof of the order
could be given the justices were wrong. (Quite apart from the justices’ power to allow the
case to be re-opened—a matter which hardly needs an authority but which has the support
of Cave, J.in Hargreaves v. Hilliam (58 J. P. 655)—if the prosecution were not prepared
at the moment to hand in a copy of the order, and if, as is most unlikely, there was no
copy in court, the justices had power to adjourn the case so as to enable proper proof of
the order to be given, and in such a case as the present it was their judicial duty to adjourn
for that purpose.”

The second point urged by Mr. Harney at the hearing of this appeal was that the power
given to the Traffic Commissioner by subsection (1) of section 78 of the Vehicles and Road Traffic
Ordinance, 1946, covers only orders for special occasions (e.g. race meetii:¢s) and does not empower
him to issue general orders for an indefinite period. F inally Mr. Harney submitted that in every
prosecution under the subsection it is essential that the Traffic Commissioner give evidence of his
reasons for making the order alleged to have been contravened. For each of these propositions
Mr. Harney asked reference to the words “in any case where such a road is liable to be thronged
or obstructed ” appearing in the subsection.

It is quite evident that those words qualify everything preceding them, but, like the
learned trial Magistrate, I see no reason for treating the words “in any case” as synonymous with
“on any occasion’; nor do I perceive any inconsistency between the section as so construed and the
power conferred on the Governor in Council under section 77 (1) (m) of the Ordinance to make
regulations for the appointment of parking places. The power conferred on the Traffic Commis-
sioner is supplemental to that conferred on the Governor in Council and is, I think, intended to
make provision for circumstances which from time to time affect pariicular roads—may be for a
day, a week, a month, or even longer—but which cannot conveniently be dealt with by regulations.
The power is to be exercised in the discretion of the Traffic Commissioner, and the maxim omnia
praesumuntur rite esse acta applies.

The appeal is dismissed with costs £3. 3. 0.

W. A. Dare,
Puisne Judge.
7th January, 1954.

e



11 February, 1954.] THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 37
IN THE COURT OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS
(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

Appeal No. 10 ef 1958

Between:
Resecca Ponp & WatreR Ponp Appellants (Defendants)
and
JoserH ih. Byron Respondent (Complainant)
Before: DATE, J.

EK. KE. Harney for Appellant Resrcca Ponp.

J. R. Hexry for Appellant Warrer Ponp.

D. A. pe Freiras (Acting Crown Attorney)
for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

The appellants were convicted by the Acting Magistrate of District “ A” (Mr. B. F. Dias) for
harbouring smuggled good. contrary to section 42 of the Antigua Trade and Revenue Ordinance, 1900.
That section, as amended, states—

42. Every person concerned in smuggling any goods, or in unshipping or landing or
attempting to land any goods without having first obtained the warrant of the Treasurer, and
every person receiving, harbouring or removing such gocds shall be liable to a penalty not
exceeding £500. 0. 0.

The only other section of the Ordinance which need be referred to is section 61:

61. In every case where any question arises in any proceedings before a Magistrate or in
any Court of Law whether any goods have been legally imported into the Presidency, or
whether the duties of import or excise upon the same have been duly paid and satisfied, the
onus of proving that the goods have been legally imported and the duties duly paid shall be
on the defendant or person alleging the affirmative.

The grounds of appeal argued on behalf of the appellants in this Court were—
(a) that there was no evidence before the Magistrate to show that the place where the
offences are alleged to have been committed is in Magisterial District “ A’;

(b) that the goods alleged to have been smuggled were not found in the possession of the
appellants;

(c) that there was no evidence before the Magistrate to show that the goods raised any
question with regard to duty;

(d) that the convictions are bad in that they order the appellants to be imprisoned “in
Her Majesty's Prison”, and there is no such place.

Grounds (a), (/) and (d) can be disposed of in a few words. As to («), no such objection to
jurisdiction was taken in the court of first instance, and it will not now be entertained. As to (6), there
was ample evidence before the learned Magistrate on which he could properly find that the goods alleged
to have been smuggled were in the possession of the appellants, and he so found. As to (qd), if any ver-
bal alterations or additions are required to the formal orders drawa up in the Magistrate’s Court, they
can easily be effected under the powers conferred by section 191 of the Magistrate's Code of Procedure
Act, us replaced by section 7 of the Magistrate’s Code of Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1945, which
reads thus:

191. If, on the hearing of the appeal, any objection is made on account of any defect in
a complaint or is ormation, or on account of any omission or mistake in the drawing up of a
conviction or order, and if it is shown to the satisfaction of the appeal Court, that sufficient
grounds were in proof before the Magistrate who made the conviction or order to have
authorised the drawing up thereof free from that omission or mistake, the Court may amend
the complaint or information, or the conviction or order, and proceed thereafter as if the defect,
omission or mistake had not existed.

It will be convenient at this stage to refer brietly to the facts of the case. P.C. O’Donoghue,
-accompanied by P. C.’s Samuel and Wilkins, went to the home of the appellants armed with a written
authority from the Treasurer to search their premises for goods liable to seizure under the Trade and
Revenue Ordinance, 1900. In the presence of the appellant Rebecca Pond, but in the absence of the
appellant Walter Pond, P. C. Wilkins took from the pocket of a man’s coat hanging in the house, four
packets of Lucky Strike cigarettes. The packets were marked ‘ Virgin Islands’? in red and had the



38 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954.

number “211” on their stamp or seal. Rebecca Pond’s attention was drawn to the cigarettes and to -
the place where they were found, and she said: ‘They are belonging to my son Walter.” The search
was continued and beneath some ledges in the yard, about five rods south-east of the house, P. C.
Samuel found a biscuit tin which contained thir ty-nine packets of Lucky Strike cigarettes with markings
similar to those found in the coat pocket in the house. When Walter Pond arrived at the house, P. C.
O’Donoghue told him what had been said by his mother about the ownership of the first four packets
of cigarettes. Walter made no reply. O'Donoghue then told both appellants that they would be
reported for harbouring smuggled goods. At the trial no evidence was given as to whether Lucky
Strike cigarettes are lawfully pe into and sold in the Presidency; nor was any evidence given as
to the significance of the markings on the packets of cigarettes.

To support their arguments in respect of ground (c) Mr. Harney and Mr. Henry, for the
appellants, cited a case which came before this Court some years ago— //ill +. Richards (Appeal No. 2 of
1945). The respondent in that case was charged with unlawfully harbouring smuggled goods, to wit,
849 Chesterfield cigarettes. The evidence showed that upon lawful search by the police a quantity of
Chesterfield cigarettes were found on the respondent’s premises. In answer to the police he stated he
had bought the cigarettes from a woman wh» said they were duty paid. The learned Judge took the -
view that the failure of the prosecution to adduce any evidence indicative of a smuggling was fatal.
Referring to section 61 of the Ordinance, he laid special emphasis on the words “where any question
arises” and “ the defendant or person ¢ alleging the affirmative ”, and then went on: ‘‘ A question must arise
and the defendant must allege an affirmative to the effect that the duty has been paid. It may be asked
how is the question to arise? It seems to me only by evidence being given that a smuggling has taken
place of, if uot the articles which form the subject of the charge, at least of articles of a similar type or
brand. In other words there must be some evidence to put the matter in issue so that the defendant
shall be called upon to prove that duty has been paid. It may be asked, what should be the nature of
this evidence. This is best answered by giving examples—these are, evidence that a brand of articles
has never been legally imported into the Presidency and on which import duty has not been paid, or
evidence that on an attempt to frustrate an offence of smuggling a portion of the articles attempted to be
seize, escaped capture, the inference being that they were of « similar brand to portion of the articles
which were seized... ............ and are some of these articles........ some evidence of the type indicated should
be given and it would seem that its source would appear to be the Customs Department.”

[ entirely agree with the dictum in Hill v. Richards. The tinding of’ thirty-nine packets of
Lucky Strike cigarettes beneath some hedges is a suspicious circumstance, but it does not necessarily
point to the goods having been smuggled; it is, for instance, equally consistent with the goods being
stolen goods, on which duty may or may not have been paid. In the absence of any direct evidence of a
smuggling there should at least have been some evidence for the prosecution with regard to the importa-
tion and sale of Lucky Strike cigarettes in the Presidency. To hold otherwise would be to expose law-
abiding citizens to the intolerable liability of being called upon, whenever official suspicion is aroused, to
prove that duty has been paid upon any or all of the dutiable goods in their homes.

This appeal is allowed, with costs £3. 3.0. to each of the appellants, and the convictions are
set aside.

W. A. Dare,
7th January, 1954. Puisne Judge.

ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M. Brackman, ED,
Government Printer.—Ky Authority.
1984,

[Price 20 cenis.}



No. 18 of 1953. Watercourses and Water Works
(Abolition of Water Board)

[L.8.]
I Assent,
K. W. Biackeurne,
Governor.
31st December, 1953.

ANTIGUA.
No. 18 of 1953.

An Ordinance to amend the Watercourses and
Water Works Ordinance, 1945, so as to
abolish the Water Board and to transfer to
the Colonial Engineer the powers, duties and
functions iehenee vested: in or exercised by
the Water Board.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Governor and
Legislative Council of Antigua as follows:—

1. This Ordinance may be cited as the
Watercourses and Water Works (Abolition of
Water Board) Ordinance, 1958, and shall be read
as one with the Watercourses and Water Works
Ordinance, 1945, hereinafter called the Principal
Ordinance.

2. Section 2 of the Principal Ordinance ig
hereby amended ss follows:—

(a) by the deletion of the definition of
of the expression “ The Board”’;

(b) by the insertion, berwebn the defini-
tions of the expressions ‘‘ City Commissioners”
and ‘distribution area”, of the following
definition:—

“ “Colonial Engineer’ means the

Colonial Engineer of the Presidency ;” ;

(c) by the deletion of the words “ other
than the City of Saint John.” appearing in

v the definition of the expression ‘distribution
area’

329.7297
A497 4.

ANTIGUA,

Short title.

6/1945.

Amendment
of section 2 of
the Principal
Ordinance,



ANTIGUA. 2 Watercourses.and (Water Works No. 18 of 1953.
(Abolition of Water Board)

” Substitution 3. The sections of the Principal Ordinance _
eae specified in the first column of the Schedule to this
“Board” in Ordinance are hereby amended by the substitution
eereae of the words “ Colonial Engineer” for the word

“Board” to the extent specified in the second

column of the Schedule.

Haenimentot 4. Section 8 of the Principal Ordinance is
section 8 o as een

Ghee Pansigal hereby further amended as follows:—
Ordinance.

(a) by the substitution for subsection (1)
thereof of the following subsection:—

“(1) The Colonial Engineer shall
control, manage, maintain and supervise
all watercourses and waterworks in the
Island of Antigua and shall provide (so
far as is practicable) an adequate water
supply for the consumers therein.”

(b) by the substitution of the following
for paragraph (¢) of subsection (2) thereof:—

‘“‘(e) whenever it may be expedient
or necessary for the construction, altera-
tion, maintenance or repair of any water-
works to break open any street:

Provided that until the roadway is
restored the place where it is broken open
shall be watched and properly lighted.”

Amendment 5. Section 10 of the Principal Ordinance is
Sree hereby further amended by the substitution in
pa! Ordinance. paragraph (a) of subsection (2) thereof of the

words “ Public Works Department’ for the word

‘“ Board” appearing in the first line thereof,

Amendment 6. Section 24 of the Principal Ordinance is
of sectio# 24 hereby amended as follows:—
of the Princi- . “

1 Ordinance. We
pape (a) by the substitution of the words

“ Qulonial ‘ Engineer” respectively for the
words “‘any member of the Board ” appearing
in the third and fourth lines thereof and for the
word “Board” appearing in the marginal
note thereto;



No. 18 of 1953. Watercourses and Water Works 3
‘ (Abolition of Water Board)

(6) by the deletion of the word “‘thereof’
in the fifth line, and the substitution therefcr
of the words “of the Public Works
Department ”’.

7. Section 26 of the Principal Ordinance is
hereby amended by the substitution of the words
“ Colonial Engineer” respectively for the words
“secretary of the Board” appearing in the
third line thereof and for the word “secretary ”
appearing in the marginal note thereto.

8. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14 and 16 of
the Principal Ordinance are hereby repealed.

9. Nothing in this Ordinance shall affect
any Regulations made, rates levied or fixed, direc-
tions given, instruments issued or things done
under the Principal Ordinance before the com-
mencement of this Ordinance by the Board estab-
lished under section 4 of the Principal Ordinance
hereby repealed or by any officers or servants of
the said Board, but any such Regulations, rates,
directions, instruments or things shall, if in force
at the commencement of this Ordinance, continue
in force, and, so tar as they could have been made,
levied, fixed, issued or done under the Principal
Ordinance as amended by this Ordinance shall
have effect as if made, fixed, issued or done under
the Principal Ordinance as amended by this
Ordinance.

10. . This Ordinance shall come into opera-
tion on the Ist day of January, 1954.

R. Sr. J. O. Wayne,

President,

Passed ‘the Legislative Council this 21st day
of December, 1953.

J. L. Roprnsoy,
Clerk of the Council,

ANTIGUA.

Amendment

of section 26
of the Princi-
pal Ordinance.

Ss

Repeal.

Saving.

Commence:
ment.



ANTIGUA, 4

First Column.

Section’ 8
Section 10
Section 12

Section 13
Section 15

Section 18
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23

Watercourses and Water Works No. 18 of 19538.
(Abolition of Water Board)

SCHEDULE.



——

Second Column.

The first line of subsection (2) and the marginal note

The first line of subsection (1). 4

The first line of subsection (1), the fourth line of
subsection (3) and the marginal note.

The first line.

The second line of subsection (1), the second line of
swbsection (2) and the marginal note.

The third line of subsection (1),

The first lines of paragraphs (A), (1) and (7) of sub-
section (1).

The second and twelfth lines.

The second and fourth lines,

ANTIGUA,

Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. Buackman, E.D., Government Printer—By Authority.

—460—2.54.

1954.
[Price 6 cenis.]



Full Text






certs
Published by Authority” ~
VOL. LXXXII. THURSDAY, lire FEBRUARY, 1954. No. 9.





Notices.

International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea.

The Collision Regulations (Ships
and Seaplanes on the water) and
Signals of Distress (Ships) Order,
1953, 8. I. 1953 No. 1557 made under
Section 418 of the Merchant Ship-
ping Act, 1894 (a) came into opera-
tion on the Ist January, 1954.

2. The British Ships to which,
wherever they may be, the Collision
Regulations apply include, among
others :—

(a) Ships registered in the Colo-
nies under the Merchant Shipping
Act 1804.

(0) Ships registered under sec-
tion 88 «f the Merchant Shipping
Act 1594.

(c) Siips registered in Colonies
ete., which have their own Mer-
chant Shipping Legislation and
have repealed section 418 (1) of
the Merchant Shipping Act 1894,
in its application to such ships, in
exercise of the powers conferred
by section 735 (1) of the Merchant
Shipping Act 1894.

8. Paragraph 3 of Article 1 of
the new Order revokes certain pro-
visions relating to aircraft on the
surface of the water which are con-
tained in the Air Navigation Order,
1949, and the Colonial Air Naviga-
tion Order, 1949, as subsequently
amended. The revoked provisions
are indicated in Piri II of the Third
Schedule to the Order. When the
Order comes into «peration on the
Ist January, 1954 these provisions
~ will no longer be nerded as seaplanes
on the surface of the water (except so
far as distress signals are concerned)
will thereafter be dealt with in the
Collision Regulations set out in the
First Schedule to the Order. Signals
of distress for aircraft are at present
dealt with in Schedule II of the Air
Navigation Order, 1949 and Sched-
ule II of the Colonial Air Navigation
Order, 1949 and these provisions will
be re-enacted in the new Air Naviga-
tion Order which is at present in
preparation and in the corresponding
Colonial Air Navigation Order.”

‘4. The following are some of the
more important changes: —
(i) They apply to seaplanes on the
water as well as to ships.

328, 7A97
LYPTR

(ii) Under the existing Regulations
a second white masthead light is
optional. Under the new Regu-
lations the second light becomes
compulsory for power-driven
vessels under way except for
vessels less than 150 feet in
length and for vessels engaged
in towing.

(iii) The lights shown by fishing
vessels when fishing must be
visible at a distance of at least
two miles.

(iv) The stern light which under
the existing Regulations ig
optional becomes compulsory,
and its range of visibility is in-
creased from one to two miles.

(v) The range of visibility of
anchor lights is increased for all
vessels under 150 feet in length
from one to two miles and for
vessels of 150 feet in length and
over from one to three miles.
In day time vessels at anchor
must carry a black ball not less
than two feet in diameter in the
fore part of the vessel. Vessels
aground must carry in daytime
three black balls, placed in a
vertical line one over the other
and not less than six feet apart.

(vi) Vessels of more thin 350 feet
in length when at anchor in fog,
mist, falling snow, heavy rain-
storms or any other condition
similarly restricting visibility
must, in addition to ringing a
bell in the forepart of the vessel,
sound in the after part a gong or
or other instrument, the tone and
sounding of which cannot be
confused with that of the bell.

(vii) A new sound signal (one pro-
longed blast of the whistle) is
prescribed for a power-driven
vessel nearing a bend in a chan-
nel where another power-driven
vessel might be approaching
from the other direction but
cannot be seen.

(viii) When a power-driven vessel
which, under the Regulations,
has to keep course and speed is
in sight of another vessel and is
in doubt whether the other vessel
is taking sufficient action to avert
collision, she may indicate her
doubt by giving at least five
short and rapid blasts on the
whistle.

5. The International Conference
on the Satety of Life At Sea, 1948
which approved the Regulations also

adopted the following recommenda-
tions:—

The Conference, while recognising
that the recent advances in radar
and electronic navigational aids
are of great service to shipping,
is of the opinion that the posses-
sion of any such device in no
way relieves the Master of a ship
from his obligations strictly to
observe the requirements laid
down in the International Regu-
lations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, and in particular the
obligations contained in Rules
15 and 16 of those Regulations.

Copies of the Order (Price 6d.)
may be obtained from :—

Her Majesty’s Stationery Gifice,

York House, Kingsway,
London, W.C, 2.
Ref. No. A. 70/44.

Workmen’s Compensation Act.



The attention of persons in Anti-
gua employing workmen, defined by
the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
1937, is directed to the notice dated
12th February, 1953 published in
the Leeward Islands Gazette on the
26th February, 1953 whereby such
persons are required to render, on or
before the 15th day of February in
every year to the Labour Comumis-

. sioner, a correct return in respect of
the preceding calendar year specify-
ing:—

(a) The total number of injuries
to workmen during the year in
respect of which compensation has
been paid;

(b) The number of fatal injuries
included under (a);

(c) The total amount paid in full
settlement of claim for compensa-
tion in respect of non-fatal injuries;

(ad) The total amount paid to
dependents in respect of fatal in-
juries:

(e) The number of non-fatal in-
juries which have been classified
as of a permanent nature;

(f) Full details respecting any
payment of compensation being
made on account of temporary dis-
ablement under section (4) (7) (d).
Dated the 5th day of February,

1954.
R. St. J. O. WAYNE.
Administrator.
Ref. No, A 47/8.
28 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE.

In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.

ANTIGUA CIRCUIT.

In the matter of the Lunatics Act,
Cap. 111.

GENERAL ORDERS

In exercise of the powers conferred
on me by section 9 of the Lunatics
Act { hereby order that where, upon
any appeal under the said section, the
issuc whether the person alleged to
be « !unatic is or is not a lunatic and
@ proper subject of confinement is to
be tried by a jury, the following pro-
eedure shall be adopted :—



(1) The provisions of ‘the Jurics
Act, Cap. 56, relative to the trial by
corinon jury in the Supreme Court
of ai y person charged with felony
other than treason or murder, shall
be applied mutatis niutandis.

(2) Vhe trial shall take place at the
first practicable sitting of the Supreme
Court in its criminal jurisdiction
after notice of appeal has been filed.

(3) The respondent shall have the
right to require the appellant to sub-
mit himself to medical examination
by one or more doctors either before
evidence is taken or during the
course of the trial.

(4) The evidence of the respondent
and his witnesses shall be taken
before that of the appellant and his
‘witnesses: Provided that the presi-
ding Judge may, in his discretion,
allow evidence in rebuttal to be
given at any-stage of the proceedings.

(5) In all other respects the pro-
cedure shall be as nearly as possible
in accordance with the procedure
from time to time in force for the
tria! of indictable offences in the
Supreme Court.

Maile this 8th day of February,
1954.
; W. A. DATE,
Puisne Judge.



Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950.



In pursuance of the requirements
of section 3 (2) (a) of the Aid to
Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1950,
it ig hereby notified for general in-
formation that the Governor in
Council proposes to make the under-
mentioned Order under section 3 (1)
of the said Ordinance.

-2. Any person who objects to
the making of such Order shall give
notice in writing of his objection and
of the grounds on which he relies in
support thereot to the Clerk of the
Executive Council on or before the
22nd day of February, 1954.

J. L. ROBINSON,
Clerk of Executive Council.

The Aid to Pioneer Industries (Manu-
facture of Malt Liquors) Order,
1954 dated made
by the Governor in Council under
section 3 (1) of the Aid to Pioneer
Industries Ordinance, 1950 (Wo. 9
of 1950).

ORDER IN COUNCIL

1. Crrarion. This Order may
be cited as the Aid to Pioneer In-
dustries (Manufacture of Malt Li-
quors) Order, 1954.

2, MANUFACTURE OF MALT LI-
QUORS DECLARED A PIONEER IN-
DUSTRY. The manufacture of Malt
Liquors is hereby declared to be a
pioneer industry for the purposes of
the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordi-
nance, 1950, and the following pro-
ducts are hereby declared to be
pioneer products for the said pur-
poses:-—

Beer
Ale
Stout
Porter,

Made by the Governor in Council
this day of 1954.

Clerk of Hxecutive Council.

Ref. No. A 42/57.

Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950.

In pursuance of the requirements
of section 3 (2) (a) of the Aid to
Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1950,
it is hereby notified for general infor-
mation that the Governor in Council
proposes to make the undermentioned
Order under section 3 (1) of the said
Ordinance.

2. Any person who objects to the
making of such Order shall give
notice in writing of his objection and
of the grounds on which he relies
in support thereof to the Clerk of the
Executive Council on or before the
22nd day of February, 1954.

J. lL. ROBINSON,
Clerk of Hxecutive Council.

The Aid to Pioneer Industries (Pro-
cessing of Meat) Order, 1954,
dated made by the
Governor in Council under section
3 (1) of the Aid to Pioneer Indus-
tries Ordinance 1950 (No. 9 of
1950).

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

1. OrraTion. This Order may be
cited as the Aid to Pioneer Industries
(Processing of Meat) Order, 1954.

2. PROCESSING OF MBAT DE-
CLARED A PIONEER INDUSTRY. The
processing of Meat is hereby declared
to be a pioneer incustry for the pur-
poses of the Aid to Pioneer Industries

[11 February, 1954.

Ordinance, 1950, and the following
products are hereby declared to be
pioneer products for the said pur-
poses—

Processed Meat
Sausages

Salami

Faggots

Brawn, and

Bone meal fertilizer.

Made by the Governor in Council
this dey of 1954.

Clerk of Ececutive Counetl.

Ref. No. 42/57.

Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950.

In pursuance of the requirements
of section 3 (2) (a) of the Aid to
Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1950,
it is hereby notified for general infor-
mation that the Governor in Council
proposes to make the undermentioned
Order under section 3 (1) of thesaid
Ordinance.

2. Any person who objects to the
making of such Order shall give
notice in writing of his objection and
of the grounds on which he relies in
support thereof to the Clerk of the
Executive Council on or before the
22nd day of February, 1954.

J. L. ROBINSON,
Clerk of Executive Council.

The Aid to Pioneer Industries (Manu-
facture of Vegetable Oil) Order,
1954, dated made
by the Governor in Council under
section 3 (1) of the Aid to Pioneer
Industries Ordinance, 1950 (No. 9
of 1950).

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

1. CrraTIoN. This Order may be
cited as the Aid to Pioneer [Industries
(Manufacture of Vegetable Oil) Order,
1954.

2. MANUFACTURE OF VEGETABLE
OIL DECLARED A PIONEER INDUS-
TRY. The extraction and refining of
vegetable oil is hereby declared to be
a pioneer industry for the purposes
of the Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1950, and. the following
product is hereby declared to be a
pioneer prodnct for the said-
purposes :-—

Vegetable Oil.

Made by the Governor in Couneil
this day of 1954.

Merk of Executive Council.

Ref. No. 42/58.
11 February, 1954.]

Token Imports Scheme.





After consultation between Colo-
nial Governments concerned H.M.
Government and Canadian and Ameri-
can Authorities it has been decided
to place the following items forth-
‘with on open general licence:—

News Print, Kraft Paper, Fish

(Dried, Smoked, Pickled & Salted)

Onions, Potatoes, Animal Feeding

Stuffs (except in British Guiana),

Cheese, Powdered & Canned Milk,

Split Peas, Meat, Canned Fish.

The first 6 items which have
hitherto been included in Canadian
Token Imports Scheme will now be
deleted from list of items covered by
this Scheme.

Administrator's Office,
Antigua.
9th February, 1954.
Ref. No. S.A, 40/82—-IT.

No. li.

The Secretary of State for the
Colonies has informed the Governor
that the power of disallowance will
not be exercised in respect of the
undermentioned Ordinance:—

Virgin, Islands.
No. 5 of 1953, **The Income Tax
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1993.”



No. 12.

The following Ordinance is circu-
lated with this Gazette and forms
part thereof:—

Antigua.

No. 18 of 1953, ‘‘ The Watercourses
and Water Works (Abolition of Water
Board) Ordinance, 1953”.

4 pp. Price 6 cents.

In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.

SAINT CHRISTOPHER CIRCUIT.
A.D. 1954.

NOTICE is hereby given that in
pursuance of Rules made by the Chief
Justice under Section 16 of the
Windward Islands and Leeward
Islands (Cenrts) Order-in-Council
1939, and duly approved as therein
provided on the 16th day of October,
A.D. 194], The Honourable the
Puisne Judge selected for the sitting
of the Court in the Saint Christopher

THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE.

Circuit has appointed the day of the
month on which the ensuing Cirenit
Court shall sit as follows, that is
to say :-—

The Saint Christopher Circuit on
FRIDAY the 26th day of FEBRU-
ARY, 1954 at 10 o’clock in the fore-
noon. ,

Dated the 25th day of January,
1954.
D. S. BROOKEs,
Registrar of the Supreme Court.

Re death of EMANUEL GOVIA,
late of St. Paul’s Village, in
the island of Saint Christo-
pher, a workman lately em-
ployed at Belmont Estate,
which death occurred on the
13th day of January, 1954.

COMPENSATION in the above
matter having been deposited with
me under Section 8 of the Work-
men’s Compensation Act, the De-
pendants of the said HMANUEL
GOVIA, deceased, are hereby required
to appear before the Commission-
er on SATURDAY, the 27th day of
FEBRUARY, 1954, at 10 oclock in
the forenoon at the Court House
Basseterre, when the Commissioner
will proceed to determine the distri-
bution thereof.

PROOF of relationship of depen-
dants to the deceased will be required
by the Commissioner to be furnished
by the claimants at the enquiry, such
proof to be im the form of Certificates
of Birth and Marriage as in the cir-
cumstances be necessary.

A CLAIMANT for funeral ex-
penses of the deceased must submit
and prove his claim to the Registrar
before the 26th day of February,
1954.

Dated
L954.

the 26th day of January,

D. S. BROOKES,
Registrar of the Supreme Court.
Ref. No. A 36/00004.

RAINFALL FIGURES.
Centra} Experiment Station,



Antigua.
1950. 1951. 1952. 1963. 1954,
Jan. 23 5.41 38.60 2.41 1.98 3.04
Feb. 6 1.52 — .69 62 40
“G93 360 310 255 3.44







nO

9

In the Supreme Court of the
Windward Islands and
Leeward Islands.

NEVIS CIRCUIT.
A.D.1954.

NOTICE is hereby given that in
pursnance of Rules made by the
Chief Justice under Section 16 of the
Windward Islands and Leeward
Islands (Courts} Order-in-Council,
1939 and duly approved as therein
provided on the 16th day of October,
A.D. 1941, The Honourable the
Puisne Judge selected for the sitting
of Court in the NEVIS CIRCUIT
has appointed the day of the month
on which the ensuing Circuit Court
shall sit as follows, that is to say:—

THE NEVIS CIRCUIT on Monday
the 12th day of April, 1954 at 10
o’clock in the forenoon.



Dated the 25th day of Januaty,
1954.
D. 8S. BROOKES,
Registrar of the Supreme Court.
Ref. No. 26/00002.

TRADE MARKS OFFICE,
ANTIGUA, 2nd February, 1954.

STABILIMENTI DEMANIALI
RECOARO SOCIETA PER AZIONI
of Via Carlo Poerio No. 39, Milan;
Italy have applied for Registration of
one Trade Mark consisting of the
following :—

CHINOTTO RECOARO

in class 44 that is to say:-—
Non alcoholic beverages

The Applicants claim that they
have used the said Trade Mark in
respect of the said goods for seven
years before the date of their said
Application.

Any person may within three
months from the date of the first
appearance of this Advertisenient in
the Leeward Islands Gazette, give
notice in duplicate at the Trade
Marks Office, Antigua, of opposition
to registration of the said Trade
Mark.

A. R. MEADE,
Acting Registrar of Trade Marks,
30 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. {11 February, 1954.

TRADE MARKS OFFICE,
Antigua, 2nd FEBRuaRy, 1954.

NESTLE’S PRODUCTS LIMITED of 309, North Side of Bay Street, Nassau, Bahama
Islands have applied for Registration of one Trade Mark consisting of the following: —

RRL cE AEN |
EQOA ce | A

ARIAT CNET|

RNAI IAL UGA AU AGT ORRIN Aruna
wT EQN OUANORN OL



in Class 42 that is to say:—
Milk, milk products of all kinds, including cheese and butter.

The Applicants claim that they have used the said Trade Mark in respect of the said goods
for three months before the date of their said Application.

Any person may within three months from the date of the first appearance of this
Advertisement in the Leeward Islands (razette, give notice in duplicate at the Trade Marks Office,
Antigua, of opposition to registration of the said Trade Mark.

A. R. Meapg,
Acting Registrar of Trade Marks.
11 February, 1954.) THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 31

IN THE COURT OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS
(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
Appeal No. 5 of 1952.

Between:—
NEVILLE JAMES Appellant (Defendant)
and
Tuomas H. Kersick Respondent (Complainant)
(Asst. Supt. of Police)
Before:-— DATE J.

S. T. Caristr1an for Appellant
D. A. dE Frerras, Acting Crown Attorney, for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

The appellant was convicted by the Additional Magistrate for District ‘“‘B” on two separate
charges committed on the same day: the first for making use of indecent language, contrary to section 8 (a)
of the Small Charges Act; the second for assaulting and beating John Huggins, a private of the Leeward
Islands Police Force, while in the execution of his duty, contrary to section 36 (2) of the said Act. For
the first offence the appellant was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment with hard labour, and for the
second to six months with hard labour. He has appealed against both of these convictions and sentences.

On his behalf it was submitted in this Court—
(a) that the proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court are a nullity for the reason that
Assistant Superintendent of Police Bunting, who conducted the case for the prosecu-
tion, had no authority to do so;

(b) that there was no evidence to show that the place where the offences are alleged to
have been committed is in Magisterial District ““B”’;

(c) that the convictions are against the weight of evidence;

(d) that the conviction orders are bad in that they are drawn up in the past tense and not
in the present;
(e) that the sentences imposed are excessive.

Objections (a), (0), (c) and (d) are, in my opinion, without merit.

Section 27 of the Police Act, 1951, expressly provides that where a charge is brought in the
name of one police officer “any other police officer shall have the same privileges as to addressing the
Magistrate and examining the witnesses adduced in the matter as the police officer in whose name the
charge is laid............ cc would have had.”

Submission (6) is in effect an objection to jurisdiction. No such objection was taken in the
Magistrate’s Court, and it is not competent for the appellant to raise it now.

As to submission (c), there was abundant evidence before the learned Magistrate on which he
could properly reach his findings of fact.

As regards submission (d), the conviction orders are hereby amended by substituting the word
“being” for the words “having heer” in the second line of each order.

There remains for consideration only the question of sentence. The maximum term of im-
prisonment prescribed under the Small Charges Act tor indecent language is one month; the maximum
upon summary conviction for assaulting and beating a police constable while in the execution of his duty
is twelve months. Having regard to all the circumstances I am strongly of the opinion that the sentence
imposed for the indecent language used is execessive. In passing sentence for this offence the Magis-
trate seems to have erred in taking into account the appellant’s conduct for which he was separately
charged. I accordingly direct that the sentence of thirty days imprisonment be set aside and orcer that
in lieu thereof the appellant pay a fine of $7.20 or, in default of payment, be imprisoned with hard
labour for ten days.

The sentence passed in respect of the assault and battery presents greater difficulty. Itisa
serious matter to assault a police constable in the execution of his duty, and the appellant does not
possess a clean record. Nevertheless the evidence as a whole indicates that much of the injury suffered
by P. C. Huggins was probably brought upon himeelf by his aggressive manner towards the appellant.
I think that a sentence of three months imprisonment with hard labour will meet the case; and I direct that
that sentence be substituted for the sentence of six months passed by the Magistrate.

W. A. Dare,
7th January, 1954. Puisne Judye.
32 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD
ISLANDS

(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

Appeal No. 7 of 1951

Between:—
MirceEtyt MICHAEL Appellant (Plaintiff)
and
CLaRIssA ABRAMS Respondent (Defendant)

Before:— Date, J.

C. E. Francis for Appellant.
J. R. Henry for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

The history of this case is remarkable. On 17th January, 1951, the appellant (plaintiff) filed
a suit in the Magistrate’s Court, District “A,” claiming from the respondent the sum of $18.00 paid
by the appellant on behalf of the respondent in respect of assessed city rates for 1950 on certain build-
ing land at Ottos occupied by the respondent as tenant of the appellant. The case came before the
then Acting Magistrate (Mr. B. F. Dias) on 2nd February, 1951. The only witness called on behalf
of the appellant was George Joshua, clerk to the appellant. He testified that the respondent had been
in occupation of the land since 1st February, 1948; that the rental was $3 per quarter, the respondent
being responsible for the payment of city rates; and that the respondent paid these rates for 1948 and
1949 but refused to pay for 1950 and appellant had to do so. There is nothing in Mr. Joshua’s
evidence as to the “standard rent” of the land in question, nor is there anything to indicate what the
rates were. [t was conceded by counsel in this Court—as it must have been in the Magistrate’s Court—
that in respect of each of the years 1948 and 1949 the rates amounted to $12; in 1950 they were
Increased to $18.

At the close of the appellant’s case in the Magistrate’s Court Mr. Henry, who appeared for
the respondent, submitted that there was no case to answer. The learned Magistrate agreed with him
and gave judgment for the respondent, with costs $4.20 His reasons for Decision are as follows:—

‘From the evidence before me, I have come to the conclusion that this is either an at-
tempt to increase the rent by more than fifteen per centum without the sanction of the Rent
Commissioners, and as such is forbidden, by section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance,
No. 18 of 1947 of Antigua, cr else it is the requiring ‘ payment of a fine, premium or other
like sum, or the giving of any consideration in addition to the rent’ such as is forbidden by
section 9 of the said Rent Restriction Ordinance....... From the evidence adduced for the
plaintiff, no attempt was ever made to get the Rent Commissioners to sanction such an increase.
Until the rent has been thus legally increased the tenant, according to section 8 of the said
Ordinance, can, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, recove: such eum paid by
him over and above the standard rent as increased by fifteen per cent.”

The appellant appealed, and on the 15th of October, 1951, Jackson C. J. ordered that the
ease be remitted to the Magistrate with a direction that he put the respondent to her election whether
she would lead evidence or not.

The case came before the Acting Magistrate for the second time on 30th April, 1952, and
evidence was then given by the respondent herself; whereupon the Magistrate again gave judgment for
the respondent with costs $4.20, and the appellant again appealed.

What happened subsequent to the filing of the second notice of appeal is not clear. It would
seem that owing to confusion associated with the transfer to another Colony of the Magistrate who
dealt with the case, the notes of evidence taken at the second hearing in the Magistrate’s Court were
misplaced and the appeal was not forwarded to the Registrar of this Court, Eventually, however, as a
result of un order made by Wooding J. on 13th April, 1953, the Magistrate sent in Reasons for Deci-
sion together with a certificate to the effect that a note of the respondent's evidence, as prepared by
counsel for the appellant and respondent, was true and correct. That note reads thus:

“[ live in my own house on lands of Mitchell Michael, rental $3 per quarter; I have paid
the rents in 1948 and 1949. [ paid some money for city rate because Mr. Michael told me
he would put lights and remove garbage. None of these facilities, I refused to pay the city
rate for 1950. The neighbour to the east of me does not pay city rate.


11 February, 1954. | THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 33
The first point taken by Mr. Francis (for the appellant) when the case came before me was
>that the trial Magistrate was wholly mistaken in thinking, as stated in his Reasons for Decision, that
--counsel were ‘“‘contented to leave the matter as a question of consideration.......whether or not the plain-
tiff did in fact promise the facilities which were not forthcoming, and so whether or not there was a
failure of consideration for the defendant’s promise to pay the city rates.” Mr. Francis’ statement in
~ this connection was not challenged by Mr. Henry who, throughout these proceedings, has appeared for
the respondent. Moreover, the Court record discloses that the Magistrate in preparing his Reasons for
Decision gave reasons from his “memory of the case” as he “did not have the notes of evidence availa-
ble.” This, doubtless, accounts also for his obvious misconception of the evidence given for. the ap-
pellant as regards the nature of the agreement entered into between the parties.

It is quite evident that the Magistrate has not appreciated My Lord’s reasons for remitting
_ the case to him, and that he has failed to address his mind seriously to the evidence before him. From

“the start he has been obsessed with the idea that any arrangement whereby rates and taxes are payable
by the tenant offends against the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1947. No authority
for such a proposition has been cited by him, nor has any been produced in this Court.

In the deplorable circumstances set out above this case must, I regret, once more be sent back
v4o the Magistrate’s Court, for retrial by another Magistrate.

W. A. Date,
Puisne Judge.
Ist February, 1954. . |
34 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954. .

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND
LEEWARD ISLANDS

(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)
(AprELLATE J URISDICTION)

Appeal No. 2 of 19538

Between :—
Marruew Brake Appellant (Defendant)
and
Toomas H. Kersick Respondent (Complainant)
(Assistant Superintendent of Police)
Before:— DATE. gd.

S. T. Carisrian for Appellant
C. A. Kersick (Acting Attorney General) for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

This is an appeal against a decision of the Acting Magistrate of District “A” convicting
the appellant of having upon him a certain instrument, to wit, a hatehct, with intent to commit a
felonious act, contrary to section 50 (c) of the Small Charges Act, Cap. 67. The appellant was
ordered to pay a fine of $15.00 or, in default of payment, to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour
for one month.

On behalf of the respondent it was submitted wz imine that the provisions of section 178
of the Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act, Cap. 61, had not been complied with by the appellant
and that, consequently, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain bis appeal. The relevant portion
of section 178 reads thus:



178. The appellant shall within three days ujier the day on which he served nokice of his
intention to appeal enter into a recognisance before a Magistrate with or without sureties
as the Magistrate may direct conditioned to appear before the Judge and to try the appeal
and to abide the judgment thereon of the J udge and to pay such costs as may be awarded
by him, or if the Magistrate thinks it expedient he may instead of entering into recogni-
sances give such other security by payment of money into Court or otherwise ag the
Magistrate deems sufficient.

The notice of appeal filed herein is dated 31st J anuary, 1953. There is a notation on it to
the effect that it was received by the Magistrate’s Clerk at 11.55 a.m. that day. The recognisance
is dated 30th January, 1953. [t would appear, therefore, that the recognisance was executed before
the notice of appeal was filed. Learned counsel for the appellant endeavoured to show that this
‘was not the case, but unfortunately the clerk formerly employed by him who attended to the filing
of the appeal in this matter, is at present in the United Kingdom. On the documents before me I
must, albeit reluctantly, conclude that the notice of appeal was not in the possession of the
Magistrate when the recognisance was executed. Such procedure is wroiy and was held to be fatal
in R. v. Anglesay Justices (1892), 2Q.B. 29, and R. ». Cheshire Justices (1896), 60 J.P. 585. It
cannot be excused on the ground that the M agistrates here invariably fix recognisances in the sum
of £5.0.0., the amount mentioned in the appellant’s bond. The Magistrate has a judicial
discretion to exercise; it must be exercised in each case, and in order to do so he must have before
him the notice of appeal, which contains the grounds of appeal, and all other relevant facts.

Section 193 of Cap. 61, which is similar to section 8 of Baines’ Act, empowers the court
before which the appeal is brought, in cases where the recognisance has heen entered into within
the time by law required, but is in any way invalid, to allow the sulstitution of @ new and
sufficient recognisance, and for that purpose to allow such time and make such examination and
impose such terms as to payment of costs to the respondent as shall appear just and ee
That section, however, applies only to cases where a recognisance has been catered into within the time

required by law. | |
I reeret that I am obliged to hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
reore

It is accordingly dismissed. | | |
| re ht in bringing the
ink I 5 t learned counsel for the respondent was rig g
: I think a es ae attention of the Court. It is the duty of every court to sey
defect in ane aaa tive, on the question of jurisdiction. It would therefore be most ee
eee: = OT rie Gur: knowing of an irregularity affecting its jurisdiction, to remain silen
for any oflicer 0 2 °

and allow the court to proceed to adjudication. W. A. Dare,

Puisne Judg?.

ith January, 1954
11 February, 1954.] THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 35

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND
LEEWARD ISLANDS

(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
Appeal No. 3 of 1953.

Between:—
CraupE E. FRAnNcIs Appellant (Defendant)
and
Tuomas H. Kexsick Respondent (Complainant)
(Assistant Superintendent of Police)
Before— DATE, J.,

Ii. K. Harney for Appellant
A. VF. Loursy (Acting Crown Attorney) for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

‘The appeilant was convicted under sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Vehicles and Road
Yraffic Ordinance, 1946, for failing to comply with an order of the Traffic Commissioner published.
in the local newspapers on the L9th of October, 1952, in that he parked his car on the north side of
Long Street, between Market Alley and Thames Street. The sub-section reads as follows:—

“78, (1) The Traffic Commissioner may by notice published in the Grazetfe or ina
newspaper published in the Presidency make orders as to the line to be kept by persons
driving or riding any vehicle or animal on any road and as to the manner in which
vehicles of any description shall be drawn up while waiting on any road and as to the
route to be observed by all vehicles, horses, and persons, and for preventing obstructions
on any road, in any case where such a road is liable to be thronged or obstructed; and also
may give directions to police officers for the purpose of regulating traffic in the neighbour-
hood of Courts of Law, public offices, churches, theatres, and other places of public resort;
and any person who, after being made aquainted with any orders made or directions given
under this section, shall contravene or fail to comply with such orders or directions shalk
be guilty of an offence.”

_ The facts of the case are not in dispute. On 5th January, 1953, the appellant drove his
ear, A.G. 462, into Long Street and parked on the north side of that street, in the section of the
street which lies between Thames Street and Market Alley. There was no parking space available
on the south side of the street. P. C. Prince went to the appellant and told him he could not park
there, informing him that there was a notice to that effect by the Traffic Commissioner published
in the newspapers. The appellant told the constable that the Commissioner had no power to make
law, and refused to move his car.

At the trial before the Acting Magistrate, District A, copies of the Autigua Star and the |
Workers’ Voice were produced. Each paper contained a notice in the following terms:—

“ Trarric NOTICE

' By virtue of the powers vested in me under Section 78 (1) of The Antigua Vehicles
and Road ‘Trafic Ordinance No. 4 of 1946, I make the following orders.

Until further notice—

(1) No vehicle of any description shall park in Thames Street, between
Newgate Street and Redcliffe Street.
(2) Vehicles must park on the South side only in Long Street, between
Thames Street and Market Alley.
J. R. A. Branca,
Trafic Commissioner.

17th October, 1952.

The appellant offered no evidence in the Magistrate’s Court but submitted, wifer alia, that
there was no proof that J. 8. A. Branch—the person whose name appeared at the foot of the
‘notices—was the Traffic Commissioner. Section 4 (1) of the Ordinance provides that “the
Commissioner of Police or such other person as the Administrator may appoint shall be the Trattc
Commissioner for the Presidency.” There was, however, no evidence that J. R. A. Branch was
Commissioner of Police. The learned Magistrate, in a considered decision delivered some days
later, agreed that the mere publication in the newspapers of a notice purporting to be signed by
J.R. A. Branch as Traffic Commissioner was unsuflicient. He called wpon the prosecution “ to
produce and tender the Gazelle appointing J. k. A. Branch to be Traffic Commissioner or other
lawful proof thereof” and announced that the appellant would have a further opportunity to
answer the complaint or take any objection which may be taken with regard to such production.
36 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954, .

Evidence was subsequently given by John Reginald Arthur Branch to the effect that he was
Commissioner of the Leeward Islands Police Force and Traffic Commissioner of Antigua, that it
was he who had issued the traffic notice published in the newspapers and that no other person had.
been appointed Tratfic Commissioner of Antigua.

In this Court Mr. Harney, for the appellant, urged firstly that the evidence given by John
Reginald Arthur Branch before the Magistrate was inadmissable at the stage at which it was
tendered as the prosecution bad already closed its case. To support this contention he relied
entirely upon the case of R. vr. Day. 27 Cr. App. R. 168. The headnote to that case reads thus:—

“ After the defence of a prisoner charged with forgery and obtaining money by a
forged instrument had been closed, the Judge adjourned the case and allowed the
prosecution to call a handwriting expert. Specimens of the prisoner’s admitted hand-
writing had been in the possession of the prosecution from the beginning of the proceedings.
Apart from this additional evidence, the case for the prosecution rested on the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an accomplice.

Held, that as the additional evidence did not relate to something which had arisen ez
wmprovisy in the course of the trial, but was evidence, the necessity for which should have:
been obvious from the outset, if should not have been admitted at that stage of the trial;.
and, as it was lnpossible to say that the jury must inevitably have convicted apart from
the additional evidence the conviction must be quashed.”

Day's Case, however, is remote from the present one. In A. v. Day the Court was
dealing with a point that went to the merits of the case—that was, indeed, the principal issue at
the trial. Were we are concerned only with a matter of formal proof, as was the case in Dufin v.
Markham and ancr., (A918) 26 Cox C. 0. 308. That was a prosecution before justices for an offence
under the Bread Order, 1917. The prosecuting inspector did not. put in the order itself, apparently
not being aware that he ought to do so; thereupon, the case for the prosecution having been closed,
the solicitor for the defendants successfully took the objection that no proof of the order had been
given and that no proof couid then be given to remedy the defect. On appeal to the King’s Bench
Division Avory, J., in the course of his judgment said this:



In holding that after the close of the case for the prosecution no proof of the order
could be given the justices were wrong. (Quite apart from the justices’ power to allow the
case to be re-opened—a matter which hardly needs an authority but which has the support
of Cave, J.in Hargreaves v. Hilliam (58 J. P. 655)—if the prosecution were not prepared
at the moment to hand in a copy of the order, and if, as is most unlikely, there was no
copy in court, the justices had power to adjourn the case so as to enable proper proof of
the order to be given, and in such a case as the present it was their judicial duty to adjourn
for that purpose.”

The second point urged by Mr. Harney at the hearing of this appeal was that the power
given to the Traffic Commissioner by subsection (1) of section 78 of the Vehicles and Road Traffic
Ordinance, 1946, covers only orders for special occasions (e.g. race meetii:¢s) and does not empower
him to issue general orders for an indefinite period. F inally Mr. Harney submitted that in every
prosecution under the subsection it is essential that the Traffic Commissioner give evidence of his
reasons for making the order alleged to have been contravened. For each of these propositions
Mr. Harney asked reference to the words “in any case where such a road is liable to be thronged
or obstructed ” appearing in the subsection.

It is quite evident that those words qualify everything preceding them, but, like the
learned trial Magistrate, I see no reason for treating the words “in any case” as synonymous with
“on any occasion’; nor do I perceive any inconsistency between the section as so construed and the
power conferred on the Governor in Council under section 77 (1) (m) of the Ordinance to make
regulations for the appointment of parking places. The power conferred on the Traffic Commis-
sioner is supplemental to that conferred on the Governor in Council and is, I think, intended to
make provision for circumstances which from time to time affect pariicular roads—may be for a
day, a week, a month, or even longer—but which cannot conveniently be dealt with by regulations.
The power is to be exercised in the discretion of the Traffic Commissioner, and the maxim omnia
praesumuntur rite esse acta applies.

The appeal is dismissed with costs £3. 3. 0.

W. A. Dare,
Puisne Judge.
7th January, 1954.

e
11 February, 1954.] THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. 37
IN THE COURT OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS
(ANTIGUA CIRCUIT)

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

Appeal No. 10 ef 1958

Between:
Resecca Ponp & WatreR Ponp Appellants (Defendants)
and
JoserH ih. Byron Respondent (Complainant)
Before: DATE, J.

EK. KE. Harney for Appellant Resrcca Ponp.

J. R. Hexry for Appellant Warrer Ponp.

D. A. pe Freiras (Acting Crown Attorney)
for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

The appellants were convicted by the Acting Magistrate of District “ A” (Mr. B. F. Dias) for
harbouring smuggled good. contrary to section 42 of the Antigua Trade and Revenue Ordinance, 1900.
That section, as amended, states—

42. Every person concerned in smuggling any goods, or in unshipping or landing or
attempting to land any goods without having first obtained the warrant of the Treasurer, and
every person receiving, harbouring or removing such gocds shall be liable to a penalty not
exceeding £500. 0. 0.

The only other section of the Ordinance which need be referred to is section 61:

61. In every case where any question arises in any proceedings before a Magistrate or in
any Court of Law whether any goods have been legally imported into the Presidency, or
whether the duties of import or excise upon the same have been duly paid and satisfied, the
onus of proving that the goods have been legally imported and the duties duly paid shall be
on the defendant or person alleging the affirmative.

The grounds of appeal argued on behalf of the appellants in this Court were—
(a) that there was no evidence before the Magistrate to show that the place where the
offences are alleged to have been committed is in Magisterial District “ A’;

(b) that the goods alleged to have been smuggled were not found in the possession of the
appellants;

(c) that there was no evidence before the Magistrate to show that the goods raised any
question with regard to duty;

(d) that the convictions are bad in that they order the appellants to be imprisoned “in
Her Majesty's Prison”, and there is no such place.

Grounds (a), (/) and (d) can be disposed of in a few words. As to («), no such objection to
jurisdiction was taken in the court of first instance, and it will not now be entertained. As to (6), there
was ample evidence before the learned Magistrate on which he could properly find that the goods alleged
to have been smuggled were in the possession of the appellants, and he so found. As to (qd), if any ver-
bal alterations or additions are required to the formal orders drawa up in the Magistrate’s Court, they
can easily be effected under the powers conferred by section 191 of the Magistrate's Code of Procedure
Act, us replaced by section 7 of the Magistrate’s Code of Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1945, which
reads thus:

191. If, on the hearing of the appeal, any objection is made on account of any defect in
a complaint or is ormation, or on account of any omission or mistake in the drawing up of a
conviction or order, and if it is shown to the satisfaction of the appeal Court, that sufficient
grounds were in proof before the Magistrate who made the conviction or order to have
authorised the drawing up thereof free from that omission or mistake, the Court may amend
the complaint or information, or the conviction or order, and proceed thereafter as if the defect,
omission or mistake had not existed.

It will be convenient at this stage to refer brietly to the facts of the case. P.C. O’Donoghue,
-accompanied by P. C.’s Samuel and Wilkins, went to the home of the appellants armed with a written
authority from the Treasurer to search their premises for goods liable to seizure under the Trade and
Revenue Ordinance, 1900. In the presence of the appellant Rebecca Pond, but in the absence of the
appellant Walter Pond, P. C. Wilkins took from the pocket of a man’s coat hanging in the house, four
packets of Lucky Strike cigarettes. The packets were marked ‘ Virgin Islands’? in red and had the
38 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [11 February, 1954.

number “211” on their stamp or seal. Rebecca Pond’s attention was drawn to the cigarettes and to -
the place where they were found, and she said: ‘They are belonging to my son Walter.” The search
was continued and beneath some ledges in the yard, about five rods south-east of the house, P. C.
Samuel found a biscuit tin which contained thir ty-nine packets of Lucky Strike cigarettes with markings
similar to those found in the coat pocket in the house. When Walter Pond arrived at the house, P. C.
O’Donoghue told him what had been said by his mother about the ownership of the first four packets
of cigarettes. Walter made no reply. O'Donoghue then told both appellants that they would be
reported for harbouring smuggled goods. At the trial no evidence was given as to whether Lucky
Strike cigarettes are lawfully pe into and sold in the Presidency; nor was any evidence given as
to the significance of the markings on the packets of cigarettes.

To support their arguments in respect of ground (c) Mr. Harney and Mr. Henry, for the
appellants, cited a case which came before this Court some years ago— //ill +. Richards (Appeal No. 2 of
1945). The respondent in that case was charged with unlawfully harbouring smuggled goods, to wit,
849 Chesterfield cigarettes. The evidence showed that upon lawful search by the police a quantity of
Chesterfield cigarettes were found on the respondent’s premises. In answer to the police he stated he
had bought the cigarettes from a woman wh» said they were duty paid. The learned Judge took the -
view that the failure of the prosecution to adduce any evidence indicative of a smuggling was fatal.
Referring to section 61 of the Ordinance, he laid special emphasis on the words “where any question
arises” and “ the defendant or person ¢ alleging the affirmative ”, and then went on: ‘‘ A question must arise
and the defendant must allege an affirmative to the effect that the duty has been paid. It may be asked
how is the question to arise? It seems to me only by evidence being given that a smuggling has taken
place of, if uot the articles which form the subject of the charge, at least of articles of a similar type or
brand. In other words there must be some evidence to put the matter in issue so that the defendant
shall be called upon to prove that duty has been paid. It may be asked, what should be the nature of
this evidence. This is best answered by giving examples—these are, evidence that a brand of articles
has never been legally imported into the Presidency and on which import duty has not been paid, or
evidence that on an attempt to frustrate an offence of smuggling a portion of the articles attempted to be
seize, escaped capture, the inference being that they were of « similar brand to portion of the articles
which were seized... ............ and are some of these articles........ some evidence of the type indicated should
be given and it would seem that its source would appear to be the Customs Department.”

[ entirely agree with the dictum in Hill v. Richards. The tinding of’ thirty-nine packets of
Lucky Strike cigarettes beneath some hedges is a suspicious circumstance, but it does not necessarily
point to the goods having been smuggled; it is, for instance, equally consistent with the goods being
stolen goods, on which duty may or may not have been paid. In the absence of any direct evidence of a
smuggling there should at least have been some evidence for the prosecution with regard to the importa-
tion and sale of Lucky Strike cigarettes in the Presidency. To hold otherwise would be to expose law-
abiding citizens to the intolerable liability of being called upon, whenever official suspicion is aroused, to
prove that duty has been paid upon any or all of the dutiable goods in their homes.

This appeal is allowed, with costs £3. 3.0. to each of the appellants, and the convictions are
set aside.

W. A. Dare,
7th January, 1954. Puisne Judge.

ANTIGUA.
Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M. Brackman, ED,
Government Printer.—Ky Authority.
1984,

[Price 20 cenis.}
No. 18 of 1953. Watercourses and Water Works
(Abolition of Water Board)

[L.8.]
I Assent,
K. W. Biackeurne,
Governor.
31st December, 1953.

ANTIGUA.
No. 18 of 1953.

An Ordinance to amend the Watercourses and
Water Works Ordinance, 1945, so as to
abolish the Water Board and to transfer to
the Colonial Engineer the powers, duties and
functions iehenee vested: in or exercised by
the Water Board.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Governor and
Legislative Council of Antigua as follows:—

1. This Ordinance may be cited as the
Watercourses and Water Works (Abolition of
Water Board) Ordinance, 1958, and shall be read
as one with the Watercourses and Water Works
Ordinance, 1945, hereinafter called the Principal
Ordinance.

2. Section 2 of the Principal Ordinance ig
hereby amended ss follows:—

(a) by the deletion of the definition of
of the expression “ The Board”’;

(b) by the insertion, berwebn the defini-
tions of the expressions ‘‘ City Commissioners”
and ‘distribution area”, of the following
definition:—

“ “Colonial Engineer’ means the

Colonial Engineer of the Presidency ;” ;

(c) by the deletion of the words “ other
than the City of Saint John.” appearing in

v the definition of the expression ‘distribution
area’

329.7297
A497 4.

ANTIGUA,

Short title.

6/1945.

Amendment
of section 2 of
the Principal
Ordinance,
ANTIGUA. 2 Watercourses.and (Water Works No. 18 of 1953.
(Abolition of Water Board)

” Substitution 3. The sections of the Principal Ordinance _
eae specified in the first column of the Schedule to this
“Board” in Ordinance are hereby amended by the substitution
eereae of the words “ Colonial Engineer” for the word

“Board” to the extent specified in the second

column of the Schedule.

Haenimentot 4. Section 8 of the Principal Ordinance is
section 8 o as een

Ghee Pansigal hereby further amended as follows:—
Ordinance.

(a) by the substitution for subsection (1)
thereof of the following subsection:—

“(1) The Colonial Engineer shall
control, manage, maintain and supervise
all watercourses and waterworks in the
Island of Antigua and shall provide (so
far as is practicable) an adequate water
supply for the consumers therein.”

(b) by the substitution of the following
for paragraph (¢) of subsection (2) thereof:—

‘“‘(e) whenever it may be expedient
or necessary for the construction, altera-
tion, maintenance or repair of any water-
works to break open any street:

Provided that until the roadway is
restored the place where it is broken open
shall be watched and properly lighted.”

Amendment 5. Section 10 of the Principal Ordinance is
Sree hereby further amended by the substitution in
pa! Ordinance. paragraph (a) of subsection (2) thereof of the

words “ Public Works Department’ for the word

‘“ Board” appearing in the first line thereof,

Amendment 6. Section 24 of the Principal Ordinance is
of sectio# 24 hereby amended as follows:—
of the Princi- . “

1 Ordinance. We
pape (a) by the substitution of the words

“ Qulonial ‘ Engineer” respectively for the
words “‘any member of the Board ” appearing
in the third and fourth lines thereof and for the
word “Board” appearing in the marginal
note thereto;
No. 18 of 1953. Watercourses and Water Works 3
‘ (Abolition of Water Board)

(6) by the deletion of the word “‘thereof’
in the fifth line, and the substitution therefcr
of the words “of the Public Works
Department ”’.

7. Section 26 of the Principal Ordinance is
hereby amended by the substitution of the words
“ Colonial Engineer” respectively for the words
“secretary of the Board” appearing in the
third line thereof and for the word “secretary ”
appearing in the marginal note thereto.

8. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14 and 16 of
the Principal Ordinance are hereby repealed.

9. Nothing in this Ordinance shall affect
any Regulations made, rates levied or fixed, direc-
tions given, instruments issued or things done
under the Principal Ordinance before the com-
mencement of this Ordinance by the Board estab-
lished under section 4 of the Principal Ordinance
hereby repealed or by any officers or servants of
the said Board, but any such Regulations, rates,
directions, instruments or things shall, if in force
at the commencement of this Ordinance, continue
in force, and, so tar as they could have been made,
levied, fixed, issued or done under the Principal
Ordinance as amended by this Ordinance shall
have effect as if made, fixed, issued or done under
the Principal Ordinance as amended by this
Ordinance.

10. . This Ordinance shall come into opera-
tion on the Ist day of January, 1954.

R. Sr. J. O. Wayne,

President,

Passed ‘the Legislative Council this 21st day
of December, 1953.

J. L. Roprnsoy,
Clerk of the Council,

ANTIGUA.

Amendment

of section 26
of the Princi-
pal Ordinance.

Ss

Repeal.

Saving.

Commence:
ment.
ANTIGUA, 4

First Column.

Section’ 8
Section 10
Section 12

Section 13
Section 15

Section 18
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23

Watercourses and Water Works No. 18 of 19538.
(Abolition of Water Board)

SCHEDULE.



——

Second Column.

The first line of subsection (2) and the marginal note

The first line of subsection (1). 4

The first line of subsection (1), the fourth line of
subsection (3) and the marginal note.

The first line.

The second line of subsection (1), the second line of
swbsection (2) and the marginal note.

The third line of subsection (1),

The first lines of paragraphs (A), (1) and (7) of sub-
section (1).

The second and twelfth lines.

The second and fourth lines,

ANTIGUA,

Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands,
by E. M. Buackman, E.D., Government Printer—By Authority.

—460—2.54.

1954.
[Price 6 cenis.]