Bulletin 760 (Technical)
NE-58 RESEARCH BULLETIN
October 1973
MIGRATION AND THE COST OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROTECTION
FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
Robert D. Emerson
Agricultural Experiment Stations
Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences
University of Florida, Gainesville
J. W. Sites, Dean for Research
In cooperation with the
U. S. Department of Labor
>-~'
MIGRATION AND THE COST OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROTECTION
FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
Robert D. Emerson
Assistant Professor, Department of Food and Resource
Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville
This report was prepared under Contract UIS 72-2 with the U. S.
Department of Labor. Any opinions expressed herein are those of the
author and are not to be construed as representing the official position
or policy of the U. S. Department of Labor or of the Institute of Food
and Agricultural Sciences of the University of Florida.
This public document was promulgated at an annual cost
of $3,699.62, or 74 cents per copy to present information on the
cost of extending unemployment insurance to migrant agricultural
workers.
PREFACE
This study is based on a set of agricultural worker data collected
under the direction of the respective state project directors of Regional
Research Project NE-58 of the Northeast Agricultural Experiment
Stations, in cooperation with the U. S. Department of Labor. The
project directors at the time of the survey were:
#Raymond O. P. Farrish
#Joachim Elterich
Leo Polopolus
A. Stewart Holmes
Bradford Crossmon
Edmund F. Jansen, Jr.
George F. Luke
#Ward W. Bauder
C. A. Bratton
Bernard L. Erven
#James S. Holt
Rex H. Warland
David Reusink
Raymond H. Tremblay
University of Connecticut
University of Delaware
University of Florida
University of Maryland
University of Massachusetts
University of New Hampshire
Rutgers University
Cornell University
Cornell University
Ohio State University
Pennsylvania State University
Pennsylvania State University
Texas A&M University
University of Vermont
Reports discussing the impact of unemployment insurance to
agriculture for each of the states in the project and for the region
as a whole either are in preparation or have been released. This
report is based on a project which is supplementary to the above
work, looking at alternative assumptions about the effect such a
program might have on migratory labor, and how these effects
might influence the cost of the program.
Computer programs common to the NE-58 regional project and
to the one reported upon herein were made available by Ward Bauder.
Roger Rossi of the Unemployment Insurance Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor has provided valuable suggestions and insight through-
out this study. Programming for the study, often under excruciating
time constraints, was done by Michael Mara, Sheriar Irani, Gerry
Roset, Jack Mace, and Robert Jewett. Computations were done
through the University of Florida Computing Center.
Leo Polopolus, Galen Moses, and Stuart Monplaisir of the Food
and Resource Economics Department have been most helpful through-
out the project. The author wishes to acknowledge the comments of
John Holt, Marvin Konyha, and Glenn Zepp on an earlier draft of
this report.
#Members of Executive Committee
SUMMARY
The objective of this study is to determine the effect on the cost
of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural
workers if interstate workers reduced their migration for employment
as a result of such a program. An argument against such a program
has been that if unemployment insurance benefits were available to
migratory agricultural workers, they would choose to remain in one
location and collect unemployment benefits during the off-season
rather than migrate for agricultural work. No attempt has been made
in this study to answer the question as to whether or not such a
phenomenon would occur; the phenomenon has been assumed to
have occurred and its effect on the cost of the program has been
determined.
Interstate workers for this study were defined as those having
employment earnings in more than one state during the 52 week
period under analysis. When so defined, there were 50,425 migrants
in the 14 state region' out of a population of 211,157 workers who had
agricultural employment during the same 52 week period. Two sets
of adjustments were made on migratory workers who were eligible
for unemployment insurance benefits on the basis of agricultural
coverage if they were not already eligible by previously covered non-
farm employment: 1) 50% reduction in interstate weeks of employment,
and 2) 100% reduction in interstate weeks of employment. Workers
whose employment histories were adjusted had as nearly as possible
50% and 100%, alternately, of their interstate employment deleted to
simulate the phenomenon under study. One particularly important
constraint placed upon the reductions was that, if deleted, a job must
be deleted in its entirety. Similarly, no job could be deleted which
would make a worker ineligible for benefits.
The effective reductions in interstate employment when taken
over all migrant workers were 20% and 71% for the two reductions,
respectively. The deviations from the hypothetical reductions were
a result of the constraints imposed on the deletion procedure. With
no changes in migratory work histories, the extension of unemploy-
ment insurance coverage to agricultural employers with one or more
workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or
more resulted in a cost rate of 4.78 for migrants separately and 2.95
for all agricultural workers taken together.2 This rate taken over all
workers increased to 3.79 after the 50% reduction and to 6.15 after
the 100% reduction. It should be noted that even with 71% of the
'Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and West Virginia.
2The cost rate is defined as the ratio of additional actual benefits to
additional taxable earnings, multiplied by 100, resulting in a percentage.
interstate weeks of employment eliminated, the cost rate increased
only by a factor of slightly more than two.
The 13,559 workers covered by the above provision who had work
reductions under the 50% reduction had reductions averaging 21%
of their weeks of employment. The economic loss in terms of fore-
gone earnings net of additional unemployment benefits averaged to
$409, representing 12% of their average earnings plus benefits prior
to the adjustment. The 32,513 workers with reductions under the 100%
reduction had reductions averaging 31% of their weeks of employment.
Similarly, their economic loss averaged to $687, representing 22% of
their average earnings plus benefits prior to adjustment. Average
earnings plus benefits for migrants were $3,534. To be in their proper
perspective, any judgments made on the change in cost rates as a
result of reduced migration must include consideration of the economic
losses to the worker if he does decide not to migrate. As noted at the
beginning, no attempt has been made to determine whether or not
the workers actually would alter their work patterns. This question is
left to judgment and further research.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ..................... ............................ iii
SUMMARY ..................................... .......... v
LIST OF TABLES .................. ............ .............. ix
SECTION I: INTRODUCTION ............................... 1
Unemployment Insurance Program ........................ 1
The Extension of Unemployment Insurance
Coverage to Agriculture ................... ............. 2
No Change in Migration .............................. 2
Reduced M igration ............................ ....... 6
SECTION II: WORK ADJUSTMENT .................... ...... 9
M igrant Status ........................... ............. 10
Home State .................... ..................... 10
Benefit Eligibility Restrictions ............................. 11
W ork Reduction ........................................ 12
Expansion to Population Estimates ......................... 13
SECTION III: MIGRATORY WORKERS AND
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ............................. 14
SECTION IV: WORK REDUCTION AND ITS COST EFFECT ...... 22
The Reductions ........................................ 22
Effect on Beneficiary Status ............... ............. .. 24
Effect on Benefits and Earnings ........................... 25
Effect on the Cost of the Program ......................... 29
SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS .................. ............. 32
The Likelihood of the Reductions .......................... 32
Implications for the Supply of and Demand for Labor ........ 36
Lim stations ........................ ............... ... 40
Concluding Remarks .................. .................. 42
APPENDIX .................................................. 43
GLOSSARY .................... ................ ........... 69
REFERENCES ................................................ 70
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1 Effect of alternative employer coverage criteria on
14 state region agricultural workers ..................... 5
Table 2 Summary for 14 regional states under full coverage ....... 7
Table 3 Migratory workers and all workers with respect to
unemployment insurance benefit status: 14 state region .... 15
Table 4 Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from
agricultural coverage: Work within 14 state region ........ 18
Table 5 Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from
agricultural coverage: All locations ...................... 20
Table 6 Interstate work summary .............................. 22
Table 7 Interstate workers by number of states and employer
changes ............................................. 23
Table 8 Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status .... 26
Table 9 Additional benefits with reduced migratory employment:
Allocations to 14 state region .......................... 27
Table 10 Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of
unemployment insurance benefits: 14 state region work
only ....................... .... ................. 28
Table 11 Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of
unemployment insurance benefits: All locations ........... 30
Table 12 Effect of work reduction on income of migrants .......... 34
Table 13 Work reduction and income loss per person .............. 35
Table 14 Migrants by interview state and home state .............. 37
Table 15 Employment reductions and implied wage rate changes .... 38
Appendix Table 1 Coverage and beneficiary status of migrants and
all workers: 14 regional states .................. 44
Appendix Table 2 Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting
from agricultural coverage: 14 regional states ..... 46
Appendix Table 3 Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary
status: By individual states .................... 48
Appendix Table 4 Reduced migratory employment and the added
cost of unemployment insurance benefits: By
individual states .............................. 55
SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
Agricultural workers have been summarily excluded from un-
employment insurance protection at the federal level. Although states
are free to include agricultural employers in the unemployment
insurance program, only Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia have chosen to do so. During the late 1960's there was
increased interest at the federal level to extend unemployment
insurance protection to agricultural workers. The last attempt by the
Administration to include agricultural labor within the unemployment
insurance program was in 1969. Although the attempt was unsuccessful,
one result of a joint conference of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives was to direct the Secretary of Labor to obtain more
information pertinent to the extension of the program to include
agricultural workers.
The data have been collected toward this end as a part of the
cooperative project, NE-58, of the Northeast Agricultural Experiment
Stations with funding from the U.S. Department of Labor. Data on
agricultural employers and their workers were collected on a standard-
ized basis for 15 states: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.
The data for each of these states have now been summarized and
computations have been done to determine the cost of extending
unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers.'
Unemployment Insurance Program
A clear perspective of the objectives of unemployment insurance
will be useful for interpreting the results presented in this report. The
Department of Labor has described the objectives of the program as
follows (13; p. 26):2
Unemployment insurance is a program established under Federal and
State Law for income maintenance during periods) of involuntary un-
employment due to lack of work, which provides partial compensation for
'Reports for each of these states have now been prepared, presenting
the impact of the extension of unemployment insurance protection to agri-
cultural workers (1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22). A report
summarizing the results for the 15 states as a region has also been prepared
(2). A thorough discussion of the survey and further background information
on unemployment insurance for agricultural workers can be found in (2).
2This was reprinted from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Employ-
ment Security, Major Objectives of Federal Policy with Respect to the
Federal State Employment Security Program, General Administration Letter
No. 305, April 25, 1955.
wage loss as a matter of right, with dignity and dispatch, to eligible individ-
uals. It helps to maintain purchasing power and to stabilize the economy. It
helps to prevent the dispersal of the employers' trained work force, the
sacrifice of skills, and the breakdown of labor standards during temporary
unemployment.
It is clear from this statement that the primary objective of the
program is for the protection of the worker with secondary objectives
of stabilization of the economy and the maintenance of a permanent
work force for the employer. It is unclear, however, why a particular
group of workers should be excluded from such protection if this is
the primary objective.3
The unemployment insurance program is basically a self-support-
ting system. Covered employers are taxed a certain percentage of their
payroll to maintain the system's fund for covering possible drains
on the system's fund as a result of claims by workers whom they might
lay off in the future. The unemployment experience of the employer's
workers is a major factor in the determination of the tax rate. In most
states this experience is reflected by charging benefits paid to an
employer's account. For example, an employer with high benefit
charges is given a higher tax rate than one with lower charges.4
There is, however, a maximum tax rate that an employer can be
charged.5 Claims on the fund are made by workers who have become
unemployed through no fault of their own. Opponents to the extension
of unemployment insurance protection have argued that the additional
claims which would be placed by agricultural workers would be larger
than the additional contributions to the fund by their employers.
The Extension of Unemployment Insurance Coverage
to Agriculture
No Change in Migration
The results of the analysis on the data collected indicate, how-
ever, that additional benefits which would have been paid to
agricultural workers during the survey year on the basis of workers
surveyed in a 14 state region ranged only from 3.0% to 3.5% of taxable
agricultural earnings over a relatively wide range of employer coverage
3It should be noted that agricultural workers are not the only group
excluded. Depending on the particular state, others are typically domestic
services in private homes and state and local governments. However, any
state can elect to cover classes of workers excluded by the Federal law.
4Employers are given a period of time in which to establish an "experi-
ence rating." During this initial period, the employer is taxed at a given rate
for new entrants. Both the rate and the length of time vary by state.
5The maximum tax rate is determined by each state's laws and hence
varies across states. See (26) for the rates in specific states.
criteria.6 These rates indicate that the extension of unemployment
insurance protection to agricultural workers would not necessarily
be a net drain on the fund. Since most maximum tax rates exceed
these rates, employer contributions could cover the withdrawals.7
However, a remaining question is to determine what happens to the
ratio of benefits to taxable earnings if workers who migrated for
work prior to the program choose to collect unemployment benefits
now rather than migrate for work. The effort reported upon herein
is an attempt to answer this question.
The results presented in this report are based on 14 of the above
named 15 states for which employer and worker data have been
collected. Texas is not included in the state comparisons or in the 14
state region. Although the data are available and similar calculations
have been done for Texas, the standardized procedures used in the
14 other states are not appropriate for the Texas sample. Due to time
constraints, Texas workers were sampled in some areas of the state
during the off-peak season, thus presenting problems peculiar to the
standardized procedures for the other states. Although work is in
progress to adjust for this problem (14), a procedure compatible
with the other 14 states was not available for use in the present study.
Florida is also unique to the other states in the region. Whereas
interviewing was done during the summer of 1970 for all states except
Florida and Texas, Florida interviewed from mid-November 1970
through February 1971. Although this resulted from the late entry of
Florida into the project, it is the peak season in Florida agriculture
and hence its employment as well. The difficulty presented in terms of
developing population estimates of workers and their earnings is that
the universe from which the Florida sample was drawn may be a
part of the universe for the Northeastern states. Although there were
no workers who were actually interviewed both in Florida and in a
Northeastern state, it is possible that a worker interviewed in Florida
was a worker in a Northeastern state at the time when their workers
were interviewed. In fact, as will be clear later in the illustrations of
labor mobility, there were large numbers of workers encountered in
Florida who had worked in Northeastern states during the analysis year.
Similarly, there is the reverse transfer. Although the estimates of
the workers for each of the states separately would be satisfactory,
the sum oVer the states might involve some double-counting, resulting
6The 14 state region consists of the previously mentioned 15 states
excluding Texas. Texas is not included in regional summaries due to sampling
difficulties which present problems of comparability with the other states
being considered.
7The relation of benefits to taxable earnings will be referred to as a
percentage rate throughout the report. It is defined as the ratio of additional
benefits to taxable agricultural earnings, multiplied by 100.
in an over-estimate for the region. The corresponding items such as
earnings would be affected similarly.
The important question, of course, is how this problem might be
expected to influence the results of the study. The major impact would
be an over representation of migrants in the sample, resulting in
population estimates of respective variables having a larger migratory
component than in fact was the case. As will become clear when
migratory workers are contrasted to all workers, the effect would
be to over-estimate increases in the cost rates for all workers after
the work reductions are made. This follows from the characteristics
of migrants and the possibility that migrants represent too high a
proportion of all workers in the sample.
Both regional and state estimates will be referred to throughout
the report. Regional estimates refer to a summation of the respective
items for the 14 states considered. Although state estimates are
referred to occasionally in the text, most state tables have been
deferred to the Appendix. When referring to persons in either state
or region estimates, the base is the persons interviewed in the respec-
tive area. When referring to dollars in either state or region estimates,
there are two possible ways of arriving at these. One is simply a sum
of all items based on the workers interviewed in the geographic area
regardless of whether or not their work was within that area. The
second alternative for regional estimates is including only dollar
items which refer to work done within the region. For example, if
a worker had 26 weeks of work in Florida and 26 weeks of work in
Alabama, only the earnings from the Florida work would be included
in the regional estimates since Alabama is not in the region. The
second alternative for state estimates, although similar to the regional
procedure, requires further clarification. Again, if the worker in the
above example were from the Florida worker sample, only his 26 weeks
of Florida earnings would be included in the estimate of Florida
earnings. However, Florida earnings of workers from the other 13
states are also included in the Florida earnings.
The effects of extending unemployment insurance coverage to
agricultural employers over alternative coverage criteria are summar-
ized in Table 1 for the 14 state region. Reading down the table, the
coverage criteria include fewer employers. As a result, fewer workers
are covered by the less inclusive criteria. Similarly, beneficiaries,
benefits, and earnings decrease for the less inclusive criteria. Column
six of the table is the item of most interest in the consideration of the
extension of the program to protect agricultural workers. Although
there is nearly a 50% reduction in the number of workers covered
under the least inclusive criterion, 8 or more workers in 26 or more
weeks, there is very little variation in the ratios of additional actual
benefits to taxable agricultural earnings. The rates indicate that from
3.0% to 3.3% of taxable agricultural earnings would have been required
to pay benefit claims of workers as determined from their work
4
Table 1. Effect of alternative employer coverage criteria on 14 state region agricultural workers.a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer Workers Potential Actual Additional Additional (4) f (5)
coverage covered beneficiaries beneficiaries actual taxable x 100
provisions benefits earningsf
Million dollars
1 in 1 211,157 164,411 48,076 14.15 478.29 2.96
(100.0) (77.9) (22.8) (100.0) (100.0)
1 in 20 or 204,091 161,292 47,420 13.85 468.85 2.95,
$1500 H.Q. (96.7) (76.4) (22.4) (97.9) (98.0)
payroll
4 in 20 or 156,324 134,550 42,647 12.45 377.13 3.30
$5000 H.Q. (74.0) (63.7) (20.2) (88.0) (78.8)
payroll
4 in 20 143,357 127,690 39,346 11.19 355.52 3.15
(67.9) (60.5) (18.6) (79.1) (74.3)
8 in 26 111,117 106,326 34,183 9.08 280.76 3.23
(52.6) (50.4) (16.2) (64.2) (58.7)
a The items immediately below each entry of columns (1)-(3) are the percentages of workers covered under the 1 in 1 provision. The items below each
entry of columns (4) and (5) are percentages of the respective entries under the 1 in 1 provision.
b The coverage provisions in this and subsequent tables are to be read as, for example, the second provision, one or more workers in 20 or more weeks or
a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
c Included are 23,826 workers who were potential beneficiaries by covered non-farm work.
d Included are 8,351 workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage.
e This includes additional actual benefits beyond actual benefits without agricultural coverage, based on work done within the 14 state region.
Included are only those earnings within the 14 state region which would be taxable as a result of agricultural coverage.
histories. Benefits and earnings are in this case based on work done
within the region.8
Although the rates cited above are probably the single most im-
portant item, the other information in the table is not to be overlooked.
If all workers were covered (the I in 1 provision), 77.9% would qualify
as potential beneficiaries. Although the eligibility requirements vary
across states, typically requiring some combination of minimum
earnings and weeks of work for a covered employer, some degree of
attachment to the labor force is indicated. Of those who qualify as
potential beneficiaries under each provision, 29% to 32% had
compensable periods of unemployment such that they would have been
actual beneficiaries. Again under full coverage, $478 million would be
taxable as a result of the extension of unemployment insurance
coverage to agriculture. This declines by 41% when all employers who
do not have eight or more workers in 26 or more weeks are excluded.
Actual benefits paid out under the system are estimated to be $14
million under full coverage and $9 million under the least inclusive
provision considered.
Similar information is shown in Table 2 for each of the 14 regional
states. It is readily seen that there is considerable variation among
the states both in terms of the number of workers involved and in the
relation of actual benefits to taxable earnings. The latter rate varies
from as small as 0.8% in Vermont to 6.7% in Connecticut. The number
of persons who are potential beneficiaries shows considerable variation
among states in relation to those who would be covered. Similarly,
actual beneficiaries in relation to potential beneficiaries fluctuate. No
attempt will be made in this report to give a complete explanation of
the reasons for variations among states.9 However, an obvious factor
would be variations in the state unemployment insurance laws,
affecting potential beneficiaries in particular. Different agricultural
patterns among the states can also contribute greatly to this variation.
For example, Vermont's agriculture is largely dairy farms requiring
a rather stable labor force, whereas Connecticut's agricultural labor
requirements are much more seasonal. These are only two examples
among many. The important point to note is that the variations among
states do not necessarily imply that workers' behavior is highly unpre-
dictable. It is much more likely that differences as mentioned above
account for a substantial part of the variation.
Reduced Migration
The preceding information is extremely useful for legislative
purposes and should assist in permitting an informed decision con-
8If earnings and benefits are included regardless of the location of work,
the rate is 3.2% to 3.5%, depending on the coverage provision. See Table 5.
9A discussion of the variation among states may be found in (2).
Table 2.-Summary for 14 regional states under full coverage. a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State Workers Potential Actual Additional Additional (4) t (5)
covered beneficiaries beneficiaries actual taxable x 100l
benefits earnings
Million dollars
Connecticut 13,524 8,229 3,663 1.33 19.95 6.67
Delaware 3,834 3,149 1,491 .30 5.90 5.12
Florida 56,624 52,834 16,131 5.74 187.78 3.06
Maine 10,015 5,803 1,966 .24 13.83 1.72
Maryland 7,978 6,801 711 .28 17.99 1.58
Massachusetts 7,693 6,846 1,129 .64 20.76 3.06
New Hampshire 1,371 965 230 .06 2.49 2.62
New Jersey 16,071 12,893 4,933 1.64 28.20 5.81
New York 39,378 28,643 7,883 1.28 78.69 1.62
Ohio 25,394 15,505 5,582 1.50 37.34 4.03
Pennsylvania 20,762 16,329 3,437 .87 46.57 1.87
Rhode Island 565 484 143 .09 1.73 5.10
Vermont 3,955 2,814 160 .08 10.19 0.80
West Virginia 3,993 3,116 617 .10 6.87 1.47
a Workers of employers with one or more workers in one or more weeks.
blncluded are additional actual benefits beyond actual benefits without agricultural coverage as estimated from the 14 state sample
and allocated on the basis of work done in the respective states.
Concluded are those earnings which would be taxable as a result of agricultural coverage for work done in each of the 14 states
as estimated from the 14 state sample.
dThese may not correspond directly due to rounding of columns (4) and (5).
cerning the question of the cost of extending unemployment insurance
protection to agricultural workers. A myriad of assumptions is required
for any such estimates. Although the researcher generally tries to
maintain the set of assumptions which permits the most useful
analysis, he frequently relaxes certain assumptions to determine the
sensitivity of the results to those particular assumptions.
One particular assumption upon which the previous results are
based is that the individual worker will maintain the same work pattern
as he did during the 52 week history which was utilized for the estimates.
One might argue that the incentive to work is altered as a result of
unemployment insurance protection for the worker. Such an effect is
ignored in the previous estimates. A particular group of workers which
might be most sensitive to this effect is migrant labor. It has been
suggested that if the migrant worker were eligible for unemployment
insurance benefits he might remain in his home state and collect
benefits rather than go to another state for agricultural work. The
effect of such a phenomenon on the cost of the extension of unemploy-
ment insurance protection to agricultural workers is examined in this
report.
Although migrant workers have been declining in relative impor-
tance in United States agriculture, they provide a large part of the
seasonal labor for crops such as citrus. The survey upon which this
study is based indicates that 24% of the hired agricultural labor
force in the 14 state region is migrant labor, a considerably larger
proportion than 7% for the United States (25; p. 2).10 Although part
of this variation may be a result of a different survey design, it is not
unlikely that the 14 state region does in fact have a higher proportion
of migrants than the United States as a whole. Thus, if such a
phenomenon as indicated above were to occur, the states within this
region would be affected more than some other states in the nation.
The following section of the report is a discussion of the adjust-
ments which were made in the migrant labor work histories to simulate
possible worker adjustments. The third section presents a comparison
of migratory workers to all agricultural workers for items of importance
to unemployment insurance. Section IV presents the results of the
adjustments on the estimates of the cost of extending unemployment
insurance protection to agricultural workers. The final section is a
summary of the report and the major findings.
'0The definitions are not the same in each case. The definition in this
report is known earnings in more than one state, whereas the definition in
(25) is work reported in more than one county. This actually tends to under-
state the difference, since some are included in (25) who would not be
included in the present definition.
SECTION II
WORK ADJUSTMENT
The objective of this study was to determine the extent to which
the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricul-
tural workers is affected by alternative assumptions concerning the
impact of such a program on the mobility of the migrant labor force.
Migrant workers in this study were defined as those workers who
crossed state lines for employment for at least one week during the
52 week period under consideration. This is more restrictive than
the more usual definition encompassing those who crossed county
lines for employment. However, it should be noted that in this survey
the number who crossed county lines without crossing state lines was
relatively small.'
Although the extension of unemployment insurance protection to
agricultural workers may affect the incentive to work for all workers,
the focus of this study was on interstate migratory workers. It was
assumed that they would be the most easily influenced by changes in
work incentives. An economic rationale for this is that the marginal
earnings of migrant workers from working in other states are less than
for work in the home state. As a result, it could be argued that the
availability of unemployment benefits would reduce the incentive to
migrate to another state for work more than the labor supply of those
workers who do not migrate. Whether or not this hypothesis is true
has not been tested. It has merely been assumed to be true, and the
effect on the cost of the extension of unemployment insurance protec-
tion has been determined.
The study is based on a slightly different set of workers than was
the original study for the region (2). Whereas the latter considered all
workers encountered in the survey, this report is limited to those
workers who actually had known agricultural earnings during the
analysis year. The basis was changed in order to more closely deter-
mine the impact of extending unemployment insurance coverage to
agricultural employers. Included in the original population were some
workers who had no agricultural employment during the analysis year.
Since only migrant work histories were adjusted, the workers were
first divided into migrant and non-migrant categories. All compu-
tations relating to non-migrants were unaltered relative to the original
study. For example, all information such as earnings, weeks of work,
potential benefits, and actual benefits were the same for non-migrants
in this study as in the original one.
The migrant worker was assumed to reduce his interstate employ-
ment and collect unemployment benefits during this period of time.
'In Florida, for example, 25.8% of the workers were interstate workers.
Intrastate workers were 7.9% of all workers, i. e., they crossed county lines
for work in the same state. Only 44.1% of the intrastate workers (3.5% of all
workers) had intrastate work but no interstate work.
Since he could only collect benefits if he met the benefit eligibility
criteria, the work history adjustment was limited to those migratory
workers who were potential beneficiaries.2 Workers who were potential
beneficiaries by covered non-farm employment alone were not included
in the group to have their work histories adjusted. It was argued that
since they were presently eligible for benefits and they were still
migrating, any adjustment which they might make as a result, of un-
employment insurance benefits would have been made when they chose
to work for a presently covered employer. Two adjustments, here-
after referred to as B and C, were then made in the work histories of
the migratory workers who were selected for work adjustment in
comparison to the actual employment histories, A:
A. No adjustment in the weeks of interstate work.
B. Fifty per cent reduction in the weeks of interstate work.
C. One-hundred per cent reduction in the weeks of interstate
work.
Migrant Status
The data used permit two criteria for selecting which workers
were interstate migrants. One was with reference to a question which
specifically asked at the time of interview whether or not the worker did
interstate work within the past 12 months. The difficulty with this
criterion was that the 15 state standardized 52 week period differs
from the 12 month period for which he would be responding. This would
be particularly true for Florida where interviewing was done between
mid-November 1970 and February 1971. The standardized 52 week
period which is considered in this report refers to the period of July 5,
1969 to July 4, 1970. Consequently, the worker may have had work in
more than one state in one period but not in the other. Hence, the
criterion used for selection of interstate migrant workers was that they
reported earnings from either agricultural or non-agricultural work
from more than one state during the 52 week period under considera-
tion.
Home State
Since interstate work was deleted alternatively by 50% and 100%,
a consistent criterion for which work was interstate work was also
necessary. Again, there were alternative criteria which could have been
used. One choice could have been to declare all work outside the inter-
view state as interstate work. But this was subject to the same problem
of timing as mentioned above. Although the worker was obviously
2Potential beneficiaries are defined as persons who could claim benefits
if they had compensable unemployment irrespective of whether or not they
had such weeks during their work history. There are of course, non-monetary
eligibility criteria which must also be met. These are discussed later.
working in the interview state at the time of interview, he may have
had little or no work in that state during the period analyzed. Another
criterion which could have been used in some states was a question
asked with reference to the worker's permanent address. However, this
question was not asked by all of the 15 cooperating states. A third
criterion, and the one which was used, could be applied to all states in
the analysis: the state in which the worker had the most weeks of work
with earnings was assumed to be the home state.3 All work done in
other states was considered to be interstate work.
Benefit Eligibility Restrictions
Once a home state was chosen, portions of the interstate work
were deleted alternatively for the 50% and 100% reductions. Two
constraints were imposed before any work was deleted. First, the
worker must have met the monetary eligibility requirements by
employment under covered employers. Although each state has its
own laws for eligibility requirements (26), the eligibility requirements
of the interview state were used for all workers regardless of their
home state in order to maintain consistency with the original compu-
tations. The same was done for the benefit computations.4 In addition,
the worker could not quit a job and then claim unemployment bene-
fits. Consequently, deletions of work were constrained to points at
which the worker changed jobs in his work history.5
Given these two constraints, the procedure for deleting work was
well defined. The home state was first examined to determine if the
worker had met the monetary eligibility requirements. For example,
3If the maximum number of weeks with earnings was the same for more
than one state, the interview state was chosen as the home state if it was one
of these states. If it was not, the state which occurred earliest in the worker's
history of this group was chosen as the home state.
4If this were not done, comparisons with the original analysis would
not be meaningful, since differences could be attributed to either the
different benefit computation procedures for each state or the work adjust-
ments. By basing all benefit computations on the interview state procedures,
any differences can be directly attributed to the work adjustment.
5A job change is defined for purposes of this study as either a change
in employer or a change in state of employment. The latter is included since
the focus of the study is on migration. A change in state of employment
without a change in employer is most likely to occur when the worker is
working for a labor contractor. The employer-employee relationship is
generally of a more casual nature in this case so that a worker could simply
not move on to the next state without having formally quit his job. At any
rate, the test for whether or not he had met the non-monetary benefit
eligibility criteria would be somewhat more in his favor than if he formally
left a "stationary" employer.
in Florida this required him to have had at least 20 weeks of work in
his home state with average earnings of $20 or more. If he could not
meet this requirement on the basis of home state work alone, inter-
state work was introduced until eligibility was met. Interstate work
was introduced job-sequentially starting with the first interstate job
following the first home state job.6 The combination of home state
work and this interstate job was then tested for eligibility. If it was
still not met, the process continued until eligibility was met.7
Any interstate work introduced for eligibility purposes had two
restrictions placed upon it. First, none of these jobs could be deleted
later in the 50% and 100% interstate work reductions. If they were,
the worker would no longer have been eligible for benefits, and hence,
there would be no incentive for him to reduce his interstate work.
Secondly, any interstate employment so introduced was introduced
in its entirety. It is not permissible to introduce only a sufficient
number of weeks of a job to meet the eligibility requirements and
permit the remaining weeks of the job to be deleted later. This would
imply that the worker was quitting his job to obtain unemployment
benefits. This would clearly be in violation of the non-monetary eligi-
bility requirements. It is important to note that in the particular case
in which the worker did not meet eligibility by home state work alone
and had only one interstate job, the latter restriction implies that no
weeks of work would be deleted in either the 50% or 100% reductions.
He was assumed to have the same employment and earnings before
and after the introduction of unemployment insurance.
Work Reduction
Once eligibility was met, the appropriate interstate weeks of work
were deleted to attain the 50% and 100% work reductions. The latter
is more easily understood, and hence will be discussed first. If the
worker met eligibility by home state work alone, all of his interstate
weeks of work were deleted. As a result, his work history would
consist of only those weeks of work in his home state. If interstate
6The assumption of repetitive employment patterns becomes important
again at this point. In essence, it is argued that the initial point is arbitrary
for the individual. The first home state job has been chosen as the initial
point. Introduction of interstate work is job-sequential following this job.
Since this will generally not be on the first week of his work history, the
interstate weeks which precede this job are assumed to be employment of
the following year and are sequentially introduced after the interstate work
through the 52nd week has been introduced.
7Eligibility was always eventually met since only potential beneficiaries
were considered.
work were included to meet eligibility requirements, then all inter-
state jobs not used for eligibility purposes were deleted.8 In this
case, the revised work history would have both home state and some
interstate work included. In such cases, the 100% reduction was
obviously less than a complete reduction of interstate work.
The 50% reduction was an attempt to reduce interstate work by
50% of the weeks worked outside the home state. Just as the first
interstate employment following the first home state jobs was intro-
duced when required for eligibility purposes, the worker was assumed
to migrate for interstate work during the weeks immediately following
home state work. Since job changes generally will not occur at
precisely the 50% point, the job change closest to the 50% point was
chosen as the breaking point. All interstate employment following
this point was deleted from the worker's history. However, two cases
which should be noted in which the 50% reduction resulted in no
reduction were 1) when the worker had only one interstate job,
and 2) when all interstate employment was required for eligibility
purposes.
Expansion to Population Estimates
At this point, all adjustments in the migrant worker employment
histories have been made. The same computations were performed on
the revised employment histories as were done on the original histories
in the previous work. Each worker's information such as earnings was
expanded by the inverse of his particular sampling rate in the survey.
For example, if he represented 10 workers by being chosen in a 10%
sample, his earnings were multiplied by 10 to obtain the corresponding
population estimate. The expanded worker data were then accumulated
over all workers to obtain the results for the entire worker population.
Population estimates of the following variables are given in the
next section: the number of potential beneficiaries, the number of
actual beneficiaries, the number of benefit exhaustees, total covered
earnings, taxable covered earnings, potential benefits, actual benefits,
and the ratio of actual benefits to taxable covered earnings. Each of
these has been computed for migrants only and the population as a
whole for a limited number of employer coverage provisions.
sRecall that the interstate eligibility jobs could extend beyond the mini-
mum eligibility period since the entire job was included; parts of jobs could
not be deleted.
SECTION III
MIGRATORY WORKERS AND
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
It will be helpful to compare migratory workers with the typical
farm worker on the basis of the relevant criteria for studying the
effect of an unemployment insurance program. Migratory workers
have been defined in this study as workers who had known earnings
in more than one state. This is somewhat more restrictive than the
more typical definition of those workers who cross county lines for
work.' However, the first definition has more meaning for this study.
The beneficiary and coverage status of migratory workers is
compared with all agricultural workers in Table 3.2 As noted in the
previous section, 24% of the workers were classified as migrant workers,
giving a population estimate of 50,425 migrants. The first regularity
to note is that migrants tend to work for larger employers than the
average farm worker. The least inclusive employer coverage criterion,
8 or more workers in 26 or more weeks leaves 62% of the migrants
covered whereas only 53% of all workers remain covered.
Migratory workers were more likely to have met the monetary
eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance benefits than non-
migrants. The percentage of migratory workers who were potential
beneficiaries ranges from 89 to 66 over the coverage criteria
considered, whereas the range is 78 to 50 for all workers taken together.
As noted in Section I, the criterion for a potential beneficiary varies
from state to state but it typically requires some combination of
minimum earnings and weeks of work. For example, Florida law
requires the worker to have worked for covered employers for 20
or more weeks at an average weekly wage of $20 or more. One may
argue whether or not such a criterion represents a significant attach-
ment to the labor force, but the results clearly indicate that there is
a significant number of non-migrant workers who have less attach-
ment to the labor force.
Migratory workers were also more likely to have had claims for
unemployment insurance benefits. Depending on the particular cov-
erage criterion, 28% to 42% of the migrants had compensable periods
of unemployment and were also potential beneficiaries in contrast to
16% to 23% of all workers. A somewhat more appropriate comparison
may be drawn by looking at the ratio of actual beneficiaries to poten-
tial beneficiaries for the respective groups, since a worker must be the
latter before he can be classified as the former. From 43% to 47% of
ISee Supra,n. 1, p. 9.
2Appendix Table 1 summarizes the comparison for each state.
Table 3. Migratory workers and all workers with respect to unemployment insurance benefit status: 14 state region.a
Workers covered Potential Actual Benefit
Employer beneficiaries beneficiaries exhaustees
coverage Migrants All Migrants All Migrants All Migrants All
provision only workers only workers only workers only workers
1 in 1 50,425 211,157 44.900 164,411 21,091 48,076 2,551 10,521
(100.0) (100.0) (89.0) (77.9) (41.8) (22.8) (5.1) (5.0)
1 in 20 or 49,980 204,091 44,751 161,292 21,007 47,420 2,517 10,146
$1500 H.Q. (99.1) (96.6) (88.8) (76.4) (41.7) (22.5) (5.0) (4.8)
payroll
4 in 20 or
S$5000 H.Q.
payroll
4 in 20
8 in 26
44,067
(87.4)
38,969
(77.3)
31,470
(62.4)
156,324
(74.0)
143,357
(67.9)
111,117
(52.6)
42,004
(83.3)
38,485
(76.3)
33,410
(66.3)
134,550
(63.7)
127,690
(60.5)
106,326
(50.4)
19,233
(38.1)
16,843
(33.4)
14,247
(28.2)
42,647
(20.2)
39,346
(18.6)
34,183
(16.2)
2,445
(4.8)
1,633
(3.2)
1,319
(2.6)
8,930
(4.2)
7,924
(3.8)
7,032
(3.3)
a Immediately below each table entry is the percentage which this entry is of all migrants and workers, respectively.
b Included are 10,979 migrants and 23,826 under all workers who became potential beneficiaries by covered non-farm work alone. The respective
percentages for migrants and all workers are 21.8 and 11.3.
c Included are 4,512 migrants and 8,351 under all workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage. The respective percentages for
migrants and all workers are 9.0 and 4.0.
migratory potential beneficiaries were actual beneficiaries and 29% to
32% of all potential beneficiaries were actual beneficiaries. Thus, the
conclusion still holds that migrants who satisfied the monetary eligi-
bility requirements were indeed more likely to have had compensable
periods of unemployment.
Although one might expect relatively more migrants to
exhaust their potential benefits since relatively more were actual
beneficiaries, there is no discernible difference between the two
groups. From 3% to 5% of the workers in each group were classified
as benefit exhaustees.3 A comparison with those who were potential
beneficiaries is again appropriate. When so done the percentages
range from 4% to 6% for migratory workers and 6% to 7% for all
workers together.
The additional benefits and earnings resulting from agricultural
coverage are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 for migrants in compari-
son to all workers.4 Table 4 is based on work done within the 14 state
region, whereas Table 5 includes all work regardless of location. As
was the case with the workers who were covered under the less inclu-
sive criteria, smaller proportions of migrant worker earnings are
excluded in the less inclusive criteria than is the case for all farm
workers. The least inclusive criterion excludes 35% of migratory
covered earnings and 39% to 40% of covered earnings from all workers.
Additional actual benefits for migrants in the least inclusive category
(8 in 26) are 47% less for all locations than if all migrants were covered.
In comparison, additional actual benefits for all workers in the least
inclusive category are 36% less within the region and 37% less for all
locations than if all agricultural workers were covered. These variations
over the coverage criteria tend to indicate that not only do migratory
workers work for larger employers in comparison to all workers
(smaller decrease in earnings for the less inclusive criteria), but
those who work for smaller employers tend to have less attachment
to the labor force than the majority working for the larger employers
as denoted by the larger decline in actual benefits.
The ratio of additional actual benefits to taxable agricultural
earnings for work done within the 14 state region ranged from 3.9%
to 4.9% over the coverage provisions for the migratory workers. If
all earnings and work are included regardless of location, the rate
varies between 4.3% and 5.3%. The rates for all workers are less, vary-
ing between 3.0% and 3.3%, and 3.2% and 3.5% over the coverage
3Benefit exhaustees are defined as those persons for whom their actual
benefits equal their potential benefits. The number is an under-estimate as
a result of the benefit year being the same as the base year.
4Appendix Table 2 summarizes the information for each state.
16
provisions for work within the region and work in all locations,
respectively. The rates are somewhat higher for migrant workers than
for all workers taken together.5 The purpose of looking at the rates
for migrants separately is not that they should be considered as a
separate risk group. Rather it is to determine the cost of an unemploy-
ment insurance program for migrants as a part of the agricultural
labor force. It is clearly higher than for all farm workers, but it is
not so high that the burden of the program would be shifted to
employers of a non-migratory work force. Most states have maximum
tax rates which are nearly as high as the rates shown for migrants (26).
In summary, we can conclude that the data indicate that the
migrants tend to be employed by larger employers and have at least
as strong an attachment to the labor force as do the average farm
workers. The cost of protecting migrant workers under an unemploy-
ment insurance program is indicated to be somewhat higher than for
the average farm worker as shown by the ratios of actual benefits to
taxable agricultural earnings.
5This is part of the basis for the statement in the Introduction that the
possible over-sampling of migrants would lead to an over-estimate of
increases in the cost rate resulting from the work reduction. In the case of
over-sampling of migrants, their cost rate would be given too much weight
in the above computations, resulting in a cost rate over all workers which
is higher than in the case of an unbiased sample.
Table 4. Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from agricultural coverage: Work within 14 state region.
Coverage provisions
Item 1 in 1 1 in 20 or 4 in 20 or 4 in 20 8 in 26
$1500 H. Q. $5000 H. Q.
payroll payroll
------------------- Million dollars -- ----------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential benefits 32.54 32.38 29.13 25.76 20.38
(2) Actual benefits 5.16 5.13 4.77 3.82 2.75
(3) Total covered agricultural earnings 111.14 110.71 99.44 89.31 72.43
(4) Taxable agricultural earnings 107.82 107.40 96.69 86.87 70.65
----------- --- --------------- -Per cent -------
(5) (2) T4) x 100 4.79 4.78 4.93 4.40 3.89
Table 4. Continued.
Coverage provisions
Item 1 in 1 1 in 20 or 4 in 20 or 4 in 20 8 in 26
$1500 H. Q. $5000 H. Q.
payroll payroll
---------------- Million dollars ---- --------------
All workers
(6) Potential benefits 147.31 144.38 116.79 109.86 85.58
(7) Actual benefits a 14.15 13.85 12.45 11.19 9.08
(8) Total covered agricultural earnings 559.24 548.94 448.86 425.06 337.88
(9) Taxable agricultural earnings 478.29 468.85 377.13 355.52 280.76
------------------------------ -Per cent ---------------
(10) (7+ (9) x 100 2.96 2.95 3.30 3.15 3.23
a Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
Table 5.- Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from agricultural coverage: All locations.
Coverage provisions
Item 1 in 1 1 in 20 or 4 in 20 or 4 in 20 8 in 26
$1500 H. Q. $5000 H. Q.
payroll payroll
-------------- --- ---- Million dollars ------- ---------
S Migrants only
(1) Potential benefits
(2) Actual benefits
(3) Total covered agricultural earnings
(4) Taxable agricultural earnings
38.54
6.64
131.43
127.89
38.34
6.58
130.87
127.32
34.67
6.12
118.11
115.12
30.68
4.90
105.55
102.90
24.32
3.58
85.67
83.73
------------------ er cent ----------------
5.32 4.76 4.28
(5) (2) -(4) x 100
5.19 5.17
Table 5. Continued.
Coverage provisions
Item 1 in 1 1 in 20 or 4 in 20 or 4 in 20 8 in 26
$1500 H. Q. $5000 H. Q.
payroll payroll
----------------- Million dollars --------------------
All workers
(6) Potential benefits 154.82 151.84 123.62 89.62 64.68
(7) Actual benefits 15.98 15.65 14.04 12.50 10.07
(8) Total covered agricultural earnings 585.53 575.06 473.01 446.23 355.20
(9) Taxable agricultural earnings 503.64 494.04 400.35 375.77 297.34
-------------------------------- ---Per cent -----------------
(10)(7) -(9) x 100 3.17 3.17 3.51 3.33 3.39
a Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
SECTION IV
WORK REDUCTION AND ITS COST EFFECT
The Reductions
The effective work reduction for migratory workers was less than
the hypothetical 50% and 100%, B and C, as a result of the restrictions
imposed on the work deletion procedure outlined in Section II. Since
the reduction variable is weeks of interstate work, the overall
reduction is best measured by man-weeks of interstate employment
before and after the reduction, as shown in Table 6.
Reduction C reduced interstate employment by 71%, leaving
29% of interstate employment unaffected. The primary reason for the
divergence from 100% in this case is that no reductions were made for
10,979 or 22% of the migrant workers who were potential beneficiaries
by non-farm work alone. Another less important reason in reduction
C was that an interstate job might have been necessary for the worker
to meet the monetary eligibility requirements. Also recall that this job
had to remain in the work history in its entirety; only subsequent
interstate employment could be deleted.
Case B did not perform as well in terms of meeting the desired
reduction in interstate employment; 20% of interstate employment
was deleted rather than 50%. Recalling the restrictions placed on work
deletion for B in addition to those for C, employment could only be
terminated at the change of employment. Thus, if the worker had only
one interstate job and met eligibility by home state work alone, his
interstate employment could not be reduced by 50%; there would be
no reduction. Further investigation into the number of different states
in which a worker worked and the number of times he changed
employers indicates that migrant workers are not as unstable as they are
often characterized. As shown in Table 7, 78% of the migrant workers
worked in only two different states, the least possible number for the
person to be classified a migrant. Only 22% changed employers four
or more times during the year, and 24% changed employers or states
four or more times during the year. This is rather revealing information
Table 6.-Interstate work summary.
Interstate employment Man-weeks Per cent
A. Actual 673,749
B. After 50% reduction 540,096 80.2
Effective reduction 133,653 19.8
C. After 100% reduction 197,446 29.3
Effective reduction 476,303 70.7
Table 7. Interstate workers by number of states and employer changes.
Number States a Employers b Employer or
state changes c
2 39,414 24,185 22,919
(78.2) (48.0) (45.4)
3 8,391 14,171 15,217
(16.6) (28.1) (30.2)
4 2,254 7,671 8,261
(4.5) (15.2) (16.4)
5 308 2,034 2,432
(0.6) (4.0) (4.8)
6 or more 65 1,353 1,602
(0.1) (2.7) (3.2)
a These are workers with a given number of different states.
bThese are workers with a given number of employer changes, not necessarily different
employers. There were 1,012 workers (2.0%) with no employer changes.
c These are workers with a given number of employer or state changes, not necessarily
different employers or different states in all cases.
about the stability of the migrant workers, but it also indicates that
little would be gained by considering alternative reduction levels at
less than 100% since the same problem would occur as with case B.
The majority of the workers are not affected by anything less than the
elimination of interstate work as long as the restriction to delete only
entire jobs after the first interstate job is maintained for partial
reduction.
As set forth earlier, the objective of the work reported upon
herein was to examine the effects of changes in migratory work
patterns on the cost of extending unemployment insurance pro-
tection to agricultural workers. It has been shown in Section III
that the ratio of additional actual benefits to taxable agricultural
earnings for migratory workers would be somewhat higher than for
all agricultural workers together. This was under the assumption
of no change in the employment patterns of migrants and non-
migrants. The procedures were outlined in Section II for the partial
reduction in interstate employment. It was shown above that as a
result of restrictions placed upon the work reduction scheme in order
to be consistent with unemployment insurance eligibility criteria, the
50% reduction (B) resulted in only a 20% effective reduction in interstate
man-weeks (Table 6). Although this is less than desired, we shall see
23
that when taken in conjunction with the 100% reduction results, the
results are still quite meaningful.
Two employer coverage provisions were selected for ease of ex-
position since there is no systematic difference in the relations
across the coverage provisions for our purposes. The two provisions
discussed in the remainder of the report are:
I. One or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly
payroll of $1500 or more.
II. Four or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Weeks of work deleted are interstate weeks which may or may not
be from states within the 14 state region. Hence, the results are
summarized for earnings and benefits within the region only and for
earnings and benefits regardless of the location.
Effect on Beneficiary Status'
Recall that only those workers who were potential beneficiaries
were to have their interstate work reduced, and that no work could
be deleted which would make them non-eligible for benefits. As a
result of a programming error for the New Jersey program, a few
workers were given deletions which made them ineligible for benefits
after the 100% reduction.2 Although this introduces a slight deviation
from the established restrictions, the error is relatively small and
should have no bearing on the results.
The number of migrants who were actual beneficiaries are
shown in Table 8 to have increased substantially, as one would
expect when weeks of employment were deleted. Under reduction
B, the proportion of migrants who were actual beneficiaries increased
from 42% to 56% and from 33% to 46% under provisions I and
II, respectively. Reduction C increased the proportions to 75% and
63% for coverage provisions I and II, respectively, resulting from so
many more workers being affected by reduction C. After reduction
C, 82% and 85% of the migrants who were potential beneficiaries
were actual beneficiaries for provisions I and II, respectively, cor-
responding with the high reduction achieved in man-weeks of inter-
state work. Reduction B resulted in 61% and 63% of the migrant
potential beneficiaries becoming actual beneficiaries under provi-
sions I and II, respectively. When non-migrants are included with
the migrants to determine the relative effect over all workers, the
'The results for individual states are shown in Appendix Table 3.
2There are 108 fewer potential beneficiaries in case C for Coverage
I than in cases A and B; see Table 8. The cost of doing the New Jersey
computations over was far in excess of any gains to be derived given the
insignificance of the error in terms of the magnitudes being dealt with.
24
proportional changes are, of course, much less. The proportion of
all workers who were actual beneficiaries increased to only 26%
and 30% by reductions B and C, respectively, under provision I.
The corresponding increases under provision II were from 19% to
22% and 26% for reductions B and C, respectively.
The number of migrants exhausting all of their benefits in-
creased with reductions B and C, changing from 5% to 8% and 27%
under coverage I. Similarly, under coverage II, they increased from
3% to 6% and 25% with reductions B and C, respectively. Since
two-thirds to three-fourths of all migrants were actual beneficiaries
after reduction C, it is surprising that not more than one-fourth
would exhaust all of their benefits. This indicates a substantial
degree of employment in the home state where no work was deleted.
Again, when migrants are combined with non-migrants the relative
changes are less, changing from 5% to 6% and 10% after reductions
B and C under coverage I. The corresponding increases for coverage
II were from 3.8% to 4.5%. and 9% after reductions B and C, re-
spectively.
Effect on Benefits and Earnings3
Potential benefits decreased with the reductions in employment
as expected (Table 9). This resulted from the reduced employment
rather than a reduction in the number of workers who were po-
tential beneficiaries. The reductions for migrants were 3% for both
provisions I and II by reduction B, and 12% and 13% by reduction
C under provisions I and II, respectively. When taken over all workers
this represents 1% and 3% for reductions B and C, respectively.
Taxable agricultural earnings of migratory workers decreased by
somewhat greater proportions, 6% and 23% for reductions B and C,
respectively, as shown in Table 10. When taken over all workers, the
reductions were 1% and 5% under coverage I, and 2% and 6%
under coverage II by reductions B and C, respectively. It should be
noted that the relative, and absolute, changes in potential benefits
are considerably less than those for taxable agricultural earnings.
Whereas taxable earnings are reduced directly by a reduction in
employment,4 potential benefits are not necessarily reduced. Al-
though the way in which potential benefits are affected is dependent
on the state law for determining them, there are features common to
3The results for individual states are shown in Appendix Table 4.
4This will be true unless the worker has more than $4200 of earnings
from the particular employer for which he is now assumed not to work.
In general, since most migrants have more than one employer, their earnings
will not be greater than $4200 from one of the employers.
25
Table 8. Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status.a
Employment reduction and coverage
Ib IIc
Item Ad Be Cf Ad Be Cf
Migrants only
Potential beneficiaries 44,751 44,751 44,643 38,485 38,485 38,398
(88.8) (88.8) (88.5) (76.3) (76.3) (76.2)
Actual beneficiaries h 21,007 28,074 37,896 16,843 23,341 31,622
(41.7) (55.7) (75.2) (33.4) (46.4) (62.7)
Benefit exhaustees 2,517 4,182 14,100 1,633 3,124 12,383
(5.0) (7.6) (27.0) (3.2) (6.2) (24.6)
All workers
Potential beneficiaries 161,292 161,292 161,184 127,690 127,690 127,603
(76.4) (76.4) (76.3) (60.5) (60.5) (60.4)
Actual beneficiariesJ 47,420 54,484 64,307 39,346 45,843 54,127
(22.5) (25.8) (30.4) (18.6) (21.7) (25.6)
Benefit exhaustees 10,146 11,813 21,732 7,924 9,415 18,676
(4.8) (5.6) (10.3) (3.8) (4.5) (8.8)
a The numbers immediately below each entry are the percentages of total migrant workers and total workers for the respective sections of the table.
b Employer coverage provision: 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
c Employer coverage provision: 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
d No work adjustment.
e 50% interstate work reduction.
f100% interstate work reduction.
9 Included are 10,979 workers who became potential beneficiaries on the basis of non-farm work alone.
h Included are 4,512 workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage.
Included are 23,826 workers who became potential beneficiaries on the basis of non-farm work alone.
I Included are 8,351 workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage.
Table 9.-Additional benefits with reduced migratory employment: Allocations to 14 state region.a
Benefits Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
---------------- Million dollars --------------------
Migrants only
Potential 32.38 31.40 28.65 25.76 24.96 22.43
(100.0) (97.0) (88.5) (100.0) (96.9) (87.1)
Actual 5.13 8.81 18.62 3.82 7.04 14.98
(100.0) (171.7) (363.0) (100.0) (184.3) (392.1)
All workers
Potential 144.38 143.41 140.66 109.86 109.06 106.53
(100.0) (99.3) (97.4) (100.0) (99.3) (97.0)
Actual 13.85 17.53 27.34 11.19 14.41 22.35
(100.0) (126.6) (197.4) (100.0) (128.8) (199.7)
aBenefits were allocated to states in proportion to earnings from the respective states.
Table 10. Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: 14 state region work only.
Employment reduction and coverage
I II
Item A B C A B C
Migrants only
(1) Actual benefits a,b 5.13 8.81 18.62 3.82 7.04 14.98
(100.0) (171.7) (363.0) (100.0) (184.3) (392.1)
(2) Taxable agricultural 107.40 101.09 82.98 86.87 81.56 66.78
earnings (100.0) (94.1) (77.3) (100.0) (93.9) (76.9)
(3) (1)-(2)x 100 4.78 8.72 22.44 4.40 8.63 22.43
All workers
(4) Actual benefits a,b 13.85 17.53 27.34 11.19 14.41 22.35
(100.0) (126.6) (197.4) (100.0) (128.8) (199.7)
(5) Taxable agricultural 468.85 462.54 444.44 355.52 350.20 335.42
earnings (100.0) (98.6) (94.8) (100.0) (98.5) (94.3)
(6)(4)-(5)x100 2.95 3.79 6.15 3.15 4.11 6.66
a Additional benefits resulting from agricultural coverage.
b Million dollars.
most(26). First, there is generally a maximum level of potential benefits
which can be accumulated. When the maximum is attained, additional
earnings do not affect the level of potential benefits. Consequently, if a
worker has exceeded this level, his potential benefits would remain
constant over part or all of the employment reduction. Secondly, when
potential benefits are below the maximum level, a reduction in earnings
may result in a less than proportional decline in benefits.
One would expect actual benefits to increase with the intro-
duction of compensable unemployment by reductions B and C. The
respective increases over all workers were 27% and 97% under pro-
vision I, and 29% and 100% under provision II. Although these are
markedly larger relative increases than the decreases of potential
benefits and taxable earnings, the base is much smaller than for the
latter two. The magnitudes of the changes under provision I are
increases of $3.68 and $13.49 million in actual benefits as com-
pared to $.97 and $3.72 million decreases in potential benefits with
reductions B and C, respectively.5 The difference in absolute mag-
nitudes between actual and potential benefit changes can be attributed
to some workers having the maximum level of potential benefits such
that there can be some decrease in employment without any effect on
their potential benefits. In contrast, since relatively few workers were
benefit exhaustees and most were potential beneficiaries in case A, any
reduction in employment resulted in an increase in actual benefits.
Effect on the Cost of the Program
One of the more important criteria in evaluating the cost of ex-
tending unemployment insurance protection to a group of workers
is the relation of additional taxable earnings to additional benefits
which would be paid out for claims. The self-supporting system col-
lects its funds by a tax on the employer's payroll.6 The cost infor-
mation is given in Table 10 where actual benefits represent additional
claims which would be made upon the system as a result of agri-
cultural coverage under the alternative assumptions. The taxable
earnings represent the additions to the tax base upon which the fund
would be supported. As indicated above, taxable earnings declined
by 1% and 5% for reductions B and C, respectively, under pro-
vision I. The increase in actual benefits of 27% and 97% has also been
discussed. With an increase in actual benefits and a decrease in
5Coverage II has similar differences: $3.22 and $11.16 million in-
creases for actual benefits with $.80 and $3.33 million decreases for po-
tential benefits.
6The determination of the tax rate was discussed in the Introduction.
29
Table 11. Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: All locations.
Employment reduction and coverage
I II
Item A B C A B C
Migrants only
(1) Actual benefitsa,b 6.58 10.88 21.11 4.90 8.66 16.93
(100.0) (165.3) (320.8) (100.0) (176.7) (345.5)
(2) Taxable agricultural 127.32 118.52 94.10 102.90 95.49 75.46
earnings (100.0) (93.1) (73.9) (100.0) (92.8) (73.3)
(3)(1)+(2)x100 5.17 9.18 22.43 4.76 9.07 22.44
All workers
(4) Actual benefits a.b 15.65 19.95 30.18 12.50 16.26 24.54
(100.0) (127.5) (192.8) (100.0) (130.1) (196.3)
(5) Taxable agricultural 494.04 485.24 460.82 375.77 368.36 348.34
earnings b (100.0) (98.2) (93.3) (100.0) (98.0) (92.7)
(6) (4)-(5)x 100 3.17 4.11 6.55 3.33 4.41 7.04
a Additional benefits resulting from agricultural coverage.
b Million dollars.
taxable earnings, the ratio of the former to the latter necessarily
increases. The rate increased from 2.95 to 3.79 for all workers with
reduction B and from 2.95 to 6.15 with reduction C. Similar relations
hold between benefits and earnings under provision II with the rate
increasing from 3.15 to 4.11 by reduction B and from 3.15 to 6.66 by
reduction C.7 Reduction B results in roughly a one percentage point
increase in the cost rate. This cost rate roughly doubles with a nearly
complete elimination of interstate work.8
The corresponding information is given in Table 11 for work done
in all locations. The earnings and benefits were, of course, larger when
all employment was included. However, the relative changes are
similar. The cost rates, although slightly higher than when only
regional employment was included, change in approximately the same
way, also.
Reductions in interstate employment and the ensuing effects on
the rate have been shown. Given the employment records of mi-
gratory workers as compared to all workers, one would expect an
increase in the cost rates, but the magnitude of the increase could
not be predicted without a test such as has been reported upon
here. There were, in essence, two unknowns creating the need for
a project such as this: (1) the employment characteristics of mi-
gratory workers in contrast to non-migratory workers, and (2) given
knowledge of the first, what would be the magnitude of the effect
of a reduction in mobility on the cost of unemployment insurance
protection to agricultural workers? The inter-relation of these two
factors and the implications of the results are explored in the fol-
lowing and concluding section.
7The above estimates are all based on additional benefits and tax-
able earnings for employment in the 14 state region.
SThe increase in the cost rates in conjunction with migrant rates being
higher than the rates for all workers is a sufficient condition for the state-
ment in the Introduction that the possible over-sampling of migrants in the
region results in an upward bias in the cost rate change.
SECTION V
CONCLUSIONS
Information has been presented on the employment char-
acteristics of migratory workers in contrast to non-migratory workers.
As indicated by the relatively higher number of migrants who
met the monetary eligibility requirements for unemployment in-
surance benefits, migrants had a slightly stronger attachment to
the labor force than the average farm worker. It was also shown
that the relative number of actual beneficiaries was somewhat higher
for migrants than was the case for the average farm worker. One
possible explanation for this is that more migratory workers may
have been heads of household than was the case for the average
farm worker. For example, it is well-known that many farm workers
are students; their time spent in school is not compensable for unem-
ployment insurance benefits. The latter explanation is not intended
to explain the entire difference in the two sets of workers, but would
certainly contribute to the difference which is noted in actual bene-
ficiaries.
The relatively high number of migrants who met the eligibility
requirements indicates a somewhat less casual labor force than is
often thought to be the case. Included in the non-migratory category
must be a larger proportion of workers who have extremely short
durations of employment.
Given this information, the direction of change in the cost rate
with reduced employment is more predictable. The question then is
more in terms of the magnitude of change. By reducing interstate
employment, additional taxable earnings decreased and additional
actual benefits increased. In such a case the ratio of the latter to
the former unambiguously increases. This rate increased from 3.15%
to 4.11% and 6.66% for all employment within the 14 state region
with work reductions B and C,' respectively, and the coverage pro-
vision of 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks. Similar results
were obtained for the other coverage provisions examined.
The Likelihood of the Reductions
The remaining question once the cost rate change has been
estimated, is how likely is such a change in migratory behavior?
Although the cost rate for the region lies within the interval of
6% to 7% after the maximum reduction in interstate employment,
the individual state cost rates should be examined. As shown in
Appendix Table 4, there is considerable variation among the states
'B refers to the 50% reduction in weeks of interstate employment,
and C refers to the 100% reduction in weeks of interstate employment.
32
in how the rates are affected. However, in most cases even after
reduction C, the rates are not far above the maximum tax rates for
employers under the respective unemployment insurance laws.2 It
should be noted that the cost rate for New York which has a large
number of migrant workers is still below the maximum tax rate
after reduction C. However, in light of the adjustments in employ-
ment which have been imposed and the ensuing effects on the cost
rate, one has to question how much of a reduction in interstate
employment there might be as a result of extending unemployment
insurance protection to agricultural workers. No attempt to deter-
mine the extent of this reduction has been made in this project.
Some pertinent information relating to the question raised
above is included in Table 12. One would expect the individual's
choice of whether to continue employment or to become unemployed
and collect unemployment insurance benefits, if such a program
were in effect,3 to be based in part on the benefits obtained in
relation to the earnings foregone. There is also the added incentive
of free time if he is able to collect benefits in lieu of working.
The first column of Table 12 indicates the benefits which could
have been claimed under two coverage criteria and the alternative
work reductions. Recall that the item corresponding with A refers
to benefits which could have been claimed during periods of time
in the worker's employment records which were of a compensable
nature. In addition, the items for B and C include benefits which
could have been claimed during periods when the worker had his
interstate work deleted. The second column is total earnings of the
workers under the alternative reduction schemes. Benefits include
those attributed to both covered agricultural and non-agricultural
work without regard to the location of the work. The total earnings
column includes all earnings of covered workers since their non-
covered earnings would be just as important as covered earnings in
deciding whether or not to migrate.4 The third column is the sum
of the first two indicating a total income concept from combined
benefits and earnings.
2 See the respective state reports for a discussion of the relation of cost
rates to tax rates for individual states (1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19,
20, 22).
3This, of course, assumes that the individual has met the non-monetary
eligibility requirements such as there being no suitable work available for
him in periods of unemployment.
4Total earnings includes in addition to agricultural and covered non-
agricultural earnings of covered workers, non-covered non-agricultural
earnings, earnings from self-employment, and earnings of unknown type
of covered workers.
Table 12.- Effect of work reduction on income of migrants. a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Actual Total Total Income loss
coverage/reduction benefits earnings income b as per cent of
total income
----- Million dollars------
A 8.12 169.71 177.83
B 12.42 159.86 172.28
Gain (Loss) 4.30 (9.85) (5.55) (3.1)
C 22.65 132.83 155.48
Gain (Loss) 14.53 (36.88) (22.35) (12.6)
II.
A 6.45 150.83 157.28
B 10.20 141.43 151.63
Gain (Loss) 3.75 (9.40) (5.65) (3.6)
C 18.48 118.05 136.53
Gain (Loss) 12.03 (32.78) (20.75) (13.2)
a Included are all agricultural and non-agricultural earnings and benefits of migratory workers
for all employment locations.
b Actual benefits plus total earnings; column (1) plus column (2).
The net gain or loss to the workers can then be determined
for the alternative reductions. For example, under coverage I,
reduction B results in a $9.85 million loss in total earnings, but
only a $5.55 million loss in total income. This represents a net re-
duction of 3.1% in comparison to total income with no change in
interstate migration. Reduction C results in a net loss of 12.6% in
comparison to total income with no change in interstate migration. The
net loss percentages obtained for coverage II were 3.6 and 13.2 for
B and C, respectively. This table gives some indication of the relative
magnitude of earnings foregone in the aggregate by the imposed
reductions in migration.
A somewhat better indication may be obtained by placing this
relative change on a per person basis as in Table 13. In this way,
the comparison may be made for those persons who actually had
changes in interstate work introduced rather than imposing the
change over all migratory workers. The important consideration is
how reasonable a particular change is for the worker whose employ-
ment history was altered. The individual could be expected to make
a choice, assuming he has such a choice, based on the loss in
income in comparison to the additional weeks he now does not
work.
Under coverage provision I, there were 13,559 and 32,513 mi-
gratory workers under reductions B and C, respectively, who were
Table 13. Work reduction and income loss per person.
Employment reduction and coverage
I II
Item B C B C
Persons with work reduction 13,559 32,513 10,588 26,562
Man-weeks prior to reduction 633,258 1,516,417 503,776 1,248,882
Weeks per person 46.7 46.6 47.6 47.0
Man-weeks reduction 129,901 474,340 109,267 395,045
Reduction per person (weeks) 9.6 14.6 10.3 14.9
Reduction per person (percent) 20.6 31.3 21.6 31.7
Loss in total income ($ million) a 5.55 22.35 5.65 20.75
Loss in total income per person ($) 409 687 534 781
Loss in total income as per cent of total 11.6 19.4 15.1 22.1
income per person b
a See Table 12, column (3).
b Average earnings, average actual benefits, and average income for migrants were $3,372, $162, and $3,534, respectively.
given work reductions. The average reduction for these workers was
9.6 and 14.6 weeks in B and C, respectively. The relative reductions
were 20.6% and 31.3% based on averages of 46.7 and 46.6
weeks of employment per person adjusted. Similar reductions were
obtained for coverage II as shown in Table 13. When considered
in this way, the 50% reduction is not as far away from the 100%
reduction as when man-weeks over all persons are accumulated.
It is seen that the major reason for reduction B not meeting the
50% reduction is that most of the migratory workers were not ad-
justed in this case. Again, this occurred as a result of so many workers
having only two jobs.
When the loss is placed on a per person adjusted basis for cover-
age I, the loss per person is $409 and $687 for B and C, respectively.
The corresponding losses for coverage II are $534 and $781. If these
are compared to the average total income of migrant workers,
the losses represent 11.6% and 19.4% of total income of the workers,
respectively, under provision I.5 Provision II results in somewhat
larger relative losses, representing losses of 15.1% and 22.1% for re-
ductions B and C. Whether or not this is a large or small
relative decline in income is a question which the reader must
answer for himself at the present, and a question on which further
research should be done. At the present, one can only subjectively
evaluate whether or not workers would be willing to give up the
above proportion of income for the indicated weeks of reduction
in work.
Implications for the Supply of and Demand for Labor
Reductions in the quantity of labor have been imposed to de-
termine the possible effects on the cost of extending unemployment
insurance protection to agricultural workers. The reductions, if
they were to occur, would be expected to increase the wage rates
for agricultural workers in those areas where the reduction in labor
supply was significant. Since some states use migratory labor over
rather short periods of time and others characteristically have longer
periods of employment, the reductions imposed in this report will
have effects of different magnitudes in the respective areas.
Migrants have been classified by home state and interview state
in Table 14. Florida is the only state of the 14 states which has
fewer migrants by interviewing than by home state classification.
Although 27% of the 14 state population of migratory workers was
from the Florida sample, nearly twice as many, 47%, from the 14
5This assumes that workers who were given work adjustments had
the same average income as all migratory workers.
36
Table 14. Migrants by interview state and home state.
Area Migrants by Migrants by
home state interview state
Number Per cent Number Per cent
Connecticut 1,456 2.9 3,220 6.4
Delaware 563 1.1 2,235 4.4
Florida 23,729 47.0 13,781 27.3
Maine 301 0.6 764 1.5
Maryland 837 1.6 1,872 3.7
Massachusetts 577 1.1 818 1.6
New Hampshire 74 0.1 160 0.3
New Jersey 2,672 5.3 7,898 15.7
New York 2,740 5.4 9,970 19.8
Ohio 1,784 3.5 5,994 11.9
Pennsylvania 1,718 3.4 2,872 5.7
Rhode Island 8 a 44 0.1
Vermont 204 0.4 240 0.5
West Virginia 264 0.5 557 1.1
14 State region 36,927 73.2 50,425 100.0
Other areas 13,498 26.8 b b
a Less than .05%.
b Not applicable.
state region had Florida as their home state.6 It should be noted
that 73% of the migrants were assigned home states within the 14
state region. Of the 13,498 who were assigned home states outside
the region, nearly half were assigned to Puerto Rico, 5,937. This
confirms much of what is already known about labor migration,
namely that Florida is a large supplier in the Eastern Seaboard
Migratory Stream and that Puerto Rico also supplies a relatively
large number of workers to Northeastern states. It should also be
noted that the stream is relatively self-contained with 73% of the
workers having home states within the region.
The reduction in employment within a particular area has been
measured in man-weeks of agricultural labor.7 The imposed reduc-
tions represent a shift to the left of the supply function of agri-
cultural labor. Given a downward sloping demand curve for agricultural
6This, more than any other point in the report, demonstrates the de-
gree to which workers migrated between Florida and other states. At the
same time, it must be interpreted with caution due to the possible problems
resulting from different interview times in Florida than in other
states. See p. 3.
7This excludes non-agricultural employment, self-employment, and em-
ployment of unknown type.
labor, this implies an increase in the wage rate. One approach for
approximating the pressure or degree of disequilibrium in the labor
market which would result from the above reductions is to consider
the implied increases in wage rates. One of the limitations to this
is that the eliminated employment is primarily seasonal employ-
ment. Not only do we lack adequate demand estimates for seasonal
labor, but there are also different bases to be used for determining
the relative magnitudes of the reductions. The relative reductions
as compared to the base of total man-weeks of agricultural labor
for the respective areas are shown in Table 15 for coverage provision
II.
Reduction B resulted in a decline of 1.1% of agricultural man-
weeks within the 14 state region. The corresponding estimate for
Table 15.-Employment reductions and implied wage rate changes.
Implied wage rate change
Area a Agricultural man- given demand elasticity ofb
weeks reduction -.25 -1.0 -1.5
-.25 -1.0 -1.5
Number Per cent ------Per cent-------
Reduction Bc
14 state region 75,944 1.08 4.32 1.08 0.72
Connecticut 1,843 0.64 2.56 0.64 0.43
Delaware 1,008 1.15 4.60 1.15 0.77
Florida 4,791 0.18 0.72 0.18 0.12
Maryland 7,187 2.65 10.60 2.65 1.77
New Jersey 18,056 4.69 18.76 4.69 3.13
New York 20,294 1.72 6.88 1.72 1.15
Ohio 14,607 2.42 9.68 2.42 1.61
Pennsylvania 7,194 0.98 3.92 0.98 0.65
Reduction Cc
14 state region 266,886 3.80 15.20 3.80 2.53
Connecticut 7,555 2.62 10.48 2.62 1.75
Delaware 5,416 6.19 24.88 6.19 4.13
Florida 41,118 1.56 6.24 1.56 1.04
Maryland 16,473 6.07 24.28 6.07 4.05
Massachusetts 4,168 1.50 6.00 1.50 1.00
New Jersey 64,028 16.64 66.56 16.64 11.09
New York 68,609 5.82 23.28 5.82 3.88
Ohio 29,826 4.94 19.76 4.94 3.29
Pennsylvania 27,398 3.73 14.92 3.73 2.49
West Virginia 1,494 1.07 4.28 1.07 0.71
aStates with reductions of fewer than 500 man-weeks are not listed separately.
bThis assumes the supply of man-weeks is perfectly inelastic.
c Employer coverage provision of 4 of more workers in 20 or more weeks.
38
reduction C was 3.8%. There is considerable disparity among the
states for both reductions. Reduction B resulted in decreases of
0.2% in Florida to 4.7% in New Jersey. Reduction C resulted in
decreases of 1.1% in West Virginia to 16.6% in New Jersey. It is
interesting to note that Florida had the smallest decrease in Case B
and was very low (1.6%) in case C. This results from so many
of the migrants having Florida as their home state; deleted
employment for those workers resulted in deletions in states other
than Florida. New Jersey stands out in both reductions B and C
as having the largest reduction. The characteristic feature of New
Jersey would appear to be that 49% of their worker population
was classified as migratory as compared to 24% for the 14 state
region. However, only one-third as many workers from the region
were given New Jersey as a home state. As a result, the remaining
two-thirds of the workers who were given work reductions would
have had New Jersey employment deleted even though they were
interviewed in New Jersey. Although this results from the procedures
used in the study, the result provides information with respect to
the question asked. New Jersey's agriculture requires a relatively
large number of seasonal workers for a short period of time. If
workers were to reduce their migration, New Jersey would be one
of the more critical states.
Approximations to possible wage increases or disequilibrium
imposed on the agricultural labor market by reductions such as those
set forth herein may be obtained by comparison of the employment
reductions with the elasticity of demand for labor. There is no single
elasticity of demand for labor, but a range of feasible estimates of
the elasticity does exist. Various studies of the demand for hired
agricultural labor indicate that the range is -1.5 to -.25 (3, 12, 18,
21, .23, 24, 27). These estimates have generally been based on nat-
ional data and annual observations. Although there are regional
estimates, particularly Schuh and Leeds (21), Tyrchniewicz and
Schuh (24), and Glover (12), these are not of too much use for our
purposes other than verifying that the regions are not too dissimilar
such that the above range of estimates is still appropriate.8 The way
in which seasonality affects the demand for labor has yet to be well
established, however. The data simply have not revealed great dif-
ferences in the elasticity of demand among seasons on the basis of
models used thus far (12).
Many of the earlier studies of the demand for agricultural labor
8The New England and Mid-Atlantic regions could be used since the
data cover those regions. However, the range of estimates utilized includes
estimates obtained for these regions.
tend to show elasticities at the lower absolute end of the range,
whereas the more recent ones tend to be larger in absolute value,
generally being elastic. The implied changes in the wage rate
(assuming perfectly inelastic supply) are shown in Table 15 for re-
ductions B and C for three demand elasticities: -.25, -1.0, and
-1.5. In the author's judgment, the "true" elasticity is between
-1.0 and -1.5. For simplicity, we can assume for discussion
purposes that the elasticity is -1.0, resulting in wage rate changes
of equal magnitude but opposite sign of the employment reductions.
The wage rate changes, assuming that the elasticity of demand is
indeed between -1.0 and -1.5, would be somewhat smaller than those
discussed as evaluated with an elasticity of-1.0. The resulting increase
in the wage rate for the region after reduction B is then 1.1%.
The range for the states is, of course, the same as for the reductions
in man-weeks, 0.2% to 4.7%. Similarly, reduction C would result
in a 3.8% wage rate increase for the region with a range across
the states of 1.5% to 16.6%.
The implied wage rate increases must be interpreted with ex-
treme caution. First, they are based on the assumed reductions in
employment presented in this report. The likelihood of the reductions
is in itself questionable. Secondly, the estimates assume that the
supply shifts immediately and fully with the introduction of unem-
ployment insurance. This would not be the case in actuality since
there are considerable lags in economic behavior. As a result,
workers, if they were to adjust their labor supply, would adjust their
supply over a long period of time, not all in the first year. Lags
in the supply function of agricultural labor have been well documented
by Tyrchniewicz and Schuh (24). Third, the supply function is assumed
to be perfectly inelastic. Since the supply is somewhat elastic (24;
p. 550), the effect on implied wage rate changes is to overestimate the
increase. Finally, there are also lags in the behavior of the employer.
Given a longer period'of time, the employer has the option of substi-
tuting other factors of production for labor and thus further reducing
the pressure on the labor market.
The implied wage rate changes are included primarily for il-
lustrative purposes to further evaluate the reductions assumed in this
report. They are expected, however, to place extreme upper bounds
on any disequilibrium which might occur in the agricultural labor
market.
Limitations
The major limitation of the analysis has been indicated in the
first part of this section. Given the change in cost rate, how reasonable
is the adjustment which has been made? The major conclusion
40
which can be drawn from such an approach is simply an upper bound
for the cost rate; there is no basis for assuming that such an imposed
decrease in migration will occur as has been imposed in the analysis.
Rather, it is shown that if such a phenomenon were to occur in
these magnitudes the effect on the cost rate for the extension of
unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers would be
as shown.
The major limitation in achieving the work reductions for the
50% and 100% interstate work reductions was the limited number of
jobs which the workers had. Since one cannot leave a job volun-
tarily and then collect benefits, a similar restriction was imposed in
the reduction procedure--jobs could only be deleted at changes in
employment. As a result, intermediate work reductions of whatever
proportion, in this case 50%, are not very closely approximated. Such
a procedure requires workers with continuous job changes to be
effective. Migratory workers do not have this characteristic; their job
changes are quite discrete.
From the legalistic viewpoint, a major limitation is the assump-
tion that the worker is free to choose between employment or re-
maining unemployed and collecting unemployment insurance
benefits. The individual is, in fact, not quite this free. For example,
he must accept any employment which is in his line of work if it
is within reasonable distance of his home location. Since there is
no experience with such situations for migratory workers, it is unclear
whether a worker with a history of traveling across several states for
employment would be required to do so or he would be classified
as unemployed and be eligible for benefits. This also assumes that
there is no work available for him in his home location. The
effect of this limitation on the analysis is to overstate the extent of
work reduction there would be as a result of an unemployment in-
surance program protecting migratory agricultural workers.
The definition utilized to define which workers were interstate
migratory workers is an operational definition for this study, not
without its limitations. The definition has the advantage of including
only those workers who demonstrated that they crossed state lines
during the period under consideration. Secondly, the criterion could
be used in all states considered. One disadvantage of the definition
is that it gives a different number of migratory workers relative to all
workers who responded that they had crossed state lines for work in
the previous 12 months.
Another limitation is that the analysis is highly static. Reductions
in employment have been imposed with no compensating effect from
the demand for labor. Reductions in interstate migration could be ex-
pected to have significant effects on employers; i.e. particular groups
of employers utilizing migratory labor services would have insuffi-
cient labor to harvest their crops. Implications on the wage rate
for agricultural labor have been examined in the previous sub-section.
In the short run, the wage would be driven up by the reduced
number of workers available for harvest. A longer run effect might
be to seek more mechanization so that they would have less reliance
upon labor.
A consideration which is often neglected in considering the
effects of the extension of unemployment insurance protection to a
group of workers is the benefit to the worker in addition to the
actual benefits for periods of unemployment. The employer, in
essence, is paying for an insurance policy for his workers and accept-
ing some of the risk for possible lay-offs of his workers. Consequently,
the worker bears less of this risk and may, as a result, be willing
to accept a lower wage rate than he otherwise would have. Although
the employer would have to pay the payroll tax, he might also have
a compensating reduction in wages or wage increases. Also, in com-
parison to employers who are not covered by unemployment in-
surance, the employer who is covered would be expected to be at a
comparative advantage in attracting workers.
Concluding Remarks
It has been found on the basis of a survey of agricultural
workers in 14 states, that the effect of presently migrating workers
discontinuing such migration would be to approximately double the
cost rate for unemployment insurance protection for agricultural
workers. However, even after doubling, the rate is in the neighbor-
hood of 6%. The limitations of the analysis have been indicated
above and should be carefully noted. Most importantly, one should
note that no evidence has been presented to indicate that migratory
workers would decrease their migration by any degree whatever. The
procedure has only been to determine the effect on the cost of an un-
employment insurance program for farm workers if such a phenomenon
were to occur.
APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1.-Coverage and beneficiary status of migrants and all workers:a 14 regional states.
State Workers covered Potential beneficiaries Actual beneficiaries Benefit exhaustees
Migrants All Migrants All Migrants All Migrants All
only workers only workers only workers only workers
Connecticut 3,220 13,524 2,423 8,229 1,626 3,663 330 983
(100.0) (100.0) (75.2) (60.8) (50.5) (27.1) (10.3) (7.3)
Delaware 2,235 3,834 1,844 3,149 1,162 1,491 20 104
(100.0) (100.0) (82.5) (82.1) (52.0) (38.9) (0.9) (2.7)
Florida 13,781 56,624 13,232 52,834 4,981 16,131 869 4,682
(100.0) (100.0) (96.0) (93.3) (36.2) (28.5) (6.3) (8.3)
Maine 764 10,015 749 5,803 481 1,966 18 615
(100.0) (100.0) (98.0) (57.9) (63.0) (19.6) (2.4) (6.1)
Maryland 1,872 7,978 1,832 6,801 342 711 34 135
(100.0) (100.0) (97.8) (85.2) (18.3) (8.9) (1.8) (1.7)
Massachusetts 818 7,693 818 6,846 153 1,129 75 707
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (89.0) (18.8) (14.7) (9.3) (9.2)
New Hampshire 160 1,371 144 965 30 230 2 47
(100.0) (100.0) (90.2) (70.4) (19.2) (16.8) (1.5) (3.5)
New Jersey 7,898 16,071 7,272 12,893 3,204 4,933 367 1,007
(100.0) (100.0) (92.1) (80.2) (40.6) (30.7) (4.7) (6.3)
New York 9,970 39,378 8,928 28,643 4,427 7,883 163 343
(100.0) (100.0) (89.6) (72.7) (44.4) (20.0) (1.6) (0.9)
Appendix Table 1.-Continued.
Workers covered Potential beneficiaries Actual beneficiaries Benefit exhaustees
Migrants All Migrants All Migrants All Migrants All
only workers only workers only workers only workers
5,994 25,394 4,529 15,505 3,217 5,582
(100.0) (100.0) (75.6) (61.1) (53.7) (22.0)
2,872 20,762 2,454 16,329
(100.0) (100.0) (85.5) (78.7)
589 1,570
(9.8) (6.2)
1,164 3,437
(40.5) (16.6)
44 565 42 484 21
(100.0) (100.0) (95.6) (85.6) (49.1)
240 3,955 170 2,814 9
(100.0) (100.0) (70.8) (71.1) (3.8)
143
(25.4)
160
(4.1)
223
(1.1)
8
(18.2)
0
(0.0)
557 3,993 463 3,116 274 617
(100.0) (100.0) (83.2) (78.0) (49.2) (15.5)
State
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont
West Virginia
a Full coverage.
Appendix Table 2.-Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from agricultural coverage: a 14 regional states.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State Potential Actual Total covered Taxable (2) -(4)
benefits benefits agricultural agricultural x 100
earnings earnings
Connecticut ------------------ Million dollars -------------------
Migrants only 1.57 .59 3.71 3.70 15.88
All workers 10.73 1.33 25.79 19.95 6.67
Delaware
Migrants only .80 .22 2.30 2.26 9.78
All workers 1.88 .30 6.34 5.90 5.12
Florida
Migrants only 16.28 1.88 60.38 58.27 3.23
All workers 52.03 5.74 214.21 187.78 3.06
Maine
Migrants only .35 .03 1.30 1.11 2.60
All workers 4.21 .24 15.69 13.83 1.72
Maryland
Migrants only 1.03 .13 3.04 3.03 4.38
All workers 5.86 .28 19.76 17.99 1.58
Massachusetts
Migrants only .50 .10 1.53 1.50 6.44
All workers 7.80 .64 26.25 20.76 3.06
New Hampshire
Migrants only .04 .005 .16 .16 3.19
All workers .88 .06 2.93 2.49 2.62
Appendix Table 2.-Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State Potential Actual Total covered Taxable (2)-(4)
benefits benefits agricultural agricultural x 100
earnings earnings
New Jersey
Migrants only
All workers
New York
Migrants only
All workers
Ohio
Migrants only
All workers
Pennsylvania
Migrants only
All workers
Rhode Island
Migrants only
All workers
Vermont
Migrants only
All workers
West Virginia
Migrants only
All workers
a Full coverage.
Million dollars ---------
3.84
10.04
4.22
23.58
1.41
10.87
2.31
16.82
.02
.73
.05
2.77
.10
1.82
.43
1.50
.31
.87
.005
.09
.005
.08
.01
.10
10.97
31.14
15.46
94.51
4.86
45.41
6.67
55.93
.05
2.39
.18
11.62
.52
7.25
10.88
28.20
14.86
78.69
4.84
37.34
6.48
46.57
10.55
5.10
.18
10.19
Appendix Table 3.-Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status:
Connecticut.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,173 2,173 2,173
beneficiaries (75.1) (75.1) (75.1) (67.5) (67.5) (67.5)
Actual 1,626 1,682 1,887 1,451 1,474 1,641
beneficiaries (50.5) (52.2) (58.6) (45.1) (45.8) (51.0)
Benefit 330 392 742 200 263 575
exhaustees (10.3) (12.2) (23.1) (6.2) (8.2) (17.9)
All workers
Potential 8,055 8,055 8,055 7,076 7,076 7,076
beneficiaries (59.6) (59.6) (59.6) (52.3) (52.3) (52.3)
Actual 3,623 3,678 3,883 3,323 3,346 3,513
beneficiaries (26.8) (27.2) (28.7) (24.6) (24.7) (26.0)
Benefit 983 1,046 1,396 817 880 1,192
exhaustees (7.3) (7.7) (10.3) (6.0) (6.5) (8.8)
Delaware.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,482 1,482 1,482
beneficiaries (82.5) (82.5) (82.5) (66.4) (66.4) (66.4)
Actual 1,162 1,248 1,655 1,135 1,208 1,294
beneficiaries (52.0) (55.9) (74.1) (50.8) (54.1) (57.9)
Benefit 20 99 175 104 183 258
exhaustees (0.9) (4.5) (7.8) (2.7) (4.8) (6.7)
All workers
Potential 3,028 3,028 3,028 2,409 2,409 2,409
beneficiaries (79.0) (79.0) (79.0) (62.8) (62.8) (62.8)
Actual 1,451 1,536 1,944 1,350 1,423 1,509
beneficiaries (37.9) (40.1) (50.7) (35.2) (37.1) (39.4)
Benefit 20 94 170 71 144 220
exhaustees (0.9) (4.2) (7.6) (1.9) (3.8) (5.8)
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500
or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A-none, B-50% reduction, C- 100% reduction.
Appendix Table 3.-Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary
status: Florida.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 13,232 13,232 13,232 12,748 12,748 12,748
beneficiaries (96.0) (96.0) (96.0) (92.5) (92.5) (92.5)
Actual 4,981 7,660 11,635 4,537 7,190 11,151
beneficiaries (36.2) (55.6) (84.4) (32.9) (52.2) (80.9)
Benefit 869 1,842 7,504 506 1,435 7,071
exhaustees (6.3) (13.4) (54.4) (3.7) (10.4) (51.3)
All workers
Potential 52,826 52,826 52,826 49,865 49,865 49,865
beneficiaries (93.3) (93.3) (93.3) (88.1) (88.1) (88.1)
Actual 16,131 18,810 22,784 15,256 17,909 21,870
beneficiaries (28.5) (33.2) (40.2) (26.9) (31.6) (38.6)
Benefit 4,682 5,655 11,317 4,181 5,111 10,747
exhaustees (8.3) (10.0) (20.0) (7.4) (9.0) (19.0)
Maine.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 749 749 749 749 749 749
beneficiaries (98.0) (98.0) (98.0) (98.0) (98.0) (98.0)
Actual 481 481 481 481 481 481
beneficiaries (63.0) (63.0) (63.0) (63.0) (63.0) (63.0)
Benefit 18 18 18 18 18 18
exhaustees (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4)
All workers
Potential 5,256 5,256 5,256 3,676 3,676 3,676
beneficiaries (52.5) (52.5) (52.5) (36.7) (36.7) (36.7)
Actual 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,497 1,497 1,497
beneficiaries (18.8) (18.8) (18.8) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0)
Benefit 545 545 545 545 545 545
exhaustees (5.4) (5.4) (5.4) (5.4) (5.4) (5.4)
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500
or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20,or more weeks.
Reduction: A- none, 8- 50% reduction, C- 100% reduction.
Appendix Table 3.-Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status:
Maryland.
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 1,832 1,832 1,832 1,608 1,608 1,608
beneficiaries (97.8) (97.8) (97.8) (85.9) (85.9) (85.9)
Actual 342 713 1,282 264 501 1,058
beneficiaries (18.3) (38.1) (68.5) (14.1) (26.8) (56.5)
Benefit 34 34 147 34 34 69
exhaustees (1.8) (1.8) (7.9) (1.8) (1.8) (3.7)
All workers
Potential 6,704 6,704 6,704 4,428 4,428 4,428
beneficiaries (84.0) (84.0) (84.0) (55.5) (55.5) (55.5)
Actual 711 1,082 1,651 616 853 1,410
beneficiaries (8.9) (13.6) (20.7) (7.7) (10.7) (17.7)
Benefit 135 135 248 135 135 170
exhaustees (1.7) (1.7) (3.1) (1.7) (1.7) (2.1)
Massachusetts.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 818 818 818 738 738 738
beneficiaries (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (90.3) (90.3) (90.3)
Actual 153 153 560 117 117 480
beneficiaries (18.8) (18.8) (68.5) (14.3) (14.3) (58.8)
Benefit 75 75 92 54 54 70
exhaustees (9.3) (9.3) (11.3) (6.6) (6.6) (8.6)
All workers
Potential 6,554 6,554 6,554 4,879 4,879 4,879
beneficiaries (85.2) (85.2) (85.2) (63.4) (63.4) (63.4)
Actual 859 859 1,266 686 686 1,050
beneficiaries (11.2) (11.2) (16.5) (8.9) (8.9) (13.7)
Benefit 437 437 454 359 359 376
exhaustees (5.7) (5.7) (5.9) (4.7) (4.7) (4.9)
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500
or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none, B 50% reduction, C 100% reduction.
Appendix Table 3. Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status:
New Hampshire.
Item
Migrants only
Potential
beneficiaries
Actual
beneficiaries
Benefit
exhaustees
All workers
Potential
beneficiaries
Actual
beneficiaries
Benefit
exhaustees
Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
144 144 144 140 140 140
(90.2) (90.2) (90.2) (87.8) (87.8) (87.8)
30 35 64 30 35 62
(19.3) (21.9) (40.2) (19.3) (21.9) (39.3)
2 2 11
(1.5) (1.5) (7.0)
2 2 11
(1.5) (1.5) (7.0)
955 955 955 719 719 719
(69.7) (69.7) (69.7) (52.5) (52.5) (52.5)
230 234 264 193 197 225
(16.8) (17.1) (19.3) (14.1) (14.4) (16.4)
47 47 56 31 31 40
(3.5) (3.5) (4.1) (2.3) (2.3) (2.9)
New Jersey.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 7,137 7,137 7,029 6,727 6,727 6,640
beneficiaries (90.4) (90.4) (89.0) (85.2) (85.2) (84.1)
Actual 3,120 4,515 5,758 2,929 4,302 5,369
beneficiaries (39.5) (57.2) (72.9) (37.1) (54.5) (68.0)
Benefit 333 658 2,534 312 547 2,321
exhaustees (4.2) (8.3) (32.1) (4.0) (29.4) (5.4)
All workers
Potential 12,506 12,506 12,398 10,247 10,247 10,160
beneficiaries (77.8) (77.8) (77.2) (63.8) (63.8) (63.2)
Actual 4,840 6,235 7,478 4,294 5,668 6,735
beneficiaries (30.1) (38.8) (46.5) (26.7) (35.3) (41.9)
Benefit 972 1,298 3,174 860 1,095 2,870
exhaustees (6.1) (8.1) (19.8) (5.4) (6.8) (17.9)
a Coverage: I- 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500
or more.
II 4 or more workers ih 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A- none, B- 50% reduction, C- 100% reduction.
Appendix Table 3. Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status:
New York.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 8,928 8,928 8,928 6,660 6,660 6,660
beneficiaries (89.6) (89.6) (89.6) (66.8) (66.8) (66.8)
Actual 4,427 5,963 8,185 2,866 4,176 5,706
beneficiaries (44.4) (59.8) (82.1) (28.8) (41.9) (57.2)
Benefit 163 216 1,326 36 64 910
exhaustees (1.6) (2.2) (13.3) (0.4) (0.7) (9.1)
All workers
27,829 27,829 27,829 19,785 19,785 19,785
beneficiaries (70.8) (70.8) (70.8) (50.3) (50.3) (50.3)
beneficiaries
Actual 7,798 9,334 11,556 5,364 6,674 8,204
beneficiaries (19.8) (23.7) (29.4) (13.6) (17.0) (20.8)
Benefit 343 396 1,506 216 244 1,090
exhaustees (0.9) (1.0) (3.8) (0.6) (0.6) (2.8)
Ohio.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential
beneficiaries
Actual
beneficiaries
Benefit
exhaustees
All workers
Potential
beneficiaries
Actual
beneficiaries
Benefit
exhaustees
4,529
(75.6)
3,217
(53.7)
584
(9.8)
15,196
(59.8)
5,582
(22.0)
370
(6.2)
4,529
(75.6)
3,728
(62.2)
751
(12.5)
15,196
(59.8)
6,093
(24.0)
526
(6.8)
4,529
(75.6)
4,044
(47.5)
1,330
(22.2)
15,196
(59.8)
6,409
(25.2)
1,028
(9.1)
2,752
(45.9)
1,766
(29.5)
370
(6.2)
9,970
(39.3)
3,188
(12.6)
535
(2.1)
2,752
(45.9)
2,262
(37.7)
526
(8.8)
9,970
(39.3)
3,683
(14.5)
691
(2.7)
2,752
(45.9)
2,437
(40.7)
1,028
(17.2)
9,970
(39.3)
3,859
(15.2)
1,193
(4.7)
a Coverage: I- 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500
or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A- none, B 50% reduction, C- 100% reduction.
52
Appendix Table 3.-Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary
status: Pennsylvania.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,119 2,119 2,119
beneficiaries (85.1) (85.1) (85.1) (73.8) (73.8) (73.8)
Actual 1,164 1,562 1,895 982 1,290 1,568
beneficiaries (40.5) (54.4) (66.0) (34.2) (44.9) (54.6)
Benefit 63 69 171 55 61 109
exhaustees (2.2) (2.4) (6.0) (1.9) (2.1) (3.8)
All workers
Potential 16,178 16,178 16,178 11,576 11,576 11,576
beneficiaries (77.9) (77.9) (77.9) (73.8) (73.8) (73.8)
Actual 3,437 3,835 4,168 2,951 3,260 3,538
beneficiaries (16.6) (18.5) (20.1) (14.2) (15.7) (17.0)
Benefit 223 229 332 85 91 138
exhaustees (1.1) (1.1) (1.6) (0.4) (0.4) (0.7)
Rhode Island.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 42 42 42 37 37 37
beneficiaries (95.6) (95.6) (95.6) (84.3) (84.3) (84.3)
Actual 21 21 21 21 21 21
beneficiaries (49.1) (49.1) (49.1) (49.1) (49.1) (49.1)
Benefit 8 8 13 8 8 13
exhaustees (18.2) (18.2) (31.3) (18.2) (18.2) (31.3)
All workers
Potential 393 393 393 301 301 301
beneficiaries (69.5) (69.5) (69.5) (53.3) (53.3) (53.3)
Actual 143 143 143 131 131 131
beneficiaries (25.4) (25.4) (25.4) (49.1) (49.1) (49.1)
Benefit 20 20 26 20 20 26
exhaustees (3.7) (3.7) (4.7) (3.7) (3.7) (4.7)
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500
or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A-none, B-50% reduction, C-100% reduction.
53
Appendix Table 3.-Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary
status: Vermont.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 170 170 170 170 170 170
beneficiaries (70.9) (70.9) (70.9) (70.9) (70.9) (70.9)
Actual 9 9 54 9 9 54
beneficiaries (3.8) (3.8) (22.7) (3.8) (3.8) (22.7)
Benefit 0 0 0 0 0 0
exhaustees (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
All workers
Potential 2,708 2,708 2,708 1,127 1,127 1,127
beneficiaries (68.5) (68.5) (68.5) (28.5) (28.5) (28.5)
Actual 120 120 165 80 80 127
beneficiaries (3.0) (3.0) (4.2) (2.0) (2.0) (3.2)
Benefit 3 3 3 3 3 3
exhaustees (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
West Virginia
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
I II
A B C A B C
Migrants only
Potential 463 463 463 382 382 382
beneficiaries (83.2) (83.2) (83.2) (68.6) (68.6) (68.6)
Actual 274 304 375 255 275 300
beneficiaries (49.3) (54.6) (67.3) (45.9) (49.3) (53.8)
Benefit 18 18 37 18 18 18
exhaustees (3.3) (3.31 (6.7) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3)
All workers
Potential 3,104 3,104 3,104 1,632 1,632 1,632
beneficiaries (77.7) (77.7) (77.7) (40.9) (40.9) (40.9)
Actual 617 647 718 417 436 461
beneficiaries (15.5) (16.2) (18.0) (10.4) (10.9) (11.6)
Benefit 82 82 101 66 66 66
exhaustees (2.1) (2.1) (2.6) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7)
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500
or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A- none, B- 50% reduction, C- 100% reduction.
Appendix Table 4.--Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Connecticut.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
-- ------------------Million dollars-----------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)i(3)x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6).(7)x 100c
1.56 1.50 1.28 1.41
(100.0) (96.2) (82.0) (100.0)
1.37 1.18
(97.2) (83.7)
.59 .66 .84 .51 .56 .72
(100.0) (111.9) (142.4) (100.0) (109.8) (141.2)
3.67 3.45 2.84 3.32
(100.0) (94.0) (77.4) (100.0)
3.15 2.63
(94.9) (79.2)
----------- Per cent-----------
16.00 19.01 29.10 15.28 17.62 26.93
---------- Million dollars-------------
7.81 7.75 7.53 6.84
(100.0) (99.2) (96.4) (100.0)
6.80 6.62
(99.4) (96.8)
1.31 1.38 1.56 1.20 1.25 1.41
(100.0) (105.3) (119.1) (100.0) (104.2) (117.5)
19.44 19.22 18.61 16.77
(100.0) (98.9) (95.7) (100.0)
16.60 16.08
(99.0) (95.9)
----------- Per cent -----------
6.75 7.19 8.38 7.18 7.54 8.77
aCoverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A- none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Delaware.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars-------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2);(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7)x100c
.79 .74 .59 .35
(100.0) (93.7) (74.6) (100.0)
.22 .23
(100.0) (102.2)
2.25 2.09
(100.0% (92.8)
.32
(91.4)
.22
(62.9)
.22 .09 .10 .10
(99.5) (100.0) (105.2) (104.2)
1.64 1.02
(72.9) (100.0)
0.95 0.65
(93.1) (63.7)
------------ Per cent----------------
9.84 10.84 13.45 9.29 10.96 15.33
---------- Million dollars-----------
1.77 1.72 1.57 1.10
(100.0) (97.2) (88.7) (100.0)
1.07 96.9
(97.3) (88.1)
.30 .30 .30 .14 .15 .15
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (107.1) (107.1)
5.53 5.37 4.92 3.31
(100.0) (97.1) (89.0) (100.0)
3.24 2.93
(97.9) (88.5)
------------Per cent---------------
5.44 5.71 6.10 4.32 4.70 5.02
aCoverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
CThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Florida.
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
I II
A B C A B C
----------------- Million dollars ---------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)-(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7)x100c
16.28 16:90 18.07 13.74 14.28 14.92
(100.0) (103.8) (111.0) (100.0) (103.8) (108.5)
1.88 4.78 12.39 1.44 4.02 10.2
(100.0) (254.2) (659.0) (100.0) (279.2) (708.3)
58.26 57.97 55.25 49.99
(100.0) (99.5) (94.8) (100.0)
49.71 47.34
(99.4) (94.7)
----------- Per cent----------
3.23 8.24 22.42 2.87
8.08 21.57
--------- -- Million dollars---------------
52.01 52.63 53.81 47.21 47.75 48.39
(100.0) (101.2) (103.5) (100.0) (101.1) (102.5)
5.74 8.64 16.25 5.11 7.69 13.88
(100.0) (150.5) (283.1) (100.0) (150.5) (271.6)
187.71 187.43 184.70 171.57 171.29 168.92
(100.0) (99.8) (98.4) (100.0) (99.8) (98.5)
----------- Per cent------ ------
3.06 4.61 8.80 2.98 4.49 8.22
aCoverage: I 1 or
more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A-none
B 50% reduction
C- 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Maine.
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
1 II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars-------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)i(3) x 100
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)t(7)x 100c
.30 .30 .32 .22
(100.0) (100.0) (106.7) (100.0)
.21 .23
(95.5) (104.5)
.02 .02 .07 .01 .01 .07
(100.0) (100.0) (350.0) (100.0) (100.0) (700.0)
.98 .96 .96 .64
(100.0) (98.0) (98.0) (100.0)
.61 .62
(95.3) (96.7)
------------- Per cent--------------
2.28 2.34 7.74 2.13 2.21 10.62
---------- Million dollars ------------
3.59 3.58 3.61 1.98
(100.0) (99.7) (100.6) (100.0)
1.97 1.99
(99.5) (100.5)
.20 .20 .25 .12 .12 .18
(100.0) (100.0) (125.0) (100.0) (100.0) (150.0)
11.77 11.75 11.75 6.45
(100.0) (99.8) (99.8) (100.0)
6.43 6.43
(99.7) (99.7)
------------ Per cent ----------------
1.66 1.66 2.10
1.93 1.94 2.74
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
c These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4. -Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Maryland.
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
I II
A B C A B C
------------------ Million dollars-----------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)-(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
1.03 1.01 .74 .66
(100.0) (98.1) (71.8) (100.0)
.63 .45
(95.5) (68.2)
.13 .21 .32 .04 .07 .15
(100.0) (161.5) (246.2) (100.0) (175.0) (375.0)
3.03 2.89 1.89 2.07
(100.0) (95.4) (62.4) (1000)
1.93 1.25
(93.2) (60.4)
-------------------- Per cent----------------
4.38 7.11 17.01
1.79 3.27 11.76
Million dollars------
5.79 5.76 5.49 3.23
(100.0) (99.5) (94.8) (100.0)
3.20 3.02
(99.1) (93.5)
.28 .36 .47 .18 .21 .29
(100.0) (128.6) (167.9) (100.0) (116.7) (161.1)
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7)x100c
17.57 17.44 16.43 9.54
(100.0) (99.3) (93.5) (100.0)
9.40 8.72
(98.5) (91.4)
------------Per cent-----------
1.61 2.04 2.87 1.93 2.23 3.37
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C- 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
CThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.- Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of
unemployment insurance benefits: Massachusetts.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars-----------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)-(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)i(7) x 100
.50 .51
(100.0) (102.0)
.34 .35 .36
(68.0) (100.0) (102.9)
.20
(57.1)
.10 .13 .13 .09 .12 .12
(100.0) (130.0) (130.0) (100.0) (133.3) (133.3)
1.51 1.45 .94 1.02
(100.0) (96.0) (62.3) (100.0)
.97 .50
(95.1) (49.0)
------------ Per cent------------
6.44 8.73 13.74 8.69 12.26 23.96
---------- Million dollars----------
7.61 7.62
(100.0) (100.1)
7.45 5.31 5.32
(97.9) (100.0) (100.2)
5.17
(97.4)
.46 .49 .49 .38 .41 .41
(100.0) (106.5) (106.5) (100.0) (107.9) (107.9)
20.22 20.17 19.66 13.57
(100.0) (99.8) (97.23) (100.0)
13.52 13.05
(99.6) (96.2)
------------ Per cent --------------
2.29 2.44 2.52 2.81
3.04 3.15
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: New Hampshire.
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
I II
A B C A B C
-------------------Million dollars-------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)i(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6);(7) x 100c
.04 .04 .04 .03 .03
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
.02
(66.6)
.01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
.16 .16
(100.0) (100.0)
.13 .11 .11
(81.8) (100.0) (100.0)
.09
(81.8)
----------- Per cent-------------
3.19 3.58 8.86 4.18 4.71 12.63
---------- Million dollars-------------
.86 .86
(100.0) (100.0)
.85 .57 .57
(98.8) (100.0) (100.0)
.56
(98.2)
.07 .07 .07 .05 .05 .06
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (120.0)
2.43 2.43
(100.0) (100.0)
2.40 1.60 1.60
(98.8) (100.0) (100.0)
1.58
(98.8)
------- ---- Per cent---------------
2.69 2.72 2.99 3.19 3.23 3.65
aCoverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
CThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4. -Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: New Jersey.
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars-------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)-(3)x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7)x 100c
3.77 3.36 2.48 3.44
(100.0) (89.1) (65.8) (100.0)
3.06 2.21
(89.0) (64.2)
.88 1.16 1.79 .76 1.02 1.58
(100.0) (131.8) (203.4) (100.0) (134.2) (207.9)
10.71 9.19 5.86 9.82
(100.0) (85.8) (54.7) (100.0)
8.36 5.13
(85.1) (52.2)
-----------Per cent--------------
8.22 12.60 30.59 7.75 12.25 30.86
-----------Million dollars-----------
9.66 9.26 8.38 7.17
(100.0) (95.9) (86.7) (100.0)
6.79 5.93
(94.7) (82.7)
1.60 1.88 2.51 1.43 1.69 2.25
(100.0) (117.5) (156.9) (100.0) (118.2) (157.3)
27.25 25.72 22.39 20.22
(100.0) (94.4) (82.2) (100.0)
18.77 15.54
(92.8) (76.9)
------------Per cent -------------
5.87 7.30 11.21 7.06 9.01 14.49
aCoverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: New York.
Item Employment reduction and coveragea
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars----------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)-(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits b
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7) x 100c
4.21 3.74 2.58 22.93
(100.0) (88.8) (61.3) (100.0)
22.46 21.30
(98.0) (92.9)
.55 .68 1.60 .39 .48 1.20
(100.0) (123.6) (290.9) (100.0) (123.1) (307.7)
14.82 12.86 6.95 10.46
(100.0) (86.8) (46.9) (100.0)
8.95 4.58
(85.6) (43.8)
----------- Per cent --------------
3.69 5.28 23.09 3.72
5.39 26.12
---------- Million dollars ---------------
2.89 2.51 1.66 15.97
(100.0) (86.9) (57.4) (100.0)
15.59 14:74
(97.6) (92.3)
1.26 1.39 2.32 .95 1.05 1.76
(100.0) (110.3) (184.1) (100.0) (110.5) (185.3)
76.05 74.09 68.18 50.23
(100.0) (97.4) (89.7) (100.0)
48.71 44.34
(97.0) (88.3)
------------ Per cent-----------------
1.66 1.88 3.40
1.90 2.15 3.97
aCoverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A- none
B 50% reduction
C- 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Ohio.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars----------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits b
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)'(3)x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7)x100c
1.41 1.01 .78 1.04
(100.0) (71.6) (55.3) (100.0)
.74 .50
(71.2) (48.1)
.43 .51 .61 .26 .35 .41
(100.0) (118.6) (141.9) (100.0) (134.6) (157.7)
4.84 3.51 2.46 3.78
(100.0) (72.5) (50.8) (100.0)
2.74
(72.5)
1.71
(45.2)
------------ Per cent -----------
8.80 14.43 24.93 6.75 12.73 24.08
---------- Million dollars----------
10.73 10.33 10.11 7.32
(100.0) (96.3) (94.2) (100.0)
7.03 6.79
(96.0) (92.8)
1.50 1.58 1.69 .80 .89 .96
(100.0) (105.3) (112.7) (100.0) (111.3) (120.0)
36.90 35.57 34.52 26.37
(100.0) (93.7) (93.6) (100.0)
24.33 23.30
(92.3) (88.4)
----------- Per cent -----------
4.08 4.45 4.90 3.15 3.67 4.10
aCoverage: I 1 or
more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reudced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Pennsylvania.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars-----------
Migrants. only
(1) Potential
benefits b
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)(3) x 100c
All workers.
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)+(7)x100c
2.31 2.14 1.32 1.54
(100.0) (92.6) (57.1) (100.0)
1.36 .76
(88.3) (49.4)
.31 .42 .60 .23 .29 .40
(100.0) (135.5) (193.5) (100.0) (126.1) (173.9)
6.47 5.90 3.58 4.10
(100.0) (91.2) (55.3) (100.0)
3.66 1.99
(89.3) (48.5)
----------- Per cent---------------
4.80 7.16 16.65 5.41
8.01 20.12
---------- Million dollars ---------------
16.60 16.43 15.61 10.74
(100.0) (99.0) (94.0) (100.0)
10.56 9.97
(98.3) (92.8)
.87 .98 1.16 .65 .72 .83
(100.0) (112.6) (133.3) (100.0) (110.7) (127.7)
45.97 45.41 43.09 28.55
(100.0) (98.8) (93.7) (100.0)
28.02 26.35
(98.1) (92.3)
----------- Per cent --------------
1.89 2.16 2.68
2.29 2.57 3.14
a Coverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
8 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.- Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Rhode Island.
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
--------------- Million dollars ----------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)-(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7)x 100c
.018 .017 .014 .017 .016 .014
(100.0) (94.4) (77.8) (100.0) (94.1) (82.4)
.01 .005 .004 .01 .005 .004
(100.0) (50.0) (40.0) (100.0) (50.0) (40.0)
.05 .05 .04 .05 .05 .04
(100.0) (100.0) (80.0) (100.0) (100.0) (80.0)
----------- Per cent- -----------
10.55 10.77 9.75 10.69 10.92 9.75
---------- Million dollars -- ----------
.53 .53 .53
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
.09 .09 .09
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
1.33 1.33 1.32
(100.0) (100.0) (99.2)
----------------------Per
6.63 6.63 6.57
.41 .41 .41
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
.09 .09 .08
(100.0) (100.0) (88.8)
1.00 1.00 .99
(100.0) (100.0) (99.0)
cent -----------
8.63 8.64 8.58
aCoverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4. -Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: Vermont.
Item Employment reduction and coverages
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars--------------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits b
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits b
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7)x100c
.05 .05 .04 .03 .03 .03
(100.0) (100.0) (80.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
.005 .005 .01 .001 .001 .007
(100.0) (100.0) (200.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
.18 .18 .15 .12 .12 .11
(100.0) (100.0) (83.3) (100.0) (100.0) (91.7)
------------- --Per cent------------
2.63 2.63 7.23 .70 .70 6.60
---------- Million dollars----------
2.67 2.67 2.66 .95 .95 .95
(100.0) (100.0) (99.6) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
.07 .07 .07 .03 .03 .04
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (133.3)
9.85 9.85 9.82 3.27 3.27 3.26
(100.0) (100.0) (99.7) (100.0) (100.0) (99.7)
----------- Per cent--------------
0.66 0.66 0.73 1.04 1.04 1.24
aCoverage: I -1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
Appendix Table 4.-Reduced migratory employment and the added cost
of unemployment insurance benefits: West Virginia
Item Employment reduction and coverage
I II
A B C A B C
---------- Million dollars -- ----------
Migrants only
(1) Potential
benefits
(2) Actual
benefits
(3) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(4) (2)-(3) x 100c
All workers
(5) Potential
benefits
(6) Actual
benefits
(7) Taxable
agricultural
earnings
(8) (6)-(7) x 100
.10 .09 .05 .06 .05 .03
(100.0) (90.0) (50.0) (100.0) (83.3) (50.0)
.01 .01 02 .002 .004 .01
(100.0) (100.0) (200.0) (100.0) (200.0) (500.0)
.49 .43 .26 .28
(100.0) (87.8) (53.1) (100,0)
.23
(82.1)
.11
(39.3)
----------- Per cent -------------
2.51 3.21 6.22 0.58 1.68 7.84
---------- Million dollars -----------
1.81 1.80 1.76 1.05
(100.0) (99.4) (97.2) (100.0)
1.04
(99.0)
1.02
(97.1)
.10 .10 .11 .04 .04 .05
(100.0) (100.0) (110.0) (100.0) (100.0) (125.0)
6.82 6.77 6.60 4.08
(100.0) (99.3) (96.8) (100.0)
4.03 3.91
(98.8) (95.8)
------------ Per cent --------------
1.48 1.52 1.60 1.25
1.40 1.78
aCoverage: I 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of
$1500 or more.
II 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A- none
B 50% reduction
C 100% reduction
bTotal benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.
cThese may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding
of the latter two.
GLOSSARY
Actual Beneficiary-Any person who satisfied the monetary unemploy-
ment insurance benefit eligibility requirements and had weeks of
compensable unemployment.
Actual Benefits-The amount of benefits which an individual could
have withdrawn based on his earnings and employment and his
weeks of compensable unemployment had unemployment insurance
been in force during the survey year.
Benefit-Cost Ratio (Cost Rate)-The ratio of actual benefits to taxable
covered earnings multiplied by 100.
Benefit Exhaustee-Any person who had a sufficient number of weeks
of compensable unemployment to claim all of the benefits for which
he was eligible as a result of his employment history.
Compensable Unemployment-All non-work categories except in-
school, sick or injured, and paid vacation.
Covered Earnings Earnings of a worker or workers for an employer
who was covered by the unemployment insurance laws.
Home State The state in which the worker had the most weeks of
work.
Migrant Worker Any person who had known earnings in more than
one state during the 52 week period under consideration.
Potential Beneficiary Any person who satisfied the monetary unem-
ployment insurance benefit eligibility requirements.
Potential Benefits The amount of benefits which an individual could
withdraw from the fund based on his employment history if he had a
sufficient number of weeks of compensable unemployment in which
to claim the benefits.
Taxable Earnings Earnings of the worker upon which the employer
must pay a tax. This is the first $4200 of the worker's earnings for
each employer.
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Unvrit 1fFlrd
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