96th Congress COXXIITTEE PRINT 1st Session
SENATE DEBATE ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: A COMPENDIUM OF MAJOR STATEMENTS, DOCUMENTS, RECORD
VOTES AND RELEVANT EVENTS
PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
BY
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGREO-,--,
FEBRUARY 1979
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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96th Congress
1 st Session
COMMITTEE PRINT
SENATE DEBATE ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: A COMPENDIUM OF MAJOR STATEMENTS, DOCUMENTS, RECORD
VOTES AND RELEVANT EVENTS
]PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
BY
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
36-614
FEBRUARY 1979
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island JACOB K. JAVITS. New York GEORGE McGOVERN, South Dakota CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee JOHN GLENN, Ohio JESSE HELMS, North Carolina RICHARD STONE, Florida S. I. HAYAKAWA, California PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana EDMUND S. MUSKIE,2\Maine
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
W ,ILLIAMI B. BADER, Staff Director
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Washington, D.C., December 14, 1978.
Hon1. JOHN SPARMVAN,
Chairs. n, Com/inittee on Foreign Relations, 7 U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRM.NAN: In response to a request from your committee, the staff of the Congressional Research Service has prepared this volume., which I ami pleased to transmit, on the Senate debate on the Panama Canal Treaties. The purpose of this effort is to bring together information on the debate itself the progression of legislative actions that shaped the debates, and the political and diplomatic context i1D. which the debates occurred.
Included in this volume are an introductory essay on the form, siibstance and significance of the debate; a selection of major floor stfittmnents and colloquies on key themes in the debate; summaries of every amendment or reservation considered by the Senate along(- with thevotes on those items and on the resolutions of ratification themselves; and a chronology of events during the period of congressional consdration of the treaties. I hope that these materials will make the substance and context of the debates more accessible to those interested in this historic process.
This report was prepared by members on the Foreign Affairs and National DefenseIDivision. The contributors are indicated at the beginning of each section.
Sincerely,
GILBERT GUDE, Director.
PREFACE
In the early evening of April 18, 1978, the Senate took its filial vote on the controversial Panama Canal agreements and ended 38 days of continuous debate. It was the second longest treaty debate in the history of the Senate.
Following conclusion of the debate, I requested the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in mid-May to begin work on a compendium that would serve to highlight the breadth and scope of that historic event. This volume recaptures the spirit of the debate from beginning to end, and makes clear, I believe, that the debate itself was as inspirational as it was time consuming. But through it all-the tedium and the excitement, the solemnity and the laughter-the process worked and worked well. Americans everywhere, regardless of their views on the Panama issue, can be justifiably proud of this process and the democratic foundation upon which it rests. Indeed, the Panama Canal debate was nothing more or less than an expression of the vitality of our democratic procedures, as evidenced by the material contained in this volume.0
Part I provides information on the negotiations and hearings prior to the debate, on Senate procedures for consideration of treaties, and on the highlights and significance of the debate.
Part 1I contains a selection of representative statements by proponents and opponents on such key themes of the debate as the military importance of the Canal, the economic importance and treaty-related costs of the Canal, the constitutional issue of Congress' role in the disposal of U.S. property, and the issue of a future sea-level canal. This section also contains general statements on the treaties as well as statements on the historical setting.
Part III contains a complete listing of all proposed modifications to the treaties and resolutions of ratification that were considered by the Senate, generally in the order in which they were considered. The format for the listing is described in more detail at the outset of that section.
Part IV provides a chronology of events related to congressional consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties from August 1977, the period of agreement in principle on the new treaties, to June 1978, the period when President Carter and General Torrijos exchanged the instruments of ratifications for the new treaties. Drawn from press commentary and congressional sources, this chronology summarizes major developments in Congress but also reflects the political and diplomatic context in which these events were taking place.
Part V of this collection provides the text of the Protocol of Ex-. change and related instruments of ratification for the Panama Canal Treaties, which were exchanged on June 16,1978.
(V)
VI
I want to thank the Library of Congress and the Congressional Reseacrch Service for the time and effort devoted to this project. In this regard a special word of thanks is owed to Larry Storrs and Barry Sklar, analysts in Latin American affairs. I also want to thank Robert 1-. Dockery of the Committee staff for overseeing the project and bringing it to a final conclusion: JOHN SPARKMAN, Chairman.
CONTENTS
page
Letter of transmittal ---------------------------------------------- III
Preface ---------------------------------------------------------- V
I. INTRODUCTION:
A. The Senate's Role and Procedures in Treaty Ratification 3 B. Background to the Deae---------------4
C. The Significance and Highlights of the Debate--------10
11. REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE MAJOR THEMES
OF THE DEBATE:
A. General-Pro:
(1) Senator John Sparkman, ]February 8, 19 78-------17 (2) Senator Frank Church, February 10, 17------23 (3) Senator Ernest Hollings, February 23, 1978------31 (4) Senator Paul Sarbanes, March 171111111111142 (5) Senator Robert Morgan, April 17, 1978--------47
General-Con:
(1) Senator Robert Griffin, February 8, 198------64 (2) Senator Robert Dole, February 8, 1978--------75 (3) Senator Harry Byrd, March 6,17884 (4) Senator James Allen, March 16,17896 (5) Senator Paul Laxalt, April 18, 1978-------- 109
B. History and Back groun d-Pro- Con Colloquy:
(1) Senator Robert Byrd with Senators Laxalt, Hatch, Helms, Sarbanes, Case, Allen, and Church, February 9, 17------------- 112
History and Background-Pro:
(1) Senator Mike Gravel (and remarks by Senator Frank
Church), February 9, 1978--------- 131 History and Background-Con:
(1) Senator Jesse Helms, February 9, 1978--------140
C. Defense-Pro:
(1) Senators George McGovern and Frank Church (with remarks by Senators Gan and Curtis), February 24, 1978---------------------------153
(2) Senator Robert Byrd, February 27, 1978--------166 (3) Senator Sam Nunn, March 14,178169
Defense-Con:
(1) Senator Jesse Helms, February 8, 1978--------177 (2) Senator Orrin Hatch, February 23, 1978------- 189 (3) Senator John Stennis, 'March 8, 19 78 197 (VII)
VIII
D. Economic-Pro: Tage
(1) Senator Edmund Muskie, February 28, 1978-------- 206
(2) Senator Mike Gravel, (in dialog with Senator Paul
Laxalt), March 1, 1978 ------------------------ 218
(3) Senator Robert Byrd (in dialog with Senators Allen,
Muskie, and Sarbanes), March 1, 1978----------- 223
Economic-Con:
(1) Senator Edward Brooke, February 22, 1978--------- 231 (2) Senator John Stennis, February 23, 1978 -------- 236 (3) Senator John Tower, March 8, 17--------249
E. Constitutional-Pro:
(1) Senator Jacob Javits, March 2, 1978-------------- 252
(2) Senator Frank Church, April 5, 1978 ------------- 263
Constitutional-Con:
(1) Senator Barry Goldwater, February 23, 1978..__.____ 277 (2) Senator Orrin Hatch, April 4, 1978---------------- 283
F. Sea-Level Canal-Pro-Con Colloquy:
(1) Senators Gravel, Laxalt, Church, Curtis, Sarbanes, Javits, Goldwater, Magnuson, Leahy, and McClure, March 1, 198-----------292
(2) Senators Gravel, Leahy, and Dole, April 10, 1978-- 329
III. SUMMARY, TEXT AND VOTE FOR ALL PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS OF RATIFICATION CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE:
Introductory note----------------------------------------------- 347
A. THE NEUTRALITY TREATY
Article I------------------------------------------------ 348
Proposed Amendments to Article I:
Amendment No. 40, as M~vodified (Allen, Laxalt), February 24, 1978Tabled 55-34-- - - - - - - - - - - - 34
Unprinted Amendment No. 1 (Hatch), February 27, 1978-Tabled 34
58-26---------------------------------------------------- 349
Amendment No. 22 (Scott), February 27, 1978-Rejected 6-24------ 350 Amendment No. 45 (Allen, et al.), February 28, 1978-Tabled 57-38-- 351
Unprinted Amendment No. 2 (Allen, et al.), March 1, 1978-Tabled
60-34 ----------------------------------------------------- 352
Amendment No. 51 (Allen, et al.), March 2, 1978-Tabled 59-36 -- 354
Unprinted Amendment No. 3 (Hatch), March 2, 1978-Rejected
67-22---------------------------------------------------- 355
Amendment No. 47 (Allen, et al.), March 2, 1978-Rejected 63-15- 356 Amendment No. 61 (Allen, et al.), March 3, 1978-Tabled 52-40----...357
Amendment No. 52 (Allen, et al.), March 6, 1978- Withdrawn------ 358
Unprinted Amendment No. 10 (Stevens, et al.), March 14, 1978Tabled ------------------------------------------------- 359
Article II---------------------------------------------- 360
Proposed Amendment to Article II:
Unprinted Amendment No. 4 (Helms), March 7, 1978-Tabled 58-36- 360
Article III ----------------------------------------------- 362
Proposed Amendments to Article III:
Amendment No. 64 (Stevens), March 7, 1978-Tabled 59-34-------- 363
Unprinted Amendment No. 5 (Allen), March 8, 1978-Tabled 58-31--. 364
Article IV ----------------------------------------------- 365
Ix
Proposed Amendments to Article IV:
Amendment No. 20 (Byrd, Baker and 75 cosponsors), March 9, 1978- Page
Adopted 84-5--------------------------------------------- 365'
Proposed Amendments to Byrd-Baker Amendment No. 20:
Amendment No. 59 (Dole) to Byrd-Baker Amendment No,
20, March 9, 1978-Tabled 45-37--------------------- 366
Amendment No. 27 (Helms, et al.) to Byrd-Baker Amendment No. 20, March 10, 1978-Tabled 57-27------------ 367
Unprinted Amendment No. 6 (Allen) to Byrd-Baker Amendment No. 20, March 10, 1978-Tabled 53-33------------ 369
ArticleV-------------------------370
Proposed Amendments to Article V:
Amendment No. 12, as Modified (Dole, et al.), March 10, 1978Tabled 50-34 ---------------------------------------------- 370
Amendment No. 58 (Dole, et al.) March 10, 1978-Tabled 45-37--- 371 Amendment No. 77 (Allen, et al.) March 13, 1978-Tabled 53-41 - 372
Article VI ----------------------------------------------- 374
Proposed Amendments to Article VI:
Amendment No. 21 (Byrd, Baker, and 75 cosponsors), March 10,
1978-Adopted 85-3 ---------------------------------------- 374
Proposed Amendments to Byrd-Baker Amendment No. 21:
Unprinted Amendment No. 8 (Allen) to Byrd-Baker Amendment No. 21, March 13, 1978-Tabled 53-34___________--375
Amendment No. 60 (Dole) to Byrd-Baker Amendment No.
21, March 13, 1978-Tabled 5-7---------376
Unprinted Amendment No. 9 (Helms), March 13, 1978-Tabled
58-28 ---------------------------------------------------- 377
Article VII ---------------------------------------------- 379
Article VIII --------------------------------------------- 380
Amendments Considered by the Senate Following Article-by-Article
Disposition in the Committee of the Whole:
Amendment No. 73, as Modified (Thurmond, et al.), March 14, 1978Tabled 58-38-------------------------------------------- 380
Amendment No. 78 (Schmitt), March 14, 1978-Tabled 65-30__-__ 382
B3. RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION FOR THE NEUTRALITY TREATY
Resolution of Ratification as Reported from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee---------------------------------------- 398
Proposed Reservations, Understandings and Conditions to the Resolution
of Ratification:
Condition No. 8, as Modified (Nunn, et al.) March 14, 1978Adopted 82-16 --------------------------------------------- 398
Reservation No. 7, as Modified (Randolph, et al.), March 15, 1978Adopted 96-1 ---------------------------------------------- 399
Understanding No. 14, as Modified (Long, et al.), March 15, 1978Adopted------------------------------------------------ 401
Reservation No. 4 (Bartlett), March 16, 1978-Tabled 60-37_____ 402
Condition No. 83, as Modified (DeConcini, et al.), March 16, 1978Adopted 75-23 --------------------------------------------- 403
Proposed Amendment to DeConcini Condition No. 83:
Unprinted Amendment No. 12 (Allen) to DeConcini Condition No. 83, March 16, 1978-Tabled 62-36--------405
Reservation No. 6 (Heinz, et al.), March 16, 1978-Adopted---------406
Understanding No. 9 (Church), March 16, 1978-Adopted-------- 407 Understanding No. 11 (Hayakawa, et al.), March 16, 1978-Adopted- 407 Understanding No. 13 (Chafee, et al.), March 16, 1978-Adopted.-- 407 Understanding No. 3, as Modified (Brooke), March 16, 1978-Adopted- 408
Amendment No. 71, as Modified (Griffin, et al.), March 16, 1978Tabled 67-33 ---------------------------------------------- 408
x
Page
The Resolution of Ratification, as Amended -------------------------- 410
Vote on the Resolution of Ratification, March 16, 1978-Adopted
68-32------------------------------------------------------ 413
C. THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY
Article IJ----------------------------------------------------415
Proposed Amendments to Article I:
Amendment No. 69 (Dole), March 20, 1978-Rejected 45-39--- 416
Unprinted Amendment No. 13 (Wallop), March 20, 1978-Tabled
50-37------------------------------------------------------ 417
Amendment No. 86 (Allen), March 21, 1978-Tabled 56-35, 52-42 418 Amendment No. 89 (Bartlett), March 22, 1978-Rejected 7-15------ 420
Unprinted Amendment No. 14 (Hatch), March 22, 1978-Rejected
62-26 ------------------------ --------------------------------421
Amendment No. 91 (Allen, et al.), March 23, 1978-Tabled 56-36-- 422 Amendment No. 92 (Hatch, et al.), March 23, 1978-Tabled 58-37- 423 Unprinted Amendment No. 17 (Helms), April 6, 1978-Tabled 54-33- 424
Article II-------------------------------------------------- 426
Proposed Amendments to Article II:
Amendment No. 97 (Schmitt, et al.), April 13, 1978-Tabled 55-34- 426 Amendment No. 101 (Allen, et al.), April 13, 1978-Tabled 59-29-- 427
Article III------------------------------------------------ 429
Proposed Amendments to Article III:
Unprinted Amendment No. 18 (Allen), April 6, 1978-Tabled 53-25 432 Amendment No. 38 (Hatch), April 7, 1978-Tabled 54-29---------- 433
Amendment No. 23 (Cannon), April 11, 1978-Tabled 52-42-------- 434
Article IV------------------------------------------------- 436
Proposed Amendments to Article IV:
Amendment No. 100 (Helms), April 11, 1978-Tabled 64-28--------- 437
Unprinted Amendment No. 20 (Helms), April 11, 1978-Tabled 66-28- 438 Unprinted Amendment No. 21 (Helms), April 11, 1978-Tabled 59-32.. 439
Article V-------------------------441
Proposed Amendments to Article V:
Unprinted Amendment No. 22 (Hatch), April 11, 1978-Tabled 62-29- 441 Amendment No. 102 (Helms), April 11, 1978-Tabled 54-40 -------- 442
Article VI-------------------------------------------------- 446
Article VII ----------------------------------------------- 447
Article VIII------------------------------------------------ 448
Article IX------------------------------------------------- 449
Article X-------------------------------------------------- 451
Proposed Amendment to Article X:
Amendment No. 82 (Hatch), April 12, 1978-Tabled 55-33---------- 453
Article XI------------------------------------------------- 455
Proposed Amendment to Article XI:
Unprinted Amendment No. 25 (Dole), April 13, 1978-Rejeeted -- 456
Article XII ----------------------------------------------- 458
Proposed Amendment to Article XII:
Amendment No. 10 (Dole, et al.), April 10, 1978-Tabled 49-40---- 458
Article XIII ---------------------------------------------- 460
xi
Proposed Amendments to Article XIII: Pg
Amendment No. 41 (Bartlett, Hansen), April 7, 1978-Tabled 40-33- 461
Unprinted Amendment No. 24 (Thurmond, et al.), April 12, 1978Tabled 5-9-------------------------462
Article XIV ----------------------------------------------. 464
Proposed Amendment to Article XIV:
Amendment No. 90 (Stevens, et al.), April 12, 1978-Tabled 53-40--. 464
D. RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION FOR THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY
Resolution of Ratification as Reported from the Senate Foreign
Relations Cmite---------------------467
Proposed Reservations, Understandings and Conditions to the Resolution
of Ratification:
Reservation No. 99 (Long, et al.), April 17, 1978-Adopted 65-27-- 467
Reservation No. 14 (Hollings, Heinz, Bellmon), April 17, 1978Adopted 90-2----------------------------------------------- 468
Unprinted Understanding No. 26 (Brooke, Byrd of Va.), April 17,
1978Adoted------------------------------------469
Unprinted Understanding No. 27 (Brooke, Byrd of Va.), April 17,
1978-Adopted 84-3---------------------------- 470
Unprinted Reservation No. 28 (Brooke, et al.), April 17, 1978Adopted 84-3----------------------------------------------- 471
Unprinted Reservation No. 29 (McClure), April 17, 1978-Tabled
56-31 --------------------------------------------------------472
Reservation No. 18 (Helms), April 17, 1978-Tabled 56-39---------- 473
Understanding No. 12 (Danforth), April 17, 1978-Adopted--------- 475
Reservation No. 19 (Curtis, Hatch), April 17, 1978-Rejected 65-33- 475
Unprinted Understanding No. 31 (DeConcini), April 17, 1978Adopted ------------------------------------------------------477
Reservation No. 20 (DeConcini), April 17, 1978-Adopted 92-6------- 477
Understanding No. 7 (Sarbanes for Sparkman), April 17, 1978Adopted --------------------------------------------------- 479
Understanding No. 10 (Sarbanes for Sparkman), April 17, 1978Adopted-------------------------------------------------- 479
Unprinted Reservation No. 33 (Dole), April 18, 1978-Tabled 56-42 -- 479
Unprinted Reservation No. 34 (Dole for Thurmond), April 18, 1978Tabled 5-0----------------------- 481
Understanding No. 16 (Thurmond), April 18, 1978-Tabled 56-42-- 482 Reservation No. 15 (Stone, et al.), April 18, 1978-Withdrawn-------- 483
Reservation No. 3 (Bartlett), April 18, 1978-Tabled 63-35---------- 483
Unprinted Reservation No. 36 (Byrd, Baker, DeConcini, et al.) April
18, 1978-Adopted 73-27-------------------------------------- 484
Proposed Amendments to Byrd-Baker-DeConcini Unprinted
Reservation No. 36:
Amendment No. 104 (Allen, et al.) to Byrd-Baker-DeConcini
Unprinted Reservation No. 36, April 18, 1978-Tabled
60-8-----------------------------------48G
Amendment No. 105 (Allen, et al.) to Byrd-Baker-DeConini
Unprinted Reservation No. 36, April 18, 1978-Tabled
59-41 ------------------------------------------------487
Unprinted Amendment No. 37 (Cannon) to Byrd-BakerDeConcini Unprinted Reservation No. 36, April 18, 1978Tabled 5-1---------------------488
Amendment No. 103, as Modified (Griffin, Wallop), April 18, 1978Tabled 6-6-------------------------489
Unprinted Reservation No. 39 (Cannon, et al.), April 18, 1978Adopted 90-10----------------------------------------------- 496
The Resolution of Ratification, as Amended--------------------------- 493
Vote on the Resolution of Ratification, April 18, 1978-Adopted 68-32- 495
X1I
IV. A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES,
AUGUST 1977-JUNE 1978: Page
August 17----------------------499
September 17---------------------502
October 17----------------------506
November 17---------------------512
December 17---------------------515
January 17-------------------- 516
February 17---------------------521
March 17----------------------525
April 17-----------------------533
May 17-----------------------540
June 17-----------------------541
V. PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOR THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, AND THE RELATED INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, JUNE 16, 1978:
A. Protocol of Exchange of Instruments of Ratification--------- 545 B. U.S. Instrument-Panama Canal Tet-------- 546
C. Panamanian Instrument-Panama Canal Treaty----------- 549
D. U. S. Instrument-Neutrality Treaty------------552
E. Panamanian Instrument-Neutrality Treaty--------556
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION rage
A. The Senate's Role and Procedures in Treaty Ratification---- 3 B. Background to the Deae----------------4
C. The Significance and Highlights of the Debate---------------- 10
(1)
I* INTRODUCTION'
AV. THE SENATE'S ROLE AND PROCEDURES IN TREATY RATIFICATION 2
The'Senate's role in the formulation and approval of treaties stems directly from Article IT, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, which pro'jdes that the President shalll have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." This section of the Constitution grants to the President the power to make treaties, but it requires that the Senate approve such treaties by a two-thirds vote.
In U.S. practice., a number of steps are involved in the making of treaties. These generally include iie gotiat ioni, signing, approval by the, Senate, ratification by the President, exchange. of ratifications by the parties, and proclamation, after which the treaty becomes legally binding. The 'Senate is formally involved in this process only at the "advice and consent" to ratification stage; thle President i epni ble for all other stages, including ratification. Contrary to popular imnpressionr, the Senate does not ratify treaties. The President ratbfies, treaties after receivinio the Senate's advice and consent. However, siiuce the Senate must give its approval by a two-thiirds vote, it exercises considerable influence in the conclusion of treaties.
In the process of exercising its advice, and consent powers the Senate has a number of options. Although the available options vary greatly, the mnain options lin rising Order of severity are as follows:
(1) The Senate -may give approval to a treaty by adopting, a clean resolution of ratification without ally conditions; (2) the Senate may advise and consent to ratification while making its views known in a committee report; (3) the Senate may inltilde in the resolution of ratification various "understandings" or "ute rpretations" with thle implication that -the cotr-actual relationship of tile treaty is being' clarified, not changed; (4) the 'Senate miay add "reservations" to the resolution of ratification with the purpose of modifying- or limlitiio thie, substantive effet of the treaty on the United States; (5) thle Senate may "amend" various provisions of tile treaty, making substantive change s that require the agreement of the other party if thle treaty is to be legally binding; (6) the Senate may fail to take actionon a treaty, thereby 'blocking ratification; and (7) the Senate may reject a treaty outright.
Since the beginning of World War IT the Senate, has rarely amended treaties and only occasionally has it insisted on reservations to treaties. The more customary practice has been to approve the treaty uinconditionally or to approve tile treaty subject to certain understandiiigws or interpretations.
1 Prepared by K. Larry Storrs, Analyst In Latin American Affairs.
2 This section relies heavily on U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 'The Role of the Senate in Treaty Ratification : A Staff Memorandum to the Committee on Foreign Relations." 95th Congress, 1st session, November 1977. Washington, U.S. Governmnent Printing Office, 1977.
(3)
4
After a treaty has been signed, the President transmits a copy of the treaty to the Senate along with) his message and a report by the Secret ry of State which explains the provisions and justifications for the treaty. Upon receipt by the Senate, the English text of the treaty, together with the accompanying papers, is ordered to be printed in a Senate document and the matter is referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
After conducting hearings, the Committee on F oreign Relations submits a written report on the treaty to the Senate which is printed in a numbered executive report. When treaties are reported from the Committee, they are placed on an executive calendar, which differs f rom the legislative calendar, and they are taken up in order when the Senate goes into executive session.
While Senate Rule 37 requires the Senate acting "as in the Committee of the Whole" to first consider amendments to a treaty article by article, and then to report to the Senate for further consideration, after which the resolution of ratification and any reservations are to be considered, the common practice since the 1940's has been to adopt by unanimous consent a procedure whereby treaties are considered to have passed through the various parlimentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification. When the Panama Canal treaties were considered, however, unanimous consent was not granted, so the treaties were consi dered article by article in the Committee of the Whole procedure, after which reservations to the resolution of ratification were considered.
Whether in the Committee of the Whole or in the Senate, a simple majority vote is required for adoption of an amendment to the treaty or adoption of a reservation to the resolution of ratification. Only the final vote to agree to the resolution of ratification as amended, or a motion to postpone indefinitely, requires a two-thirds vote of those present.
These in brief are the Senate's procedures for consideration of treaties. Since the debate on the Panama Canal treaties was conducted in conformity with these rules, rather than the more customary simplified procedures, they are important to an understanding of that debate.
B. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
When the Carter Administration took office., negotiations to modernize the United States-Panama relationship-based on the 1903, 1936 and 1955 treaties-had taken place intermittently for more than a decade under the three previous Presidents. During this period, the United States had pledged twice, in December 1964 and again in February 1974, to conclude an entirely new treaty with Panama with a fixed expiration date which would end the "in perpetuity" concept of the 1903 Treaty. Negotiations had not been concluded, however, in part because of perceived congressional and public opposition in the United States.
In early 1977, President Carter determined to pursue negotiations vigorously and Sol Linowitz was designated, along -with Ellsworth Bunker, to negotiate the new pacts. After inconclusive talks in February and a breakthrough in May, based on Panama'ls-willingness to accept a U.S. defense role after the termination of a new treaty and
5
United States Willingness to set the year 2000 as the date for terminationl of the new treaty, substantial agreement was reported in June. When the financial arrangements were settled in July, agreement "in principle" on two new treaties was announced in Panama on August 10, 1977. After drafting, the completed treaties were initialled on September 6, 1977, and were signed by President Carter and General Torrijos on September 7, 1977, in a Washington ceremony attended by representatives of over 26 Western Hemisphere countries.
President Carter transmitted the treaties to the Senate on September 16, 1977, with the request that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification. Accompanying the President's message was a letter of submittal from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance which summarized the basic provisions of the two treaties as follows:
Under the new Panama Canal Treaty, the United States will operate the Canal and have primary responsibility for its defense until December 31, 1999. The Treaty grants the United States all of the rights necessary for the operation, maintenance and defense of the Canal, including the use of specific land and water areas necessary for these purposes. United States operations and miaintenance of the Canal will be carried ot by the Panama Canal Commission, a new United States Government agency that will replace the present Panama Canal Company and Canal Zone Government.
Panama will participate increasingly in the operation and defense of the Canal during the duration of the Treaty, and will assume responsibility for the Canal npon expiration of the Treaty.
In addition, the Panama Canal Treaty establishes basic employment policies for the Panama Canal Commission, provides for payments to the Republic of Panama out of Canal operating revenues, provides for protection of the environment and commits the two countries to study the feasibility of constructing a sea-level canal in Panama and to deal with each other regarding construction of a new interoceanic canal.
The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal will enter into force simultaneously with the Panama Canal Treaty. This Treaty establishes a regime of permanent neutrality of the Canal to ensure that the Canal, both in time of peace and time of war, "shall remain secure and open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality."
The United States and Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality established in the Treaty notwithstanding the termination of anly other treaties between the two countries. The Treaty does not limit in any way the measures the United States might take to ensure the maintenance of the neutrality regime. In recognition of the important contributions of the United States and Panama to the Canal, their vessels of war and auxiliary vessels shall be entitled to transit the Canal expeditiously.3
The President concluded his message with the following appeal:
I believe that these Treaties are fair to both countries, consistent with our heritage, and right for our times. They protect United States interests in the Panama Canal for the future better than the 1903 Convention which they will replace. Undue delay in ratification could cause serious problems for our foreign relations and jeopardize our long-term interests in the Canal and in the Hemisphere. Accordingly, I urge the Senate to give these Treaties early and favorable consideration.'
After a first reading in the Senate, the treaties-designated Executive N, 95th Congress, 1st Session-were referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration.
3 U.S. Congress. Senate. Panama Canal Treaties-Message from the President Transmitting the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. Executive N, 95th Congress, 1st session, September 16, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 p. vi.
4 Ibid., p. ini.
36-614-79-2
6
During 1977, various congressional committees held hearings on important aspects of the Panama Canal treaties. On the House side, the International Relations Committee held hearings from September 8 to October 20 ; 5 the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee held hearings in July 6 and late November, 7 while the full Committee held a. hearing on August 17, 1977; 81 and the Armed Services Committee held hearings on October 20.9 On the Senate side, the Foreign Relations Committee, to which the two treaties were referred, conducted extensive hearings from September 26 to October 19,10 and the Subcommittee on Separaion of Powers of the Judiciary Committee held hearings in July, September, October and November 1 on the constitutional questions relating to disposal of U.S. property.
Administration witnesses and treaty supporters argued during the hearings that the new treaties would adequately protect U.S. economic and military interests since the United States would continue to opeiate and defend the Canal until the year 2000, and thereafter would have the permanent right to maintain the neutrality of the Canal. They stressed that use of the Canal, not its ownership or control, was the prune interest of the United States and that it was best assured by a new treaty arrangement With Pan ama. Opponents of the treaties, stressing the military and commercial importance of the Canal, argued that continued U.S. sovereign ty or control over the area was essetial to safeguard American interests, particularly when dealing With the Torrijos Government which was characterized as a left-leaning, proCastro dictatorship with a poor human rights record.
With approval of the treaties in doubt, the focus of concern and attention seem(ed to shift from subject to subjet as the hearings progressed.
IDuring the summer and early fall. hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Separation of Powers Subcommittee and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee focused on the constitutional question of Congress' role in the disposal of property. Many members of Congress, treaty opponents and constitutional scholars, relying on A \rticle IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution ("The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulat ions respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
-)S Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Proposed Panama Canal rreties Hearings, 95th Con-ress. ist Session, September 8, i4, 15, 20, 26, 28 and October ii and 20,1i977. Washington, 'U.S. Government Printing Office, i977.
6T1.5 Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Subcommittee It the Panama Canal. U.S. Interest in Panama Canal. Hearings 95th Congress. is.t Session, JntiY 25, 26, 27, i977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1977. Serial No. 95-i0.
-.Panama9 Canal Treaty Ramifications. Part i and Part 2. Hearings. 95th Cong-ress, 1st Session, November 30, December i, i977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, i978. Serial No.95-20.
81 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. New Pqn-ma Canal Treaity. Hearings .95th Congress. ist Session, August i7, i977. Washington, U.S. Governmnent Printing Office, i977. Serial No. 495-i3.
9UI.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Panama Canal Treaties. Ilearings, 95th Cong-ress. Ist Session, October 20, i977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, i977. H.-.A.S.C. No. 95-34
10 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal Treaties. Hearins-5h oges. st Session. Washington. U.S. Government Printing office. i'977. Part i-Administration Witnesses, September 26, 27, 29 and 80 and October i9, 1977: Part 2Cangressional Witnesses, October 4 and 5, i977 ; Part 3-Public Witnesses, October 10, ii, 13 and 14, 1977.
11 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. Panama Canal Treaty (Disposition of the United States Terr itory). Part 1, July 22. 1077; Part 2, July 29, 1977: Part 3. September-S. October 131 an(] 28. November 3 and 171. 1977,. Hearings, 95th Congress 1st Session. Washington, U.. Governmnt Printing Office, 1977.
7
States") argued that the President could not transfer the Canal Zone to Panama by treaty alone. They maintained that separate legisation to dispose of U.S. property would also have to be approved by both houses of Congress. In response, Administration spokesmen, notably Attorney General Bell and State Department Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell], argued that Congress' power to dispose of property was not exclusive under the Constitution, and that the Executive could also undertake such a transfer by treaty with the approval of twothiirds of the Senate. Despite the rejoinder, it was evident that the issue would persist when over fifty members of the I-ouse of Representatives joined in a court suit to require a role for their chamber in the disposal of the Canal Zone, and several senators indicated their intention to propose a reservation to the treaties requiring action by both houses before the treaties could go into effect.
In Spebr after the sign ing of the treaties, the political and militarv issues became the main focus of attention when thie Touse Interna0tional Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relationis Coinmniftee~ conducted hearings. Senator ]Dole proposed a series of treaty aMendments at this time whichi addressed the main areas of concern. IHis amendments would have (1) allowed the United States to negotiate with any country for the right to build a sea-level canal, (2) reduced by about one-half the economic payments to Panama, (3) retained t.5. criminal jurisdiction in the territory until 1990, (4) permitted the United States to intervene m-ilitarily to maintain the neutrality of the Canal, (5) and provided TI.S, warships wNith "privilegred passage" through the Canal during time of war. His resrvations would have required that Panama make significant luiman rights improvements and that the transfer of property be contingent on enetinent of leislation by both houses of Congress.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its hiearing)s oni September 26. against the backdronD of the Dole amendments, and attention quickly turned to apparent conflicts in interpretation of the( Neuitrality Treaty by the American and Panamanian negotiators. These conflits related to U.S. rights to take whatever action was necessary to defend the Canal and to head-of-the-line passage in emiergrencies.
Whien the conflicts persisted and Senate approval seemed doubtful, the Carter Administration initiated discussions with Poanma to clarify tb-, disputed provisions, leading to the October 14, 1977 Statement of U nderstanding between President 'Carter and General Torrijos:
Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (the Neutrality Treaty), Panama and the United States have thie responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure to ships of all nations. The correct interpretation of this principle is that eachl of the twvo countries shall, in accordance with their respetive constitutional processes, defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Cnl.
This does not mean, nor shall it he interpreted as a right of intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any U~nited States ation will be directed at insuring that the Canal will remain open, secure and accessible, aid it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or political indepIendence of Panama.
Tha \eTtrality Treaty provides that the vessels of war and auxiliary vesses of the Unlited States and Panama will be entitled to transit the Canal expeditiously. This is intended, and it shall so be interpreted, to assure the transit of
8
such vessels through the Canal as quickly as possible, without any impedimentt. with expedited treatment, and in case of need or emergency, to go to the head of the line of vessels, in order to transit the Canal rapidly."
The Statement of Understanding was viewed as improving the chances for Senate approval, but several Senators, including members of the Foreign Relations Committee, indicated that it might be necessary to add the text of the document as an understanding to the treaties to accommodate continuing concern with political and military matters. Meanwhile, a full explanation of the Statement was made in Panamia before voters approved the pacts by a two-to-one margin in the plebiscite of October 23, 1977.
Congress adjourned without taking action on the treaties; however, a steady stream of congressional visits to Panama took place toward the end of the year. Among these, three visits seemed to be especially important.
Majority Leader Robert Byrd led a delegation of seven senators to Panama November 9-12, 1977. 13 Along with other matters, Senator Byrd particularly raised human rights concerns with General Torrijos. At the end of the visit, Torrijos promised to repeal various repressive laws and to improve human rights conditions. He also assured the visiting senators that he fully supported the October 14 Statement of Understanding.
Early in 1978, Minority Leader Howard Baker led a three-man delegation to Pama.'4 During talks with General Torrijos, he explored the possibility of adding the lanaguage of the Statement of Understanding to the treaties as an amendment or reservation, a modification which Senator Baker felt was necessary to assure Senate approval. Torrijos reiterated his support for the Statement and indicated a willingness to consider some treaty modifications.
Later, in mid-January, just before the beginning of the new session of Congress, seven members of the Foreig Relations Committee, led by Chairman John Sparkman, visited Panama and the Canal Zone to study conditions and to discuss possible treaty modifications with U.S. and Panamanian officials, including incorporation of the Statement of Understanding in the treaty.
While most of the congressional visits f ocused on political matters. with the coming of the new year the center of treaty concern seemed to shift to the financial questions concerning the costs of the treaties which would be borne by the United States. These questions. previously addressed by the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee in hearings on November 30 and December 1, 1.977, were particularly highlighted in hearings in late January 1.978 -which were conducted by the Senate Committee on Armed Services.'5
12 weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 13, October 17 1977. p. 1547. 13 U.S. Congress. Senate. Report of the Senatorial Delegation to the Republic of Panama r Senators Byrd. ITuddleston, Matsunaga, Metzenbaum. iegle, Sarbanes and Sasser], November 9-12, 1977, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 95-79, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.
14 U.S. Congress. Senate. Report of Delegation Studying the Panama Canal Treaties and Other Matters of Interest to the United States in Latin America [Senators Baker. Gain and Chafeel, January 3-14. 1978. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 95-S. Wasing-ton. U.S. Government Printing Office, 197. 15 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Defense, Maintenance and Oneration of the, Panama Canal. Including Administration and Government of the Canal Zone. Hearings. 97;th Congress. 2nd Session, January 24, 31. and February 1, 1978. wasbingtoin. UTS. Government Printing Office, 1978. The Committee's report, 95th Congress, 2nd Session. Senate Report No. 95-633, with a title identical to that of the hearings, provided an excellent summary of the various concerns.
9
Among the questions raised during the hearings were the extent to which appropriated funds would be used for base relocations and Canal employee benefits, the possible loss of interest payments to the Treasury on U.S. investment in the Canal, the extent to which Canal revenues would be sufficient over the long run to make treaty-mandated payments to Panama, the extent to which allowance would be made in the toll base to provide income to cover the contingency payments to Panama, the extent of final obligation to pay any accumulated contignypayments in the year 2000, the value of the properties to be transferred to Panama under the treaties, and the actual cost to Panama for providing public services in the Canal Zone area. In contrast to earlier arguments by Administration spokesmen, several of the witnesses in these hearings testified that the financial costs, above and beyond the toll revenues, would be quite substantial, raising new questions about the treaties on the eve of the Senate debate.
Be-Fore reporting the treaties to the Senate, the Committee of Foreign Relations held a final series of hearings in late January which featured historians, legal scholars, transportation exports, businessmen, and congressional and public witnesses.'63 While this testimony covered an array of topics, much of the attention was focused on legal and financial questions.
At the end of these hearings, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd appeared before the Committee to discuss his position and to recommend at procedure for consideration of the treaties. 17 After summarizing his trip to Panama, he indicated that he would actively support the treaties provided that certain conditions were met, namely, that the Neutrality Treaty be amended to incorporate the text of the 'Carter-Torrijos Statement of Understanding to clarify U.S. rights to defend the Canal and to head-of -the-line passage through the Canal in times of emergency. On the one hand, Senator Byrd felt that the change would be necessary to win Senate support for the treaties, and, on the other band, hie felt that the change would be acceptable to Panama since the Statement of Understanding had been explained in Panama prior to the plebiscite. Moreover, Panamanian officials had indicated to Senator Byrd, to Senator Baker, and to members of the Foreign Relations Committee that they would have no objections to the incorporation of the Statement of Understanding into the treaties so long as it w as done in a manner that would not require a new plebiscite.
After the Committee completed hearings, the customary procedure ,would have been for the Committee to report the resolutions of ratification with the amendments and reservations adopted by the Committee. For political reasons, Senator Byrd, in consultation -with Senator Baker. suggested that the Foreign Relations Committee recommend certain changes to the Senate in the Committee's report, while reporting the resolutions of ratification without amendments. This procedure was proposed to allow a large number of senators who were not members of the Foreign Relations Committee to cospon16 ITS. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal Treaties. Part 4-Congressional and Public Witnesses. Hearings. 95th Congress 2nd Session, January19 20. 9nd 25. 1978. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1978. 17 U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal Treaties, Part 5-Mlarkup. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, January 26, 27, and 30, 1978. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.
10
sor amendments and reservations to the treaties, particularly the incorporation of the October Statement of Understanding, and to share credit for the amendments.
Once the Committee agreed with Senator Byrd's suggestion to merely recommend treaty changes to the Senate, it proceeded on January 27, 1978, to consider the various amendments, principally the amendments proposed by Senator Church to add the Statement of Understanding to the Neutrality Treaty in a f ormial way.',,
Acting on advice from the State Department, the Committee at first voted 13-1 to add a new Article IX to the Neutrality Treaty which would contain the text of the Carter-Torrijos Statement. Later, after being informed that Panamanian officials feared that the addition of a new article might require a niew plebiscite in Panama, the Committee reconsidered its action and voted 13-1, on January 30, to recommend two amendments which would add the relevant portions of the Statement of Understanding to Articles IV and VI of the Neutrality Treaty.
The Com-mittee then tabled all other proposed amendments, finding many of them moot since they also sought to incorporate the Statement into the treaties. The Committee did recommend four -understandings, two of which required the inclusion of Senate actions in the instruments of ratification of the Neutrality Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaty, respectively. The third understanding required that any prisoner transfer ag-reement between the United States and Panama be submitted as a treaty for the Senate's advice and consent, while the fourth understanding indicated that the prohibition against negotiation with third States to construct an interoceanic canal would not be construed as prohibiting discussion of such matters.
After conceluding, action on recommendations, the Committee voted 14-i-, on January 30, with Senator Griffin opposing. to report a clean resolution of ratification for the Neuitrality Treaty. It then voted 14-i to approve a clean resolution of ratification for the Panama Canal Treaty, conditioning its approval of the later resolution on Senate approval of the prior resolution. It was in this form that the Cor-nmittee on Foreign Relations reported the treaties to the Senate for debate.'9
Shortly thereafter, Majority Leader Byrd -and Minority Leader Baker cosponsored amendments to Article IV and VI of the Neuitrality Treaty identical to -those recommended by the Foreign Relations Committee. These so-called "leadership amendments," numbered 20 and 21, were eventually cosponsored by more than seventy senators before the debate'began on February 8, 1978.
C TiIlE SIGNIFICANCE AND HITGHLIGHTS OF THE SENATE DEBATE
The Senate debate on the Panama Canal treaties, running for over two months, from February 8 to Anril 18. 1978, was truly historic in a number of regards. To begin with, the Senate-reflecting the pub"I TId.
19 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal Treaties: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations with Sunlemental and Minority iews On Execultive N. 95th Congress, 1st Session, The Treaity Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal and The Panama Canal Treaty. . 95th Congress. 2nd Session. Executive Report No. 95-12, February 3, 1978. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.
11
lie-was deeply divided over the controversial treaties and the. outcome of the debate was uncertain until the last moment, setting the stage for an exciting political drama. Second, the Senate debate was broadcast live to radio stations throughout the nation for the first time in history. Third, the Senate utilized the Commitee of the Whole procedure to consider the treaties article by article for the first timle in fifty years. Fourth, the Senate, taking an expanded view of its advice and consent role, formally attached amendments to a treaty for the first time in half a century. Fifth, the debate ran for a total of 38 legislative days, making it the longest treaty debate in U.S. history except for the debate on the Treaty of Versailles after World WarI-.
At the end of the lengthy debate on the Panama Canal treaties, in which the 'Senate had considered nearly 90 amiendmnents or reservNations and had worked its will on the treaties in detail, the final vote on both treaties was razor-close, 68 to 32, one vote more than the required two-thirds.
The major spoke esmen for the treaties were MNajority Leader Byrd, aided by Mfajority Whip Cranston, for the Senate leadership, and the floor managers, Senators Church and Sarbanes of the Committee on Foreign Relations, assisted by Chairman Sparkmnan and other memibers of the Committee. Senator Baker, in his role as Minority Leader and as a member of the Foreigyn Relations Commnittee, also played a role, helping to fashion a procedure for amending the treaties which was acceptable to the requisite number of senators.
Among the major opponents of thetreaties, Senator Allen was ably aided by 'Senators Laxalt, Hatch, Helms, Thurmond and Dole, with assistance f rom Minority 'Whip Stevens. ndiviclually, and as a group, these senators sought vainly to add a substantial number of amnendments to the 'two treaties. Senator Griffin. the sole dissenter on the Foreign Relations Committee, played a major role as well, demanding clarification on various points and urging repeatedly that the treaties be returned to the President for renegotiation.
A key group of undecided senators leaning toward support for the treaties included Senators DeConcini, Ford, Long, Nunn, Talmad-e, Brooke and Cannon. While all of these senators had serious doubts about the treaties, they were willing to vote for the pacts provided that their concerns could be alleviated by reservations. It was this group of senators which offered the major reservations to the treaties, and, in thie end, they provided the necessary votes to assure passage.
The Senate debate on the Panama Caiial -treaties began on February 8, 1978. Since the'Committee on Foreign Relations had reported the Neutrality Treaty first, that was the first order of business. This was done on thetheory that it would be necessary to guarantee permanent U.S. rights to defend the canal and to head- of-the -line passage during emergencies under the Neutrality Treaty before the 'Seiate would agree to the Panama, Canal Treaty under which the United States would relinquish control of the Canal to Panama in the year 2000.
After initial parliamentary inquiries by Senator Allen, the openling days of the debate were devoted to general statements onl the treaties, many of which are included in Part IT of this compendium. 'Then, shortly after the Lincoln Day recess, the Senate, at Senator Dole's request, held a closed door session on February 21 for a briefing on
12
allegations-which were never satisfactorily substantiated-that Pana)manian officials and members of the Torrijos family were involved in drug trafficking.
On the following day, February 22, Senator Allen moved to reverse the order and to consider the Panamna Canal Treaty before the Neutrality Treaty. In the first test vote in the debate, the Senate voted down the procedural change by a vote of 67 to 30. The Senate then proceeded to consider amendments to the Neutrality Treaty article by article.
From the outset of the debate, the major diver,!:ence centered on the necessity for amendments to the treaties. The Senate leadership, in consultation with the executive branch, had decided, as indicated in the previous section, that it would be necessary to amend Articles IV and VI of the Neutrality Treaty to incorporate portions of the Carter-Torrijos Statement of Understanding. They were also wvillingf to permitsenators to address other substantive concerns by means of reservations or understandings if necessary. But they were determined to resist other amendments-characterized as "killer amendments"which might require a new plebiscite in Panama, on the grounds that the amendments were likely to be unacceptable to Panama and -were unnecessary in any case.
Day after day, as the debate proceeded, treaty opponents offered amendment after amendment seeking unsuccessf ully to convince the leadership and a majority of the Senate that substantive amendments beyond the leadersh-ip amendments were necessary to protect the interests of the United States. Amendments were offered, for example, to extend the U.S. military presence in the Canal Zone area beyond Decemrber 31,A 1999, under a variety of circumstances; to -permit the United States to deny hostile warships the right to transit the canal; and to make the English text of the treaty binding over the 'Spanish text in the case of divergence. These amendments and others were defeated by significant majorities, generally on emotions to table, bt the opposition consistently produced nearly a third of the votes, enough to cast considerable doubt on the final passage of the treaties.
After agreeing in early March by unanimous consent to set afinal vote on the Neutrality Treaty for March 16, the Senate moved on to adopt the so-called leadership amendments to Articles IV and VTJ of the treaty, relating to defense rights and head-of-the-line passage, by votes of 84-5 and 84-3, respectively, indicating widespread suppor'for these treaty modifications.
After completing work on the treaty amendments, the Senate turned, on March 14-, to a consideration of the resolution of ratification for the Neutrality Treaty. While a number of proposed reservations and understanding were defeated, the leadership and the Administration agreed to accept several reservations offered by -undecided senators in order to gain their support on the final crucial votes. Two of these seemed to be especially important in producing a coalition in f avor of the treaties. The "Nunn -Tal madgre reservation" provided that nothing in the treaty wNouild preclude the United States and Panama from negotiating arrangements for a continuing U.S. presence in Panama after the year 2000. The "DeConcini reservation"prvddta"ith Canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the 'United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each independently
13
have the right to take such steps as each deems necessary .. ,including the use of military force in the Republic of Panama, to reopen the Canal or restore the operations of the Canal, as the case may be." Other reservations and understandings are listed in Part III of this compendium.
On March 16, 1978, the Senate voted 68-32, one vote more than the required two-thirds, to approve the resolution of ratification as amended, thereby giving its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. The necessary votes to approve the treaties had been obtained, partly because many senators feared that a negative vote would damage the President in his conduct of foreign policy, and partly because the legislators had insisted on a number of measures to clarif y and define U.S. rights and responsibilities. IAfter the dramatic roll call vote, the Senate turned to consideration of the Panama Canal Treaty, under which Panamna would assume sole control of the canal in the year 2000. Despite the earlier favorable vote, the outcome on the second, more controversial pact, remained very much in doubt. In fact, a number of senators who voted for the first treaty publicly reserved the right to vote against the Panama Canal Treaty if it were not modified.
The day after the vote on the Neutrality Treaty, the newspapers reported that Panamanians were angered by the DeConcini reservation because it appeared to grant the United States the right to intervene in Panama. According to these reports, General Torrijos had written to President Carter before the vote on the Treaty to explain the problems which would be posed for Panama if the Senate approved the DeConcini reservation. In his letter, Torrijos said that Panama would find "unacceptable any reservation that dishonors the national dignitk.y, that changes the objectives of the treaty, or is intended to impede the exercise of Panama's sovereignty over all its territory or the U.S. military withdrawal on December 31, 1999."' At the same time, Panamanian officials were quoted as saying that they would carefully study amendments and reservations to the Neutrality Treaty as well as any modifications of the Panama Canal Treaty before determining whether the changes were acceptable. The effect of these reports was to raise doubts about Panama's willingness to accept the Senate modifications.
In the daily debate in the Senate, treaty opponents continued to of fer a stream of amendments to various articles of the Panama Canal Treaty without success, following the pattern of the Neutrality Treaty. The result of a sample of the proposed amendments would have been to, provide that only the United States and Panama could maintain military forces in the Republic until the year 2000, to permit the United States to negotiate with any third party for the construction of a sealevel canal, and to prohibit the nationalization of U.S. property by Panama. The complete list of the amendments may be found in Part III of this compendium. While the leadership was willing to accept reservations to deal with some of these matters, amendments were considered unacceptable and were regularly tabled or defeated by substantial majorities.
After returning from Easter recess in early April, the Senate tabled Senator Hatch's amendment No. 92 requiring the enactment of sepa-
14
rate legislation by both houses of Congress to dispose of U.S. property in the Canal Zone, and then by unanimous consent set April 18 as the date for the final vote on the Panama Canal Treaty.
Meanwhile, Panamanian opposition to the DeConcini reservation was mounting rapidly. According to news reports, Panama's Ambassador had met with White House aides on April 5 to warn that the Senate had been unaware of Panamanian dissatisfaction with the DeConcini reservation when it approved the Neutrality Treaty. It was also learned that General Torrijos had written a letter concerning the re servation to certain heads of state, explaining that he felt it. was. his duty to inform them of a situation "about which we have already expressed our deep concern." Panama's Foreign Ministry was circulating a letter on the same subject in the United Nations as well.
With Panamanian acceptance of the Senate's -reservations in. doubt, the Senate leadership, working with the various parties, began to fashion a compromise that would be acceptable to Senator DeConcini and other undecided senators, while reassuring~ Panama that the United States had no intention of abandoning its adherence to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic aff airs of other countries.
The resulting .comprmie.wrked out -as, the .Senate turned, On April 17, to consideration of the resolution of ratification for the Panama Canal Treaty, was the leadership reservation proposed by Senators Byrd, Baker, DeCon cini, Church, Sarbanes, Sparkman, Jayits. Leahy and Gravel-. It provided that "any action taken by the United States of America, .. shall be only "for the purpose of assuiring that the Canal shall remain open, neutral, secure, and accessible, and shall not have as its purpose -or be interpreted as a right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Panam-a or interference with its political independence or sovereign integrity." It was adopted on April 18, by a vote of 73 to 27, along with a series of six reservations and six understandings approved in the final two days of debate.
After 38 days of debate, the final roll call vote on the resolution of ratification for the Panama Canal Treaty was called on April 18, 1978. While the outcome was uncertain to the very end, the Senate- approved the resolution by a vote of 68 to 32, one vote more than the required two-thirds, thus ending one of the longest treaty debates in U.S. history.
CONTENTS
II. REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE MAJOR THEMES
OF THE DEBATE:
A. Genei al-Pro: Page
(1) Senator John Sparkman, February 8, 1978---------17 (2) Senator Frank Church, February 10, 1978_________ ---23 (3) Senator Ernest Hollings, February 23, 1978________ 31 (4) Senator Paul Sarbanes, March 17, 1978___________---42 (5) Senator Robert Morgan, April 17, 17--------47
General-Con:
(1) Senator Robert Griffin, February 8, 17----- 64 (2) Senator Robert Dole, February 8, 1978----------75 (3) Senator Harry Byrd, March 6, 198~-------84 (4) Senator James Allen, March 16,17----------96 (5) Senator Paul Laxalt, April 18, 17---------109
B. History and Background-Pro-Con Colloquy:
(1) Senator Robert Byrd with Senators Laxalt, Hatch,
Helms, Sarbanes, Case, Allen, and Church, February 9, 17------------------112
History and Background-Pro:
(1) Senator Mike Gravel (and remarks by Senator Frank
Church), February 9,198-----------131
History and Background-Con:
(1) Senator Jesse Helms, February 9,178140
C. Def ense-Pro:
(1) Senators George Mc Govern and Frank Church (with
remarks by Senators Gan and Curtis), February
24,298-------------------153
(2) Senator Robert Byrd, February 27, 97 ------166 (3) Senator Sam Nunn, March 14, 97~-------169
Defense-Con:
(1) Senator Jesse Helms, February 8,178177 (2) Senator Orrin Hatch, February 23, 198-------189 (3) Senator John Stennis, March 8, 1978---------9
D. Economic-Pro:
(1) Senator Ednmnd Muskie, February 28, 178206
(2) Senator Mike Gravel (in dialog with Senator Paul
Laxalt), March 1, 1978--------------218
(3) Senator Robert Byrd (in dialog with Senators Allen,
Muskie, and Sarbanes), March 1, 1978------------- 223
Economic-Con:
(1) Senator Edward Brooke, February 22,.1978----- 231 (2) Senator John Stennis, February 23, 198~-----236 (3) Senator John Tower, March 8, 1978-----------249
(15)
16
E. Constitutional-Pro:
Page
(1) Senator Jacob Javits, March 2, 17------- 252, (2) Senator Frank Church, April 5, 1978 ---- 263
Constitutional-Con:
(1) Senator Barry Goldwater, Febiuary 23, 1978________ 277 (2) Senator Orrin Hatch, April 4, 17-------- 283 F. Sea Level C anal-Pro-Con Colloquy:
(1) Senators Gravel, Laxalt, Church, Curtis, Sarbanes,
Javits, Goldwater, Magnuson, Leahy, and McClure,
March 1, 198-----------------292'
(2) Senators Gravel, Leahy, and Dole, April 10, 1978 -- 329,
11. REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE MAJOR
THEMES OF THE DEBATE1I
A. General-Pro
(1) Senator John Sparkman, February 8, 1978 (5 1505-07)
Mr. SPARKTMAN. Mr. President, first let me say I -want to express my appreciation to the majority leader and to thie minority leader for the very fine manner in -which they have cooperated with the Committee on Foreign Relations. Of course, Senator Baker is a member of the committee himself and he participated in all of the hearings and the voting and performed a wonderful job.
Senator Byrd appeared before our committee, testified forcefully, and was very helpful to us in our considerations.
I have a statement that I want to present as the opening statement in this debate.
Mr. President, the Committee on Foreign Relations has reported favorably the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal with recommendations to each. The committee reached its decision after long and careful consideration of the issues and the viewpoints of all concerned. I have no hesitation in recommending strongly that the Senate give its advice and consent to these treaties as reported by the committee.
Prior to reaching a decision on the treaties, the Committee on Foreign Relations held 15 days of hearings and heard 92 witnesses including 17 Members of the Congress, representatives of the executive branch, shipping g interests and canal users and retired military officers. These hearings were conducted with the goal of gaining as much information and as many views as possible. Every effort was made to allow individuals with different positions to present their cases. I am proud of what I think -was fair and objective consideration of the real issues, the dedication and hard work exhibited by the members of the committee and the harmony with which our consideration was conducted. I do not know how such an important proceeding could have been conducted more equitably.
In addition to the numerous hearings held by the committee, 10 members of the committee traveled to Panama and the canal in recent months. These committee members, and others in the Senate including our distinguished majority and minority leaders, went to Panama to gain firsthand knowledge about the canal, its future and our relations with Panama.
I was in Panama last month, and I returned impressed by the basic good will of the Government and people of Panama toward the United
1Prepared by Barry Skar. Specialist in Latin American Affairs. Statements are taken from Congressional Record (daily edition).
(17)
18
States. I fedl that when problems that have f estered for many years are resolved by the ratification of these treaties, the United States and Panama will be able to cooperate well in operating and protecting the canal in their mutual interest.
Five volumes of hearings and an extensive report have been ;issued by the committee in connection with these treaties. I urge every Member of the Senate to review this information, but especially the comnmnittee's report. WAe considered and discussed the issues raised by those in opposition to the treaties, and the report details the committee's determinations on these ise and responses to them. However, I would like briefly to outliiie the majo r questions the committee examined.
First, the committee considered the need for a new treaty relationship with Panama to govern the operation of the Panama Canal. The committee was convinced that the surest way to place our position in Panama and in Latin America and thie canal itself in jeopardy was to cl ing blindly to the 1903 Treaty.
The 1903 treaty was ne-fotiated and ratified under circumstances that could be called questionable at best. The treaty -was negotiated a nd signed for Panama by a Frenchman more interested in the welfare of the French Canal Co., of which lie was a major stockholder, than in the newly formed Republic of Panama. When the Pana manians objected to the treaty, the threat of withdrawal of the U.S. inu itary presence left them no -choice but to ratify.
Since 1903, the treaty relationship and espeially the U.S. control over the Canal Zone has been a constant source of conflict. As Secretary of State Hay said in a letter to Senator Spoonier, the 1903 treaty is
Vastly advantageous to the United States, and we mst confess, with what face we can muster, not so advantageous to Panamua . you and I know too well how many points there are to which a Panamanian patriot could object.
The objections by Panamanians have not since decreased, but, instead, have intensified. The objections have been presented to thle United States on countless occasions, to international bodies and, tragically, in demonstrations resulting in the death of United States and Panamanian citizens. It is inconceivable -when looking at, thlis record that the United States can reasonably hope to clino to the 1903 treaty and also maintain the cooperative environment essential to the operati on of the -canal.
M.r. President, I should like to interject right here that I have recently read two very interesting books on the Panama Canal. One, was entitled "The Path Be-twecen the Seas." The other was "The Story of the Panama Canal."
I found them 'both interesting. Bu1t there was one thing pointed out in these books with which I was absolutely amazed, and that was the number of treaties there have been involving the Panama Canal and its precincts. The history goes way back to the DeLesseps Co. of France and its arrangement with Colombia. 'There were even efforts an(] treaties long before that. It has been a long, long trail.
The outdated Hay-B3unan-Varilla Treaty of 1903 not only seriousty hinders an effective relationship with Panama, but it is a major prob1cm in our long term relationshiips with the other Latin American and third world nations. Even nations- that have been our traditional allies recognize that the 1903 Treaty has no place in the modern- world.
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When the U.N. Security Council met on the Panama Canal issue in 1973, the best the United States could do was to get Great Britain to abstain while the United States vetoed a resolution critical of the continuation of the 1903 Treaty.
During the committee's hearings, even the most vocal critics of the proposed treaties did not contend that the 1903 Treaty should govern canal operation into the future without some modification. The Comittee on Foreign Relations agrees that modification is necessary, and has determined that the treaties under consideration offer the best sohition that could be negotiated to deal with our difficulties with the 1903 Treaty.
The committee would like to make it clear that regardless of thie questionable circumstances surrounding the negotiation and ratifica tion of the 1903 Treaty, the United States has no reason to apologize for the manner in which it constructed and has opDerated the anal. The canal is truly a wonder of science and engineering. I am particularly proud of thie great contribution in the area of disease control made 'by may fellow Alabamian, Col. William Crawford Gorgas. Without his work in the control of tropical diseases, the canal might not have boen built, or the death toll would have been many times higher. Not only did tbe United States succeed in conquering the engineering and health problems, but we have compled an admirable record in operating the canal as an international public utility at the lowvest possible rates.
I may say that we take pride in the work done in connection with the laying out, the engineering, the construction of thle Canal in addition to the fine work that I mentioned done by Dr. Gorgas.
Next, the committee asked what was tihe most important interest of the United 'States in the canal and answered that use by our nav-al vessels and commercial shipping was the most critical interest of the UTnited States. Use of the canal, and not ownership of the canal or jurisdiction over the Canal Zone., far outweighs any claims of soyereigunty. Repeatedly during our hearings this view was stressed by military leaders and -witnesses from the Departments of Transpoortation and Commerce who are directly concerned with naval and commercial traffic through the canal. Secretary of Defense Brown said:
The first requirement includes free and unimpeded use of the Canal both by our Navy and by our merch,,ant ships. Free use of the Canal is essential to assure optim-um ability to shift our forces and inateriel rapidly between the Alantic and Pacific Oceans.
General Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added: "U.S. military interests in the Panama Canal are in its use, not. its ownership."
After addressing the question of our maior interest in the canal, the committee turned to the issue of how this interest could best be protected. The committee found that the long_-term interest of the United States would be. ill-served by maintenance of the present badly ouitdated treaty of 1903 since tbeti treaty has been the cause of rancor ever since it went into effect. 'We must face the fact that thle Panamna Canal lies ripht in the middle of another nation, and loaic compels us to realize that a cooperative environment in that nation is far more beneficial than an irranoement that has already cai-e(d violence on several occasions. Under the proposed treaty relationship,
20
Panama will have a -greater stake in the canal, and, thus, a greater interest in seeing that it remains open for the use of the ships of the United States and the world.
Secretary of Defense Brown said during the committee' s hearings:
Whether or not'we will have that use depends on a good many things. It depends upon whether in extremes we have a military force capable of assuring that it is kept open, but it also depends importantly on the attitudes of the Panamanians. It is easy to damage a lock so that the Canal's operation is shut down for a brief period. It is easy to do that over and over again. What do we want? Do we want a situation where we may have to use force over and over and over again in order to preserve the operability of the Canal or do we want a situation where the people of Panama see themselves correctly as having an important stake in keeping the Canal operating? Well, clearly the latter is the preferable situation.
The committee believes the proposed treaties represent the best agreements obtainable; that they were carefully negotiated; and that they will protect our interest in the use of the canal.
Mr. President, I should like here to pay a compliment to our two chief negotiators of these treaties, Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Linowitz. WVIe heard from them at length. We felt that they had done a remarkably good job in negotiating these treaties.
The committee then considered the ability of the United States to take action to defend the canal should the need occur. Until the year 2000. the United States clearly has the primary responsibility for canal defense, and the Panama Canal Treaty provides for these defense responsibilities. However, the committee looked at the long range defense question as it -will be affected by the neutrality treaty. The committee is confident that the Neutrality Treaty, as clarified by the joint statement issued by President Carter and General Torrijos and the committee's recommended amendment based on this statement, provides ample authority for the United States to act to protect its interest in the use of the canal. Also, our interest in priority use of the canal during times of need of emergency is fully protected.
Charges that the United States -will be giving away the canal and the taxpayers will be paying Panama to take it were examined by the committee. The committee does not believe that such is the case. All annuity Tpayments to Panama will come from canal operatin g revenues and not from the tax dollars of Americans.
The increased payments reflect, at last, adequate compensation to Panama f or the use of its territory and natural resources, especially water.
It takes 52 million gallons of fresh water to send just one ship through the canal. With over 13,000 transits per year at present and many more than that by 2000, it should be easy to see that Panama contributes much to the successful operation of the canal.
The Payments to Panama -will aid in the maintenance of a D)rogressive,, free enterprise economy in Panama, which will contribute to Panamna's ability to cooperate in operating the canal. The payments, also,-will be a major incentive to Panama to see that the canal remains open an d operates efficiently.
The committee also wanted to know the effects of these treaties on the economy of the United States. Our findings are that the treaties and the toll increase of approximately 30 percent that will be necessary will have a negligible effect on the U.S. economy. A 30 percent
21
increase in tolls will have a very minimal influence in the cost of gYoods sh1-ipped through the canal. The U.S. merchant fleet will not be placed at a further disadvantage, since all ships will pay the same tolls. The canal will retain its advantageous position in comparison to alternative routes or methods of shipment.
Along__ with our interest in the use of the canal goes an interest in Seeing that it is operated effectively. The Panama Canal Treaty fully provides for effectiveness through the transition period leading to operation of the canal by Panama in the year 29000. During this period of over 20 years, the United States will continue to operate the canal through the Panama Canal Commission to be established as an agency of the U.S. Government, and the necessary rights and authority for U.S. operation are provided. Secretary of the Army Alexander assured the committee that:
In short, Mr. Chairman, the Treaty will provide us with all the rights necessary to adequately care for both the Panamanian and U.S. citizens of our dedicated work force.
Mr. Chairman, under the Treaty we would retain all the specific rights necessary to efficiently operate the Canal and adequately care for our employees.
Until sufficient numbers of Panamanians can be trained to assume the operation of the canal in 2000, and- possibly after that date, American employees will be needed. As noted by Secrtary lexander in the statement I just quoted, the treaties provide the rights necessary to care for the American employees.
Although some workers will be displaced; efforts will be made to retain workers in their positions, preference will be given for other I.S. Government jobs to those displaced and eryonional retirement will be provided. For those Amiericans who will be eploye-d by the Commission or our Armed Forces. adequnat e housing ancd anT)-ropriate health and educational facilities will be available. in adilition. these employees and their dependents will be covered by status of f orces type agreements to protect their interests.
After our lengthyv and close examination of the foregroing points and other directly related to the treaties ait hand, the Committee' on Foreign Relations has concluded tht the treaties meet the needs of the IVnited States and that the Senate should Jve its advice and consent to their ratification with the recommendations reported by the committee.
Now, I would like to comment on some basic principles the comm-ittee used in its scrutiny of these treaties which I hope the Senate -will also recognize.
These, treaties will not resolve every issue in the relations between thep United States and Panama such ag hummn rights, Panama's relations with Cuba, the internal policies of Panama or the form of Panama's government. The treaties were not negotiated for these purposes, and it would be illogical to expect that any treaty cold aceomnpisuh a broad Trogram. or that it should be expeted to do so.
The committee did not focus its attention on extraneous issues Or nionissues: and I feel the, Senate would be making a serious mnistakce if it allowed itself to get bogged down in useless debate on matters -not cdiiectly related to the real purpose of the treaies. The Se l-ate could debate for days issues such as whaqt sovereign interest the UVnited s(t,9tes has in the Canal Zone; but debate of this type would add little to what
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must be a political decision of whether these treaties best serve the long-term interests of the United States.
No treaty arrangement to govern the operation of the canal could possibly remove every doubt or deal with every contingency. Our consideration of the treaties must not become confused by "what if's" or "may be's." The committee has determined that the treaties represent a workable, specific structure for future canal operations and defense with sufficient latitude to deal with changed circumstances or contingencies that may develop.
I1 am confident that my colleagues will join in meaningful and responsible consideration of these important treaties and that 'the Senate's final decision will be based on rational analysis of the interests of the United States.
At this point, I would like to say again that I am proud of the work done by the Committee on Foreign IRelations and of the manner in which the Panama Canal treaties were handled. I sincerely thank all the members of the committee, and especially Senator Case, the ranking minority member, Senator Church, the ranking majority member, and Senator Sarbanes, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, for their splendid cooperation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the treaties and integral related documents, excerpts f rom the committee report, and certain other relevant materials be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
A. General-Pro
(2) Senator Frank Church, February 10, 1978 (S 1762-65)
Mr. Ciiunci-i. I thank the Senator very much for his remarks. He will remember that it was in the early stages of the hearings that we began to get reports of differing interpretations. I thought that was intolerable. I said then, and I had the full support of Senator Sarbanes at the time, that the Se-nate could not be expected to ratify these treaties if crucial provisions wNere being, interpreted in one fashion in the United States and in another in Panama. It was after this development that President Carter asked General Torrijos to return to Washington and the interpretation of these crucial provisions was clarified.
As I have said before, welcome as the development was, in my judgment, it is insufficient to rest the interpretation of such vital provisions upon an unsigned communique by two heads of state. It is for this reason that I said we must put this language directly into the treaties themselves. If we do, I can support them. If we do not, I shall have to vote against them.
Mr. President, in the committees report, the interpretation of the second amendment that we recommend to the Senate is made clear:
It allows the United States to introduce its Armed Forces into Panama whenever and however the canal is threatened. Whether such a threat exists is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes. What steps are necessary to defend the canal is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes. When such steps shall be taken is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes. The United States has the right to act as it deems proper against any threat to the canal, internal or external, domestic or foreign, military or non-military. Those rights enter into force on the effective date of the treaty. They do not terminate.
IWith this modification, will the treaties help promote military security for the canal? The best place to look for an answer, it seems to me, is to those who have the responsibility for defending it-the U.S. Armed Forces. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States would "without question" have the right to act unilaterally to protect the canal agrains any internal threat, including radical Panamanian rioters, for example. But again, the heart of it, the committee was told by General MlcAuliffe-who is directly responsible for the canal's defense-is that the treaties will create a "'friendly environment around the canal in which to operate." We can conduct "our defense tasks better in a friendly rather than hostile environment," he said. And while sabotage can never be ruled out, the incentive can be taken away by giving the Panamanians a stake in the canal. As Secretary of Defense Brown testified: The most important factor in inhibiting such actions by frustrated groups in Panama is a situation in which the Panamanian Government and the bulk of the Panamanian people see the continued operation of the canal as in their interest.
It just makes sense. Commonsense.
Adm. lmo Zumwalt, former'Chief of Naval Operations, concurred.
(23)
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The Panama Canal can never be made completely secure militarily. We know that. Neither can the Capitol. Nor can the Pentagon. Nor the country. But with the two modifications I have outlined, I am satisfied that General Brown is correct in saying that the security of the canal is actually enhanced by the new treaties. They will encourage Panamanian cooperation; they will prohibit-for the first time-the stationing of f oreign troops in Panama; they will give the United States the unil ateral right to act militarily in the canal's defense; and they will give our ships the right to go to the head of the line in an emergency. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk summarized the net effect of these guarantees:
If, God forbid, it should ever become necessary for a President and a Congress to take strong measures to keep the canal functioning and saf e.
lie told our committee:
They would be in a far stronger position to do so under the treaties of 1977 than
-under the anachronistic Treaty of 1903.
The third requirement is that the worldwide position of the United States not be weakened, and that the hand of our adversaries not be strengthened in Latin America. A natural tendency exists, after the Vietnam tragedy, to want an end to what some see as yielding and retreat by the United States. I see no point in debating here whether that perception is correct; my own judgment is that our foreign policy has been generally more realistic-and more humane-since our involvement in the Vietnam war ended. But whether that is true or not, the point must be made, and made emphatically, that the treaties now before uts do not represent -a retreat. The willingness to enter*** sign of strength, not of weakness-just as it was a sign of strength, not weakness, to give the Philippines back to the Filipinos, and just' as it was a sign of strength, not weakness, to give Okinawa and Iwo Jima back to the Japanese. We fought and bled for Okinawa and Iwo Jima during World War II, but the citizens of those islands were Japanese, and they wanted to live under the Government of Japan, and we concluded that it was right and just that they be allowed to do that, they were entitled to be restored to the jurisdiction of their homeland.
No one perceived our country as weak when we granted independence to the Philippines or when we returned Okinawa and Iwo Jima to Japan. Quite the contrary-these were seen as the acts of a self -confident nation, as acts of justice, as adherence to our priniples-acts which benefitted our relations significantly in the Pacific. These treaties with Panama also will represent an act of self-confidence and of justice and of principle. One of the principles that Americans have always held highest is that of self -determination, and it would be ironic, indeed, if we were to renounce it in the case of tiny Panama today.
These treaties, in short, will weaken our adversaries and strengthen our friends throughout the Western Hemisphere. As Admiral Zumiwalt testified, rejection of the treaties would "serve to separate us from our friends in Latin America," and make our adversaries' objectives easier to achieve in Panama and in neighboring countries)
A new arrangement governing the use of the canal, one which is mutually acceptable to Panama and the United States, would likely increase U.S. influence in Panama and in Central America. It would give leftists less to exploit, in Panama and around the world, and it
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would make other governments in Latin America less vulnerable to pressures from the left. It could, in sum, be the keystone to improved relations with all of the Hemisphere.
It thus appears to me that, on this count as well, the treaties pass muster.
Fourth and finally the treaties should be fair and should be seen to be fair. Fairness is of course relative: It is best measured perhaps by contrasting' the new relationships with the the old and by superimposing those old relationships on the UTnited'States.
There is an old Indian saying in the West you must never measure a mn until you have walked a mile in his moccasins.
It is a pretty good test for eliminating the double standard.
In our hearings the American Ambassador to Panama William Jo rden applied that test rather vividly. Let me quote what he said: Suppose . that history had dictated that the Mississippi River and the territory on each side were controlled by a foreign power. Suppose that in going from Ill inois to Missouri, or from Louisiana to Texas, yon had to cross that strip.
And imagine, if you will, that yon broke the law in some fasion-by speeding or having a tail light ot, or whatever, and you were arrested by a French gendarme or a Mexican policeman. It does not take great imagination to know what our reactions would be. Yet that is the situation that our Panamianian f rien ds have f ound themselves in for the past 70 years.
AXmericans are a fair-minded people, and I doubt that most Amenicans would view that sort of arrangement as fair.
Admiral Zumwalt summarized well the views of many witnesses. He said:
The present relationship is a colonial anachronism which is no longer feasiblefor a democratically-constituted nation to maintain.
The admiral said it well. The treaties, I believe, rectify this unf airness by giving Panamanians a stake in the operation of the canal pursuant to an arrangement that has been approved by two-thirds of the Pana manian people.
Therefore, it appears to me that the treaties, as modified, will pass each of the tests that concerned Americans have applied. They allow the United States to continue to enjoy the canal as an open and neutral passageway. They maximize the security of the canal. They strengthen our -worldwide position. 'They weaken that of our adversaries. And because they are f air, they are likely to endure.
These are the treaties' advantages, but they obviously are not in our national interest unless the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
W1/hat are the disadvantages?
There are, I think, seven principal arguments that have been made against the treaties. They-and what I believe are the answers to them-are as follows:
First, the familiar argument: We built it and paid for it. It is ours, and we should keep it. The answer is, I think, that -we are keeping it, in the way that matters-the only way that matters. We are keeping it open and running, and that is what is important.
To argue about tech-nical legal questions, such as -who has "titullar sovereignty," misses the point. It is use that counts. it is our right to protect the canal that counts. t is our right to go through first during emergencies that counts. And these rights are the ones guaranteed by the treaties.
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Wle do not now possess "titular sovereignty" over the canal or the zone it occupies, under the current treaty, as the committee report makes clear. But even if we did, what good would it be if, in order to retain it, we had to jeopardize the canal's -use?
So the answer, in short, is that the treaties do not give away our vital interests in the canal. They insure our ability to protect those' interests.
As General Brown testified before our committee, they "provide the best way of assuring that we will be able to continue to use this canal." To refuse to approve the treaties would be the surest way to expose the canal to obstruction by terrorists, saboteurs, and rioters, -who would have the sympathy of much of the world if the treaties are rejected.
The second argument is that -we should not pay them to take the canal off our hands.
Mr. President, the answer to that argument is that we are not. These treaties do not commit the U.S. Treasury to pay one dime to Panama. Any money Panama receives will be paid out of operating revenues of the Panama Canal Commission, revenues generated by toll fees or by subsidiary services performed in Panama by the commission.
The statement of President Carter in this regard has been distorted. Several times today, in the course of the debate, I have heard his statement distorted. Let me read what the President had to say on this subject in his recent address to the Nation. President Carter said:
Under the new treaty, any payments to Panama will come from tolls paid by ships which use the canal.
That is an accurate, factual, truthf ul statement.
As I have said, these treaties do not commit the U.S. Treasury to pay one dime to Panama. Any money Panama receives will be paid out of operations of the canal itselfI and the tolls -will be adjusted to gYenerate those revenues.
It is true that Panama is in line for certain economic assist ance, but this aid is apart from the treaties. We have given aid to Panama before, as we have to every other country in Latin America, and as we will agrain. But this aid has nothing to do with the treaties nor with the revenues to be derived f rom the treaties.
Most of the proposed new aid will consist of loans which must be repaid to our Treasury and which, in addition, will be granted under terms aimed at stimulating I.S. exports, and thus helping our own employment situation.
Panama never -yet has defaulted on a loan from us. Its credit rating is good. There is no reason to expect Panama to default in the future, given the importance to its economy and its prosperity of maintaining that credit rating. So the American taxpayer will not be affected or set back by such transactions.
The third argument is that General Torrijos is a dictator and head of an unstable government. Much has been said about this already. Let me simply add that it is true that General Torrijos is a dictator, far from the worst in Latin America but not the most benevolent, either.
It is also true that most governments in the world today are authoritarian. They are dictatorships of one form or another. Of the 145 nations in the United Nations, probably not more than -30 would qualify a's being elected under a free political system of the kind we enjoy in the United States.
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It never has been our practice to deal oniy with fully developed democracies, for to do so would be to declare some 120 nations in this world off limits.
So the problem is not that the Government of Panama is a dictatorship and therefore unstable. As a dictatorship, it happens to be very stable. General Torrijos has been chief of state for 9 years. He has held the reins of government in Panama longer than any other Panamanian, since independence. There is no effective political opposition and no sign that he may be deposed. He has managed to retail his popularity among the people of Panama. We deal with him because he heads up the Panamanian Government, and there is no one else with whom to deal. So much for that argument.
The fourth argument made against the treaties is that General Torrijos is pro-Communist and the treaties, therefore, will lead to a Cuban or Soviet takeover of the canal.
The answer is that the Torrij os government is strongly nationalistic but not pro-Communist. It is true that General Torrijos has visited with Fidel Castro. So have I1. So have a number of other Members of this body. But the Torrijos government does not even recognize the Soviet Union or China, and the economy of Panama, far from being socialistic, consists of a strong f ree enterprise system. Over 70 major multinational banks operate in Panama, including' eight of America's largest. Banks are not wont to do business in unstable societies. There is moreover, no Soviet presence to speak of in Panama at the present time. Out of a population of some 1.7 million people, there are only a few hundred Communists.
The specific answer to concerns about a future 'Soviet or Cuban military presence, however, is that Panama will be expressly prohibited under the new treaties from inviting foreign troops into her territory. I mentioned this earlier but it bears repeating: Article V of the Neutrality Treaty provides that after the year 2000-the last year the U.S. Armed Forces will be present-"only the Republic of Panama shall operate the canal and maintain military forces, defense sites, and military installations within its national territorv." This assurance against foreign military intervention is not contained in the existinty treaty arrangement and represents a safeguard of considerable value to the American Interests in the canal and the region.
The fifth argument is that the treaties will be yet another retreat by the United States, a "withdrawal" in response to threats and coercion. 'There is the. feeling that somehow things are not as they used to be, and that is so. The worl d has ch anged. It used to be that gunboat diplomacy would serve to enforce our will in the Caribbean and in Central America.
But now it takes some respect for the rights of others, and that is a change for the better. I am gclad it has happened.
I opposed the war in Vietnaim for many reasons, from the very start. One of those reasons was my belief that our intervention in that civil war, among a foreign people in distant Asia, -was not only unnecessary in terms of our own interests, but would weaken our international position and strengthen that of our adversaries.
To have become involved in a guerilla war in the jungles of Southeast Asia was a grave mistake. I think most of us know and acknowledge that today.
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Mr. President, I say the same reason militates -with equal force against exposing ourselves unnecessarily to the risk of fighting a guerrilla war in the jungles of Panama. From the standpoint of our own domestic tranquility, from the standpoint of effective foreign policy, and indeed from the standpoint of simple justice, we would be seriously misguided to rely upon a military solution to achieve our objectives in Panama when the probability is that those same ends, an open, functioning canal which is militarily secure, can be achieved through the peaceful procedures outlined in these treaties.
Whether we again choose military power over the power of peace to effect our national goals will, it seems to me, say much about us as a society and the lessons we have learned from Vietnam.
The sixth argument that is made against the treaties is that there is no guarantee that Panama will not nationalize the canal and demand that we leave immediately.
This is true. There is nothing to prevent them from doing that right now. Under the new treat ie s-which commit both the United States and Panama to protect and defend the canal's neutrality-the moral and legal case of the United States would be far stronger were such an eventuality to occur. If the treaties are ratified, General Taylor testified, the "conflicts over the canal should cease to be a confrontation between an overbearing Uncle Sam, the Goliath of the affluent industrial world, and the tiny Panama, the David representing Latin America and the world's have-not community."
The final major argum-ent is one that I also touched on a moment ago; namely, that the neutral status of the canal means that hostile warships could go through in effect, under the benefit of U.S. protection. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown answered this objection directly at our hearings. "The last place we want to sink a ship," he said "is in the canal, and we will therefore depend upon our military power outside of the canal to serve our interests. The new treaties do guarantee passage through the canal. They don't guarantee passage to the canal... I might add that the canal has always been administered as a neutral passageway; it has never-even during two world wars-been closed; and we have always been able to protect it by keeping enemy ships a safe distance away. If we cannot prevent enemy shins f rom reaching the canal, Henry Kissinger testified, "the provisions of a legal document will be precious little help."
So those are the major arguments against the treaties and the answers. Over the past 5 months I have carefully examined all the arguments, pro and con. During( that period, the Committee on Foreiffn Relations has held 16 days of hearings on the treaties. Over 90 wtnesses have testified. We have heard representatives, of the administration, Members of Congress, and private itizens. We have heard fervid supporters of the treaties and vigorous foes. We have compiled a hearins record of Over 2,000 pages.
T approached those hearings with no preconceptions about the issues they raise. Based upon thle best evidence available, I have concluded that, on balance, with the two amendments I have discussed, the treaties are in our national interest.
In closing, Mr. President. let me say a word about the effect of these treaties on our perception of the past and our direction in the future.
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The Treaty of 1903 has been characterized in many ways-as a vestige of colonialism, as a diplomatic dinosaur, as the product of a plot rivaling that of "The Sting." It is true that the history behind that treaty is not flattering. But however the treaty may appear today I believe that there is no need for apology. The events surrounding the conclusion of the Treaty of 1903 must be viewed in the context of the times, when large powers acted much differently toward small powers than they do today. The world of 1903 was a world of empires-and of colonies. Most of the world's population in that year-in China, in Indochina, in Egypt, in India, in Persia, in Morocco, in Algeria, and throughout Africa-lived under foreign rule. They were governed by foreign laws that were administered by foreign governments-whether British, French, ]Dutch, Belgian, or German. 'The desires of the colonial people were largely ignored; they endured for the benefit of the empires that ruled them.
Those times, I am glad to say, are gone. The empires that governed the world in 1903 have faded into history. People in former colonies throughout the world have won the right to determine their own destinies. A hundred ne~w independent nations have emerged since the 1903 treaty was signed.
So the issue bef ore us, really, is whether -we will accept change or whether we will resist it-whether we recognize that rigid efforts to preserve the past lead inevitably to tragedy-whether we are flexible enoug(_h to pursue our national interest by new means when old means fail. To adapt to change while preserving our vital interests is a work of statesmanship; to resist change by attempting to preserve the past is a A-vork of folly.
This is -not to denigrate the magnificence of our forefather's achievement-the building of the canal, it has rightly been said, was the moon landing of the age, a sublime translation of dreams into reality, a soaring triumph of engineering and medicine, of courage, and imagination. We honor those who built it, but we honor them not by grieving or glossing over past wrongs, but by rectifying present inequities and by insuring future harmony. We recognize the nobility of their achievem--ent by preserving the canal, not as a crippled testimonial to mankind's irrationality, but as a working monument to international cooperation and good will.
This goal can be achieved, but it will not be.' easy. Indeed, it may require surmounting obstacles as great as any confronted by the builders of the canal themselves-perhaps even greater. For instead of yellow fever or malaria, we face the fever of nationalism. Instead of h-e -darkness of the jungle, we face the darkness of slogans and hialfh71111is. And instead of mountains we can see, we face a future that is obscure.
I repeat, this challenge can be met, but it caflls for the mot"nreious resources that -we as a people can muster-not force of arms, but force of principle, f orce of character, and force of intellect. Not every nation coul Id do so; a special strength is required, a strength deriving from our sense of self-security as a society, to accept change, to move ahead, and thereby to preserve rather than destroy the best that we h-ave wrought from the past. Theodore Roosevelt-and it was Roosevelt,
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1 think, who deserves most of the credit for building the canal-pu, it well when he said:
The important thing is the'next step. It often happens that the good conditions of the past can be regained not by going back, but by going forward. We cannot recreate what is dead; we cannot stop the march of events; but we can direct this march and out of the conditions develop somthing better than the past knew.
Mr. President, I believe that these treaties will direct the march of events toward developing something better than the past knew. I urge the Senate to advise and consent to their ratification with the changes recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations,
A.General-Pro
(3) Senator Ernest Hollings, February 23, 1978 (S 2099-2103)
Mr. HoLLINGs. Madama President, I only have a few moments. At a little after 12 I have to try to make another appointment. But I will try to get into some of the questions raised by my distinguished f riend from Alabama.
We have been indulgent-a better word, perhaps, is respectful-of the Senator from Alabama, recognizing his capability of once getting wrought up being able to wreck a process, and in the U.S. Senate we do not want to "wrought" him up, and I do not think he should be.
He has been my f riend and I have tremendous respect for lhm. But I find that under the rule now, unwritten, that we sort of just let himalone and let him talk himself out, and a lot of things go unchallenged.
To get specific, when the Senator was on his feet, hie questioned the idea of visitation. He questioned that idea of visiting Panama. He said, "What you ought to do, Senator, is read the treaty. You don't have to go down there if you want to make up your mind about the conitents, and the interest, and whether the United States is protected sufficiently. A visit is not in order. What is really in order is to sit and read the treaties."7
Now, that is what we have to do. That is a very intelligent approach, before we take a position, we ought to read what we are taking a position on.
Of course, the distinguished Senator from Alabama did not do that with his hearings. He did not wait for a written treaty.
The Senator from Alabama, long before the treaties could be raised, was objecting, and that was his privilege. That was his privilege, under the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers to raise certain questions and start his objecting to a document that had yet to be drawn.
So do not criticize others who were trying not only to read the document, but go see the parties and the country and learn something about a people. One of the most significant things in the entire treaty ratification process is an understanding of the country we have built, as well as the canal we have built.
Now, in July, and I think it was July 15 of this past year, the U.S. Senate, Madam President, passed a resolution unanimously, Senate Resolution 221, on July 15, directing the appointment of Senators to visit certain countries, including Panama and South America, to study the economic and security interests of this Nation in Panamna and in those other countries.
Now, why criticize me for making a trip when the Senate directs me to go?
The Senator is on the floor all the time, and I am sure that that never would have passed if he really objected to it. So I went, not willy-nilly and wandering for a place to flit around and land upon; but, on the contrary, at the solemn direction of the U.S. Senate, with a bipartisan
(31)
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group which, incidentally, included the counsel for the Latin American Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, our distinguished Seceitary of the Senate, and the Secretary to the minority, and it was a very educational procedure. So that is why we went. As I go down the list of things that he brings up, Madam President, I am reminded of the old sayin, "A problem for every solution."
Let us go back to when I was trying to fathom the right and the wrong and making *initial impressions. In 1967, when I was a member of the Commerce Committee, former Secretary Anderson, chairman of the negotiation team, came to present at that time a proposed treaty that did not include -the rights of defense.
The Senator asks, "Was not the treaty today substantially changed and everything else?" Not really-with respect to defense, except what the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote-article IV. With respect to military occupation by troops, at that particular time it was that we leave after the year 2004; and after negotiating for some 11 to 12 more years, we lost 3 years.
Some who want to continue to negotiate wonder where the trend is and how the United States is faring. Let it be recorded that we lost 3 good years there. Would it not be grand to sit here and let things stay as they are and just do not do anything, if we had that luxury?
It is bunkology that you have to come on the floor and listen to Senators play games. It reminds me of back in the sixties, during the war in Vietnam. You would walk up on the floor, and there was one backing up a battle. Another one was bombing. Another one was calling them murderers. Another one was saying, "Don't do it"; another was saying, "Do it." Another said, "More troops." Another said, "No, get out.," Those were all scenarios in Vietnam, and now we have all the scenarios after the year 2000, with total disregard.
I am confident that the Senator from Alabama and many in opposition have no idea of the problem in Panama today, no idea of the complexity of the issues involved. The way they talk and try to reduce it ,down misses the complexity involved.
I guess he wants to make Fra nklin D. Roosevelt a dictator talking about Sidney Hillnian. He said, "Check it with Sidney," and now, "Chieck it with Torrijos." Well, nothing could be more ridiculous or f urth)er from the truth.
It is a complex problem, Madam President.
I will never forget the other night, when Eric Sevareid was retiring. lie said, after 40 years at CBS, that when he started, there were all black and white, moralistic questions-the Depression and World War II and McCarthyism-and simple answers could be given. He said that is the one thing that impresses him most after 40 years, that there
-are no simple answers any more.
And this treaty is not a simple, thou shalt bam, bam, bam-all your ,rights are spelled out and everything just done exactly right. It explains it in some measure after 13 years and getting the best we could in f air'ness to the United States, the best we could in fairness to the Republic of Panama. We will go into that when we have time, into the history of it.
People are worrying about what they are going to do in Panama. Read the historical record. Talk to David McCullough, or any historian. It was the United States that breached every one of the agreements and understandings and treaties for the last 70 years. We are al-
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most like the Soviets. I like to get on this floor and~ tell about, "Why have another agreement with the Soviets, because they never obey them?" If I were at Panamanian, I would have a talk here: "Why have aii agreement with the United States?" Because wve never keep it.
I could go down the record of history as to who did the violating, but 'we do not have a chance for that, because we have to tell this nonsense and everything is peaceful and happy and we have no problem down there.
With my limited time, let me simply state, Madam President, that I had the opportunity the other evening to debate former brigade commander Maj. Gen. George Mabry before the American Legion in my State. He is a Medal-of-Honor winner; and if we start another war, I want him to be my commander. He sees things as a commander should see them: forward march; to the rear, march; fire; cease fire. It is a life they are leading,, and they learn, and I respect.
I am serving now on the board of the Air Force Academy. I have served at West Point. I am a graduate of military schools, and I think we should have more discipline in society, and more in the Senate. But tat is not our option.
They start with this limbo of gag, which is not only nonsense, but insulting. Then they go to the constitutionality argument. The President did not have constitutional authority to get a treaty. Whoever heard of that? They were starting the hearings and bringing petitions, and some of them believed that, and they went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court and stopped the Senate. We could not even ratify.
They went from that to Sol Linowitz, that scenario back in again, that he was not even confirmed. The man was not confirmed. What kind of damn juvenile approach is that?
Everyone knows of the entire death of that little country. And you call him a dictator. A squad leader. They do not have an army as good as the South Carolina National Guard. We have more men in the South Carolina National Guard, and better equipped. Bunk. I am tired of listening to it.
It is a little country we built down there. But they went dTown there. And they said, "Linowitz"-$11/2billion total debt, $355 million debt of the banks; and all of a sudden we were going to get a treaty just to get the banks out of trouble down there.
Then we went to the sea level argument. I remember when the Senator from Alabama -was here saying:
Wait a minute. Why agree to this Article XII, section 2 (b), where we sign off and say we are not going to negotiate anywhere? Look at what they got. They got us; they got us.
lie forgot his long history, because when William Jennings Bryan was -the Secretary of State under WVoodrow Wilson-he broke with Wilson later over World War I-he fash-ioned rights in perpetuity
forus it th conty of Nicaragua in the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty anid it hel d fast until the year 1.971.
Now, what happened? We have been having troubles in Pn ~.
and there is evidence after opecaion, after riot, 9fter sailor killed,. soldier killed, American killed. right on up the line to thleelectOior dl.,v of Jimmy Carter, 1976, where they bombed in thet Canal 7nw. What is going to happen afterward? What happened befor'e?Wh at
34
will happen afterward is more of what happened before. Everyone with commonsense knows that.
It is not blackmail. We have to have some judgment in these things.
So it was that when we filed that voluminous Interoceanic Canal Conimiission report by Milton Eisenhower, Bob Anderson, and all the rest, 5 years and $22 million, and went all through the Colombia scenario, the Nicaragua, the Costa Rica, everything else as formulated on page 69, they said that the only feasible routes were Route 10 and Route 14 in the Republic of Panama.
But our good Commander in Chief and President-he is a pretty good negotiator; he is the President. He came f rom Pl ains, and he beat all the rest of the crowd in the U.S. Senate, and he has been working, at it, for the interests- of this country. He said, "I don't wnt to make this treaty and then have some other country builcd a sea-level route through where we found was the only feasible place."
Torrijos said, "Fine. I sign on that. You don't go anywhere else."
Nicaragua by that time had found that even the rights in perpetuity were giving them trouble down there.
Travel to some of these countries, I say to the Senator. Learn the feelings of the people. They did not even like the rights. When -we found we did not want it, then they brought the treaty up for recission.
Ah, does not the Senator from South Carolina have some pleasures? February 17, the roll was called up yonder: Aiken, Allen, Aha, rescind those treaties-66 to 5. Who rescinded it? And now they talk this last summer and fall about the sea level. 'The distinguished Senator from Alabama is the one who rescinded it. They f orgeot the history.
We are not granted the luxury of doing nothing.
When Carter walked down that main s-treet, Pennsylvania Avenue, on Inaugural Day, the next day he met with some 11 Latin American Presidents. They said, "Look, Mr. President, President Johnson Promised us but didn't deliver. He w as all involved in the war in Vietnam. President Nixon, he gyot involved. President Ford spent 2 years trying to bring integrity back to government. Now you have a good 4-year administration. Vietnam, Watergate. all excuses,are behind. We want to see right done as we voted for what friends we have'and -what is best interest."
We could not find a single friend on March 23, 1973. On that Particular date the United Nations Security Counil voted just that, to return the sovereignty of the Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama. And -we wonder what will happen with all these monkey-shine scenarios.
So they came, and President Carter brought in the Pentag-on 'and Defense chiefs, in a very commendable fashion, I thou ht because lie talked about misgivings, ju-ist as the Senator from Souith Carolina. WTe'do not want to give up and give away. ITam part of that syndrome. I am not part of that "'steppingr down" in everthing. So what I am doingf in voting ratification -with these amendments on defense. I say to the Senator from Alabama, is not withdrawing from rb~rhts but advancingr interests-advancing rthie interests of the United States;.
T firmly believe that with all the misgivings and all the changes I could0 makeand the Senator could make, that this is on balance a very, very g ood thing and a wonderful opportunihTv, and I 'hope it pans out, I might end up with egg ion my face. Torrijos is unnredictable. I think we can change a bad neighbor into a good neighbor.
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I think we can act as mature people and do away with colonialism, the last vestige of extraterritorial rights.
But let us not lose the point about the problem because all of those who said we were gagged went right on down. Incidentally, they changed. They were on drugs yesterday. I do not hear anything about drugs today. They got through that. And then the gentleman said, "Oh, -we didn't hold that to change any votes; we just wanted the f acts."
That is really misleading the American public. Those facts were available to every Senator in the Intelligence Committee when I first heard about it last September, and ll reports were filed right there, and some of the new ones brought up, that have now been in the news, operation something like limp time, or march time, or something else of that kind, the Senator f rom Idaho (Mr. Church), the distinguished former chairman of the Intelligence Committee said that is publicly filed. They -went away from brothers and tried to bring in Castro, and they will bring in now this morning Torrijos telling you have to sign off with Torrijos.
I did not see the gentleman down there. I did think it -was an arrogant thing to suggest that I should see him but not the distinguished Senator from Virginia. So I do not defend Torrij os.
I am looking at the Republic, and I am looking at the people, and I am looking through the eyes of those who served, four-star commanders. Ask everyone, whether it is General Wilson, General Underwood, General 0'Meara, General Porter, right on down the line. Not gagged. The idea that anybody in public life or the present-day military is dishonest, I resent. I resent the idea.
I saw Adm. Jim Holloway, who was born in Charleston, S.C., standing down there for the big aircraft carrier, and some of the other things. They are not gagged.
SWe are getting records right now in committees different from the administration and 0MB budget with regard to our defenses in the country, I say to the Senator, and he knows and I know it. We work that way.
General Underwood issued just a few weeks ago an article in Retired Officer, February 1978, and incidentally hie is not all sold. He calls it "The Panama Canal Treaty, a Mlixed Bag." And I want to quote thle conclusion of the article, because I read through very thoroughly and he covers the problem as it appears; namely a confused problem: IOnce a -way is found to incorporate the words or at least the sense of the Carter press statement into the treaty documentation or into the text of the treaty itself, it can become a document of great value, certainly worthy of support.
That is generally his conclusion. But how does hie reach it? All of my constituency thinks there is nobody here but us chickens. It is just like thiat cartoon in the New Yorker about: J never heard of the Panama Canal for 30 years. I never even heard of it. And nowv I finally can't even live without it.
They have not studied it. They have not gotten a feel for the people. They do not know that Eisenhower, who hiad been 3 years in that Canal Zone, started that riot in 1964 because hie had been there 3 years. He made a treaty and, incidentally, we violated it for not only upping the fees but hie made a treaty that you would have equal employment. Everybody is talking about equal employment. A Republican President
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did that. He said you could raise the Panamanian flag wherever the American flag was raised, and that is what the children were trying to do.
They talk of communism, and I had a delightful time because I had been in riots and civil disturbances for 4 years. I started with the Marions, Berrigans, wait-ins, sit-ins, and any that you want to mention. They started in iRock Hill, S.C. That is the first march that our distinguished-and I have most respect for him, and I agree on the holiday that our cities voted, and the city of Charleston where I lived-Martin Luther King Day-that we have learned a lot from his leadership, but ait that time I was trying to keep the peace and I pulled off the ragged city policeman and put black policemen all around and as a result, when there were arrests made there was not the TV result and they wVent on to Montgomery and, Bull Connor, gave them what they were looking for. It actually started in Rock Hill, S.C. I had 4 years of it with not a single e life lost and not a person with serious inury. And there were not anly Communists.
This gentleman I was debating thinks every disturbance like 1964 in Panama -was communism.
Then he explained how one could not physically get into the country later on in the debate, but he said certainly colonialism is not the problem.
So now I quote General Underwood, his commander:
Most Panamanians have felt for years that this treaty is unfair to them, dsregards their sovereign rights, and urgently needs modernization to reflect today's world rather than the colonial practices that were fashionable 74 years ago.
Going on further, under the limits of time here:
My own position in capsule form, is that the status quo is an unacceptable course of action; ...
That status quo is what the opposition wants and when we try to show some judgmental capacity, they say, "Well, we can give them a l ittle more money or do a l ittl e bit of this. Oh, yes, we believe in revising 0 treaties and everything else." t
But:
My own position in capsule form is that the status quo is anunacceptable course of action; that a new treaty is needed to puify what Panama and much Of the world see is outdated colonialist role of the United States; ...
Madam President, let me read one little paragraph that ought to be brought to the attention of every Senator, and I will h ave t o read it again when we get better attendance on the floor because it points out the problem that they do not think wve have, and I quote General Underwood: "The point here is that no collection of legalisms-"
No collection of legalisms, I say to the Senator from Utah and the Senator from Vermont and other Senators around... No collection of legalisms, no expert reading of history to the contrary, no citing of the benefitsThat is another flare they bring up:
...No citing of the benefits bestowed upon Panama by our building, operating and defending the canal will ever convince the typical Panamanian that his country's sovereignty has not been violated by our occupation of the Canal Zone and our independent operation of the canal. It makes no difference which side has the best arguments or which side has the cleanest interpretation of history. Panama happens to believe it has been wronged and will persist in that belief to the bitter end.
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This is, I interject, Madam President, this is the root cause of thehigh tension between Panama and the United States: This is a festering sore that poisons our relations. That is why I would tell visitors who asked for my appraisal of the situation confrontin,' the Southern Comwand at Panama, "We are walking onl eggshells and trying to be light-footed about it."
Now, where are the opposition with all those scenarios? They worryV about what is going to happen 20 years f rom now. I am concerned about what is going to happen in 20 days, what is going to happen in 20 weeks,~ in 20 months.
I asked about a country like Colombia, when my distinguished collea gue from Virginia and I were there. I asked what would happen if thle treaties were rejected. We were told, "They would try to take advantage of it. Turn the treaty down, and there would be violence anld bombings." Senator Scott said, "1How long would that ()o on?" They said, "That would go on just as long as th e President here allows it,, and politically hie would have to allow it to go on for several days, perhaps weeks."
It is a sad situation that we comie to where a good sized part of our Senators, Members of this body, some in a political vein-and I commiend the distinguished minority leader for not joining that; I commend the distinguished former President Gerald Ford, because I really believe if we ratify this treaty we are going~ to have to attribute a lot to his strong feel of what is in the best interest of this country; but some, just in a political vein, are usint-r the inflammatory language about "ramming the treaties through in a plebiscite," and "What about Omiar? Check it -with Omar."
That is silly talk. We are here together, trying to make the best we can out of a situation where, as General Underwood says, we are walking, on eggs. We do have a problem that they do not want to recognize, and thy all think it is a class 1 contract in freshman law, trying to find what the contract means, and where are the ends and bits, and everything else.
I was rather amused about the investigat ions of the past habits of people, where the Senator from Louisiana admonished us. Ile said, "Lord, I have been through that." Hle said, "You can go ahead and stud y f or years on end, through the FBI, CIA, the Attorney General and. Justice Department files, and have a merry chase, study for 2 years, and perhaps conclude that youi would not join in any kind of treaty or otherwise. But then a year and a half or 2 years would have passed, and we aire looking at oursel ves. "
We could care less about Torrijos, because, as I1 have said before, he' is totally unpredictable. We do care about our interests in the Republic of Panama. We do care about our defense interests, about being naked.
Incidentally, that point should be clearly understood. Why would the commanders of the military all co-me up and talk in terms of enhancing our defenses? You would think that we were going- up there walking away, and had no defenses. I will never forget talking with General Rogyers. the Chief of Staff of the Army, one evening. I said. "General, my colleague and other opponents of the treaty say you can't speak for yourselves."
TIe said, 1"Oh, no, we all have our inputs, but one a decision is made we support that decision. The difference here," he said, "is as chiefs, we
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are advocates; we volunteer to go out and make talks and advocate the ratification of these treaties." He said, "We don't have to do that."
Gen. George Brown:
I think to describe the United States, with this action. as proof that the United States is a paper tiger is absolutely wrong. I think rather it shows the United States to be determined to live in the world of today, not in the world of yesterday. I think it shows we profited by the experience of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the French in Algeria and Indochina, and ourselves in the Philippines. We left the Philippines for the same reasons that I think we should negotiate these treaties. It is in recognition of the importance of the Panama Canal that I feel -we should do this, because we would then be guaranteeing, I think, a Letter opportunity and guaranteed in the future of the use of the canal.
A better guarantee.
Gen. Bernard liogers, Chief of Staff of the Aimy:
I can certainly defend the canal much betterThis is a comparisonmuch better under the new treaty than under the present one.
Adi. fRobert Long, Vice Chief of Naval Operations:
We think these treaties will enhanceI emphasize the word "enhance"the probability of our maintaining the use of the canal.
Gen. Louis Wilson also:
I support the President in seeking the new treaty.
Lt. Gen. Dennis B. McAuliffe, zone commander, the soldier immediately responsible for maintaining the security of the United States there:
Our capability to keep the canal open will be enhanced, considerably enhanced, b'y the Provisions of the treaty.
Therein, Mr. President, is the whole thing. What would we do under the present treaty? They all worry about the year 2000. I hear talk amongst the colleagues; they think that we do not have many veterans among us now. They say, "Oh, we have got so many, 45 Members of the House of IRepresentatives," Senator f rom Calif ornia, "who never served in the military." And the legion was in town on last evcing, and you hear that undercurrent of f eeling and apprehension, that before long we are not going to be able to get the votes to def end our country and commit this country, and everything else of that kindj.
I -worry some -about that, too, but I worry more about the present. What would we do under this present treaty to put down an uprising in the next day or two. What would we do? Wewul av o cup t Everyone on this floor agrees with that. We would move in mor e oldi ers; there would be civil unrest, teewuld be little incidents, a demonstration here, a handgrenade there, and they would brings in, on the 7 o'clock news, two or three bodies with flags around them. he there would be somebody blow up asteamer. You cannot prevent sabotage, Mr. President, I live in a seaport town. If you think you can protect a vessel, where they are bringing in drugs and contraband, IvNotu a re fooIi ng youirsel f. E ve ryb ody kn ow7s the se c an alI locks ai e s ubj ect to Sb o tagre, and it cannot be prevented except as it has been prevented, by a friendly population and an understanding people, a people with an interest.
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Here, under the new treaties, we vest the Panamanians with a vested interest in what they have been fight-ingr for, their own nationalism, their right to determination of their own self destiny. Now we w,,ant to Give them that through the, new treaties, and the other crowd says, "What.? What about the new treaties? What will happen -when we give then that? WVYhat about the cost?"
Three, weeks ag o the United Nations- Economic, Commission said we m-nade $12 billion in saved costs, economically, for the United States. So (-i-e them a billion. We left $5 billion, I think, when we pulled out of Saio'on, in one day. I do not know how many billion in total it cost us, and (56,000 lives over a 12-year period, but at least $5 billion that 1 day.
-What if it does add up to a billion bucks?
The' Secretary of the Navy said, in 1976, that $200 million was saved in his budget as a result of having that canal there.
There are untold benefits that the Panamanians have enjoyed and that the United States has enjoyed. But when it comes down to costs, when we are sitting around here, voting up next year's appropriations, and we hear -we have been subsidizing them $8 million for the previous T7 years, why worry now about the cost?
Iam worried about the cost to us as at people, because what could -we do, Senator from Alabama, under that present treaty? We would have to turn a friendly people into a hostile people. We would have to turn a commercial operation-really, I would like to go into some of these thingTs: that is why I went there to visit. Going on down to the Navy there. I think there are about 600 communications personnel, the highest Olle of them holding the ra,)nk of captain. A line of communications, not of negotiation. And this is all off shore. This does not affect the ratificattion of these new treaties. We have got our defenses there.
We have our defenses there. We are not being taken there. They are not coming to the canal.
.We have our Air Force, and I hope the Air Force around the canal is not fiddling around at Howard Field I hope we are in Florida and Charleston, S.C. We will alert them long before they get to the canal. If -we do not, then this countr-y is in sad shape. About defending the canal? We will defend it from fields in Alabama, South Carolina, and Florida. We are going to defend that canal. Do not worry about it.
There is no navy. There is not a naval vessel down there,, other than
'ofhr.gunboats, things to fish from, things like that. But there is the Air Force.
ILet us go back to the present treaty. -Now we have met, we have done what the Senator from Alabama has asked. We have refused to r"Itfy, and thieyv all are going to come up with all kinds of aid programs. I can see it now. We ought to give them a little more money, a little -more hal'clout.
Talk about arrogance. It was the, Senator from AlaL ma who uped thaqt terminolo,v, n ot the Senator from South Carolina, who injected the word "arrogance." I think that is arrogance, giving' them a Yt tle more handout.
Then in the fiffties and sixties, I remember one colleague who still serves sai d, "Now they havena ref rigerator, a stove. Some of them -want automobiles. What else do the blacks want?"
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Turn the treaties down and then come up with the aid programs, how they ought to get a better deal down there, and everything else, and then wonder why we have had to occupy a friendly country, why we cannot get a single country in the entire 151 nations of the United Nations to vote on our side, as the Senator from New York said.
They have proven that bef ore the National Security Council. It is as if we have the options to fiddle around to the year 2000.
Mr. MOYNIHA-N.Will the Senator yield?
Mr. HOLLIN GS. I would be l ad to yiel d.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would like to rise not to interrupt an extraordinarily important statement, but to say that I shall be speaking later in the day precisely to the point about the United Nations and to say it is exactly as the Senator has described it. This treaty, far from being a retreat in American policy, has the potential to become an extraordinary forward movement in our relations with the rest of the world. In spac' of 10 years' time we may well reverse completely the understanding in the United Nations, for example, of what the United States stands for and what Cuba stands for.
A decade ago Cuba said it stood for resistance to imperialism, for resistance to militarism, for all those wonderful things.. We were said to stand for armies, for occupation of other people's lands. But pass this treaty and wve will be the people of the future, while the Cubans, murdering and killing and burning their way through Africa, will be the discredited militant imperialists, which in fact they are, and they will be completely rejected in Latin Amierica. The turning point will be this treaty.
Mr. HOLLINGS. The distinguished Senator from New York has a grasp of the situation and certainly a better capability to articulate.
I visited South America ais a Governor in 1960.1'We were on the tail end of an operation. PanAmerican, under John Eisenhower, and then ,John Kennedy has his operation which I cannot pronounce. It is in Spanish. Will the Senator f rom New York help his colleague?
Mr. MOYNIHAN, The Senator will think it is the Aliamza para El Progresso. It has a particullar difficulty in Spanish because it can be translated equally as the alliance for or the alliance against progress.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Well, now, some 17 years later, it looks like an alliance against progress.
After World War II, where did we go. They had done everyting. They had furnished supplies, they 'bad helpDed us with the cana, they hiad helped us with the raw materials. Latin America made a tremendous sacrifice for freedomalong with the United States, hand in glove.
Then what did we do? We said we had to gro to Japan to rebuild; we had to go to Germany and rebuild. What did we do down under? Absol utely nothing.
'We started to penalize them' because of the depression. The gold and th-e silver money demeaned their dignity in the way they paid. They still had to use separate water fountains and everything else.
Here we were with the Marshall Pl an and all, which we are all very proud of. What did we do down under? AVWe turned it around the other way and hiad a bad neirhbor p-olicy.
Mr. MOYNIHTAN. Will the Senator agreprecaln httelrei
country in Latin America, Brazil. one of the largest countries in -the world, joined us in the war atgainsst the Fascists, and the Nazis, and sent. troops to Europe?
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Mr. HOLLINGS. Yes, and one of their g generals served under Gen. MNark Clark, of the 3-d Army, in Italy. That general and others reminded me of that when I was in Brazil. Gen. Mark Clark, the Army commandere, who now lives in Charleston, is one of our most noted Soldiers.
Mr. President, I have gone over my time slightly. The Senator from California has been waiting. I think I will yield at this moment and
thncome back and -complete my thoughts. I yield the floor at this time.
A. General-Pro
(4) Senator Paul Sarbanes, March 17, 1978 (S 3995-97)
Mr. SARBANES. I want to thank the very able Senator from Vermont (Mr. Leahy) for giving us St. Patrick's Day here on the floor of the Senate.
Mr. President, I am not going to take the time of my colleagues in any extended fashion, but I do want to make some observations about the Panama Canal Treaty.
The treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal have been advised and consented to on yesterday by the Senate bya vote of 68 to 32-and I am always struck by the treaty requirement and the extraordinary majority it makes necessary in the Senate of the United States, for eve ry vote against the treaty it is necessary to have two votes for the treaty. A 68 to 32 vote on any issue of difference or controversy is a very considerable margin, but it does not exceed by all that much what is required to pass a treaty, so the treaty requirement, the two-thirds requirement, is really a very heavy burden to carry.
I think it reflects well on the merits of the substantive provisions of the treaty that the Neutrality Treaty commanded a 68 to 32 margin. That having been concluded we now move to the Panama Canal Treaty,. which is now pending before the Senate, which we will have to deal with in a similar fashion, as article by article it is opened for amendments. I understand there are a number of amendments pending at the des. Is the information readily available, Mi. President, as to how many amendments there are pending to this treaty?
The PRE SIDING OFFICER. There are 51 amendments, reservations, declarations, and understandings at the desk, a total of 51.
Mr. SARBANES. How many amendments are there to the text of the treaty? Is it 40 ?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will determine. There are 38 amendments to the treaty.
Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, in the course of considering this treaty, the 14 articles which make up the Panama Canal Treaty, I am sure we will discuss many of the provisions in some detail. I simply want to Limderscore,. since this is the treaty which applies to the 22-year period between now and the end of this century, that some of the provisions which are in this treaty accord very extensive rights to the United States.
Under the treaty, the United States is granted rights necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the Panama Canal and to manage, operate, maintain, improve, protect, and defend the canal. Those., are rights which the United States will have.
Among those rights in article III, which is the article which discusses the canal operation and maintenance, it is stated: In carrying out this function of managing, operating, and maintaining the Panama Canal, its complementary works, installations, and equipment, and to
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provide for the orderly transit of vessels through the Panama Canal, the United States may do a number of things, including the following: Use for the aforementioned purposes, without cost except as provided in the Treaty, the various installations and areas (including the Panama Canal) and waters, described in the Agreement in Implementation of this Article as well as such other areas and installations as are made available to the United States under this treaty and related agreements.
Second, the United States can make such improvements and alterations to the aforesaid installations and areas as it deems appropriate consistent with the terms of the treaty;
Third, the United States can make and enforce all rules pertaining to the passage of vessels through the canal and other rules with respect to navigation and maritime matters;
Fourth, the United States can establish, modify, collect, and retain tolls, for the use of the Panama Canal, and other charges, and establish and modify methods of their assessment;
Fifth, the United States regulates relations with employees of the U.S. Government; andl
Sixth, the 'United States will provide supporting services to facilitate the performance of its responsibilities.
Those are rather extensive rights, and those are the rig-hts, among others-because the treaty goes on to set out some general provisionswhich the United States will have over the next 22 years in the operation and the management of the Panama Canal. Of course, once we reach the end of this century, the transition will be accomplished with the operation and management of the canal then being done by the Republic of Panama.
The treaty further provides that in carrying out this function of managing and operating the canal it shall be done by a U.S. Government agency to be know as the Panama Canal Commission. Nine inem11bers, five of them Americans and four of them Panamanians, will comprise the Commission.
They will be the board which will supervise the work of the Panamna Canal, five of whom shall be nationals of the United States and four of whom shall be Panamanian nationals proposed by the Republic of Panama for appointment to such positions by the United stat-es of America in a tnmely manner.
So the majority, five, will be Americans and the remainder, four, will be proposed by Panama to the United States for appointment.
The treaty also provides that the United States shall have primary responsibility to protect and defend the canal. There is an agreement,. comparable to a status-of -forces agreement, which has been negotiated to cover the rights of our military people and their dependents. We will have the primary responsibility to protect and defend the canal.
To facilitate cooperation of the Armed Forces of both countries in the protection and defense of the canal-and this is an effort to work out a cooperative relationship between the United States and the Rlepublic of Panama-there will be a combined board established by the United States and the Republic of Panama comprised of an equal number of senior military representatives of each party. These representafives shall be charged with consulting and cooperating on all matters pertaining to the protection and defense of the canal, and with planting actions to be taken in concert for that purpose.
So there is a combined board that will consult and advise and plan.
The treaty goes on to provide that such com bined protection and defense arrangements shall not inhibit the identity or lines of authority of the Armed Forces of the United States of America or the Republic of Panama.
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While -we have this combined board for the purposes of consultation, for the purposes of advice, the lines of authority of our Armed Forces are not inhibited. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, under another provision of this treaty the primary responsibility to protect and defend the canal is in American hands.
I think it is clear under these two articles I have been quoting, article III and article IV, that both in terms of operating and managing the Panama Canal and in terms of protecting and defending the Panama Canal, it is the United States which is given the powers and authorities under this treaty to meet those responsibilities.
Other provisions in the treaty provide for a shared effort in trying to protect the environment in the Republic of Panama, something important to both countries. The United States, of course, depends, as do all countries who seek to use the canal, on the watershed contained in the Republic of Panama to produce the water to make it possible f or the canal to function.
There are also in article VIII very extended provisions given the United States certain privileges and immunities in the course of our operations.
Let me just read a couple of those so we can have some appreciation of the range and extent of the privilege and immunities which the ITnited States have.
Agencies and instrumentialities of the. Government of the United States of America operating in the Republic of Panama pursuant to the tr-aty and related agreements, shall be immune from the jur-isdiction of the Republic of Panama.
There is also a provision that installations owned or used by the agencies or instrumentalities of the United States of America operating in the Republic of Panama pursuant to the treaty and related agreements, and their official archives and documents, shall be inviolable.
So there is an effort here, recognizing the responsibilities which the United States 'will continue to have over the next 22 years, almost a qu rter of a century, with respect to operating, managing, protecting, and defending the, PanamnaCanal, to give to us a grant of ights sufIcient to carry out those responsibilities. I think that grant is very important. I think that many people do not fully appreciate how extensive and extended those grants of authority are in terms of giving
-the United States the ability to continue toimeet its responsibilities with respect to the Panama Canal.
There are other provisions in the Panama Canal Trea'-ty that deal ~with the transition over to Panama of various functions in the Canal Zone. Under the treaty the zone will cease to exist as a corridor of land dividing the Republic of Panama in two and, in effect, -will become part, just like any other part, of the territory of the Republic of Panama. Certain rights will be reserved for the operations of American Government agencees and certain protections provided for American employees, military and civilian, and their dependents and f amilies, who are involved in the Republic of Panama in helping to carry forward the operation, management, protection, and defense functions with respect to t'he Panama Canal. But the zone dividing the country into two will be gone. So that situation, an American extraterritorial
presece, ill no longer be the case.
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Now, at one point in the debate, someone suggested that oly a small portion of the population of Panama was on one sideof the Canal Zone, that most of the population was on the other side; and therefore, they suggested it really should not matter very much to the Panamanians that their country was divided by this zone. Mr. President, how can we overlook the sensitivity of any people to another power controlling a strip of land through their country and thereby dividing their nation. I can understand the sensitivity that any people would have-I think we in the United 'States would be extremely sensitive in the reverse situation. In fact a good percentage of the population of the iRepublic of Panamna is located on either side of this Canal Zone and it really does therefore in every sense, divide the country into two. Panamanians, when traveling through the zone are in effect., traveling through another jurisdiction. They are subject, then, to diff erent courts and different police, and so forth. One of the things that wvill take place under the treaty is that there will no longer be a zone dividing the Republic of Panamna into two, with all of the problems that have come with that situation.
Mr. President, there are some very careful provisions contained in this treaty with respect to employment: First of all, an effort to protecet those people already working on the Panama Canal and their' particular rights; and second, an eff ort to gVIN7e an opportunity to InIclude the Panamanian people more and more in the work of the Panama Canal; so that, over time, they, in effect, will gain the experience and the training that will be necessary to manage, conduct, operate, and maintain this important facility when at the end of the century they assume full responsibility. Theme are some very careful provisions that have been worked out *to accomplish this. I think reflcting, a great deal of concern, for those who are already working' there and also a concern that the people of Panama should haye an 1 opportunity to participate in making this can'a1 work. Iii a sense, it is a great opportunity to show the benefits of mutual cooperation and a
grea opprtuity for young people and not-so-young people !In the Republic of Panama to develop the skills that -will enable th-em1 to operate this major facility.
Almost 80 percent of the work force today on the Panama Canal are Panamnanians. It has grieved mne greatly, in the course of som-e 0oF' the debate that we have had on this issue, to hav e it suggested by sonic on the floor of the Senate that the Panamani'ans may not be capable of operating the canal, that they do not have the capacityaticonduc this major facility. I think that is nonsense. The work of the aa today is largely carried on by Panamanians.
On a visit to Panama, meeting with employees who0 work on1 the canal, one of the inquiries that was made was how eff ective the Panamanians were a's employees. The response we received w as that. they were the equal in every respect to other employees, Americaiis or' others, who wv ere working on the canal. I think it. is clear that the capacity is there.
What is needed is the opportunity. These treaties hold out an opportunity to the people of Panama to move increasingly into higher posi tions and to assume, more and more, the responsibility for the operations of this canal.
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In that 'sense, it is a great opportunity, not only for them but f or the United States, working with- the people of Panama in order to assure the efficient and effective operation of this canal indefinitely into the future.
Mr. President, there are other provisions in the treaty which I am sure we will discuss at much greater length-a provision for a sea-level canal and the provisions for Panama's economic participation in the canal, in which the tolls will provide certain payments to theRepublic of Panama, which, of course, will then bring them a return on their gYreatest natural asset commensurate with what they have devoted to this international waterway.
TIn short, Mr. President, the treaty now before us, the Panama Canal Treaty, that we are now considering, having approved the other treaty 68 to 32. off ers the opportunity to develop between the United States and the IRepublic of Panama and between the peoples of our two countries a cooperative relationship which can be an example to the whole world. AtV the same time, it insures certain grants of rights to the United States -which will fully enable us to meet our role to operate and manage the canal and our role to protect and defend the canal, since we will have the direct responsibility for both of those functions for the balance of this century, for almost another quarter of a centurvy.
I submit, Mr. President, that this treaty, just like the one that has been approved, is a treaty that well serves important basic American interests and ought to command the approval of this body.
Mr.* SARBANES. In the days ahead I know we will consider some 40 amendments, or those. at least those that will be called up that are pending at the desk. I hope we will be able to proceed, as I have indicated earlier in the debate, in an expeditions way to do that.
Someone said earlier today that the first treaty -was like an exhibition gamie and that this -was the real game. I differ with that. It is really like a double-header. You know, we have had just a brief pause in between and we are now into the second game of the double-header.
I must say, if you talk about cooperation between the United States and Panama, referring to baseball, I end on this note: A major sport in Pan ama is baseball. They are close to us in so many ways and this is but another example. Rod Carew who is such an extraordinary performer in this country and as I think many people know, he is a Panama11"ni'an citizen. Ilie has been the batting leader in the American League now for a number of years with an extraordinary average, almost .400 last year, and I only bring that up at the close of ths afternoon to underscore once again how mnuch, in so many ways we share as two people; and I hone that the debate that we have had over the course of the past weeks will not in any lasting g way do anything to harm the relationship or weaken the friendship which has existed between the people of this country and the -people of Panama.
It has been a special friendship. I hope that we will move ahead to approve this treaty, and that we -will1 do it in such a way that the strength of the ties between our two countries will develop and increase.
A. General-Pro
(5) Senator Robert Morgan, April 17, 1978 (S 5624-29)
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, we have been on this issue now for approximately 2 months, and I suspect that about everything has been ,said on behalf of these treaties that can be said, as well as all that can be said against the treaties, and I doubt that anything I could
say\, this afternoon would change the minds of any of those who are prepared to vote.
But I would like to take a few moments of the Senate's time and state for the IRecord some of my thoughts about these treaties, some of the things I have studied, and some of my belief s about them, and why I intend, barring any unforeseen development between now and tomorrow afternoon at 6 o'clock, to cast m-y vote in f avor of ratification of the treaty before the Senate, as I did for the Treaty of Neutrality which was ratified by the Senate some 2 or 3 weeks ago.
I would say in the beginning, Mr. President, that there are a lot of things in these two treaties with which I disagree, but I doubt that anyone can draft any treaties or that any treaties could be drafted with wichI'elI I -would agree completely and in totality. As a matter of f act, I doubt if treaties could be drafted that would be satisfactory to any Member of the Senate as well as the Government of Panama.
But, as taken as a whole, I believe the treaties are in the best interests of the United States, the national security of this country and, therefore, I think they should be ratified.
I want to address my remarks primarily to three topics this afternoon in the debate, if time permits. I want to talk a little about the history
-which has led me to the conclusion that the time for a new treaty arranrgem-ent with Panama is now. And then I want to address the tough questions which we all have to answer abot the second treaty dealing with the Panama Canal. And, finally, I want to speak of my personal conlvictions about the canal issue and about my hopes for our country.
No issue to my recollection has aroused so much debate and controversy, and certainly no issue during my 4-year tenure in the U.S. Senate has generated so much mail from the American people. While at times the communications we have received have been less than pleasant, I am refreshed and I am reassured by the public debate on this issueC.
I have just returned from a long weekend of travels back and forth across the State of North Carolinaf where I have talked to literally hundTreds of people, and T am impressed with the knowledge of the people concerning' the issues before us, and I am impressed with the willingness of what I believe to be the majority of the people of North Carolina to place their trust and their confidence in the majority of the Members of this Senate.
We have a great country, Mr. President, and I believe that the greatness of this country requires us to make some decisions that a lesser country could not afford to make. It is this time of decision which prompts me to speak about the Panama Canal treaties.
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Let me say, Mr. President, that my concern about these treaties did not begin in August of last year when the President of the United. States announced that an agreement had been reached between the Governments of Panama and of this country. My concern and my interest began during the first year that I arrived in the Senate.
Like so many of my colleagues and like so many of my constituents in North Carolina when I was first approached about the idea of a new treaty on the Panama Canal which might eventually turn over control of the canal to the Panamnanian Government, I was repelled by the idea. Like more than a majority of the Members of this Senate, when asked in 1975 to join in a resolution expressing our displeasure and opposition to any kind of a new treaty with Panama, I joined in that resolution.
But like so many of my colleagues and my constituents Ii joinedin sponsoring that resolution without first taking the time to ascertain whereof I was speaking.
Later on, in the latter part of 1976, on behalf of and at the behest of another committee on which I serve, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and at the request of mny distinguished chairman, the senior Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye), 1 undertook a trip, along with my assistant, Mr. Ricks of that committee, to visit the Canal Zon e, not for the purpose of talking about the Panama Canal Treaty but looking at the Southern Command of the U.S. military forces, looking at the defense intelligence agencies of that command.
It was while I was there and talking with the people in the defense intelligence agencies of our country, and tallking with the Amipric"YaA Ambassador, in going through the Canal Zone and meeting with theCitizens Association of the Canal Zone, and with the rank and file of the Panamanians, that I came home in January of 1977 and said to the people of my State that I felt that some adj ustments and som-e arrangements ought to be made with the people of Panama: that we had come a long way from the days of gunboat diplomacy, a diplomacy that was accepted by most all of the world when we acquired the right to build that canal, and that, if we expected to develop a relationship, which would help us develop some kind of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, we had to do what, in my mind, was right, and to arrive at a new relationship with the people of Panama. At the same timie,. we had to provide for the national security of this country, and provide that the canal would remain open for shipping not only for the United& States but for all of the worl d.
I expressed my opinion through the media in North Carolina after that, having no idea that within the period of a few months an agreement would be reached between our two countries.
I can understand the frustrations of the Panamanian people, who, time and time again, since the day that the 1903 treaty was signed, have expressed their indignation and their displeasure at the terms of the 1903 treaty.
We cannot right all the wrongs that have been committed in this country, Mr. President, in years past, because if we did we probably would have given this country back to the Indians. But I think that when wrongs have been committed, even though they were right in the eyes of the world at the time that they were committed, and they are-
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still causing dissatisfaction, that we are bigr enough in this country to take a look at them and reexamine ourselves. We are a great enough and strong enough nation to do what is right, and to look at the facts.
The people on that little isthmnus that now constitutes the country of Panama have long been a furiously nationalistic people, almost snce the date when the country was discovered by the Spanish explorers in 1501, and since the days when Christopher Columbus visited it in 1502. The history of that isthinus did not began with the United St ates. "You know, after all, what Panama is, we in the United States made it."
I am not sure that is true. In 1529. over 400 years ago. the Explorer Cortez (drafted a plan for a canal route. Tn 1534I, again more than 400 years a go, the King, of Spain ordered a survey for a ship canal. In 1535 there was a highway built across the Isthmus of Panama, where the Spaniards, having brought their gold up f romn the west coast of South Amierica, off loaded it at the narrow 50-m1ile isthmus and carried it across the isthnums on laud, and then put it on their ships which carried the gold to Europe. At one time, the three most thriving metropolises in the whole Western World were Panama City, Mexico City, and( Lima, Peru.
What I am saying is that Panama has been a center of commerce for th e world a long9, 1ong time and has been a most independent nation. In 1814. nearly 90 years before we began to get involved in the building of thae canal, the Spaniards attempted to construct a canal, but they were interrupted by a revolt. Again in 1821, Panama, apart from the country of New Granada, severed relationships with Spain at the time of the Latin American independence movements. At that point, Panamia joined the country of Colombia. From that time until the independence, which we helped bring about by revolution in 1903, tlime and time again these furiously nationalistic people tried to establish their own province, but time and time again their revolutions were put down.
I point that out to say that the nationalistic tendency in this part of the world is not something of recent origin, but something that has existed since the very founding of the Nation. It is something we in this country have to recognize and ought to deal with. We have to deal with it, -Mr. President, because I believe that it is in the national interest of this country that we remove some of the sources of irritation to ou r Latin American neighbors that have prevented us from building the kind of solid support there that we seek from those countries.
As I returned home from Panama in 1976, I stopped by for a day or two in Mexico City. While visiting there, I said to the American Ambassador,
How are our relations with Mexico? Do they trust us? Are they afraid?
He said to me,
Well, Senator, T think relations between Mexico and the United States are pi-etty good, considering the fact that or- the 13th of September of every year the Mle(ans have a national celebration in which they stand in Chapultapec Castle and read off the names of the young cadets that we Americans killed in storming that castle in Mexico City in the 1840's.
Three times since the turn of the century we have used military force in the country of Mexico. Thirty-eight times, or maybe 39, since
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1891, we have used force in Latin American countries. No later than the last decade, we used military force in moving into the Dominican Republic.
So when we study the record of the United States, I think we can readily see why many of our Latin American friends to the south are somewhat dubious of us, and somewhat afraid to join into meaningful coalitions for the protection of all of the Western Hemisphere.
I was speaking, with the Ambassador from Mexico who served here in Washington som-e time ago. He is a great f riend of the United States,, and he said to me, "Senator, did you know that your country had takent half or more than half of our country in the last 100 or so years?"
That astounded me. I knew we had annexed Texas. I did not f ully~ realize we had taken Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, and the area covered by Nevada, all in the last 100 or so years.
You know, those of us who live down in the South are not quite overthe Civil War yet. We live with our brothers from the North, we speak the same language, and yet I1 must confess to you that there are. animosities in the South today against the people f rom the North. Can you imagine the kind of fear that must rest in the minds and hearts of these people who live to the south of us, who do not speak our language, and who have seen us time and time again, all in the interest of pro-tection of American property or for the purpose of collecting levies, or for whatever reasons may have existed-can you imagine their fear when we have used military force against them so often?
Mr. President, as I have examined all of these facts, I have concluded that it is time that we in this country let the world know and let our neighbors and friends in the Western Hemisphere know that we want to work together to build a unified front against the ever-expanding and increasing Communism in this world. It disturbs me, Mr, President, when I look at a map of the world. If you will, visualize a map of the world and picture in your mind the countries that are controlled by Communist f orces and under the influence of Communist forces. If you look at that map, you will see all across the top of the continent of Europe nothing but red: the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and I could go on. Picture in your mind's eye the map of Asia, and look at the great land masses of China, Vietnam, North Korea, and others. You know, there would not be a whole lot of land left where there is freedom, where there is a free and democratic society. Really, when you look at it, the Western Hemisphere is about all that is left, with only one spot of a Communist- dominated country. Mr. President, I believe it is in the interest of this country that we do something about it.
For example, we have 2,200 miles of common border with our neighbor to the South-Mexico, a great neighbor and a great friend. There are 60 million people in Mexico, and the population is expected to double in the next 19 years. They are living in crowded conditions. They are living on about 12 percent of the arable land.
Today, because of the great poverty in that area, we are constantly troubled by illegal aliens who cross the border and come into the United States. We cannot control that because of this 2,200 miles of border.
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Thank goodness, I see no tendency despite this poverty of our neighbor to the South-Mexico-turning towards communism. But I will say this to you, Mr. President, that there is very little middle class in Mexico. As I drove through the suburbs of Mexico City I observed poverty, the likes of which I have never seen. There are people there who are just ripe for the picking by some Communist leader who has a knack for inspiring the people. If you were living in abject poverty, Mr. President, and had no hope under the present system, you would be a lot more inclined to follow any leader who might come along.
Yet, Mexico, With all Of its Poverty aind all of its needs for econom-ic assistance, is afraid of our country, with all its wealth. They are af raid of the "imperialistic" United States that has not only taken more than half of its country away from them, but also has, since the turn of the century, used military force on so imany different occasions.
That is why it is important that we not only do something to iprove our relations in Latin America, but also to improve our relations with the country of Panama, wNihich I think has great affection for the United States.
IMr. President, I have heard a lot of talk about General Torrijos. I
-would say, in all fairness, that I think General Torrijos is a strongyarmed Latin American leader, but I have heard very little said about other leaders of Panama.
On my visit, I sat in the office of the President of Panamia for more than a half-day, a man named Lakais, a first-generation Panamanian whose mother and father came from Greece, a man who was not a political leader but a contractor, who accepted the challenge of the presidency of that country in order to try to do something to improve the quality of lif e and the plight of the people there.
President Lakas was educated in America. He spent 7 years at Texas A.& M., and if you closed your eyes, Mr. President, you could almost hear our late President Lyndon Johnson speaking, or John Connally, or someone else with a typical Texas accent.
1 went to the office of the Minister of Economics and Planning. a very important office in that country. I f ound there a man named Mr. Barletta,. educated at North Carolina State University where he received a B.A. degree in agricultural economics; where he received a master's degree in agricultural economics, and from where he went on to get his doctorate degree at Chicago; a man who -was schooled in the American system of free enterprise; a man who has been recog nized by almost all who know him as one of the brilliant minds of all of Latin America.
No one can convince mie that M,\r. Barletta has any Communist leanings.
I visited with the Miniister of Forei !n Af1fairs, a man who was educated at LaSalle University and Stanford University.
These people know what life in America, is like, -and they are the people whio literally run the country on a day-to-day basis. It is not to say that Torrijos is not a strong man. He came from a major's rank in the National Guard, and sometimes that f rightens us.
I see a real desire, on the part of the people of Panlama and the g 'ffovernment leaders. They want to be friends with us. They want to improve their plight.
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Mr. President, I go back to what I said earlier, these people are f uriously nationalistic. It did not begin with the time that we began neg-otiating the treaties. Some 53 times between 1846 and 1903 the people l iving in this small province of Panama tried to secede from Colomibia, but they were not able to do so. It was only when we promised to protect them in their revolt that they were able to do it. I think there is no question but that we did protect then. Because of that, and because of their desire to be free, they were so very disappointed by the 19030 treaty.
What happened? The French company tried to build the canal f rom somewhere around 1878 to the time 1885. The company failed because of the loss of about 20,000 lives to malarial fever and yellow fever and had crone bankrupt. They wanted to salvage what they could from theirI venture. They approached us and asked us if we would pay them $40 million to take over their assets.
Of course we were interested. We had tried in the 1820's to get the righlt to build a canal. We had been turned down by Colombia because they -were afraid of us. We tried again in 1846 to get the right to build the canal and were turned down because they were afraid of us, even though they did let us build a railroad on the condition that we agree to let them use the railroad to protect the sovereignty of the province of Panama.
I point out something I have not heard mentioned on the floor of the Senate. In 1868 the Secretary of State William Seward, negotiated a treaty with Colombia which would have given the United Sta,)tes the exclusive right to construct an iLsthmian canal. Again it was rejected by the Colombian Senate.
-Nevertheless, -when -we were approached in 1902 and 1903, we were wi'llingy to bargain. What happened? We went to Colombia and spid, "We want to negotiate a treaty to build this canal. We want to take over the assets." All we asked for was the right to construct the canal and to maintain it until the year 2000. We agreed to pay the French cornuany. whose stock was held by a man named Bu1nani-Varilla., $40 million, to pay Colombia $10 million, and an annual annuity of a quarter million doll-ars.
Once we had done that, again the Senate of Colombia turned it down.
Mr. President, -we hiad some idea they were going to turn it down, so
-we had been doing a little footwork in this country through Mr. BunanMaIla and through a lawyer in New York by the name of William Cromwell. We sort of expected it so -we were laying the foundation to grenerate another rebellion.
Bunan-Varilla was very much interested in bringing this matter to a conclusion because his ri-ghts ran out in 1904. When the Colombian Senate rejected that treaty in Auffist of 1903 hiis f orces went to work. During Au,(ust, Sentember, and October, -we helped to brine' about a revolution. Bu1nani-Vtoilla led the people in the province to believe that if they would iinst declare their independence, American warships would appear off the coast to protect the revolutionaries and to prevent Colombi.a- from puttingY down the revoluitio-n in their own country.
So on November 2 and 3, jiist as hie hadl planned, the Panamanians declared their independence, just as they li7 ad been ledl to belIieve, our warships appeared off the coast. And just as they had been led to be-
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Ilieve, we ref used to comply with our commitments of the 1840's refusing to let the Colombians use our railroad to transport their troops.
So the revolution came about.
I do not think anyone can really say we fomented the revolution, but I think it is pretty obvious that Bunan-Varilla knew from us what was going to happen. After that, we recognized Panama as a nation within 3 days. z
In less than 2 weeks, right here in Washington, Secretary of State Hay had negotiated a treaty with Bunan-Varilla. All that we asked of Bunan-Varilla, who had become, through his own devices, the new minister for the State of Panama, was to make a treaty with the State of Colombia. But this Frenchman, who had a great deal to gain if the treaty were passed and because we were going to pay his company $40 million-and he personally, as a stockholder, about $400,000-did not want the Senate to dillydally around. So when hie got the treaty that Secretary Hay offered to himi, he made it a little more agreeable than what we had even asked for. lie struck out the 2000 year from the lease, and put in 'in perpetuity." He struck out the width of the Canal Zone of 5 kilometers and put in 10 miles. He gave us the right to control immigration and trade and even to disband their armny-an agreement much more generous than anyone had hoped.
As a matter of fact, Senator Money of Missisisppi, in 1904, claimed that the treaty "comes to us more liberal iii its concessions * than we ever dreamed of having.. In fact*** it sounds very mch as if we wrote it ourselves."
The past president of the American Bar Association, a man by the name of James Carter, by the way, called the whole affair a ''crime. "
What I am trying to say it that the treaty with the new country of Panama wvas pretty generous to the United States and it. was from the (lay that treaty was signed that the trouble began. When Mr. IBunauVarilla met the Panamanian delegates down at Union Station, three or four blocks f rom here, he confronted Mr. Amador and another Panamanian, Mr. Frederico Boyd, and he said, "Oh, look, we have a treaty signed by the United States whereby they guarantee the independence of your state. After nearly 100 years of trying to become a f ree and independent state, your independence is guaranteed by this country."
Well, according to Mr. Bunau-Varilla's own statement, when Mr. Amador read that treaty, hie almost fainted. What Mr. Buna-Varilla did not tell in his autobiography was when Mr. Frederico Boyd read the statement, he struck Mr. Bunan-Varilla, right across the face. And, Mr. President f rom that day until this, we have had continuous trouble with these extremely nationalistic people of Panama.
Some 8 or 10 times, we have had to use military force to put down riots and trouble in Panama. From time to time, we have tried to pacify those people. In 1936, the Senate agreed to a new treaty in which we said, "All right, we will not use any force to protet the canal except with the permission of Panama." And that is the way it exists now.
But in 1964, when the riots occurred and some 20 Panamanians were killed, some several hundred were injured anid we lost four of
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our people, President Lyndon Johnson met with former President Eisenhower and former President Truman. They decided that it was time that we did something to reach an understanding with these people so that we could live in peace and harmony and grow together and also enjoy the freedom in use of this canal. I believe, Mr. President, that these treaties do that, although they do not do everything that I would like them to do. C
Mr. President, these treaties remind me, this -whole matter reminds me of the years when I used to practice law. I know some of my colleagues here have had these experiences. From time to time, during my years of practice, I would have a client come in who was having an argument with his neighbor over a land line. He would come in, mad as the dickens; he was mad as a wet setting lien, we used to say. Ie would implore me, "I want to defend this land line and I am not going to give 1 incli.1By golly," lie would say. "I will see him dead and in IHades before I'll give 1 foot. I'll take it to the United States Suprenie Court."
But you know, after 3 or 4 years of litigation, going to court and taking depositions and picking juries and paying me a few legal fees, my client began to get a little more conciliatory, saying, "Maybe we ought to do something about it.; maybe we ought to give a little bit; let's get this thing over so we can move on and live in peace and harmony."
I think that is exactly what Lyndon Johnson and Dwight Eisenhower and Harry Truman were saying in 1964: We would like to keep) things as they are but by golly, if itis going to mean a continuous disruption ini relations between our country and Panama, let us do something about it. Ii think that is what we have done.
I. INTRODUCTION
I will speak specifically today to three topics in niy remarks. I will address some of the history which has led me to the conclusion that the time for a new treaty arrangement with Panama is now. Next T will address the tough questions which we all have to answer about the second treaty dealing with the Panainia Canal and, finally, I will speak to my personal convictions about the canal issue and my hopes f or our country.
INO issue to my recollection has aroused so much debate aiic controversy and none has generated so much mail from the American people. While at tinies the comniunic at ions we received were less than pleasant, I amn refreshed and reassured by the public debate on this issue. We have a great country and I believe that this greatness requires us to make decisions a lesser country could not. It is this time of decision which prompts me to speak about the Panama Canal treaties.
H. CHRONOLOGY OF PANAMANIAN HIIITORY-1500-1820
Discovery and Development:
1501. Discovered by a Spanish explorer and explored the following year by Christopher Columbus.I
1529. Explorer Cortez drafted a plan for a canal route.
1534. The King of Spain ordered a survey for a ship canal.
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153-0. The Camnino Peal, highway across the Isthmus, was in use; also about this time Panama was incorporated into the Vice Royalty of New Granada; Panama retained much of its independent identity; British interest as part of concern with Spain.
1814. Spanish attempts to construct a canal were interrupted by colonial revolts.
1820-46
1821. Panama, apart from New Granada, severed relations with Spain in the tide of Latin American independence movements.
Panama at this time joined with New Granada in the Republic of Greater Colombi a.
1831. Nev Granada became an independent republic incorporating Panama as an independent state.
1841. Panama seceded from New Granada and m-taintained its independence for 13 months.
1846-1901, U.S. INVOLVEMENT
General-53 times, between 1846 and 1903, Pananma attemi-pted to secede f romt Colombia.
Unrest had always existed.
1846. After many years of interest, from the time of acqmiring, Florida, the United States sought to secure some formn of rights in' Panamia. Fear of B1ritish business interests prompted the United States to negotiate the Bidlack Treaty with New Granada. Under the treaty, the United States promised to insure that transit over the Isthmuts remained open and that New Granada would have its sovereignty over the area insured by the United States.
1850. Unitel States signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with England setting forth that neither the United States or Britain would exercise exclusive control over any canal over tile Isthmnus or fortify a canal.
1853. Panama again seceded from New Granada.
1856. U.S. troops were landed to protect the Panama Railroad. the first time U.S. troops were on the ground in tile country.
1868-6'9. Secretary of State William H. Seward negotiated a treaty w,-ith Colombia which would have given the United States the exclusive right to construct a canal. It was rejected by the Colombian Senate.
1878. French efforts at constructing a canal got under way; no conclusive decision over the French involvement in a canal project was ever made.
1885. Revolution in Panama against Colombia.
1889. Beinningr of 5-year revolt ag ainst Panama.
1901. Negotiations of the Ijav-Pauncefote Treaty abrogating the 1850 Clayton-Bu Nier Treaty and clearing the way for U.S. negotiate t ions.
190 1-0 3
1902. IHerran, tlbe Colombian negotiator, began talks concerning the cai,al route for Colombia; Hay threatened that delay would result in rene wed negotiations with Nicaragua.
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1903. Three days after the Hay-Herran Treaty was signed concluding a deal over a canal route, Herran received delayed instructions not to sign the treaty.
Hay threatened a break off in relations if the treaty was not ratified by Colombia; privately President Roosevelt indicated his awareness of the Panamanians' readiness to declare its independence. News reports to this effect were released by the press.
Hay made it clear to Panama that the $40 million set up by the Congress to secure a route would go to the French Company, headed by IBunau-Varilla, and only the $10 million in the treaty would gro to Colombia.
August 12, 1903, Colombia rejected the treaty.
Efforts at fostering a revolution in Panama were begun by BunanVarilla and William Cromwell, a lawyer with interests in the Canal Company.
Cromwell tried to get a Panamanian to give $100,000 for a revolution, guaranteeing him the presidency of the new country-this was before Colombia had rejected the Hay-Herran Treaty. Bunan-Varilla met with Panamanian revolutionaries and encouraged their activities throughout September of 1903; in October he promised a complete package for the Panamanians-money, a constitution, a military plan.
On October 15, U.S. ships were ordered to sail on a routine exercise toward the isthmus. On October 16, Bunau-Varilla was made aware of this fact.
IBunau-Varilla secured a promise that, for his assistance, hie would be appointed Panama's first minister to the United States. He called for a revolution on November 3, the day he calculated the U.S. squadron would appear off the coast of Panama.
On November 2, a U.S. ship, the Nashville arrived and the revolution commenced; orders were on board the Nashville to insure that the line of transit across the isthmus was kept. open even against government-Colombian-troops. On November 3, the revolution was essenially completed. The only clear legal rule against which the U-.S. action would be judged was the 1846 Bidlack Treaty which provided that the United States would insure Colombia's sovereigYnty over the Isthmus of Panama.
On November 6, the United States recognized the independence of Panama.
Ne gotiations began which led to the Hav-IBunau-Varilla Treaty. Banna-Varilla exerted the same pressure and threats against 1I anamna as Secretary Hay had against Colombi a.
Bunan-Varilla negotiated treaty and signed it; Panamanians were outraged; Federico Boyd, one of the negootiators who arrived too late, strutck Bunaii-Varilla, across the f ace at Union Station.
Bunau-Varilla on his own sent a cable to Panama stating that if Panama did not ratify the treaty, the United States would withdraw its protection and sign a canal treaty with Colombia.
The terms of the treaty negotiated and signed on November 18 have been reviewed many times here in the Senate., but I believe they were best summarized by Senator Money, of Mississippi, when in 1904 hie claimed that. the treaty:
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I . coml7es to us more liberal in its concessions ... than we ... ever dreamed of having... In fact, it sounds very much as if we wrote it ourselves
The past president of the American Bar Association, one James Carter, called the whole aff air "a crime."
1904-64
General-Period of unrest and dissatisfaction with the treaty.
-Need for U.S. intervention in Panama eight times between 1901: and today, excluding the use of troops in the riots of 1959 and 1964.
United'States has intervened 39 times in Latin America since 1891 with m-ilitary force.
Interpretative problems arose immediately as in 1904, interpretation of treaty to allow United States to control customhouses; settled by f amous Taft agreements.
In 1904 the United States forced Panama to include a right of U.S. intervention in the country's constitution.
Treaty used in 1920's as basis for intervention.
In 1921, Panama was threatening to invade Costa Rica in attempting to settle a border dispute which had existed since colonial days. Based on the 1903 treaty's call for the United States to guarantee Panama's independence, the United States forced Panama to withdraw.
In 1926, a new treaty was negotiated to soothe Panamamian anger but included provisions for U.S. intervention land was rejected by the Panamianian Assembly.
Through the 1920's and into the 1930's, there was unrest and dissatisfaction with the treaty. Finally, in 1936, a revision was made increasing the toll rates.
During the war, the United States secured additional bases in Pan-amna, agreeing to withdraw within a year after hostilties ended. The United States was slow to withdraw. Post-World War II irritation had begun.
The central issues of the 1950's were over discriminatory policies within the Canal Zone which affected Panama.
Inadequate toll payments to Panama after the large increase in traffic through the canal.
U.S. commissaries within the zone which adversely affected Panamanian business.
Segregation in housing and schools within the zone.
Discrimination in pay, based on the "U.S. rate" and the "local rate."
In attempting to resolve some of these problems, President EisenIhower signed the 1955 treaty revising the original 1903 treaty.
Unrest and unhappiness continued until 1959 when the first of the "flag incidents" broke out. Panamanian students seeking some public recognition of their country's stake in the canal requested that their flag be flown along side the U.S. flag. Tempers flared and violence erupted.
On December 2, 1959, President Eisenhower stated: "I do-believe we should have visual evidence that Panama does have titular sovereignty" in the zone. Negotiations began at this point on measures which lead us up to the treaties we have today.
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In 1964, riots over flag br oke out and 25 deaths resulted; serious negotiations began which have led to the current treaties.
At this point, it is worthwhile to review some of the statements made by four of our Presidents about the canal issue:
THE 19 6 0 S AND THE VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENTS
President Eisenhower spoke to the problem created by the treaties:
I think that not all of the difficul ties that have come about have been entirely because of their demands. It is perfectly true there was a treaty made many, many years ago, more than 50, now. And the conditions of that treaty were changed from time to time as the whole condition of affairs in the world so demanded, just exactly like our Constitution has been amended 22 times.
President Kennedy, in 1962, arranged f or the United iStates and Panamanian flags to be flown jointly in the Canal Zone. In 1961, he described our relationship with Panama based on the 1903 treaties:
My Government recogizes that differences will inevitably arise between even the friendliest nations, and believes that these differences.- must be discussed thoroughly and frankly, in order to clarify the interests and attitudes of both parties. It seems clear, therefore, that when two friendly nations are bound by treaty provisions which are not fully satisfactory to one of the parties, arrangements should be made to permit qualified representatives of both nations to discuss these points of dissatisfaction with a view to their resolution.
President Johnson had to deal with riots brought about by another flag-raising incident. The issue, even went to the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Hle said of the canal and the treaties:
[The] life (of the Canal) is now limited. The canal is growing old, and so are the treaties for its management, -which go back to 1903.
My advisers have recommended that we should propose a new treaty for the existing~ canal. After careful review with my senior advisers, I have accepted this recommendation.
These changes are necessary not because of failure but because of success; not because of backwardness but because of progress. The age before us is an age of larger, faster ships. It is an age of friendly partnership among the, nations concerned with the traffic between the oceans. This new age requires new arrangements.
The strength of our American system is that we have always tried to understand and meet the needs of the future. We have been at our best when we have been both bold and prudent in moving forward.
President Nixon proceeded with negotiations begun under Johnson and noted:
The world has changed radically during the 70 years this treaty has been in effect. Latin America has changed. Panama has changed. And the terms of our relationship should reflect those changes in a reasonable way.
For the past nine years, efforts to work out a new treaty acceptable to both parties have failed. That failure has put considerable Strain on our relations with Panama. It is time for both parties to take -a fresh look at this problem and to develop a newv relationship between us-one that will guarantee continued effective operation of the Canal while meeting Panama's legitimate aspirations.
III. TOUGH ISSUES
I would like to address the four major issues which I believe conf ront this body as we draw to a close on this Most important and,
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I believe, well executed debate. In answering these issues, each Senator will determine how he views the facts 'and how hie views the future.
These major points are:
Our defense considerations;
The provisions for a new canal;
The economics of the treaty: and
The ability of Panamna to operate the canal.
1. Defense
The primary concern in my mind is defense.
This centers oni keeping the canal open which has been and is our primary national interest in Panama.
As President Nixon stated:
It is time for both parties to take a fresh look at this problem and to develop a new relationship between us-one that will guarantee continued effective operation of the Canal while meeting Panamas legitimate aspirations.
The Neutrality Treaty which we have hammered out goes alIong way to resolve many defense concerns. Indeed, there are several improvements over the current treaties.
The treaty provides that the canal remain neutral permanently and this is part of a separate treaty independent of the business parts of the Panama Canal Treaty. This concept has been in every treaty governing the isthmus since 1846 and secures our primary interest that the canal be open and that we. be f ree to insure that fact.
The Neutrality Treaty improves our situation over the past and is an advance for U.S. foreign policy.
Under the 1936 Treaty, defense of the canal had to be undertaken itfter consultation with PaaaIhenwteat y leaves the determination of the need for action to each of the parties. The 1903 and 1936 treaties were vague on the righylts of warships, while the new treaty is specific on the rights of U.S. warships to go to the head of the line. The earlier treaties were vague, and employed many of the terms of international law; the new treaty is specific and uses the language hammered out by the President and the Conugress.
I believe that th-e Neutrality Treaty satisfies the major concerns I have about defense.
rThe Panama Canal Treaty:
I feel that the treaty before us now has some advantages for the United States and Panama in the area of defense. Let me be specific.
The Panama Canal 'Treaty insures that for the next 22 years the United States, in no uncertain terms, has primary responsibility for the canal. As General Torrijos said after the September 7 signing-."W~e are now 'under the. protective umbrella of the United States."
In addition, the new treaty contains a status of forces agreement which we have not had in the past. This agreement spells ot the relationship of the U.S. military personnel outside of !the Canal Zone with Panama for the next 22 years and is an important improvement.
The treaty also creates a combined board to regulate military concerns such as coordinated defense of the canal. I believe that it. is clear that this board is a mechanism for coordination; it is not a joint commnand which would deny the United States the right to act independently.
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Taken as a whole and in conjunction with the Neutrality Treaty, I believe that our defense interests are insured by the new agreements. As a member of the Armed Services Comimittee, I sat through many hours of discussion and open debate over the merits of the treaty. On the whole, the discussion impressed me as favoring the new treaties insof ar as military considerations are involved.
2. Sea Level Canal
There has been concern expressed about the Panama Canal Treaty's provisions for a new canal. The treaty provisions for a new Canal. The treaty provides that the parties should jointly undertake a study of the feasibility of a new canal or a third set of locks. I believe that all the Senate agrees on the merit of this provision.
The treaty also provides that no canal should be built in Panama without the agreement of the United States. It also states that the United States should not negotiate with any other country to build a canal unless the parties otherwise agree. These provisions reflet the basic reality that there really is no other route for a canal. A $20 mulion study by the Presidential Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission came to just that conclusion a few years ago. In short, the new treaty simply states the obvious.
W~e have just accepted a reservation which directs the United Stl-ates to waive its rights under article XIII by agreement with Panama. I am not adverse to this idea, although I believe it is a bit unnecessary.
3. Ecovomics of the Canal Treaty
I believe that some of the nmost important debate has taken phace over the economic provisions of the second treaty.
The treaty provides for an increase in the payments made to Panama out of canal revenues, which has been long overdue. In addition, it provides for an additional payment if profits are high enough, an incentive for the Panamanians to keep the canal in smooth working order f or the next 22 years.
I believe that the statement of Senator Muskie on the 28th of February answers many of the questions which have been posed about the economics of the treaty. In that address he spoke of fairer compensation to Panama with which I fully concur. The time has come to work more closely with our neighbor. The study conducted by the Budget Committee, chaired by Senator Muskie bear out his conclusions that the canal can provide sufficient revenue under raised tolls to meet the commitments undertaken by these treaties.
Payments for pensions and retirement plans and a reduction of Costs by military consolidation were all dealt with ably by the Senator at that time.
Since February 28, we have seen many attempts to find any minor flaw in the treaty insofar as money is concerned. I can only say that the basic analysis of Senator Muskie still stands and I have faith in the work of the Budget Committee on this point. Second, I am sure that there are some flaws in any treaty, but none has been pointed out to me which would constitute sufficient cause to reject the entire package.
As I understand it, most of the costs incurred under these treaties will be handled by canal tolls and ordinary customary loans f rom in1-
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ternational development bodies will be sought. I believe that to be satisf actory.
For the United States, it appears th at we are running no loss to our own economy. The canal'"s use has been diminishing constantly and less than 1 percent of our GNP goes through the canal today. I do not believe we are going to hurt this way.
4. Canal Operation by Panama
I am confident after visiting the Canal Zone and Panama in 1976 that the Panamanians can do the job. At present, they fill 80 percent of the canal jobs and I believe that the plans for training in the next 22 years -will assure efficient canal operation. Panama's public commitment to do this one which I believe will press them to provide the best service possible.
I feel that the same motives that prompt the Panamanians to seek control of the canal will likewise press them to keep the canal open and in good working order.
IV. CONVICTIONS
Let me address this body on some of the overall questions with which I have struggled during the course of the debate. I believe that in the answer to each of these questions, we can find the guidance for the decisions we must undertake here.
National Interest
The first and most important question is whether the treaties signed by the President are in the best national interest of the United States. N ational interest is a vague term and many people give it a different content. I mean by the national interest decisions to which we are ready to make a commitment and which are vital to our national survival.
The statements by the distinguished majority and minority leaders before the passage of the Neutrality Treaty convinced me that they believe in these treaties and that the treaties will enhance the position of the United States in the world.
The change in relations between our two countries is vital to Panlamfts national interest as well. We have genuine interests in Panama and Panama must be aware of that. We have an obligation to see that the treaties we send to Panama are realistic and do not unduly infringe upon the national aspirations of Panama.
It is my responsibility to my State of North Carolina to insure that the national interest of the United States is furthered by what we do here and I believe that these treaties, yet to be finalized, go a long way
in.tha di ect on. Retreat by the United States
Is this effort a retreat for the United States?
Many among the American people fear that after Vietnam and inaction in Africa, weaertraigan-uln out of world affairs. MNr. President, no vote will ever be cast by this Senator which represents a retreat for our good and great country.
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I have been against the pullout from Korea, I have been for a strong defense and in particular the B-i bomber, I have expressed my fullest support for our friends in the Mediterranean and in particular our most important commitment in Israel. Commitment is a crucial word to me and I feel that five American Presidents have been committed to improvingy our relationship with the Republic of Panama, one of our best friends in Latin America. To cooperate with a friend and to honor a commitment is in no way retreat. It is the most direct sign a nation can give of its greatness.
Our greatness is not diminished by signing a treaty with Panama. It is enhanced by the demonstration of our moral will to deal fairly with even the smallest of countries.
The Future
During the course of the debate, we have all been asked to speculate about the future. I believe that after the extensive hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee and the investigations of the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees on which I sit, we have the best information before us. On the basis of that information, we are asked to cast our gaze toward the future. Senators on both sides of this issue have expressed their sincere concern for the possible repercussion of these treaties. Thousands of my constituents have addressed their fears and uneasiness about these new arrangements to me while others have expressed their great hope for the f uture. There has been a great outpouring of concern by the American people on this issue. Speculating about the f uture is always difficult. e
I guess that I am an optimist. I believe that the future can best be served by the new treaties and the arrangements contained in them.
For the f uture, I believe we can see three possible benefits with Panama, there should be improved relations, a better guarantee that the canal will remain open and more stability for Panamanian politics. In Latin America, I believe we will see improvement in our relations with many states. Some will continue to be antagonistic, but -for our friends this action will be a strong tool for them to resist Communist pressures within their own governments. In the world, I believe we will acquire the image of a great and moral country, one which practices what it preaches. To the small countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, we will stand as an alternate world to do the neocolonialism of the Soviet Union-a friend with whom one can work f reely, not as a shackled slave.
We can always expect the worst an-d often we are not disappointed. On the whole, I believe that this body has taken into account as many possibilities as it humanly possible. At some point, with the debate as extensive as it is, the issue becomes a m-atter for the exercise of judgment, discretion, and experience. For myself, I believe that the future will be better served by the new treaties. These treaties are no panacea. Treaties are only as good as the commitments made to them. I would caution against to much optimism or too much pessimism. We need a realistic view of the future and of what we can achieve.
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Is This The Best Course
Let me conclude that I believe that the course we are taking is the best one for our county. I am g-uided by the words of Lyndon Johnson, who said of the Panama situation:
These changes are necessary not because of failure but because of success; not because of backwardness but because of progress. The age before us is an age of larger, faster ships. It is an age of friendly partnership among the nations cencerned with the traffic between the oceans. This new age requires new arrangements.
The strength of our American system is that we have always tried to understand and meet the needs of the future. We have been at our best when we have been both bold and prudent in moving forward.
President Johnson set forth the challenge for all of us, that is to act with courage and with foresight. As men and women entrusted with the burden of making decisions for the future., we must utilize all the abilitie-s at our command and act to protect and defend the interests of our great land. I plan to do no less.
A. General-Con
(1) Senator Robert Griffin, February 8, 1978 (S 1530-34)
Mr. GRZIFFIN. Mr. President, as the only and lonely member of the Committee on Foreign Relations who voted against approval of the treaties, I wish at the outset to thank the distinguished chairman of the committee (Mr. Sparkman) and the ranking minority member (Mr. Case) for their courtesy and their consideration during the course of the committee's deliberations. I wish to say now, as I have said before, that I respect our two Senate leaders and those of our colleagues who have reached a conclusion contrary to mine-those who are convinced in their own minds that these treaties do represent and serve the best interests of our Nation. I salute them for having the courage of their convictions, because I believe, with Edmund Burke0, that a Senator does owe his constituents his judgment and should not sacrifice it to public opinion alone.
However, Mr. President, I also believe that when the call on the merits of an issue is as close as this or as close as I perceive it to be, the judgment of the people ought not to be taken lightly. Very honestly and frankly, I have come to the conclusion that, in this situation, as so often is the case, the people are right.
Mr. President, as nearly as I can boil down the basic arguments of
-many people around the country who believe these treaties should be approved, there are three:First, they believe, and are told that the Panama Canal is obsolete
-or becoming absolute that we really do not need it anymore or will not need it very long.
That is not the case. Far from it. The canal is vital to U.S. security, important to our economy-and will be more, not less, important in the years ahead-as I will detail at a later point in my statement.
Second. A second argument is that unless these treaties are ratified unknown terrorists and radicals will blow up the canal.
Like many other Americans, I am shocked and repulsed by such an argument, or suggestion, particularly when it is put forth by officials in high places in our Government. Surely, if we want self -respet as well as the respect of others, we cannot make our foreign policy on such a basis. Furthermore, as I will explain, I am deeply concerned that approval of these treaties will render the canal more vulnerable,
-not less, to the dangers of terrorism and sabotage in the years ahead.
Finally, the argument is made that we should ratify these treaties to divest ourselves of the guilt and stigma we are supposed to feel concerning the U.5. role in connection with the 1903 treaty and our operation of the Panama Canal.
Frankly, along with most Americans, I am proud of the United States role in buildingoprtig and maintaining the engineering
(64)
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masterpiece ttiat is the Panama Canal. I do not think there is reason to be ashamed or to apologize. The canal has been good for the United States-and good f or Panama-and good f or the world.
On the other hand, f or other positive reasons-and because times and circumstances do chane-I am willing to recognize, as one Senator, that a major revision in our treaty relationship with the Republic of Panama is in order-that it could serve the interests of both countries.
My problem, as a lawyer and as a Senator, is that after carefully studying the text of these treaties, and the accompanying documents, I could come to no conclusion other than that they are fatally flawedthat they are -riddled with amabiguities-that the security interests of the United States are not adequately protected-and that the defects are so serious and basic that they cannot be remedied by trying to rewrite the treaties here on the Senate floor.
Being the lone dissenter on the Foreigni Relations Comm-ittee-and for that reason alone-I find myself thrust into the role of floor manager for the opposition. I wish to make it clear, however, that mny views-and what I say-will not necessarily reflect the views of other Senators who oppose these treaties. Each of them will, of course, speak for himself as this debate proceeds.
Although I believe these treaties should not be ratified, there is a course open to the Senate other than outright rejection, and strongly urge the Senate to consider it.
Let me explain by first underscoring the fact that I recognize the importance of maintainingc close and f riendly relations with the people of Panama and -with the people of other nations in our hemisphere. I am conscious of, and concerned about, the impact that outright rejection by the Senate could have upon those relations.
Under the Constitution, the Senate's role is one of "advice and consent." Instead of consenting to these treaties, I believe it would be a wiser course for the Senate to exercise only its "advice" authority. In other words, without rejecting the treaties outright, the Senate, after examining these treaties in detail, ought to advise the President to send the negotiators back to the drawing boards with instructions to persist until more acceptable treaties can be fashioned.
Despite all of his knowledge about the history of the canal, or perhaps because of it, David McCullough, the distinguished author of "The Path Between the Seas" acknowledged before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had experienced great difficulty in reaching a personal decision about the merit of these treaties. Although he finally decided, on balance, to support the treaties, when he appeared before the committee he made this profound and perceptive point:
.. If we say "yes" to these [treaties] in a grudging way... [because w e think] we have painted ourselves into a corner and we have to get out ... [that would be] unfortunate .. [and] just as wrong, and in some ways a greater mistake than to say "no" in the spirit of saying "no" because [it should be] done rightbecause we don't want to have to come back in 15 or 20 years and have to do it all over again.
So, it would be my h-ope, Mr. President, that the Senate will consider and act in that spirit with respect to the treaties now before us.
In other words, I concur with those of my colleagues who believe and who will argue in the weeks to come that rejection of these treaties
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would be unfortunate and would adversely affect our relations with our allies in the hemisphere. But I also believe that it would be wrong to reject these treaties in effect by adopting substantive amendments on the Senate floor-that could do even more to poison the air of f riendship than outright rejection.
Let's not kid ourselves or anyone else. To make substantive changes in these treaties by amendment on the Senate floor really amounts to rejection. It would amount to an ultimatum to the Panamanian people on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Of real concern also is the possibility that the self-appointed temporary ruler now controlling Panama might say with respect to other substantive amendments, as he has already said with respect to the Byrd-Baker amendment that it will not have to be submitted to a plebesite of the Panamanian people.
In other words, we could end up with an agreement with a self -ap pointed temporary ruler of Panama, but without an agreement or treaty with the people of Panama. In my view it is vital to our future relationship that any new treaty be an agreement with the people of Panama.
Mr. President, I wish to review with the Senate some of the basic concerns I have with respect to these treaties. I will discuss the broad issue of the canal and U.S. security; the question of a new or second canal, as well as some other concern.
AMIlitary expert may disagree as to the advisability of ratifying these treaties, but it is clear there is general agreement that the Panamna Canal is very important-if not vital-to the security of the United States.
Indeed as the Soviet Navy continues to grow larger and larger, wile our own Navy shrinks in size-the canal becomes more-not less-important.
In iust the last 10 years-since 1-968-the number of ships in the U.S. Navy has been cut by more than half, from 976 vessels to 459. In 197 4, when thie Soviet fleet was smaller than it is toclay, our Joint Chiefs of staff stated that we need more than 800 ships to "support our current national defense strategy."
Yet our shipbuilding funds continue to be redluced navy officials acknowledge that the fleet will shrink f urther in size before there is an upturn in the numbers-and the goal of expandigt oeta 0 sinTs by the early 1980'S now Seems elusive,. igt oeta 0
In contrast, the Soviet. Navy by 1975 had grown to 1200 vessels-althouigh, admittedly, their ships do not compare with ours in tonnag-e or- combat eff ectiveness. n
But the sobering fact is that the rapidly expanding Soviet Navy raises real concerns about future control of the maritime chokee points" of thie world-one of which is thie Panama Cantal.
As Adm. Thomas Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified, we do not have a two ocean Navy. Hie said:
A large majority of our war and coting'ency plans are totally infeaible un1less one assumes that full and priority use of the cainal will ibe available.
It is true thiat our a i rcraft carriers, of which we ha,)ve ,in. are too Iarfve to transit theo canal. But the u Tnited States has a .Nvy that is f f ective in both major oceans precisely because the rest of the Navy, par-
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ticularly supply and support ships for the aircraft carriers, are able to shuttle between the oceans through the canal.
If access to the canal were denied to ships of the American navy, the trip from ocean to ocean' would involve an 8,000 mile journey around Cape Horn-an extra 17 days for a warship travelling at 20 knots.
In a letter to President Carter on June 8 of last year, f our of the Nation's most respected naval leaders-each of them a former Chief of Naval Operations-forcef ully stated that the strategic and economic values of the canal are at least as important to the United States now as ever before, and they declared thatLoss of the Panama Canal, which would be a serious set-back in war, would contribute to the encirclement of the U.S. by hostile naval forces, and threaten our ability to survive.
These officers-retired Admirals Carney, Anderson, Burke, and MNoorer-force fully warned the President of possible dangers to the canal because of the close ties between Panama and Cuba "which in turn is closely tied with the Soviet Union."~
Of course we can only speculate about the real intentions of the Soviet Union and its Caribbean proxy, Cuba, with respects to the canal. But few will argue against the proposition that it would be a tragic blow to United States and free world security of the Panama Canal should fall into Communist hands.
Since as far back as the 1959 Panama riots, there has been reason for concern about the covetous eye of Mr. Castro. Those concerns have been underscored in recent years by the avowed friendship between Mr. Castro and General Torrijos. If evidence of Cuban influence in Panama has not been so obvious recently, it may be because at the moment Castro has his hands very full in Africa.
Ag-ainst this background relating to the canal's strategic an d political significance, let me comment on the adequacy of the proposed treaties in protecting the security and other interests of the United States.
During the 1976 Presidential campaign, Candidate Jimmy Carter told the voters:
I would never give uip complete control or practical control of the Panama Canal Zone.
But these treat ies-negooti1ated since Presi dent Carter assumed office-not only turn the canal over to Panama in the year 29000; they would also turn over practical-if not complete-control of the Canal Zone within 36 months after ratification.
Even if we accept the decision to turn the canal over to Panama in the year 2000, our security interests still require, in my view, that the treaies be negotiated to include certain fundamental safeguards:
First, we need more control and jurisdiction between now and the year 29000 to insure that we will be able to effectively operate and dTefend the canal.
Second, we must have the right, in unambiguous terms, beyond the year 2000 to use military force, if necessary, to protect the neutrality of the canal against any threat-even a domestic Panamanian threat, or particularly an internal threat from within Panama, because that poses the greatest danger.
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Third, we need to maintain our option to negotiate for construction of a second (perhaps sea-level) canal outside of Panama, should that prove necessary because of Panamanian intransigence, or, desirable because of economic or security considerations.
As drawn, the Canal Treaty and the Neutrality Treaty do not provide these important safeguards.
lEven if it is conceded that the United States is not now sovereign in the Panama Canal Zone, there is no question that under the treaty of 1903, The United States has all the rights, power, and authority as if it were sovereign. I strongly suggest that control on that order is important if the United States is to be able effectively to operate and maintain the Panama Canal between now and the year 2000. In other words, if we are going to keep the canal for 23 years, it is essential din'ing that period at least for the United States to retain adequate control and jurisdiction.
Under the proposed Panama Canal Treaty, h nie1 tte ol
have the responsibility to operate the canal during the next 23 years with employees-both United States and Panamanian-who would be subject, even while performing their duties with respect to the canal, to the laws of Panama, the police of Panama, and the courts of Panama.
In other words, shortly after the ratification, we would be in the position of trying to operate and maintain the canal in a foreign countryrather than in a canal zone under our jurisdiction.
I am deeply concerned that instead of solving problems, this arrangement is pregnant with the seeds of acrimony and conflict.
Under the treaty, persons employed by the Panama Canal Commission would be "employees of the United States"; they would have the right to be represented by unions and to "negotiate collective contracts." If disputes arose- and that would not be unusual in labormanagement relations-how would they be resolved?
Under the treaty arrangement, the Commission itself would be immune from suit -in the courts of Panama, and could be sued only in the U.S. Court in Louisiana-something of an inconvenience" for employees in Panama who may claim back pay for discrimination or who may have any other claims against the Commission. How would the Commission enforce legal obligations undertaken by others-a union, for example? Apparently, such matters would be left to the Panamanian courts. Would they apply U.S. law or Panamanian law?
It is no wonder that many U.KS. military and civilian personnel who now work in the Canal Zone are deeply concerned about these aspects of the treaty arrangement.
Outside the boundaries of our four remaining military bases, of course, U.S. military and civilian personnel would be subject at all times to arrest and prosecution by Panamanian police in Paiamanian cou rts.
'We are assured by the State Department that arrested U.S. personnel -in Panama would be protected by a "status of forces" type agreeruent set forth in annex D, which is similar to agreements we have with Japan and certain NATO countries where U.S. forces are stationed.
IAnnex D does recite that such U.S. citizens charged with crime in a Panamanian court would have the right to a "prompt and speedy
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trial," protection against involuntary conf essions, self -incrimination, and the like. But the decision on what constitutes a "speedy trial" or an ",involuntary confession" will be left, once again, to the Panamnaniaa courts.
For years, Soviet citizens have been "guaranteed" human rights by the Constitution of the Soviet Union. The only problem, of course, is that officials of the Soviet Union pay no attention to those guarantees.
That reference would be unfair and out of order, I concede, if tihe Panamanian Government under General Torrijos had a good record of observing and respecting human rights in Panama. However, despite the fact that similar "guarantees" are set f orth in the Constitution of Panama, last year the Torrijos government had the worst human rights record of any country in this hemisphere, except Cuba. Indeed, in this respect, Panamna was rated by Freedom House as being about on a par with the Soviet Union.
Our status of forces agreements in other situations have worked reasonably well, perhaps because the host country has ~wanted the continued presence of our U.S. troops in their borders. Obviously, if a NATO ally did not appreciate our military presence and asked us to leave, we would.
In contrast, our troops are-and would be-stationed in the Canal Zone because we have a treaty right to protect the canal. Under the new treaty-at least in theory-our right to have troops there until the year 2000 would not depend on the continuing permission of General Torrijos or any successor.
In that kind of setting, it seems to me there is reason for concern about the adequacy of the protection that is accorded to U.S. citizens in annex D.
In a country where anti -Americanism has a proven political value. aind where courts may be heavily influenced by the ruler in power, one is left to wonder whether such a treaty arrangement could even be used as the basis for harassing U.S. military and civilian personnel to force them out of the country.
Because many U.S. citizens-as well as some black Panamanianswho now work in the Canal Zone are deeply concerned about their human rights if the new treaty should be ratified, morale among such employees by all accounts, is "very poor." Many of these employees indicate that they will leave if these treaties are approved; one recent poll indicated that more than 60 percent of U.S. civilians in the zone considler themselves in that category.
According to Gen. HT. R. Parfitt, Governor of the Canal Zone, there are at least 1,000 highly skilled U.S. citizens whose services are absolutely essential and for whom Panamanian replacements could not be trained in the short term. In this category are 210 ship pilots, all but 2 of whom are U.S. citizens.
In view of the great importance of keeping the canal open, it would be ironic indeed, it would be tragic if the Senate, by approving these, treaties, should trigger an exodus that closes down the canal. IT am concerned not o ny with the mishmash of jurisdiction and responsibility that would exist between now and the year 2000 under the proposed treaties, but also about the situation that would prevail under the so-call ed Neutrality Treaty after the year 2000-particularly
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in light of differences in interpretation which have existed, and in some vital respects continue to exist, between the officials of our two countries.
For example, with respect to the right of the United States under article IV of the Neutrality Treaty to intervene and defend the neutrality of the canal with military force, if necessary, against an internal threat from within Panama, major disagreements have existed between United States and Panamanian negotiators. Those disagreements have continued after the signing of the treaties and they continuie even after the joint statement of October 14, 1977, issued by President Carter and General Torrijos.
We owve it to ourselves, Mr. President, and to our children-who would have to suffer the consequences of our mistakes-to understand the depth of these disagreem-ents and their grave implications for the, f uture, if lef t unresolved.
The chief Panamanian negotiator, Dr. Romulo Escobar, declared publicly that: "The draft neutrality pact does not make the U.S. a guarantor of (the canal's) neutrality **
Panamanian spokesmen have insisted that the United States would be able to respond militarily only if a foreign power attacked or threatened the canal. Just as often, our own negotiators and others have puiblicly asserted that the United States has a right to protect the neutrality of the canal against any threat, including a Panamanian threat.
Suchb statements and counterstatements are chronicled and detailed in the statement of minority views which I have filed as part of the committee's report and which are available to all Senators.
I recognize and respect the effort that has been made to end some of the ambiguity, in particular the joint statement of October 14. 1977, issued by President Carter and General Torrijos. Without doubt it is an impro-vem cut over the atu al text of the, neutrality treaty, but -unf ortuinately the joint statement itself is not with ot ambiguities.
Mr. GnIFFTN.. Later on that same day of October 14, for example, General Torrijos stated that the United States would have the right to defend the canal if it were attacked by "a g reat power."1 Shortly thereafter, Ambaissador Linowitz replied that the United States had a right to clofepcd the canal against any threat or aggression from whatever qu arter. So the difference in interpretation quickly surfaced again ev T"T aftoir the( Carter-Torrijos statement.
The situation was further conic,,ted when General Torrijos arr~veci back in PPvniaand said. "T haven't even -igned an autogr,,iph"-at~ least implicitly swgesting that the unsigned statement was of questionable le"gal validity.
When the JByrd-Bake'r amendments are adopted, as T predict they
-will be, the Carter-Torrijos joint statement will actually he incorpo-rated as part of the text of the Neutrality Treaty that will11 be an Imu nrovement but, unfortunately, this action will not erase differences of interpretation which persist, ais underscored by the American Law IDivison of the Library of Congress in a report which concluded:
t is not altogether clear that the joint statement would permit the Ilited States to intervene in the event that the aggression or threat should result from Pan amanian action.
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Following the Carter-Torrijos joint statement and shortly before the vote by the Panamanian people, General Torrijos complicated an uncertain situation still further when lie told the Panamanian people on radio and television that the role of the United States under the Neuitrality Treaty was to defend the canal from foreign aggression if requested by Panama. Not once but twice hie said:
* the LUnited States is obligated to come to our defense . when wce ring the bell here, when we push the button .. (Emphasis supplied).
On the record, it is painfully obvious that the United States and Panamia have been in disagreemen.-t-and still disagree, despite the October 14 Carter-Torrijos joint statemient-on at least two major points:
Our administration tells the American people that the United States will have the right to defend the canal after the year 2000 against any threat to its neutrality, including an internal threat f rom within Panama. But spokesmen for Panama assert that the United States will have such a right only if the canal is threatened by a foreign power.
Our administration tells the American people that the United States can determine unilaterally when such a right to defend the canal can be exercised. But Panamanian spokesmen insist that U.S. forces can come in only when requested or when the action is agreed to by Panama.
We would be living in a fool's paradise to assume that these contradictory interpretations will simply go away if this treaty arrangenment is ratified.
It is essential, Mr. President, that we avoid being placed in the dilemma which such differing interpretations would create. Because it is by failing to reach a real agreement with the people of Panama by trying to paper over serious deficiencies and disagreements for shortterm political gain, that we could be buying ourselves a one-way ticket to another Vietnam.
Mr. President, particularly, if we are to consider tuirningT the canal over to Panama in the year 2000, and if the security aud economic interests of the United States are to be protected, then we should not relinquish our option to negotiate for construction of a second canal,
psibly a sea-level canal, in a country other than Panama.
Thiat is exacly what we would do under article XII of the proposed canal treaty, which reads in part:
During the duration of this Treaty, the United States of America sh7 all not negotiate with third Slates3 for the right to construct an interoceanic canal on any other route in the Western Hemisphere, except as the two Parties may otherwise agree.
In exchange for such a clear and unequivocal commitment on our part not to build a new canal in any other country, surely it is reasonah'le to ask what would, we get in return under the treaty?
The administration says we get a com mitment in the treaty that Panama will not collaborate with any other nation to build a second ranalq] in Panama. Whether that would be a fair exchange is open to serious questions. But beyond that, there are three important points to be made: First, the language of the proposed treaty does not say that, soo-ond, we already have suceh a guarantee under the existing 1903 tre aty; ancl third, the existing guarantee would be wiped out if we were to ratify the proposed treaty before us.
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In exchange f or our clear and unambi guous commitment not to bui d~ a new canal in any other country, Panama would be bound, and I put "bound" in quotes, by the following language in article XII:
* [Diuring the duration of the Treaty, both parties commit themselves to study jointly the feasibility of a sea level canal in the Republic of Panama, and in the event they determine that such a waterway is necessary, they shall negotiate terms agreeable to both parties, for its construction.
It is not necessary to have taken a high school course in business law to understand that, under such language, Panama would be obligated only to "study" and to "negotiate." There is no clear and unambiguous commitment there-or anywhere else in the treaty-that would preclude Panama's joining with a nation other than the United Staites to construct a second, or sea level, canal in Panama provided they complied with the requirements of the treaty that they first study and negotiate.
Mr. President, even though the existing canal is not obsolete, andI will not be obsolete in the near future, it is necessary and important that we do look toward the day when the existing Panama Canal will no longer be adequate. The dream of a sea-level canal, a canal without locks, ought to be more than just a dream in an era when men and women are going to the moon.
It is true that studies have been made and have indicated that thie least expensive place to build a second or sea-level canal would beInI Panama. But I suggest that for political and other reasons, it might be very wise to construcet such a second canal in another country, even though it would cost a few billion dolhrs more.
Furthermore, perhaps such a second canal should be built in another country under the auspices of the Organization of American States or sone other arrangement of international interests.
In a study published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1967, Immanuel J. Klette observed:
Although the cost of construction bears on the final choices, it should not be the prime factor in making decisions on a new canal. A waterway which is less expensive in dollars may be the most expensive in political consequences.
As we Move toward a new treaty relationship with Panama, we should not ignore the value of competition-economic, politic al,'and even diplomatic competition.
Holding open even the possibility of building a new canal outside of Panama-an option foreclosed by the proposed treaty-could provide very important and useful leverage in our relations with Panama.
After all, for the foreseeable future,, Panama's economic survival is dependent on the Panama Canal. As Prof. Edwin C. H-oyt observed several years ago in the Virginia Journal of International Law: If Panama is too intransigent, she may lose the [sea level] canal to one of' these other countries. This would be an economic disaster for Panama.
Furthermore, if a second canal were constructed elsewhere in Latin America, Panama would be forced to keep its own tolls competitive or risk losing most of the traffic to its almost certainly more modern rival.
A major conference on Panama sponsored by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic Studies in 1967 reached this key conclusion:-.
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Though the Republic of Panama seems technically to be the best place for a future canal facility, the United States should not abandon the right to approach other countries for possible canal location in the event that future political conditions exclude the project from Panama.
Under the circumstances, it is very difficult for me to see how article X11 of the proposed canal treaty serves the interests of the United States.
In my minority views, Mr. President, I also speak to certain economic concerns that trouble me and many of my colleagues, and indeed many Americans. I will only state here in these remarks that the soothing assurances by President Carter and others speaking for the administration that these treaties, if ratified, will not create a financial burden on the people of the United States are hardly justified by the record, particularly the record of the hearings of the Committee on Armed Services conducted only last week.
Finally, Mr. President, I feel compelled to call attention to a matter outside the text of the treaty which prompts a question: Despite the 13 or 14 years of intermittent negotiations, were these treaties, insofar as some of the final details are concerned, negotiated in haste, under the pressure of a time deadline?.
Because the treaties contain so much ambiguous language and so many provisions of doubtf ul merit, it is appropriate to ask such a question. And, unf ortunately, there is reason for some concern.
On February 10, 1977, shortly after hie took office, President Carter named Mr. Sol Linowitz to represent the United States as a negotiator for the Panama Canal treaties. But, Mr. Linowitz was appointed only on a temporary basis-for a 6-month period. Under the law, an appointment on this basis does not require confirmation by the Senate. Such an appointment bypasses the usual scrutiny by a Senate committee of a nominee's qualifications and possible conflict of interest. Doubtless the administration had its reasons for pursuing this course of action.
But because the Senate is an integral part of the treatymaking process under the Constitution, I would suggest that it was unwise-and something of an affront to the Seate-for the administration not to submit a treaty negotiator's name for confirmation. Utilizing such a short-circuit procedure did not build Senate confidence in the treaty negotiations.
lEven more important, in my judgment, is the question of whether this arbitrary and unnecessary 6-month limit on the tenure of a chief negotiator may have led the Tnited States to make hasty and unwise concessions under the pressure of an artificial deadline.
We have been given to understand that at least one very significant concession-the surrender of our option to build a second canal outside of Panama-was made at the last minute.
We are left to wonder what else we may have given away-what ambiguities we may have settled for-what loose ends we may have left untied-in our rush to beat the clock.
We do know that:
Mr. Linowitz was appointed on February 10, 1977-and he had just
6 months, and 6 months only, to bring in a new treaty.
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And interestingly enough, it was on August 10, 1977-exactly G. months later, to the day-that negotiators f or the two countries finally announced their agreement in principle on new treaties relating to the Panama Canal.
Mr. President, for these reasons and others which I shall not' take the time to discuss here today, it is my reluctant but inescapable conclusion that these should not be approved by the Senate.
Any new treaty relationship built upon the ambiguities of the treaties now before us would be doomed to failuLre from the start. We cannot afford to approve them as they stand. 'To do so would be no favor either to the Panamanians or to the people of the United States.
It is argued by some that defects in the treaties can be remedied if the Senate will adopt a series of amendments. I cannot agree. Such an expedient, however attractive it may seem politically, would be inadequate and unwise. It would do both too little and too, much.
If we must say "no" to these treaties-as I am now convinced we miust-I believe, along with David McCullogh, that how we say "no"~ in this situation is very important in terms of our future relations with the people of Panama and the. people of the Hemisphere.
I do not favor adoption on the Senate floor of a series of substantive amendments on a take- it- or-leave-it basis. That would be an aff ront to the Panamanian people. Furthermore, we would rum the real risk that the Paiiamanian ruler temporarily in power would not submit such substantive charges to a plebiscite of the Panamanian people. If this happened we would end up with a treaty relationship only with the dictator in power, but not with the people of Panama.
Accordingly, Mr. President, I believe that the appropriate course for the Senate is to withhold its "consent" to ratification of the treaties now before us-and to "advise"' the President to persist in negotiations until acceptable treaties can be f ashioned. z
A.General-Con
(2) Senator Robert Dole, February 8, 1978 (S 1550-53)
Mr. IDOLE. Mr. President, let me say at the outset that I think this is probably one of the iuost important foreign policy questions yet to comie before the 95th Congress, and perhaps it is the most critical foreign policy issue of this decade.
The Senator from Kansas does not know how many votes there are for the treaties and how many votes are against. In my judgment, it is too close to call at this point.
Perhaps during this debate some will change their minds and some will change their positions. That is the way it should be.
It can be a very instructive and a very constructive debate. Certainly the Senator f rom Kansas wishes to bea part of that effort.
I would hope we do not fall into the trap of trying to bring up the treaties in reverse order, as is now being suggested by the Senate leadership, because it seems to this Senator we first must -debate whether or not there is going to be a Panama Canal Treaty before we decide the second half of that agenda.
So I would suggest that the orderly procedure would be to take uip treaties as they were sent to the Senate by the President, as the distinguished Senator from Alabama pointed out this niioruingl.
There is no doubt in the mind of this Senator that there is a great deal of interest in both of these treaties.
TREATY DISCUSSIONS
Last Friday, the President asked mie to step into his office, and we discussed the treaties. On Sunday, President Ford called me long distance and we discussed the treaties. On Monday Ambassador Strauss called me, and we discussed the treaties. On Tuesday, former Vice President Rockefeller called me, and we discussed the treaties. On Wednesday, today, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called me, and we discussed the treaties.
I think it is common knowledge that they are all of one view, that they support the treaties. I had a very fine visit with each of these distinguished Ami-ericans and certainly I do not quarrel with their view.
I do not have the same feelings onl sovereignty as some in the Senate. My concern is, are these the best treaties? Are they good treaties? Good for Panama, yes, but are they good for us, America?
I guess everyone here has had a very difficult time deciding just what to do, and how to posture himself, and how to vote, because there are political implications to the votes on these treaties..
Let me say that when the Senator from Kansas heard that our negotiations had reached an agreement last August 10, I resolved, as I assum.e every other Member resolved, to try to come to grips with the real issues in a conscientious and impartial f rame of mind.
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I did not have any preconceived notions. I did not yet know all the details about the treaties.
-I might add I had gone through the entire campaign as President Ford's running mate in 1976, and as far as I can recall was never asked about the Panama Canal treaties, even though they were the big issue between President Ford and Governor Reagan in securing the Republican Presidential nomination.
As f ar as I know, I was never asked by anyone f rom August 19 through the election what my views on the treaties would be. So I -had nio preconceived notions or any partisan commitments on the issue.
Some of us were asked to support the treaties before they were ever made public; but until the treaties were made public and released on September 7, like most other Senators, this Senator withheld his judgmient.
Once they became available for inspection, it was our obligation as Senators to study the treaties, to adopt what we thought might be the best course. I knew of the political significance, and so I discussed it
-with many people in my State of Kansas. Many I did not have to discuss it with; they sent letter after letter, by the hundreds and by the thousands.
In ]December, I -went to Panama with the distinguished Senator f rom Nevada (Mr. Laxalt). We had a visit with Omar Torrijos, the leader of Panama. We discussed the canal, and aspects of the, canal treaties, with Canal Zone employees and military officers. I have also discuissed them with State and local public officials, and other concerned citizens throughout the Nation in the past several months. I state that, so that those who might be interesed will know that the process of reaching a decision is very difficult.
.The objective approach of the Senator from Kansas toward this critical issue has been consistent. There were a number of unresolved points, as I read the proposed treaties. I recognize that the present 1903 Treaty is out of date in many respects. There is room. for revision, .-but only in a responsible manner and to a practical degree.
So now we have the treaties before us, before the Senate of the United States, and it is our obligation as Senators to advise and consent, to give our best judgment, based not on partisan considerations but on what may be best for America and for Panama.
THESE TREATIES UNACCEPTABLE
I think all the arguments we will hear on this floor, whether they :are for the treaties or against the treaties, would boil down to whether or not these are good treaties in the sense that they fully protect U.S. rights and interests. And are they the best treaties? Why not insist
-tpon the best treaties that we can negotiate? Maybe they are the best. Maybe, after weeks and weeks of debate, the majority will determine that these are the best treaties.
I think in the end, the utimate question will be this: Would American interests be best served by Senate ratification, by a series of amendm ents, or by outri ght rej ecti on of the treaties ?
There is no doubt about it, the majority of Americans are still op-posed to the treaties. The latest Gallup poll indicated it was very
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close, and that there may be a margin for these treaties if- certain amendments were adopted.
However, I could not vote for the treaties as they were transmitted to the Senate. I do think a case can be made for updating the 1903 Panama'Canal Treaty in a way that fully protects our rights as a nation, as well as the rights of Panama. I know that many opponents of these particular treaties, including Governor Reagan and others, have indicated they would be agreeable to some revisions in the traditional Panama Canal agreements. Like them, I do not reject out of hand the concept of a new bilateral treaty.
Frankly, thouo-h, I am disappointed with most of the decisions rendered by the enate Foreign Relations Committee with regard to, modification proposals set forth by this Senator and others. With the exception of the one amendment recommended by the committee, and originally proposed by this Senator last October, the committee rejected all other treaty amendment proposals. The committee's action leaves most of the basic concerns about these treaties unresolved. I: know that I cannot support the treaties in the form recommended by the majority of the committee members, and I will actively opposes final ratification of the treaties in that form. And those are the crucial words: "in that form."
Regrettably, many of my Senate colleagues, like administration spokesmen, seem more preoccupied with avoiding treaty negotiations or a second Panamanian plebiscite than with correcting treaty def ects. Treaty modifications, they suggest, spell disaster both for these treaties and for the f oreign policy stature of this administration.
THE CASE FOR AMENDMENTS
I reject the suggestion that Senate amendments to these treaties would be equated with defeat of the treaties. Neither do I accept this view that treaty amendments would be a crushing blow to the President's ability to conduct our foreign policy in the months ahead. Instead, I think the enactment by this body of any other amendments ought to be viewed in its proper light: As a new stage in canal treaty negotiations. As the Senate performs its constitutionally designated advisory role to the President in this international treatymaking process, further talks with the Panamanians on critical points may, be necessary and should be welcomed.
But let us not overdramiatize the consequences. Amendment of the, canal treaties will not spell disaster for this administrati on's foreign policy program, and it should not, for it is not accomplished in a narrow partisan sense, or as a vote of "no confidence for the President.
If we do our work as we should do our work, and as I think every Member of this body will do his work, it will be viewed by most thinking Americans as a conscientious effort by this body to preserve what we see as nonnegotiable interests.
I have listened to the arguments by treaty proponents that Panama will not accept changes in these treaties. But let me pose this question: Do my co lleaoijes truthfully believe that Panama will reject out-ofhand a treaty that was 13 years in the making, simply because we suggest a few changes? Do my colleagues suggest that the Torrijos
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government will turn its back ona the one thing that promises to insure that regime's popularity and power for- years to come? lFrom a practical standpoint, Panama's leaders are not likely to reject these treaties simply because we insist on a few alterations. No, I think they will find it in their interest to "keep talking" at the negotiating table, as General Torrijos himself indicated to me during my visit to Panama last December.
As I recall General -Torrijos' statement, he. said he did not want a year-around plebescite, that another plebescite would be fine but he did not want a year-around plebiscite.
So I suggest that. whatever the action we take in the Senate, that Senate action will simply amount to a new stage in the treaty negotiations. And this Senator, for one, would be willing to see negotiations resume and continue, for a fewy more months if it meant protecting
Aeica's vital defense and economic interests. Realistically, I think that is an arrangement. that both governments can live with.
PRECEDENTS FOR TREATY MODIFICATION
All of us recognize, of course, that the U.S. Constitution gives the Senate the express responsibility to "advise qnd consent" on international treaty proposals, and there is ample precedent for our amending treaties such as this one. During the. course of this Nation's history, more, than 70 U.S. treaties withi other nations have gone into force with Senate amendments attached. I believe it is our solemn duty and responsibility, as guarantors of the public truct, to modify treaties w",hen necessary.
Least of all should we be deterred by the fear of renegotiation. I cannot, after all, accept the proposition that immediate ratification of these treaties is more important than guaranteeing the security of the canal and of our national interests. It would be f ar better that we spend a few more months at the negotiating table, than that we spend the rest of our lives regretting our handling of the treaty issue.
General concern with the two proposed treaties is the careless and imprecise manner in which they were drafted. It is the ambiguities, the loopholes, and the concessions which disturb me the most, particularly as they relate to American rights of defense and use of the canal. it appears that much of this can be. attributed to the undue haste in which they were concluded last year.
ADMINISTRATION CONCESSIONS DURING NEGOTIATIONS
Let us put one idea to rest right now : That. is the misconception that these treaties have the weight. of four presidential administrations in their favor. In fact, some of the major points of conflict which had been at issue f or the past 1-9 years, were suddenly "resolved" within t he. first 611months of the Carter Administration. Previous administrations preferred no treaty at all to one which would involve unacceptable concessions. And that. is to their credit. America has always taken a stand of principle over appeasement..
When one reviews the record of negotiations during the first 7 months of 1977, however, there is the unmistakable appearance of several important concessions made by the United States-A reflection
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of this admniistration's single-minded efforts to conclude a treaty by midyear. The administration's obsession in this regard was no secret, evidenced both by public statements and by the temporary 6mionth appointment of a niew chief negotiator in February of 1977
According to information that has come to light in recent weeks, it appears that this admninist ration made critical concessions regardIng the duration of the initial treaty; regarding the prospect for a continued American military presence following treaty termination; regarding preferential rights of passage for U.S. warships during emergencies; and regarding unilateral 'U.S. rights to protect the permanent security and neutrality of the canal, these points have surf aced through public statements by officials involved in the negotiations, and through certain documents that have recently come to my attention. I will talk more about these points during forthcoming debate on treaty amiendmnents.
There is no question that the Panamanian Government renewed its Old demands with the advent of tbe new administration. There is no question that subsequent bargaining involved mutual concessions. Negotiations necessarily require a conciliatory attitude on the part of all parties. But the treaty concessions I have just cited involved vital security interests which shoul d have remained nonnegotiable from our standpoint. Unfortunately, th-ey did not.
As a result, we have treaty "assurances" which are wrapped in amibioruity, and meaningless rhetoric where there should be iron-clad guarantees. We even find ourselves locked into a commitment for the next 22 years not to build a new canal in any country other than Pananma.
InI retros-pect, it seems evident there should not have been an effort to rush the final stage of negotiations. At present, there is no justification for rushing the final ratification process by our two gove rnments. If we do, we will certainly end up with a treaty that we will regret f or generations to come.
SPECi~iC CONCERNS ABOUT TREATIES
Many of my colleagues are concer-ned along -with myself about the vaume, treaty assurances on future American rights to defend thenu-mi trality of the canal, and to -use the canal for our own national Defense purposes. Our misgivings were heightened by contradictory dlefi1titionls Or particular provisions, such as articles IV and VT of the neutrality treaty. One thing is by now very clear: the -differences in American and Panamanian interpretations on these points were realThey were not just a matter of "semantics."
THE 'SECRET CABLE'1 AND THE UNDERSTANDING"
For weeks after the treaties were made public last year, the administ ration sought to gloss over the ;difference,,-. When I directed the Senate's attention to a confidential State Department cable in October. however, the realities of the contradictions became apparent. One week later, the joint "Carter-Torrijos Statement of Understanding" was issued, with its text closely modeled after two amendments I had
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introduced on September 23. The "understanding" was a step in th& right direction, but only a first step.
It seems clear that the joint statement of understanding -was a direct result of legitimate concerns raised by the State Department cable I presented to the committee on October 5. When Ambassador Sot Linowitz appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 19, he admitted thatHad the issue not been raised here, sir, wve don't think it would have been necessary to have this statement of understanding.
'With all due humility, I do believe the State Department cable was the catalyst for action by both the committee and the President to clarify our defense and passage. rights under the neutrality treaty. Despite criticism leveled at this Senator for releasing the cabe-classifted for "limited distribution"-I have never doubted that my decision was in the national interest. I believe, in retrospect, that it has served the Senate well in its consideration of the canal treaties.
THE AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
I do want to commend the members of the Foreign Relations Commi-ittee for having the good judgment and the foresight to endorse the proposal that the Carter-Torrijos understanding be made a part of the treaty itself. There has been a tremendous reversal in opinion on this point since I introduced treaty amendments Nos. 7 -and 8 to that effect on October 17, just 3 days after the statement of -understanding was issued. :Senator Ernest Hollings introduced a similar proposal as amendment No. 9, and 'Senator Lloyd Bentsen followed suit with amendments Nos. 13 and 14 last month.
For months following the issuance of thie Carter-Torrijos statemenit, the administration resisted and belittled my contention that clarifications and guarantees need to be written into the treaties themselves. A letter from the State Department to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee last December maintained that anl amendment of articles IV and VI of the Neutrality 'Treaty "is unnecessary f romn a l egal standpoint, and extremely undesirable in terms of maintaining the overall agreement on the treaties reached with Panama-such a step would, moreover, seriously complicate the ratification process." That was the State Department's opinion in December of last year. Due to the persistence of this Senator and others, the administration reversed its positionl 6 weeks later and agreed to the treaty amendment now recommended by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The Senate leadership now supports that amendment as well1, and I guess 'with 77, 78, or 85 cosponsors, one could say chances for approval appear good. But the effort to approve these treaties does not end there.
The Senator -from ]Kansas remembers when it was indicated that he was obstructing the treaty process by offering amendments numbered 7 and 8. I do not hear that now, when those amendments have become amendmdients numbered 20 and 21 by the leadership. I do not think we Should characterize any other amendments that are offered by this Senator or any other Senator as obstructions until we have bad a, fll debate. The American people understand that those of us who have amendments are concerned about our national interests, are conerned
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about Panamanian interests, and are concerned about getting the best possible treaties.
So we have made progress, but we have not yet reached the objective.
TREATY DEFECTS
The treaties do not yet merit the support of those who would insure the f uture security interests of the United States.
As the Senator f rom Kansas indicated, I am not so concerned about th~e sovereignty dilemma as some others. I am not hung up on whether the canal is sovereign territory or not, or whether we own it in a technical legal sense. I am more concerned about what happens after the year 2000. 1 am less concerned about from now to the year 2000. We will still have troops there. There will be a presence there. But 'What happens after the year 2,000, after the initial treaty terminates?
For the immediate future, I am bothered by uncertain protections of the rights of U.S. Canal Zone employees, and by excessive payr wnts guaranteed to Panama which will create pressures for higher canal tolls. Maybe it will not hit us for 4, 5, or 6 years, but it is coming. Everyone agrees it is coming.
I am concerned about maintaining U.S. discretion in selecting a site for a new sea-level Canal, and about Panamanian progress in the
ohFervnceof human rights, though I might say it appears they are doing better. They have made progress in the past year, but much rema us to be done.
It i.s for these reasons that I seek to improve the treaty langruag by proposing specific amendments and reservations-not to obstruct the proceed dings any more than I was trying to obstruct proceedings With amndetNo.7ad8 which are now amendments Nos. 20 and 21, but as one who seeks assurance of the Nation's welfare.
On September 23 of last year, I proposed six amendments and two reservations to the proposed Panama Canal Treaty and Neutrality Treaty. Those proposals focused on specific problems including American defense and passage rights, payment guarantees for Panaiu~a, duration of the transition period, the transfer of U.S. property, human rights-, and restrictions on construction of a new sea-level can( Ia. Subsequently, I introduced five additional amendments on October 17. and January 19 of this year. All of them, I believe ,go to the heart of the defects and omissions inherent in these treaties.
HEMISPHERIC INTERESTS
Mr. President, we recognize that there is widespread nationalistic upport in Panama for regaining full control of the canal and Canal Zone. We also know that there is support for a "new canal arrangement" among many of the Centraland Latin American governments. O ir friends in this hemisphere should understand that we do value the continuation of our good relations with them. We do want to base our future relationships on a foundation of mutual interest and respect.
But despite all the administration's claims about widespread support for these treaties throughout Latin America, we know that those roverIments want us to act responsibly in guaranteeing the canal's future security. They want us to 'do What we can to assure the con-
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tinuation of low toll rates, efficient Operation, and adequate maintenance in the future. To do any less would be to betray their trust in our good judgment, and would betray their own interests in the use of the canal.
As recently as last June, the Organization of American States unanimously adopted a resolution opposing excessive increases in canal tolls. Yet, it is now well known that thie payment guarantees for Panama contained within these treaty provisions will necessitate immediate toll increases of as much as 25 to 40 prcent-a fact that is sure to concern Latin American countries that are heavy canal users.
Mr. President, this Senator categorically rejects any onus of guilt or remorse on the parlt of the United States for our involvement with the canal. This Senator rejects any notion that we owe any other nation or nations an apologyT for our role in building the canal, Inl operating and maintaining it for 650 years, and in thereby enhancing the standard of living for the people of Panama.
This Senator rejects as well any suggestion that we retreat due to fear of unknown consequences. The governments of all nations must understand that we do not relinquish our presence in the Canal Zone because of veiled threats or direct pressures. They must know, withiout question, that we reserve all rights to protect the security of the canal when it is threatened, and that we expect to continue to play a vital role throughout this hemisphere. Free, then, of any sense of guilt or intimidation, we should now proceed to thoroughly discuss these treaties inu'n objective and responsible manner. We owe no less to those we rep resent, who will be listening carefully in the days ahead, perhaps more carefully than ever before.
A LONG DEBATE
Mr. President, the Senator from Kansas suggests, as he did at, the outset, that this will be a long debate. It will be a constructive debate. Minds will be changed. Senators who now are uncertain may find, in the course of the debate or in the course of some amendments,- which will be offered, a way to improve the treaties and make it possible for them to vote for the treaties with certain improvements that go -to the heart of the matter; that is, protection of America's vital interests.
Oh, yes, we are concerned about Panama. We know they are a sumall country, we know of the problems they have. We know a bout General Torrijos. We know that he has problems. We know there are difficult decisions for the leader of that country to make.
We know it is important to President Carter and we -want to hielp) President Carter when we can. It seems to this 'Senator that one way to assist the President is to make certain that we protect the national interest. Perhaps in the next week or 2 weeks or 3 weeks, amendments will be offered that will appeal to 51 Senators. It only takes 51 to amend the treaties.
It seems to this 'Senator that one way to assure passage of the treaties, perhaps by a wide margin in this body, is to make certain th at wT(, give careful attention to some of the am-endments which will be proposed.
I shall only say one more timae that there are those who yelled "ob~tr'utionism," when this Senator introduced amendments Nos. 7 aid 8. I find now that 78 Senators share my early view. I do not see
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anyone saying they are obstructionist. They say it is a positive step forward.
The leadership has embraced the amendments. They now claimthem to be their own. That is fine. That is the prerogative of the leadership. And the Senator from Kansas may want to cosponsor his amendments at the appropriate time.
But I think there has been proof demonstrated, by the f act that the leadership is embracing these amendments, that they know the treaties were vague and they knew the treaties were au-lbiguous. They knew the political dangers in ratifying the treaties liii their original form. They told the President so very candidly. They told the American people. Now they are telling us..
Suggest to my. distinguished friends, the majority leader and minority leader, that we share their responsibility. We share their concern. XWe hope that when we off er amendments, they will share our concern and they will share our responsibility, and they will understand that we offer the amendmnent~s in good faith, just as they offer amendments Nos. 290 and 21 in good faith.
This Senator has a feeling that there is going to be a big effort around here to get amendments Nos. 20 and 21 adopted and then claim victory and say it is all over. The Senator from Kansas, does not believe that should happen. There is no doubt in my mind that amendments Nos. 20 and 21 will pass. IBt if we proceed as we should, by first considering, the Panama Canal Treaty and trying to make improvements in the Panama Canal Treaty before we get to the second treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal, then I think we can end this debate with a great deal of harmony.
Perhaps at that point, there will be sufficent votes for passage of the treaties. If not, if there is an effort to beat. down every amendment, or to adopt amendments TN-,os. 20 and 21 and say, this is it-these are the big, ones, this clarifies the treaty, this is all we need-then I would suggest that the final vote is too close to call.
It seems to this Senator that there should be no fear of renegotiation. There should be no fear of upsetting General Torrijos. We should not concern ourselves with whether or not this is a plus or a minus for this administration or the former administration. We oughrt to concern ourselves with our responsibilities. I am certain we will. One of our responsibilities is to make certain that we have not overlooked something.
I commend the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. They have worked hard. They heard many, many witnesses, as did the Committee on Armed Services. And I guess, after hearings all the witnesses and after knowing about amendments 20 and 21, the great majority decided that the treaties were no longer flawed. But this Senator does not 'buy that. We want to make certain these are the best possible treaties that can pass this body.
Mr. President, the Senator from Kansas will pledge his efforts to be constructive, to keep the debate at the highest l evel, to offr respo'nsible amendments; and then hope that my colleagues, who may be wavering or may have ideas of their own, will be able to support those amendments.
I yield the floor.
A. General-Con
(3) Senator Harry Byrd, March 6, 1978 (S 2974-78)
Mr. HARRYKF BYRD, JRt. Mr. President, few issues of foreign policy in recent years have stirred so great a controversy as the question of ratification. of the proposed new Panama Canal treaties.
Is the Panama Canal and the buffer zone which surrounds it important to the United States?
Is U..S. ownership-which our country has had f or more than 70 years-important ?
Are the defense and economic interests of the United States best served by our maintaining ownership-or by the relinquishing ownership to the Panamanians?
At this point, I think some history is in order.
This is not the first time a President has proposed surrendering our .sovereignty over the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.
In 1967, President Johnson put a head of steam behind Panamai resolve to wrest the canal away from undisputed American control. Draft treaties prepared in 1967 made concessions to Panama which many Members of Congress felt were unwise.
S o great was the congressional opposition to the proposed treaty that President Johnson never submitted the proposal to the 'Senate for consideration. I am pleased to'say that I took an active and firm role in opposition to the Johnson proposal.
I see no fundamental differene between theJohnson proposal and the Carter proposal. Each would surrender U.S. control.
The Congress was told in 1967 that there would be a series of antiAmnerican riots in Panama if the U.S. Government did not give the Panamamnans what they want. We are being told the same thing today.
It is vitally important that the United States maintain a position of strength in Latin America, and the pivotal point in our defense arrangements is the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone.
As nearly as I can determine, the basic arguments in support of approving the new treaties are these:
First, those favoring the treaties are told, and believe, that the Panama Canal is obsolete or becoming obsolete-that we really do not need it anymore, or will not need it very long.
That most certainly is not the case. Far from it. The canal is important to U.S. security, important to our economy-and, according to knowledgeable witnesses, will become more important in the years ahead-as I will detail later.
Second, the argument is made that unless the new treaties are ratified violence will erupt in Panama and access to the canal will be jeopardized by acts of terrorists and radicals. This is a rehash of the same argument made more than a decade ago by Presidehit Johnson and those who supported his proposal to give away the Panama Canal.
To determine the defense and economic interests of the United States on such a basis seems to me most unwise.
(84)
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Furthermore, as I will explain, I am deeply concerned that approval of the Carter treaties will render the canal more vulnerable, not less; will increase the risks of confrontation with radical or foreign elements.
Finally, the argument is made that we should ratify these treaties to divest ourselves of the guilt and stigma we are supposed to feel concerning the UJ.S. role in connection with the 1903 treaty and our operation of the Panama Canal.
I do not subscribe to such a view. Along with most Americans, I am proud of the U.S. role in building, operating, and maintaining the engineering masterpiece that is the Panama Canal.'
I see no reason to be ashamed or to apologize.
The canal has been good for the United States; it has been good for the world; and especially-especially-it has been good for Panama. As a result of U.S. presence there, Panama, a nation of 1,700,000 perSons, about one-third that of the State of Virginia, has the highest per capita income of any Central American nation and the fourth highest in all of Latin America. Panama has the fourth highest per capita income of all 19 countries of Latin America.
Let me say, -at this point, that I regard the Panamanians as a very fine people. I first got to know them many years ago when I went to school with many of them (one of whom became President of Panama). I have had Panamanian friends through the years.
I am not unsympathetic to the views of the people of Panama.
Realizing as I do that times and conditions change, I am willing~ to recognize, as one Senator, that a major revision in our treaty relationship with the Republic of Panama could serve the interests of both countries.
But I am not convinced that the treaties now before the Senate for ratification meet that criteria.
These treaties have numerous flaws which are so serious as to make them unacceptable. They need to be renegotiated.
The first and most serious flaw is that these treaties are totally inadequate in protecting the economic and defense interests of the United States.
Second, they would surrender U.S. operational control over an extremely important international waterway.
Third, they would be very costly to the American taxpayer.
Fourth, they would deny to the United States until the year 2000 the right to negotiate with any countries other than Panama for the construction of an interoceanic canal.
Yes, Mr. President, these treaties would deny to the United States the right to even negotiate with any other country except Panama for the construction of an interoceanic canal, and Panama, thus,, would have a veto over the construction of a canal by the United States in another Latin American country.
Finally, the treaties are so vague and subject to varying interpretations as to risk serious disputes over their meaning in the future.
Let us look more closely at the facts.
Proponents of the treaties argue that we can give the canal to Panama, because it is no longer important to the United States militarily or economically.
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This argument, however, has been shown to be false.
The canal provides an essential link between the naval forces in the Atlantic -and the Pacific oceans. With the exception -of our 13 aircraft carriers, all of the Navy ships now in the active fleet are able to transit the canal. In a crisis, ships and supplies can be quickly transferred from one ocean to the other, thus allowing a smaller Navy than -would otherwise be necessary.
History has clearly recorded how relatively quickly we -were able to move elements of the Atlantic naval fleet to the Pacific after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Moreover, this quick -transfer capability was of critical importance to the United States in the more recent past.
During the Cuban missile crisis, substantial military forces -were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic in preparation for an invasion of Cuba. Their presence in the waters surrounding Cuba undoubtedly contributed to the successful outcome of that crisis.
The canal was also important during the Vietnam conflict with over 33 percent of the supplies for our forces passing throuTgh it.
Today, the canal continues to play an important part in U.S. military plans.
For example, in the event of a crisis in NATO Europe, American plans call for the transfer of a substantial number of U.S. Navy ships through the canal to strengthen the Atlantic fleet.
If access to the canal were denied to U.S. Navy vessels, the alternative route around Cape Horn involve an additional 8,000-mile journey taking 3 to 4 weeks and simultaneously would consume a great deal of fuel.
Emphasizing this military importance, Adm. James Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Senate Armed Services -Committee just last month that the canal "is absolutely essential to the war plans of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Defense Establishment* * "
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also emphasized the critical military importance of the Panama Canal in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I might say parenthetically that Admiral'Moorer is the only person in our Nation's history to serve as commander in chief of both our Pacific fleet and our Atlantic fleet.
Admiral Moorer said this:
There is no feasible war plan for the United States, taking into account our reduced forces and extended commitments, that does not assume that the Panama Canal will be available for full-time priority use.
The canal is also important to the United States economically, -with an average of about 70 percent of all cargo sent through the canal either originating in or bound for U.S. ports.
Without the canal, according to a Department of Commerce report issued in May 1975, there would be:
A 71-percent increase in the average annual consumption of
f uel by carriers of U.S. foreign trade;
A 31-day increase in average shipping time;
A $932 million increase in the yearly total delivered price of
all exports, which would price our f arm products out of Pacific
markets; and