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* THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICYMAKING Richard E. Rowberg Energy Program Manager Office of Technology Assessment U.S. Congress September 1981 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of Technology Assessment.
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The Office of Technology Assessment and Congressional Policymaking I. Introduction As technology has become more complex and pervasive, public policymaking by has had to be increasingly conscious of the broad range of consequences of technology on society. At the same time, accurate portrayal of these consequences is becoming more and more difficult, and the risks resulting from miscalculation are growing. As a principal policymaker, the United States Congress continually faces these challenges. In an attempt to be more effective in meeting them, the Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment. This paper describes the Office and its relationship with the Congress in developing technology related policy. First to be discussed will be the responsibilities of the United States Congress and how their need for advice on technical issues evolved. This leads to a discussion of the origins of the Office of Technology Assessment. Next, the Office will be described followed by a discussion of how it assists the Congress set technology related policy. Finally, the effectiveness of the Office will be discussed along with some speculation about its future. II. Background Congressional policymaking occurs in three ways. The first is through the authorization -appropriation process which provides funding authority and money for the various branches of the Federal government. The purpose of the authorization step is to allow Congress the opportunity to issue policy guidelines and specific instructions about the content of the programs funded by public monies. The Budget Act of 1974 added another layer to this process by giving Congress a means of looking at the entire Federal budget and how the
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various pieces that fall within the jurisdictions of the different authorizing committees fit together. The appropriations process also permits some policy actions, but these are limited to specific direction within the guidelines set by authorization. It is the latter where the major policymaking activity takes place concerning the Federal budget. The _second way is through the various pieces of legislation that establish or rescind Federal regulatory, tax and program activity. This is the principal policymaking avenue for the Congress since it is here that major policy initiatives can be created. Examples, enacted by the Congress include the United States Space Program, the legislation which established regulations and programs to improve the nation's environment, and the Energy Security Act of 1980 which established a program to promote the development of synthetic fuels. The authorization process discussed above is the means by which Congress can correct or alter policy decisions made in this second process. The third way is through the oversight of Federal activities. This process is similar to authorization in that it allows the Congress a way to review Federal programs and suggest or direct changes as the Congress sees fit. Oversight is broader than the authorization process in that it need not involve funds. At the same time, if oversight is not combined with the authorization process, the former has less force in causing the Federal agency in question to alter direction. Operating in parallel with, and sometimes independently of, these Congressional processes are the policymaking activities of the Executive Branch as set forth by the President. The United States is unique in that these two branches can propose and initiate policy independently of one another. The necessity of Congressional approval for funding of all Federal -2 -
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programs and Presidential authority to execute these programs, however, means that both branches must eventually agree, or at least acquise, to the policy before it can be implemented. The usual procedure is for the President to propose policy in the form of new legislation and/or directions of the Federal agencies, and for the Congress to review these proposals and enact legislation, where necessary, if it agrees to the proposal. By the time this process is complete, there can be considerable modification of the original proposal. Occasionally, the Congress itself will initiate the policy. This was true of much of the environmental legislation that was passed in the early 197O's. In either case, there are extensive discussions between the branches during the progress of any policy proposal from its inception until it becomes formal Federal policy, usually through legislation. In the course of enacting policy, there are numerous occasions on which the Congress requires information and analysis of the issues under consideration. These can range from questions about the position various groups take on the proposal to broad, detailed assessments of the issues and their consequences for society. This information is used by the Congress to help in making decisions on the policy proposals. Over the past several years, the job of assimilating this information and deciding among competing claims has become increasingly difficult. There are two reasons for this. First, more and more of the policy proposals deal with complex technologies which can profoundly affect society. Second, the Executive Branch has greatly expanded its analytical capability with the result that policy proposals from the President often are supported by elaborate and extensive analyses which are very difficult for the Congress to examine independently. As a result, Congress, on occasion, was forced to make decisions with either insufficient understanding of the technical aspects or a frustrating feeling that a better -3 -
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understanding of the consequences of their action was possible and desirable. It must be remembered, at this point, that any decision by the Congress will be largely based on political considerations because Congress first and last represents the people. As important as purely technical considerations may be the perceptions and desires of the public will always dominate in cases where technical conflicts exist. This does not, however, lessen the need for a better understanding of the technical claims in these conflicts. It is the emergence of technical conflicts that has greatly complicated the policymaking process. Technical conflicts arise when there are two or more claims about the costs and benefits of a technology and resolution is not possible with any kind of a controlled experiment. Although such conflicts have existed throughout history, it has only been in the last few decades that they have occupied such a central place in debates over policy. Some of the reasons for this include the emergence of the environmental movement, the ever increasing scale and costs of new technologies (which now seem always to require government assistance), and the greater awareness of risk if something should go wrong. Conflicts have arisen between different societal goals (economic versus physical health in some cases) and between competing technologies (solar energy versus nuclear power, l.g.) which often are decided, or at least altered, by government action. As these conflicts became more complex, Congress became increasingly concerned about ways to better understand their basis. For example, the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 established the concept of environmental impact statements to try and get a better idea of the potential environmental effects of new technologies. In addition, the Congress expanded its own staff (both of individual Members and of the Committees) to increase its analytical capability. At the same time, many of the professional societies in the -4 -
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United States begin to sponsor fellowships for their members to serve on Congressional staffs. For the first time, significant numbers of scientists and engineers began advising the Congress on a day-to-day basis, and technical capability to compete with the Executive branch began to develop. Finally, in the late 1960's, the Congress began debate about a proposal to establish a new support agency to advise them strictly on technical matters and their long-term consequences for society. Up to 1968, there were only two agencies that directly supported the Congress. The first, the Library of Congress, was established in 1800, and provides general reference material and assistance to the Members. This activity was enhanced by the formation of the Congressional Research Service within the Library in 1914. In 1970, Congress greatly expanded the responsibilities of the Service, and today they have over 800 staff who respond to Congressional requests, ranging from short questions to complex analyses of current issues. The second agency, the General Accounting Office, was established in 1920. This office is charged with auditing the operations of the Federal government to see that they are spending public funds as intended by the Congress and that the agencies are meeting the mandate of Congressional legislation. In the past decade, the General Accounting Office has expanded its role, too, and now provides the Congress with more general analyses of issues related to Federal programs and responsibilities. Despite the existence of these two agencies, the Congress still felt the need for additional advice on technical matters. In particular, they wanted analyses of technologies which would extend the concept of the environmental impact statement to all societal activities. This concern was intensified by the debate over the Supersonic Transport in 1970. Arguments about the -5 -
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environmental effects of the airplane were joined by arguments over jobs, balance of trade, technological supremacy and whether there were real advantages to decreasing travel time. Even questions about energy were raised although this was prior to the 1973 oil embargo. The Congress was deluged with information on both sides and felt frustrated by their inability to "know" what was correct. This debate provided additional ammunition for proponents of the formation of the technical assessment support agency first proposed in 1968. In this atmosphere, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was formed by legislation passed in 1972. The debate preceeding this enactment stressed the potential of technology assessment in providing a way to forecast the risks and benefits of a technology before it became widespread. The words "early warning" were used often early in the debate and are written into the legislation. Proponents of the concept believed that an Office of Technology Assessment would be one of the most important organizations in the government. They felt it would at last give the Congress and society a way to view the full range of pote~tial impacts of a technology and the alternatives to that technology. Further, through its function of developing policy alternatives, the Office would greatly facilitate Congressional policymaking. Opponents argued that the office would be used to slowdown or halt technological development. The phrase "technology assessment"-came to typify this view. In general, they believed that there was too much analysis going on and that the Congress, by establishing such an office, was trying to reach the impossible goal of determining a risk free future. As we shall see, neither of these claims has turned out to be true. In any case, the office was estalished in 1972 and began operation late in 1973. -6 -
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III. Description of OTA The motivation for establishing the Office of Technology assessment is best described by the findings and declaration of purpose in the enabling public law which is shown in Figure 1. The Office is directed to examine technologies, as requested by the Congress, in order to assess the full range of intended and unintended technical, economic, environmental, social and political consequences of the introduction, expansion or contraction of a technology. Further, OTA is to develop policy alternatives that will address the problems and benefits uncovered in the analysis, and to examine the effects of those policies. These mandates are as encompasing as any ever given an organization charged with public policy analysis. In the eight years that OTA has been in operation, a structure has evolved to meet its mandate. The legislation stated that OTA should have a director but was silent on any other organizational aspects. The current organization is shown in Figure 2. The three divisions and nine programs cover all the activity in which OTA is currently engaged. There are about 130 full staff including 90 professionals with an annual budget of about $11.5 million. The professional staff have a range of disciplines including engineering, physics, chemistry, biology, health science, and social science. The management includes nine program managers, three assistant directors (one for each division) and various administrative personnel in addition to the director. The Office has a governing board consisting of 12 members of the Congress, six from the Senate and six from the House of Representatives. The Board, which has six Republicans and six Democrats, sets policy for OTA and appoints the Director. All projects done by OTA must receive approval from the Board before they can be started and all must be reviewed by the Board -7 -
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upon completion before they can be released. Because of the wide range of political views held by Board members, this review ensures that OTA has met its responsibility to treat each issue in an unbiased, comprehensive manner. Further, approval to begin a project ensures that OTA will be carrying out appropriate studies and not work best done by one of the other support agencies. A project begins upon receiving a request from one of three places. First, and most frequent, the request will come from the Chairman and/or Ranking Minority member of a standing Committee of the Congress. Second, the Board may request a study, and third a study may be initiated by the director. An individual member can only request a study through a Committee. This is to ensure that there is wide interest within the Congress for the work OTA undertakes. Once the Board has approved the request, work is begun in the program for which the study is most appropriate. A study lasts anywhere from six months to two years, with the latter figure dominant. There is no set way to do a technology assessment although certain procedures have developed. First, each study has an advisory panel consisting of people from all the groups affected by the technology. This panel, of 10 to 15 people, has members from industry, consumer and environmental groups, state and local governments, universities and the general public. The purpose of the panel is to make sure the studies cover all aspects of the issues fairly, accurately and completely. Although the Office staff is ultimately responsible for the study, the advisory panel plays a critical role. Second, selected tasks of the analysis are contracted to outside groups. Further, OTA makes extensive use of workshops to review these contracts or develop additional information for the study. Finally, the report is written by OTA staff from the materials prepared by the contractors, workshops and -8 -
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internally. This includes the policy analysis which is the sole responsibility of the staff. Once a draft of the report is complete, it is subjected to extensive review by both the advisory panel and other interested parties. Finally, when OTA is satisfied that the report meets its mandate and standards, and fulfills the request, it is sent to the Board for review to release to the requesting Committee. After that the report is printed and made available to the rest of the Congress and the public. This procedure is elaborate, time consuming and often frustrating. It is essential, however, in order that studies are prepared that meet as closely as possible the purpose of dTA. IV. Congressional Use in Policymaking The most important test of the effectiveness of any study done by the Office of Technology Assessment is its use by the Congress in making policy. In this section we will discuss how our studies have and have not been used with the help of two examples. First we present some general observations. The studies requested of OTA are usually designed to examine technical issues that are or are anticipated to be the subject of considerable Congressional debate. Because our studies are so extensive and take a year or more to complete, it is not always possible to time them to key stages of a debate. As a result the studies do not often have a direct influence on legislative decisions. The studies, however, do provide a much better understanding of the issues under debate and have been the basis for new initiatives or directions taken by the Congress in developing policy. Because the OTA studies are so comprehensive, they have a staying power that is not found with other studies that have been done on particular aspects of a technology. This staying power allows the report to be used over and over 9 -.... ....__ -
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as issues reemerge in the Congress, as they usually will. Therefore, even though the studies may not be the direct cause of specific legislative decisions they are gaining value as the reference work on many of the subject areas considered time and again by Congress. A study completed by OTA is transmitted to the Congress in a number of ways. First the report and summary are delivered directly to the requesting Committee members and staff, and to all other interested members and their staff. Next, briefings are held for staff and members and testimony is given at hearings when appropriate. Finally, OTA staff, after completing a study, are a repository of expertise on the subject in question and are available to assist Congressional staff in a variety of ways. It is the latter category that is usually most effective since it allows Congressional staff access to OTA knowledge to help them develop new proposals, background material, and analyses during the course of debate. It is helpful to look at two examples of OTA studies to see how the above is actually carried out. The two studies to be reviewed are Residential Energy Conservation, completed in April 1979, and A Technology Assessment of Coal Slurry Pipelines, completed in March 1978. The latter report was prepared during the beginning of the debate over whether to grant the right of eminant domain to coal slurry pipelines. The railroads opposed this since it would permit pipelines to be built that would compete with railroads in their most profitable area -the hauling of coal. Without the right of eminant domain the pipeline would find it very difficult to cross railroad property (tracks) which would effectively prevent the completion of a pipeline. The debate before Congress centered around the relative economics of the two systems for hauling coal and whether sufficient water -10 -
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existed for the pipeline. The Office of Technology Assessment was asked to assess coal slurry pipelines in order to resolve these questions, and any decision would be delayed until the study was complete. Upon its completion OTA presented the findings at hearings before the Committees in which the legislation granting the right of eminant domain for pipelines was being considered. The study was used extensively by both parties -the railroads and the pipelines -to prove the validity of their arguments. In that sense the study did not unambiguously resolve the debate. It did, however, clarify the issues and show how each party was likely to benefit and lose if pipelines were allowed to go into operation. Therefore the members of Congress were as aware as possible of the technical and economic consequences of any decision they would make, but were not told which choice to make. This illustrates a very important point about technology assessment, at least as it is practiced by OTA. Recommendations are not made in our studies since any recommendation requires a value judgement which is-inappropriate for an unbiased, fair analysis of the issues. These values, expressed as political considerations, will play the principal role in any decision as they did in the case of this legislation. In this case, the Congress voted against allowing pipelines the right of eminant domain which was a victory for the railroads. This issue has been raised in every session of Congress since 1978, and each time the OTA study has been used extensively in the debate. This attests to the staying power of our studies. The second example concerns our study on residential energy conservation. While the coal slurry pipeline study addressed a specific peice of legislation before Congress, the conservation study had no such -11 -
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target. Instead, there was considerable interest in the potential for energy savings by residential buildings and what might be done to overcome the barriers to reaching this potential. When the study was released, Congressional action was at a low point on energy. The study was presented at a hearing before the Senate Energy Committee, but no active legislation proposals about energy conservation were before Congress. This situation changed dramatically, however, within two months as the effects of the Iranian shutdown of oil production were felt. Suddenly a proposal to assist synthetic fuel development became the centerpeice of Congressional debate with costs estimates of nearly $100 billion attached. The Congressional proponents of conservation -they argued conservation was more cost effective than synfuels -took advantage of the apparent acceptance of the need for active, large/scale Federal support to attack our oil vulnerability problem by introducing several major bills designed to stimulate residential conservation. Quickly, the OTA staff who had prepared the conservation study and the study itself became an important resource in developing the legislation. We testifi~d before Congressional committees on several more occasions, briefed staff members and prepared analyses on specific questions raised by Congressional staff. The Energy Security Act which was passed in June 1980, provided for a greatly expanded effort to accelerate residential energy conservation. Although the specific measures eventually enacted are not found in great detail in the OTA report, the understanding of the issues brought about by that report together with the shared expertise of the OTA staff were important in the process. Since the passage of the Act, there have been profound policy changes within the Federal government concerning a Federal role in energy conservation. The mechanism set up by the Energy Security Act -the Solar 12 -
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and Conservation Bank -has been significantly curtailed by the current administration. In addition, other initiatives established by the Congress, such as the Residential Conservation Service and Building Energy Performance Standards, have either been eliminated or greatly reduced in scope. These actions are the result of the philosophy now in ascendence, which states that the market is sufficient to generate adequate energy conservation. To a certain degree, the evidence of the past two years strongly supports this. There has been a very large response by the citizens of the United States to the doubling of oil prices after the Iranian revolution. Whether this action justifies removing all or most government programs to "correct" the market, is still not certain, however. The United States is entering a period where a real decline in energy prices over the next two to three years is possible. If history repeats and we relax our conservation efforts the Western world could be in for another severe shock if prices shoot up again around the middle of the decade. The Office of Technology Assessment intends to discuss this possibility in a report on synthetic fuels we are about to complete. It is worth mentioning that the OTA conservation study did indicate that accurate price signals are very important if conservation opportunities are to be met. Without correct pricing, all other programs to encourage conservation will be severely hobeled and largely ineffective. The above are just two examples of how OTA has helped the Congress make policy about energy technology development. There are other examples where we have had more or less influence such as our analysis of the plans and programs of the former Energy Research and Development Administration, an assessment of on-site solar energy, a study of the direct use of coal, and an analysis of nuclear power plant standardization. In addition there are numerous cases of studies from the other programs in OTA that have provided 13 -
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help to Congressional staff and members in making policy about technical issues. In nearly all cases these examples have followed a path similar to that described for the conservation study. Currently, OTA is completing or has recently completed work on three areas that are receiving intense review by the Congress. These are the MX-missile system, disposal of nuclear waste and genetic engineering. Congressional interest in these three subjects is high and we expect to be of considerable assistance to the Congress in evolving policy on these matters. V. Discussion We have discussed the evolution of Congress' ability to make policy decisions concerning technical matters. In particular we have highlighted the role of the Congressional support agencies, primarily the Office of Technology Assessment. A number of observations have been gained over this period and I will next describe what I consider to be some of the most important ones. Congressional policy analysis is much more sophisticated today, concerning technical issues at least, than it was 10 to 15 years ago. The rapid increase in Congressional staff with technical training coupled with the expansion of the support agencies -in particular the formation of the Office of Technology Assessment -has given the Congress the capability to match the Executive branch in technicqlly related policy analysis. In this connection, Congress established a fourth support agency in 1974, the Congressional Budget Office. Although primarily directed to provide analyses of the budget impacts of Congressional actions and to analyze the effects of budget changes on the economy, it also has offered Congress the capability to examine more detailed economic issues about technology development. With 14 -
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these capabilities on hand, the Congress no longer has to rely solely on outside experts through the hearing process but can marshal! its own staff to address the questions and issues it chooses. Consequences of this have been an increase in Congressionally initiated policy proposals and a far more careful scrutiny of Federal spending plans. In fact there has been some criticism that Congress has gone too far and is trying to manage the agencies as well as provide policy guidance. While on occassion, Congress has expressly directed spending on certain projects, such direction does not appear to be an inappropriate role. In fact, the access to their own sophisticated analytical capability has given Congress the confidence to specifically request approval of projects costing over a certain amount. Further, it has made the agencies more responsive to Congressional will and ultimately the people. The criticism cannot be disregarded, however, since there is danger of too much interference especially with programs involving long term, highly complex research and development. We are seeing a debate over the breeder reactor which has the potential for this kind of problem. It should be noted, however, that the Congress has been much more consistent on this issue than the Executive branch. Despite the existance of all this analytical capability, the basic forces producing decisions have not changed. As we noted above about the conservation policy, when the political forces changed, it was decided that Federal support for conservation should be drastically reduced. This was largely a result of the political philosophy of the new administration and the new majority in Congress, and only to a limited degree to the results of new analyses. Of course the l~ck of analysis did not necessarily make these changes wrong, it just shows that such changes and decisions are primarily based on interpretation of the will of the people. The political philosophy 15 -
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of a member of Congress will usually dictate his choice on a policy issue. It is that philosophy which got him there in the first place since it ordinarily represents that of the majority of his district. The kinds of analysis now possible in Congress may not change his decision if results conflict with his philosophy, but it will usually cause him to think through the reasons for his stand more completely and many times to accept additional measures that may alleviate some of the problems his choice might create. In this way, Congressional decision making has been greatly strengthened by the analytic capability now on hand but not radically altered. A second set of observations concerns the role of the Office of Technology Assessment in this process. We have already commented at length on the increase in understanding of technical issues and their consequences that are provided by OTA studies. In the final analysis I believe this will be the most important contribution by OTA. This was not what the original sponsers of OTA had uppermost in their mind, however. They saw OTA as a means to reduce or avoid the risks coming from any new technology and to explain how that technology would interact with society and the environment. The "early warning" feature was to be the central point of the Office. It is still too early to tell whether there will be any "early warning" benefits from OTA of any significance but the inherent limitations of forecasting and the complexity of the technologies dealt with make it unlikely. By the same token, the Office has not stopped any technologies or arrested technical progress. Its contribution has been an incremental -although an important increment improvement in our understanding of the technologies and their costs and benefits. That this feature has been successful is attested by the number and range of groups outside the government that use our material. This often gets back to the Congress in testimony by these groups and letters 16 -
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to individual members. The Office is recognized as the most professional and unbiased analysis group in the Federal government by a number of public and private, profit and not-for-profit ~rganizations and individuals. Still, OTA has not eliminated risk nor has it stopped technology. There is no direct proof that things would be any different today, as far as Congressional decisions are concerned, if OTA had not existed, nor is there likely to be such proof. I believe it is clear, however, that a higher level of analysis has been added, and we know more about these technologies and how they will affect our future than we did before OTA was established. The future of OTA is not yet assured. Despite the quality of the work, there have been times when members of Congress have questioned the need for an Office of Technology Assessment. In these times of budget cutbacks, such calls have increased. The ultimate survival of the Office depends on two things. First, is the acceptance by Congress of the need for analysis. Currently, the opinion is that there has been too much analysis and that it has hindered technological development. It is time to "get on with the job and quit studying it to death" is heard more and more. While it is true there has been a considerable emphasis on analysis the past several years, it is not clear whether it has been excessive. This coming decade will be one where many of the energy technologies proposed and discussed during the 197Os will be built. It is also likely that much of the analysis carried out during that period will make these technologies more effective and acceptable. The second point concerning OTA's future is the acceptance of what it can do, namely to increase the understanding of a technology and its consequences. If Congress decides that this is a valuable contribution even though it may not specifically react to day-to-day legislative decisions, than our value will be recognized. This will be a difficult task because of -17 -
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the large turnover of members of Congress and staff. It is not impossible, however, and it is our job to show that our kind of study can be an important resource for the day-to-day Congressional needs. Policymaking by the Congress has come a long way in meeting the challanges of today's highly complex and pervasive technologies. The institution is capable of meeting rapidly changing conditions, and support by agencies like OTA should ensure that this capability continues. -18 -
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Excerpt From Technology Assessment Act of 1972 Public Law 92-484, 92d Congress, H.R. 10243 October 13, 1972 "Findings and declaration of purpose Sec. 2. The Congress hereby finds and declares that: (a) As technology continues to change and expand rapidly, its applications are( 1) large and growing in scale; and (2) increasingly extensive, pervasive, and critical in their impact, beneficial and adverse, on the natural and social environment. (b) Therefore, it is essential that, to the fullest extent possible, the consequences of technological applications be anticipated, understood, and considered in determination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems." ...-I ::.:i c.., H >"'<
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) OTA Organization Chart I Assistant Director Energy, Materials, and International Security Division ._ Energy Program International 1Security & Commerce Program LMaterials Program Congressional Technology Assessment Board Director Advisory Council Support Services Congressional and Institutional Relations Assistant Director Health and Life Sciences Division Food & Renewable Resources Program Health Program Human Resources Program l Assistant Director Science, Information and Natural Resources Division Communication & Information Technologies Program Oceans & Environment Program Space Technology Program N >ii c., H .,
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