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Gearing Up for Safety: Motor Carrier Safety in a Competitive Environment September 1988 NTIS order #PB89-124796
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Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Gearing Up for Safety: Motor Carrier Safety in a Competitive Environment, OTA-SET-382 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988). Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-600549 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325 (order form can be found in the back of this report)
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Foreword Trucks carry three-quarters of the dollar value of all commercial goods transported in the United States, and the speed, convenience, and cost-effectiveness of truck transport make this ratio unlikely to change quickly. The intercity bus and commercial trucking industries are governed by Federal motor carrier regulations, and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 eliminated many economic restrictions limiting entry to the industry. Federal safety regulations remain basically unchanged, however, and were expanded gradually in range and coverage during the 1980s. Despite this, the number of highway accidents involving heavy trucks climbed during the first half of the decade, prompting concern among public and industry officials, alike. As I write this, the southwest horizon beyond my window Virginiais punctuated by a billowing, black cloud from a classic tanker truck accident and fire. Although many studies on the impacts of deregulation have been undertaken, questions have lingered about the adequac y of existing Federal safety policies and programs. The Committee on Public Works and Transportation and the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the Committee on Government Operations, both of the House of Representatives, asked the Office of Technology Assessment to determine how well existing safety policies, regulations, and technologies meet the governments responsibility for ensuring safety in the motor carrier industry. The stud y was endorsed by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. This report contains the results of that analysis. A review of critical intergovernmental issues for the Department of Transportation and State Governments has been added to the basic questions about the adequac y of Federal standards and programs. During the course of the study, it became clear that the report would have to consider how policy is implemented, and consequently, the relationship between the Department of Transportation and the States, which have become important partners in Federal safety programs. This comprehensive look at motor carrier safety also includes the economic framework of the industry as it affects operations, an analysis of safety data, and a review of research and development needs for safety technologies for both industry and government. Throughout the study, the advisory panel, review group, worksho p participants, and a host of contributors played key roles in developing the major issues and contributed a broad and invaluable range of perspectives. OTA thanks them for their substantial commitment of time and energy. Their participation does not necessarily represent endorsement of the contents of the report, for which OTA bears sole responsibility. Ill
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Gearing Up for Safety: Motor Carrier Safety in a Competitive Environment Advisory Panel Charles Curtis, Panel Chairman Van Ness, Feldman, Carla J. Berroyer Deputy Director for Intergovernmental Affairs Illinois Department of Transportation Philip T. Brown Director, Marketing Resources Division The Travelers Companies Joan Claybrook President Public Citizen John C. Dannemiller President and Chief Operating Officer Leaseway Transportation Corp. Robert A. Davis Chief Project Engineer 747 Division Boeing Commercial Airplane Co. R.V. Durham Director, Safety and Health Department International Brotherhood of Teamsters James Johnston President Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America Clyde Kizer* Vice President, Technical Services Maintenance and Operations Division United Airlines *Currently with Airline Transport Association. Sutcliffe, & Curtis Lillian Liburdi Director Management and Budget Department Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Louis M. McNair Executive Central Air Safety Chairman Air Line Pilots Association William A. Maloney Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission John Meyer James W. Harpel Professor The Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Richard C. Schwing Senior Staff Research Engineer General Motors Research Laboratories Dean Stanley Corporate Vice President for Engineering Navistar International Corp. Alan Stephen President Scenic Airlines NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided b y the advisor y panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.
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Gearing Up for Safety: Motor Carrier Safety in a Competitive OTA Project Staff Environment John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division Nancy Carson Science, Education, and Transportation Program Manager Edith B. Page, Project Director Michael Hines, Analyst Walter Diewald, Senior Analyst Kevin Dopart, Analyst Eric Butler, Analyst Karen Mathiasen, Research Assistant Melanie Cohen, Research Assistant Tse-Sung Wu, Research Assistant Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant Madeline Gross, Secretary Christopher Clary, Administrative Secretary Kimberley Gilchrist, Secretary Contractors Mark Abkowitz Jerrold Muskin Vanderbilt University Francine Rudoff Paul Jovanis University of Wisconsin Kathryn van Wyk Mark Lepofsky Porter Wheeler Vanderbilt University v
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Contents Page Chapter l. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Chapter 2. The Motor Carrier IndustryA Profile . . . . . . . . 31 Chapter 3. Federal and State Regulatory Programs. . . . . . . . . 55 Chapter 4. Motor Carrier Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . 85 Chapter 5. Technologies To Improve Motor Carrier Safety .........................109 Chapter 6. Human Factors in Truck Safety. . . . . . . . . .. ...137 Chapter 7. Sources of Information for Evaluating Safety. . ........................157 Page Appendix A. Human Factors in Truck Safety, . . ..........................179 Appendix B. Workshop Participants, Reviewers, and Contributors . . ............180 vi
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. credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff
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CONTENTS Page Background .*. .,** ..o***. ... ... ... *.*. .*** ... *.. ..** + ~ * ******.** Fragmented Governmental Framework . . . . .. .* .. .+ .. .. ..+. . . The Diverse industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human Factors .. .. ..; . . . . . . . . .*....*. ....+*.. 5 8 9 10 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 18 20 21 22 22 23 23 26 26 26 Training . . . . . . . . .. ... ... +....... Fatigue and Hours of Service ..**... ..*....* . . . . Accident Factors ..,......+....++..+.. .+. .. .......+. . On-Board Computers. ..*..*. l .,..**. . . . . . Public Education .......+. . . . . . . ... ....+ Vehicle and Roadway Technologies . . . ..*....* . Speed and Highway Design ..:... Brakes .. .. .. .. .. ... a s=. . Equipment Standards . . Adopting New Technologies . Governmental Coordination. . State issues . ... DO ...+... Access . . . . . . DOT Programs . . . . Safety Data Resources . . . Inspection and Enforcement Data Market Entry, Exit, and Financial Carrier Issues . .. $.. ... ... .o.t. ...*,,. . . . .....** . .4*.*+. . . . ...*.,. . Performance . . . . l ..+.*. . . . . . l .,.... . . . . . . . .....+4. ..**.... l .*. Profits.*. . . . .*....* Capacity F*...*** l .**..... l *** Box Page . ....**. l 6 Opportunities I-A. Motor Carrier Safety-Policy Options and DOT Figures Figure l-1. Total Freight Revenues by Modal Shares, 1978 and 1986. . 102. Truck Tree s.. . ..+. ...+. .**,... . . . . 3 4 7 8 11 12 12 13 14 19 l-3. MCSAP Inspection Rates Compared With Truck Accident Rates + . . l-4. Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length. ... .~. . .. +. . . . . . 1-5. Motor Carrier Industry Organization . . . . . . . . . l-6. Number of ICC Motor Carriers by Revenue Category, 1978-86 . . . I-7. Net Profit Margin, 1978-87 . . . . . . . ... .+. .......= 1-8. Relationship of Driver Fatigue to Accidents, by Hour of Day . . . l-9. injury Severity in Heavy Truck Accidents Relative to Truck Driver Drinking . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10.. Organizations Concerned With Brake Standards . . . . . l Tables Table Page 1-1. Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety . Safety Equipment for New Vehicles . . . 9 18 24 25 1-2. Estimated Costs of Truck l-3. Truck Safety Information IA. Truck Safety Information Systems(Accident Systems (Exposure Data) . . . . . . Data) .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ......+
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Chapter 1 Summar y Goods ranging from lettuce to automobile parts and steel cables are carried by trucks of all sizes and types from manufacturers to factories, stores, and homes. Freed by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 from many Federal rules governing entry, pricing, and services, the trucking industry has capitalized on its speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness to enhance its dominant role in commercial goods transport and no serious challenger is on the horizon. Today, trucking accounts for more than three out of every four dollars spent on domestic freight transportation (see figure 1-1). Trucking companies have continued to enlarge their market share by keeping rate increases small over the past 8 yearswell below rises in the consumer price index. Rates charged to large volume shippers have actually declined in real terms. 1 Carrier costs, however, have increased more than rates have risen. Companies that have survived the resulting economic squeeze have done so by streamlining operations and cutting costs to improve productivity. Many were unable to modernize suffi1 I Alex BroW, n & Sons, nc Wrap-Up of the October 29 Trucking Seminar, unpublished manuscript, December 1987. Figure 1-1 .Total Freight Revenues by Modal Shares, 1978 and 1986 1978 1986 NOTE: All other includes air, pipeline, water, freight forwarders, and miscellaneous shipper costs SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on data from Transportation Policy Associates, Transportation in America, November 1986, as cited in American Trucking Associations, Inc., American Trucking Trends, 1987 ciently to compete and succumbed to falling profits and cash flow problems. Intercity buses are also part of the motor carrier industrya part that has not fared well in recent years. Former bus travelers purchased automobiles or were lured by lower air fares available after airline deregulation, shifting to other transport modes in large numbers; the number of revenue bus passengers declined by about 5 percent in the 1980s. Bus companies consolidated service, abandoning routes in lightly populated rural areas, and leaving some former passengers without readily available transportation service. Despite the vital services they provide, large vehicles, both buses and heavy trucks, : are perceived as menaces on the roads by many members of the driving publicmuch to the concern of the industry. Steady increases in highway traffic have exacerbated long-standing heavy vehicle safety problems; indeed, the number of vehicles now exceeds highway design capacity in many urban areas. Todays trucks and buses are larger and heavier than those of 6 to 8 years ago and travel more miles over the Nations highwaysmost of which were designed for automobiles. Highways, such as the Interstate system, which were constructed with truck use in mind, were built for a vehicle comprised of a tractor pulling a 96-inch wide, 40to 45-foot long trailer considerably smaller than the combination vehicles now standard. (Figure 1-2 gives examples of some of the vehicles now common on major arteries.) This makes handling todays large trucks safel y through turns, on curves and ramps, passing vehicles, and stopping within the appropriate distances a challenge, even for skilled, well-trained, and experienced drivers. Government officials and safety experts have long sought ways to achieve a responsible balance between ensuring highway safety and facilitating the flow of commerce. For example, after economic deregulation in 1980, a major Federal safety program ~Heavy trucks are those ulth gross vehicle weights of 26,(YJ1 pounds and over-the focus for much of this study because the category includes comhlnation tractor-trailers, vehicles that pose the greatest drltin g challenges and the largest safety hazards. 3
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4 Figure l-2.Truck Types Straight truck l 25 40 1 4-axle tractor-semitrailer 5-axle tractor flatbed trailer 48 1 Twin trailer or double 3-axle tractor-semitrailer 5-axle tractor-semitrailer 5-axle tractor tank trailer 35 40 1 Rocky Mountain double (operated only in certain States) I 45 48 28 1 Turnpike double (operated only in certain States) (operated 28 1 Triple only in certain States) 28 28 1 Lengths shown are typical; shorter or longer lengths are possible depending on carriers needs and State laws. SOURCE: American Trucking Associations, Inc.
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5 was enactedthe Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP), authorized as part of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982. This program has assisted 48 States in building their safety and enforcement capabilities. Nonetheless, the number of accidents involving heavy trucks increased a total of 15 percent over the 5 years between 1981 and 1986, the last year for which accurate Federal data are available. 3 This increase is slightly greater than the increase in truck-miles traveled. The number of fatalities in heavy truck accidents has held constant between 4,000 and 5,000 annually over the last 10 years despite the rise in travel, a credit to safety efforts. However, four out of every five people killed in accidents involving truck tractor-trailer combinations are occupants of the other vehicle, usuall y a car. 4 Between 1 and 2 percent of accidents involving these trucks result in a fatality; the comparable figure for all other types of motor vehicles (except motorcycles) is well under 1 percent. In short, despite the steps taken to improve heav y vehicle safety, concerns persist. Accidents usually happen as a result of a sequence of events, often initiated by a single occurrence complicated by a number of interacting factors. Federal data from the National Accident Sampling System (NASS) indicates that the three most common factors associated with heavy vehicle accidents are: 1) speed too fast for conditions; 2) level of training of the driver; and 3) age of the vehicle. These factors are related to a range of activities that are affected by government and every segment of the motor carrier industry. JOTA ~alculation5, ba5ed on National Accident Sampling SYstem data and information provided b y National Highway Traffic Safety Administration staff. OTA calcuiacions, based on data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System. To identify changes to existing Federal policies and programs that address these and related safety issues, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) took a comprehensive look at the motor carrier industry and the spectrum of safety programs. Research included a review of the numerous Department of Transportation (DOT) and State regulatory, enforcement, and safety programs; accident data resources, truck studies, and accident analyses; and raw accident data. Industry operations and financial performance were assessed, using data from published sources and information provided by both large and small carriers. As a result of this wideranging effort, OTA concluded that addressing motor carrier safety issues successfully requires a comprehensive and strategic approach. Congress choices are to formulate and enact such an appreach into law, to institute more aggressive congressional oversight practices, or to leave the problem in the hands of the executive branch. Action is needed in three key areas: l l l Box increased attention to human performance factors, including training guidelines for drivers and maintenance personnel, driver hours of service and fatigue, and management practices, such as hiring, scheduling, and drug and alcohol testing; stepped-up requirements for technologies to improve safety in over-the-road vehicle operations. These must address vehicle design and equipment requirements, such as tractortrailer brake compatibility, antilock brakes, and vehicle visibility enhancements, as well as highway structure and design; and concentrated efforts to integrate government activities across all jurisdictional levels, to increase national uniformity for regulations and enforcement, and to improve regulatory compliance for all motor carriers. 1-A provides a summary of major policy options and cost estimates. BACKGROUND The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 changed or elimadditional safet y measures for motor carriers over inated Federal economic requirements for many segthe intervening years to enhance Federal safety overments of the trucking industry, but retained existsight for interstate commerce, focusing on enforceing safet y regulations. Congress has enacted several ment, and to a lesser degree, the driver and the ve-
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7 Figure 1-3.MCSAP Inspection Rates Compared With Truck Accident MCSAP inspections, vehicIe and driver violations 1,00 0 90 0 80 0 70 0 j 600 m : 50 0 L 140 0 30 0 20 0 100 0 Inspection s ---Vehicle s placed out of servic e placed out of service ,, ,. .. .. ------..-. ----------I 1 1 1 1984 8 5 8 6 8 7 tear KEY: MCSAP = Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program. SOURCE U.S Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program: Options /ntended to Improve a Generally Successful and Cooperative Federa//Sfate Partnership Promoting Truck and Bus Safety (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), table 3, p. 18. of service for violations. Even in States where efforts are made to perform completely random inspections, 30 percent of inspected vehicles are being put out of service. 5 40 0 30 0 20 0 100 0 Truck accidents, Rates by weight of truck 10,000,999 pound s ----26,000 pounds and over 1 1 1 1 I 1 1982 83 84 85 86 87 Year SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-86. Data for 1987 are not yet available. The STAA also authorized operation of trucks with trailers 102-inches wide and 48-feet long, or two 28-foot double trailers, on all Interstate highways and certain roads designated as part of the National Truck Network. The act allowed these vehicles to operate as necessary on other roads to gain reasonable access to terminals for pick up and delivery, although States retained responsibility for Photo credit: Commercia/ Vehicle Safety Alliance Paul Melander, Tennessee Puhllc Service Commission, personal communication, Mar. 23, 1988. State inspectors identify safety hazards before an accident occurs.
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8 defining reasonable access. Carriers moved quickly to take advantage of the opportunity to use larger trailers (see figure 1-4), and longer, wider vehicles now dominate intercity motor transport. In fact, encouraged by potent industry lobbying, many States permit 53-foot trailers or even longer combination vehicles, all of which exceed the limits of existing highway designs. Operating a heavy vehicle safely under such circumstances requires an experienced, well-trained driver, capable of quick and alert performance and accurate judgment and decisionmaking, as well as a well-maintained vehicle. Several studies have indicated that automobile drivers cause up to 50 percent of multiple vehicle truck accidents. Regardless of who is at fault, accident costs are spread widely, and often are paid as much by the injured, the rescuers, and inconvenienced travelers as by the party that caused the Photo credit: Ohio State Highway Patrol Heavy truck accidents delay traffic and have significant societal costs. Figure 1=4.Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length 7 0 6 0 3 0 2 0 10 0 1980 1982 1984 1986 Yea r SOURCE: Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Van Trailer Report, various years. accident. Thus, a comprehensive program to improve carrier safety must address issues related to drivers of both heavy vehicles and automobiles, to the heavy vehicles themselves, and to road design and management. While a national program to improve motor carrier safety may well bring somewhat higher direct transportation costs, these could be balanced by a reduction in the societal costs of highway accidents, which, it was recently estimated, will reach $65 billion by 1990. 6 %J. S. Congress, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, The Status of the Nation Highways: Conditions and Performance, Report of the Secretary of Transportation (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987). FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK Attempts to address safety issues in a comprehenthe Federal level, the Interstate Commerce Comsive and systematic manner are stymied by the vast mission (ICC), and three DOT agencies oversee varieties and numbers of governmental bodies that different aspects of trucking through setting standshare responsibilities for truck safety and the far ards and enforcement. Within DOT, the National flung, disparate nature of the trucking industry. At Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
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9 sets and enforces standards and requirements for the manufacture of new vehicles. The Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) in the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has regulatory and enforcement responsibility for the drivers, carrier operations, and the companies operating the vehicles. The Research and Special Programs Administration regulates containers used in highway transportation of hazardous materials (see table 1-1). A number of other offices within FHWA set standards for highway design and approve funding programs for State highway construction. These units rarely work closely on carrier safety issues; in fact NHTSA and OMC each have separate advisory groups for truck matters. In Congress, a similar number of committees have jurisdiction over different aspects of motor carrier safety. At the State level, numerous groups play roles, with Governors offices, State legislatures, and Departments of Transportation, Highways, Police, and Public Safety, as well as regulatory bodies, such as Public Utilities Commissions or Public Service Commissions as major actors. Within States, responsibilities are divided differently, and agencies have separate and often incompatible approaches to activities such as issuing inspection stickers, penalties for overweight trucks, and highway access decisions. Table 1-1 .Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety Department of Transportation Administrate ion Senior Official Responsibilities Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) National Highway Traffic Safety Associate Administrator for Engineering and > Program Development Associate Administrator for Research, Development and Technology Associate Administrator w for Motor Carriers Associate Administrator + for Policy Administration (N HTSA) Research and Special Programs > Administration Determines how truck access affects the highway system Manages research on the adequacy of highway design to accommodate trucks Establishes and enforces operating regulations for commercial motor carriers; includes driver and maintenance requirements Studies the implications of longer combination vehicle used on the Nations highway system Establishes regulations for the manufacture of new vehicles and related equipment; investigates safety-related equipment defects Establishes and enforces regulations for containers used in used in transportation of hazardous (RSPA) materials SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19S8. THE DIVERSE INDUSTRY The governmental framework seems simple when tors include companies owning from 1 to 500 or compared to the motor carrier industry, or more more trucks, doing business as private or for-hire accurately, the industries. The intercity bus induscarriers, carriers of exempt commodities, ownertry is but one small segment. Heavy truck operaoperators, intermodal-operators, and interstate and
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10 intrastate carriers (see figure 1-5). Freedom to enter the market and compete for available customers has had far-reaching effects on virtually all of these diminishing the-differences between common and contract carriers and expanding the opportunities for private carriers. The number of ICC-regulated carriers (about 33 percent of the Nations total number of carriers) more than doubled between 1978 and 1986, with most of the growth in the smallest ICC revenue category, Class III (carriers with revenue under $1 million annually). The number of large (Class I and 11) carriers declined slightly over this time period, however, as carriers declared bankruptcy or changed hands (see figure 1-6). Although many of the new entries were not new to trucking, having previously operated as exempt or private carriers, the services they offered created considerable excess capacity at the same time as the 1981-82 recession and its aftermath damped factory production and shipment levels. As a result, rates tumbled and carrier profit margins fell, even for the historically most profitable carriers (see figure 1-7). While accurate data are hard to acquire since companies leaving the industry need not report to ICC, estimates are that the number of carriers merging or going out of business climbed steadily from under 200 a year in 1978 and 1979 to over 1,500 in 1986. Surviving carriers have in common a lean, costconscious management approach focused on ways to increase market share, often through specialized service. Carriers of all sizes have been affected by rate competition and forced to examine alternatives to utilize capacity and to increase productivity. Companies that have succeeded in meeting specialized market demands or that have a financial cushion adequate to support investments in equipment, facilities, and well-qualified drivers (important for safety) can do well. Each carrier has chosen methods that are most cost-effective for its individual operations, and no single best way of managing for safety emerged from OTAs examination. In equipment management, for example, some firms with good safety records keep their tractors for 7 or 8 years, undertaking major engine overhauls at 300,000 miles. Others choose to replace tractors at 4 years or 500,000 miles, finding maintenance too costly after that. Reflecting these varying decisions, over the past 8 years, the median age of heavy trucks in the commercial fleet rose from 6 years in 1978 to 7 1/2 years in 1985, and has settled at about 7 years after strong sales in 1987. Large carriers are standardizing fleets to make maintenance more efficient and enable them to bargain hard with manufacturers for durability and maintenance-free characteristics in their large fleet purchases. However, companies with notable safety records do have in common a commitment to safety and to personnel and scheduling practices that indicate respect for the driver and his or her essential contribution. The industry relies for economic success on high productivity gained by carrying large volumes in millions of single trips, meeting demanding time schedules, and keeping prices competitive. These business requirements do not make it easy to comply with complex and varying regulations imposed at different governmental levels. OTA concludes that the economic success of a carrier has an identifiable effect on operations and fleet condition; in fleets having financial difficulties, vehicles are not as well maintained and equipment tends to be older. However, the absence of good data from the period before economic deregulation, the effects on all business activity of the 1982 recession, and the many changes in carrier operations that occurred as the result of other governmental policy decisions, all lead OTA to conclude that no clear link can be established between changes in economic regulation and motor carrier safety. HUMAN FACTORS Accident data show that over 60 percent of accidents are caused by human error. While a good deal is known about the factors that degrade driving performance, OTA concludes that Federal program have not focused adequately on developing effective countermeasures. Inexperienced drivers are particularly susceptible to accidents, and a large number of heavy truck drivers involved in accidents
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71 l-T I --> .u)
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12 w Figure l-6. Number of ICC Motor Carriers by Revenue Category, 1978-86 3 5 3 0 2 5 2 0 15 Revenues under $1 millio n ----Revenues over $1 million 0 $ 197879 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 Year KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission. SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, Inc., Trucking: An Overview and Focus on Recent Times, unpublished manuscript, September 1987, chart 14. have poor driving recordsincluding speeding offenses. Training A vital element in preventing accidents is the drivers skill and awareness; both can be increased through appropriate training. Surveys indicate that many heavy truck drivers have not received any formal driver training prior to going on the road, although many companies will hire only drivers with verifiable experience. OTA research shows that many drivers involved in accidents never had any training or significant retraining, and that level of driver training is frequently a factor cited on accident reports. OTA concludes that special attention to training requirements and close scrutiny of the guidelines for the commercial drivers license test as they are developed by DOT are warranted. To ensure that training issues are adequately addressed, Congress may wish to require national Figure 1-7.Net Profit Margin, 1978-87 (all carriers) 197879 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 Year SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, Inc., Trucking: An Overview and Focus on Recent Times, unpublished manuscript, September 1987, chart 25. guidelines for driver training and certification for truck driver training programs. A consensus process for developing and approving the guidelines is important to ensure widespread acceptability. Participants could include officials from training schools, Federal and State regulatory and enforcement agencies, labor, carrier management, and vehicle manufacturers. A key issue is on-the-road experience required of prospective drivers, and to address this issue, DOT might encourage carriers to develop apprentice programs that follow national guidelines. Considerable public and private effort will be necessary to make any new standards and programs effective, and the commitment of carrier management to safety and to implementing new standards will play pivotal roles. Historically, DOT has not been an active player in this area. Congress may wish to encourage DOT to develop a cooperative government, academic, and private research, education, and outreach program to address management-
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13 related issues such as driver hiring, screening, and training programs and hours-of-service revisions. Fatigue and Hours of Service Research indicates that fatigue can play a major role in accidents, particularly for older drivers and for drivers on the road for 12 hours or more. 7 Moreover, drivers of large trucks have shown significant increases in driving errors and decreases in driver alertness due to fatigue during driving times that are well within the current hours-of-service limit. Greater understanding of the impacts on performance of circadian rhythm (time-of-day) and fatigue is needed so appropriate regulations and changes to driver scheduling can be developed. OTA concludes that aggressive Federal research programs to address fatigue and sleep issues and to determine their role in truck accidents are top priorities. DOT has planned several research projects on these subjects for the next 2 years; these projects represent small but important initial steps and deserve support and funding. However, followup will be essential if the research is to bring safety benefits. Many heavy truck operations are not conducive to allowing adequate rest for mediumand long-haul drivers. DOT hours-of-service regulations were formulated 50 years ago, and do not take into account the effects of operating on Interstate highways, new vehicle technologies, contemporary economic conditions, or advances in understanding of circadian rhythm, fatigue, and sleep needs. OTA research points to compelling reasons for DOT to reexamine the hours-of-service regulations, and to develop revised standards based on current knowledge and the around-the-clock operating environment necessary today. Other driver-related factors, such as the effect of air quality and vibration in the cab environment on performance and fatigue, need consideration as well. An effective Federal research program on these subjects would require joint efforts by NHTSA and FHWA. Work to address these issues could also inPatrick Hamelin, Truck Drivers Involvement in Traffic Accidents as Related to Their Shiftworks and Professional Features, Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents (Ottawa, Canada: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, April 1987), vol. 2, pp. J-10?. elude cooperative government-industr y studies to explore changes in cab and seat design and feasible scheduling alternatives and training programs. To ensure that all views are heard, independent drivers and representatives of large and small carriers should participate. Accident Factors Federal support for research on fatigue could also provide information to help management and drivers understand when drivers are most vulnerable to accidents and how scheduling and procedures might be altered to accommodate sleep needs (see figure 1-8). One practical and achievable outcome of such research would be simple, effective, and inexpensive techniques to screen drivers with sleep disorders, who are at high risk for fatiguerelated accidents. Figure 1-8.Relationship of Driver Fatigue to Accidents, by Hour of Day t --Accidents classified as non fatigue related 1 t Accidents classifie d as fatigue relate d o I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 a m pm Hour of day SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; adapted from K.D, Hackman et al. (eds.), Analysis of Accident Data and Hours of Service of /rrterstate Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers (W@shlngton, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, August 1987)
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14 Drivers under the influence of alcohol are far more likely to have a severe accident (see figure 1-9). Abundant evidence indicates that truck driver performance is impaired by blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) levels well below 0.10 percent and that alcohol and drug use increases both the likelihood and severity of accidents. Congress may wish to ensure that acceptable BAC levels for truck drivers are set at 0.04 percent, the current level for airline pilots, and to require drug and alcohol screening for all driver applicants, as part of periodic DOT-required physical examinations, and for probable cause. Research is under way at the NaFigure l-9.lnjury Severity in Heavy Truck Accidents Relative to Truck Driver Drinking 100 9 0 8 0 7 0 6 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 2 0 10 0 0 ) Injury severity SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85. tional Transportation Safety Board to document truck driver activities for 72 hours prior to a fatal accident to determine drug use and to try to establish impairment levels related to that use. Since a record of previous violations is characteristic of many truck drivers involved in serious accidents, Congress may wish to monitor closely DOTs future decisions related to violations during part-time activities or while off duty. On-Board Computers On-board computers that record speed, stopping times, brake applications, etc., are management tools that many carriers have used successfully to improve the efficiency of their operations and to hold drivers accountable for their performance. Several carriers requested permission from DOT to substitute records from these computers for driver logbooks, and DOT has ruled that the devices are acceptable. Requiring the devices as a safety measure to improve compliance with the hours-of-service regulations has also been suggested. In companies where on-board computers are used, fleet managers introduced the devices only after careful dialog with drivers to minimize potential adverse reactions. Many owner-operators view the devices as intrusive and cannot find benefits that justify investment in them. OTA concludes that while a Federal requirement for on-board recording devices may be premature, Congress may wish to require DOT to plan and implement a program leading toward such a rule. Preparation and education for management, labor, and State enforcement officers are essential to ensure acceptance of these tools as safety devices, prevent their abuse, and assure their usefulness in increasing industry compliance with regulations. Public Education Finally, education programs directed at motor carrier and automobile drivers could enhance awareness of safety issues related to sharing the roads. These programs should focus on the handling and stability characteristics of trucks, the need to maintain adequate distance between vehicles, the longer distances required for a heavy vehicle to stop, and the severe damage that can result from a collision between cars and trucks. Congress may wish to re-
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15 quire NHTSA and FHWA to play mutually suppopulation. Information programs could be incorportive roles in developing a model program for porated into the process for obtaining and renewStates to ensure that these messages reach a broad ing driver licenses. VEHICLE AND ROADWAY TECHNOLOGIES While highway system design issues and truck vehicle safety technologies are inextricably linked, they are treated as two separate issues by governments, by carriers, and by vehicle manufacturing industries. Moreover, while data point clearly to vehicle technolog y problems that have identified technical fixes, only a handful of researchers have devoted similar attention to highway design issues as they affect operation of wider and longer heavy trucks. OTA finds that a systems approach to commercial vehicle highway safety is a priority for Federal action. DOT agencies, including NHTSA and OMC and highway planning, safety, and design offices in FHWA must work more closely with other and with industry to address driver, cle, and road safety issues systematically. Speed and Highway Design each vehiFederal and State accident databases cite speed too fast for conditions most frequently as a factor in truck accidents. To determine the appropriate speed for conditions, the driver must understand the operating limits of his vehicle and the configuration of the specific section of the roadway on which he or she is traveling. For example, accident analyses show that a disproportionate share of fatal Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff Heavy trucks travel all types of roads, although most roads were designed for automobiles. heavy truck accidents occur on U.S. and State highways, roads usually constructed with lane widths and median markings appropriate for automobiles. Light conditions, weather, and traffic congestion are not major contributors to such accidents. Reconstructing these highways to increase width, passing lane length, and sight distances, and to provide sturdy median barriers would be prohibitively expensive. Thus, the driver, as he or she assesses the appropriate speed and controls the vehicle, is the primary accident prevention tool. Industry approaches to limiting and controlling vehicle speed vary widely. Some companies train drivers how to operate according to explicit corporate speed policies, and design driver schedules so that trips can be accomplished within the legal duty shift. Other large trucking companies install speed governors set at roughly 57 miles per hour (mph) on their fleets, finding that the need to balance fuel efficiency, safety, and delivery schedules is best met by this method. Still other companies have installed on-board computers to monitor driver speed. On the other hand, many truck drivers, including some employed by large companies, own radar detectors and consider them essential to accomplishing the on-time deliveries required of them by shippers or brokers. Congress may wish to consider legislation to require speed control devices, such as governors or other devices that measure and record speed only, as tools to control and monitor speed and aid enforcement. In addition, since the primary reason for radar detectors is to alert a driver when the vehicles speed is being monitored to see whether it is exceeding the speeding limit, Congress may wish to make such devices illegal for all vehicles across the country. Also, model standards for penalties for speeding that are high enough to be a deterrent to violators could be developed. A reexamination of highway design standards with an awareness of the size of todays heavy trucks
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16 could lead to relatively low-cost safety improvementsrevised signs to assist drivers of heavy vehicles in accurately assessing the appropriate speed for roadway limits. Also of importance are revisions to ramp design, intersection, and other roadway standards. While these are long-term processes and reconstruction of roadways will take longer still, Federal efforts could be intensified to assist States in determining appropriate new standards. Further, in light of the important role of speed in fatal accidents, Congress may wish to reexamine the decision to permit truck speeds of 65 mph on rural Interstate highways. Data analysis for this study leads OTA to conclude that the importance of keeping trucks at speeds compatible with highway design and roadway conditions outweighs any small economic advantages that might accompany faster carrier travel. Brakes Defective brakes are the most prevalent vehicle violation uncovered by roadside safety inspections. In addition to brake wear and adjustment problems that affect buses and straight trucks, brake compatibility between tractors and the trailers they pull poses major difficulties. One result of incompatibility between tractor and trailer brakes is a high potential for jackknifing. Bobtails (tractors running without a trailer) and combination trucks running empty pose particular difficulties because of the complicated relationship between brake systems and truck loads. OTA concludes that overcoming brake incompatibility between tractors and trailers and other brake-related problems are priorities for manufacturers and carriers. Furthermore, active participation by NHTSA is necessary to bring early resuits and improved standards for brake system components. Trailer manufacturers as well as tractor makers must be involved in the rulemaking process to ensure the development and use of compatible and well-balanced braking systems. An all-out joint effort by OMC, NHTSA, the trucking industry, and tractor and trailer manufacturers to address this issue is urgently needed. Another essential step in addressing brake problems is completion of current DOT tests on antilock brake systems to verify their effectiveness under field conditions. Manufacturers are beginning to test Photo credit: Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Brake defects such as this are the most frequent equipment violations found during roadside inspections. tractor-only antilock systems, on the premise that these are currently the most feasible for the complex and diverse U.S. trucking industry. If the DOT tests are successful, antilock systems could become mandatory equipment by the early 1990s. Key components to successful implementation of the requirement include: 1) lead time for development of standard procedures for mechanics for maintaining and adjusting the brake system, and 2) education and training programs for operators and mechanics to disseminate accurate information on checking and adjusting brakes for varying loads. Full tractor-trailer antilock systems remain the eventual safety goal. Equipment Standards Handling and stability problems increase the likelihood of rollover, particularly for operations involving tractors and double trailers. Tire condition and
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17 performance are also key factors in safe operations. Additionally, lethal override/underride accidents, particularly at night, indicate a need for devices to mitigate the effects of these accidents and to make trucks more visible at night. OTA concludes that NHTSA has lagged badly in proposing upgraded standards in several of these areas. Congress may wish to require NHTSA to move vigorously on rulemaking. The Federal Government could play a more active role in determining standards for safety technologies, either as performance criteria (which state minimum acceptable capabilities) or as design standards (which detail the equipment that must be used). 8 Vehicle equipment compatibility issues are so difficult that a cooperative Federal effort by OMC (FHWA), NHTSA, and industry is needed for solutions. For example, some of the FHWA brake standards are incompatible with NHTSA requirements. As new equipment becomes standard, mechanics will need training in proper techniques and tools. Cooperative industry-government efforts will be especially useful in developing and implementing education and training programs for mechanics to ensure that both new and old systems are maintained properly. Manufacturers and researchers have experimented with and evaluated splash and spray control methods and devices. Tractor manufacturers have been working on aerodynamically shaped tractors and side deflectors and dams for trailers; one side-benefit is increased splash and spray control. OTA coneludes that NHTSA moved prematurely to close its rulemaking for this problem, and that performance criteria could be developed and phased in for new equipment, based on available knowledge. Truck occupants typically do not wear safety belts that can protect them from ejection or hard contact with the cab interior, which can cause serious injury or a fatality. OTA concludes that a require ment that drivers use three-point seat belts when operating their vehicles could contribute to driver survival. The implications of cab design and cab Joe R. Morris, Safety Implications of Changes in Truck Size and Weight Limits, Svmposium on rhe Role of Heavy Freighr Vehicles in Traffic, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 3, pp. 4-14. Robert Erwn, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Transcript of ProceedingsOTA Workshop on Technologies Affecting Truck Safety, unpublished transcript, Mar. 10, 198?. equipment location are important subjects for a continuing Federal program of cab crashworthiness research. Difficulty in designing retrofit equipment adaptable to older vehicles and the evolutionary nature of technology focus manufacturers R&D efforts toward new vehicles. 10 New requirements for safety equipment concern large firms and individual owner-operators, since refitting and modifying existing fleets or vehicles can have significant costs. Without regulation, industry will balance the degree of benefit against the effort and cost involved in retrofitting a vehicle to determine whether to adopt safety equipment. 11 Given these difficulties, Congress may wish to require DOT to develop implementation programs for regulations that require retrofits with new technologies. The relative operating safety of single and double combinations has been studied extensively, but major differences have not been established, nor could OTA identify significant variation in its own research. Moreover, after an initial learning and adjustment period for doubles operations, fleet owners have found the safety record for both types of operations to be very similar. OTA concludes that different safety problems are inherent in each design and that appropriate driver training and experience with each can improve operational safety. Finally, the cost of educating drivers to use new safety equipment is one that will have to be accounted for in some fashion by the marketplace. Although carriers may need to pay drivers and mechanics more for having technological skills, some of the costs will be offset by reduced accident and insurance costs. Adopting New Technologies Since many safety improvements do not translate directly into higher productivity, industry acceptance of new technologies is slow. The fragmentation of the industry hampers dissemination of safet y information on new technologies, and legislative and rulemaking processes required to implement new IOP.A. Gustafson, Cummins Engine Co., Inc., personal communi cation, Apr. 28, 1987. 1 IFarrel L. Krall, Navistar International Corp., personal communication, Apr. 29, 1987.
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18 technologies are complex and time-consuming. Although the number of participants may be large (see figure 1-10), government-industry working groups that focus on setting uniform standards, voluntary field testing by industry, and the sharing of experimental data can lead more quickly to acceptable new standards. OTA concludes that Federal education and information programs are essential if requirements for new technologies are to be implemented quickly. Congress may wish to allocate resources and require DOT to undertake such tasks. For example, widespread misunderstanding by operators and some maintenance personnel of how truck brake systems should be installed, adjusted, and maintained, suggests a need for a nationwide education program. Training programs for maintenance personnel are a top priority. Trade associations and publications could well take the lead in educating carriers, while States could coordinate such measures with their enforcement programs and with State trucking associations. The industry members hardest to reach with such efforts are the owner-operators, since many do not participate in large industry groups. Establishing video instructional displays at truck stops around the country is one method of informing carriers and drivers of the risks they take by operating trucks with deficient brakes. Ways to avoid and correct safety problems can also be presented at such displays. The adoption of safety-related technologies by trucking firms and owner-operators is not an automatic process. Improved safety equipment that has clear economic benefit may be quickly utilized by industry. 12 Man y firms that can benefit from a par:Brian ONeill, Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 109; and Ernie Vaughn, Owner-Operators Independent Truck Drivers Association, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 33. ticular safety technology (e.g., brake retarders for firms that operate frequently over mountainous routes) have already taken steps to adopt it. 13 However, the economic benefit of safety equipment is not always apparent to industry. OTA finds that in this situation, setting Federal performance standards for equipment through rulemaking, and ensuring that the standards apply equally to all motor carriers, regardless of classification, is appropriate. Rough estimates of the costs of new safety equipment may be found in table 1-2. 1]William Leasure, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 170. Table 1-2.Estimated Costs of Safety Equipment for New Vehicles Cost per vehicle a Equipment option (1988 dollars) Tractor: 1. Three-point seat belts . . . 50 2. Anti lock brakes. . . . . 2,100 3. Brake adjustment indicators and automatic slack adjusters (front axle) . . . . . 150 4. Brake adjustment indicators and automatic slack adjusters (rear axle) . . . . . 280 5. Splash/spray suppression . . 300 6. Reflectors . . . . . 15 Tractor total. . . . . Trailer: 1. Conspicuity devices. . . . 2. Side underride guards . . . 3. Automatic slack adjusters . . 4. Brake adjustment indicator . 5. Antilock brakes (not currently offered in U. S.) . . . . 6. Splash/spray suppression . . 7. Rear underride guard . . . Trailer total . . . . 2,895 b 125 1,000 450 150 1,200 300 100 3,325 C NOTE: The Nations registered tractodtrailer fleet included 1.1 million trucktractors and 3.4 million trailers in 19S6. aAverage or midrange cost based on current Production le@S. bRepreSentS as percent addition to tractor cost, based on $86,500 aVera9e tractor cost for 19S7. CRepreSentS a w percent addition to d~ van trailer cost, based on $11,000 aVera9e trailer cost (closed-top, dry freight van) for 1987. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19SS; based on estimates from the American Trucking Associations, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, and several trailer manufacturers, August 19S8. GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION Congressional mandates and DOT actions since licensing, represent steps toward greater safety. A 1980, such as requirements for annual vehicle incomprehensive national truck safety program resections and more stringent standards for driver quires continuing such programs and establishing
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Figure 1-10.Organizations Concerned With Brake Standards [ :.. I I Truck Trailer Brake Research Group I I 1: Us. ; Department : / Vehicle ~ Research I Test Center ~ I Manufacturer s Associatio n Engineering ; Committee : Brak e Committe e
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20 a far more systematic Federal-State approach. OTA concludes that two issues are top priorities: 1) impproving State enforcement capabilities and regulatory uniformity, and 2) better coordination and cooperation among agencies within DOT. State Issues MCSAP has firmly established the role of States as an essential adjunct to Federal safety efforts. Continued Federal financial support for State inspection and enforcement activities through MCSAP is crucial. Because additional trained personnel are needed across the country, Congress may wish to increase funding for this useful program. Additional State activities could enhance safety in a number of areas. Monitoring industry through terminal audits and ensuring the safety fitness of all motor carriers are important components of a systematic safety program. DOT has made some progress in assigning fitness ratings to the large numbers of unrated motor carriers, mostly small operators, who entered the trucking industry after deregulation. However, the safety fitness of the private fleets that provide over half of commercial truck transport must also be evaluated, and Federal personnel levels are inadequate for this task. Because State audit programs are indispensable additions to Federal enforcement efforts, Congress may wish to require DOT to develop guidelines and handbooks for States and to encourage more States to train inspectors and begin auditing carriers. Efforts by FHWA to improve regulatory compliance materials for industry would be helpful as models for the States as well. OTA concludes that industry complaints about inconsistent State inspection and enforcement procedures and penalties are symptoms of the need for stronger Federal and State efforts toward national uniformity. The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliances (CVSA) goal of establishing uniform inspection and out-of-service criteria provides an excellent model for States to use in working together toward consistent nationwide programs. However, efforts will be ineffective unless State governments make the commitment to have all their own agencies cooperate toward this goal. Moreover, intrastate motor carrier operators are subject to uniform safety controls only if Federal regulations have been adopted and are enforced by the States. Congress may wish to consider requiring all States to participate in MCSAP and adopt and enforce Federal regulations. To assist in resolving current conflicts in State agency agendas, strong DOT support for consistent implementation of enforcement programs will be needed once FHWAs review of State laws and regulations has been completed and State safety laws evaluated. Congress may wish to require DOT to provide technical assistance and information on safety regulations and enforcement issues for State officials, law enforcement personnel, and judges. Educational materials could be distributed to States and motor carriers on: 1) Federal safety requirements, 2) model programs for amending laws, 3) implementing Federal standards, and 4) developing an information clearinghouse. An enforcement handbook could provide general guidance on the safety regulations and safety factors to consider when setting penalty amounts for various types of violations. Involving State executive and legislative bodies, bar associations, and enforcement organizations, such as State Attornies General and police chiefs, in the process could help gain acceptance from all agencies of the need for a uniform approach. DOT has issued a rule, effective in November 1988, eliminating a long-standing regulatory loopholethe Commercial Zone Exemption as it applies to safety regulations in large urban regions. Congress may wish to ensure that this and other safety exemptions are eliminated completely and quickly. State and local enforcement officers will need capability to monitor and enforce safety requirements for commercial vehicles in urban commercial areas. The public safety requires that motor carrier safety regulations are independent of commodity, corporate form, type of operation, or destination of the cargothe traditional bases of regulation and often the bases for exemptions. Trucks operating in intrastate, private, government, and exempt services perform a major share of the Nations motor carrier transportation. While safety regulations have gradually been extended to these carriers, OTA coneludes that a comprehensive heavy vehicle safety program must extend safety regulations to all heavy vehicles and operators in all States. The need for safety does not vary with the type of
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27 operation, and no exemptions from safety regulations, including the Commercial Drivers License, are warranted. Access The motor carrier industry is a focal point for many conflicting demands. Shippers, especially those of bulky lightweight products, such as packaged foods or paper goods, push for larger trailers to carry more goodsat minimal extra cost. To capture this business, carriers have purchased new trailers larger than drivers are accustomed to, and joined shippers in convincing State legislatures that trailers as long as 53 feet can operate safely on State roads. In the Motor Carrier Act of 1984, Congress made clear that decisions on access to State roads for large trucks are the province of the States, not the Federal Government. Resolving the conflicts inherent between industrys push for larger and longer vehicles and the limitations of the Nations road network requires Federal and State officials to work closely with each other and with shippers and carriers. States have found developing routes and communicating access decisions clearly to industry to be complex and difficult tasks, requiring hard work, patience, good will, and good humor from all parties. Where the process has failed, carriers travel on the routes they deem necessary to reach their destinations, often using narrow rural or urban roadways that are unsuitable for the large vehicles and violating State law. OTA concludes that varying State access, inspection, and enforcement policies pose significant problems for industry and can adversely affeet highway safety when drivers detour on back roads to avoid the delays that often result. Congress may wish to require DOT to play a more active role in facilitating State-industr y dialog and resolving these difficult issues. Technology transfer for innovative solutions and working actively with appropriate State and industr y organizations are two possible approaches. (For further discussion of technical aspects of the access issue, see chapter 5.) Photo credit: Land Line States determine which roads heavy trucks may travel to reach terminals such as this one to pick up and deliver goods in urban areas.
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22 DOT Programs OTA finds that the division of responsibility for different facets of roadway, vehicle, and driver issues among multiple agencies hampers safety problem solving within DOT. To be able to respond effectively to congressional safety directives, DOT will need to coordinate its agencies. DOTs program to implement the commercial drivers license requirement is a commendable exception; it could serve as a model for efforts to deal with equipment requirements and highway design issues. Congress may wish to require DOT to develop a plan to integrate the technical expertise now divided between NHTSA and the motor carrier and highway design sections of FHWA to address issues such as roadway and vehicle compatibility guidelines, upgraded safety equipment standards, national training guidelines for drivers and maintenance personnel, accident reduction and mitigation strategies, and data collection and analysis. OTA further concludes that DOT agencies need to coordinate in collecting and analyzing data, conducting research programs, and developing regulatory proposals. Although NHTSA and OMC in FHWA do review some of each others research projects, this is the exception rather than the rule. Establishing special working groups to address issues of common concern, jointly funding research activities, and sharing staff expertise are examples of strategies that could be used. SAFETY DATA RESOURCES Accurate, uniform, and representative information that gives sufficient detail for analysis is essential for informed policy decisions on motor carrier safety issues. Objective data are needed to identify highway design limitations and problems and to evaluate the point at which technologies are reliable and cost-effective. However, OTA concludes that, with few exceptions, existing heavy truck data and information resources have deficiencies that limit their value in supporting safety policies and programs. In general, Federal data collection suffers from lack of uniformity, some duplication, inadequate quality control, poor handling, and outdated storage systems. Furthermore, OTA finds that no effective central DOT analysis capability exists, and that this deficiency seriously hinders DOTs policymaking. Congress may wish to require DOT to establish such a centralized capability and develop a comprehensive program to gather, review, and analyze relevant data. Although some of the existing data are useful for analyzing particular truck safety issues, none of the national accident databases is ideally suited for addressing all truck safety issues (see table 1-3). NASS, NHTSAs major data source, includes accident data from 1981 to the present. NASS selects accidents, based on a statistically based sampling scheme, permitting the derivation of estimates for national accident totals and annual trends. Changes made to NASS for 1988 (see chapter 7) are likely to make it more difficult to conduct detailed truck and bus accident causal studies using this database. State accident reporting systems present several promising alternatives because they can represent a census of accidents. However, the lack of uniformity among State data presents problems for extrapolating findings to the national level. The efforts of NHTSA in establishing the CARDfile, and of FHWA working with CVSA and the National Governors Association in striving for more uniform State accident reporting practices are commendable efforts to address this issue. A NASS-style approach focused on heavy vehicles could be a cost-effective prerequisite to a truck and bus accident data system, for it allows a sampling of operations by both geography and road use. To provide accurate and comprehensive information, each accident investigation could be handled by field staff that examines the vehicle and the accident site, interviews vehicle occupants, and reviews medical and driver records. For this option to be realized, additional funds will be needed both to restore the original approach and to expand the system to meet truck safety concerns, including training of field teams in truck accident investigation. FHWA currently has a uniform data collection demonstration project under way in the midwest. FHWA could work actively with other States to expand accident report forms to accommodate truck
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23 detail and to establish uniform reporting thresholds and forms for data elements. Both of these developments would enhance truck safety information and furnish a statewide census of accident history. NHTSAs advice and expertise would be invaluable, regardless of which agency took the lead. The cost of either an accident or an exposure data collection program is a function of the desired precision in the estimates. Close to 300 sampling units would be required to achieve reasonable confidence levels for determining accident rates for different truck types, at a total annual cost of close to $2 million. In addition, the logistical demands of establishing and maintaining cooperative arrangements with each jurisdiction are formidable. More economical alternatives include continuing and expanding existing data collection instruments, although their deficiencies are likely to persist. Given the massive scale of trucking activity, and the comparatively detailed safety information available for air, rail, and marine transportation, these are important tradeoffs to consider. OTA finds that uniformity between accident and exposure data, and accuracy in estimating truck movements (see tables 1-3 and l-4) are priority needs. Congress may wish to consider extending FHWAs reporting requirements to inelude an annual report from all motor carriers, including intrastate operators and those currently exempt from Federal reporting requirements. Information could include the number of trucks owned and miles traveled. To keep track of heavy vehicles, a Federal-State cooperative truck registration database could be developed in conjunction with State vehicle registration requirements. An FHWA database such as SAFETYNET could be used if modifications to the system can be made. Inspection and Enforcement Data Under MCSAP, a wide range of State inspection and enforcement data is being amassed that provides useful information for safety analyses. Although the process by which vehicles and companies are targeted for inspection varies between States, the inspection results are reported in a uniform way. SAFETYNET, the enforcement database developed for MCSAP, must mature before its information can be available in an automated form on a national scale, but at that time it will be a valuable resource. Additional DOT technical assistance for State agencies in developing more uniform data manage-ment systems and analytical capabilities, especially in tracking preventable accidents and violation statistics, would be an effective use of limited funding. States could use this information to target carriers for audits and inspections. As FHWA and ICC implement new procedures for assessing the safety fitness of commercial vehicle operators, explicit procedures for monitoring ongoing safety performance will be needed. State personnel and FHWA field inspectors alike could benefit from consistent guidelines for deciding whether to initiate a compliance education program or an enforcement action. Market Entry, Exit, and Financial Performance Little public data is available on the financial performance of the industry, and ICC has required less and less reporting over the past 8 to 10 years. OTA concludes that the ICC reporting system has dwindied to a point where it no longer adequately monitors carrier market entry, exit, and financial performance. The current lack of information presents a significant problem for both safetyrelated and broad policy decisions. Obtaining sufficient information would require a dramatic reversal of ICC policy to include Class 111 carrier registrations, requests for exemptions, and sufficient detail in the data elements to track some degree of financial performance. Substantial data will be needed to restore this system so that it serves a useful purpose for evaluating truck safety. Congress ma y wish to require ICC to collect such data or place responsibility for doing so with DOT as part of a national motor carrier safety program.
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Table 1=3.Truck Safety Information Systems (Accident Data) Database Kept by Years Strengths Weaknesses 50-T (part of FHWA, Office of Motor Carriers l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l Good detail on truck accident characteristics Exclusive truck focus l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l Missing several portions of the truck opulation Concern over accuracy and completeness of reports elies on carrier participation Restricted to aggregate accident reporting Limited in terms of number of participating States Missing some truck detail Small number of heavy truck accidents in database Detailed causal analysis sometimes difficult 1973 to present MCMIS) 1983 to present 1979 to present FHWA, Special Monitoring Study FHWA, Office of Highway Information Involves accident and exposure data Exclusive truck focus I I NASS NHTSA, National Center for Statistics and Analysis Statistical sampling design Comprehensiveness of accident investigation Reasonably good detail on truck accident characteristics National estimates of accident frequency Census of all fatal accidents Comprehensiveness of accident investigation Comprehensiveness of accident investigation Good detail on truck characteristics Exciusive truck focus Census of all accident types ( FARS NTSB NHTSA, National Center for Statistics and Analysis NTSB 1975 to present Limited details on truck configuration and operation Nonfatal accidents not represented 1986 to 1987, single collection Limited sample of accidents under investigation, not representative of truck crashes generally State databases Various State regulatory agencies Based solely on police reports at scene Varying detail on truck accident characteristics Lack of uniformity from State to State 1982 to present CARDfile NHTSA Census from several States Uniformity in reporting format Limited truck detail due, in part, to limited uniform variableiisted Based solely on police reports at scene Limited to a few States Motor carrier industry Individual carriers, trade associations Some individual carriers maintain excelent detail on accidents and movements Exclusive truck focus Individual carrier represents single observatiion in industry Access to individual carrier records is not in the public domain Trade associations report accident rates but not details on accident characteristics Insurance companies Individual companies, IS0 Detailed financial and statistical data on truck insurance policies and claims Aggregate reporting of information by insurers Primary concern over loss ratio rather than accident causation UMTRI UMTRI 1980 to present Combines coverage of FARS with Reliance on information provided by carrier during post-accident investigation Restricted to fatal accidents detail of 50-T Post-accident investigation to complete missing information Exclusive truck focus KEY: MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System; FHWA = Federal Highway Administration; NASS = National Accident Sampling System; FARS = Fatal Accident Reporting System; CARDfile = Crash Avoidance Research Datafile; NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board; NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; iSO = Insurance Services Offices, inc; UMTRi University of Michigan Transportation Research institute. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.
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Table l-4.Truck Safety Information Systems (Exposure Data) Database Kept by Years Strengths TIUS Bureau of the Census Every 5 years, most recently in 1982 CTS Bureau of the Census Motor Carrier Census FHWA File (part of MCMIS) HPMS FHWA Tws FHWA Since 1983, every 5 years Most recent 5 years Annually Annually Motor carrier industry Individual carriers, trade associations NMTDB Transportation Research and 1977 to present Marketing (consulting firm) NTTIS UMTRI 1988 to 1987, single collection l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l Covers all trucks used in the United States Sample biased toward heavy trucks Exclusive truck focus Multimodal Cross-checked against the Census of Manufacturers Provides flow data Comprehensive listing of carriers and truck fleet operators Exclusive truck focus Statistical sampling design Detail on roadway characteristics Truck classification and weight data Exclusive truck focus Aggregate statistics on tons, ton-miles, and truck registrations Detailed flow records from individual carriers and shippers; can merge with similar accident records Exclusive truck focus Focuses on long-distance truck movements Good truck and operator classification detail Exclusive truck focus Good truck and operator classification detail Disaggregate and aggregate analysis possible Exclusive truck focus l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l weaknesses No commodity flow data Only rudimental commodity information Reflects tractor use, not trailer use Based on owner response Shipment data on some products are missing Only shipments from point of manufacture to first destination are reported Nonuniformity between surveys Voluntary data submission Many carriers missing from database No commodity flow data Limited truck classification detail Counting sites are not statistically representative Method of data collection varies and is subject to observer error Truck data are based principally on LTL carriers Individual carrier represents single observation in industry Access to individual carrier records is not in public domain Purposely excludes short-haul truck movements, especially in Northeast Not in public domain Relatively small number of observations Single collection KEY: TIUS = Truck Inventory and Use Survey; CTS = Commodity Transportation Survey; MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System; FHWA = Federal Highway Administration; HPMS = Highway Performance Monitoring System; TWS = Truck Weight Study; LTL = less-than-truckload; NMTDB = National Motor Truck Data Base; NTTIS = National Truck Trip Information Sutvey; UMTRI = University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19s8.
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26 CARRIER Trucking is a tremendously complex industry with numerous market segments; each is served by a variety of motor carriers, making generalizations difficult. Changes in the economic regulation of the motor carrier industry had sweeping effects on market entry, operations, costs and pricing, employment policies and labor relations (including wage levels), and technology development. The distinctions between various types of regulated motor carriers have greatly diminished since deregulation, and entry opportunities for private carriers and owner-operators have increased. The nature and volume of the business conducted by various segments of the trucking industry have also changed. The largest general commodity carriers now tend to specialize in less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments (under 10,000 pounds). Many large LTL carriers have failed since deregulation, and few new ones have entered the market. However, several of the largest nationwide LTL carriers have expanded and prospered, concentrating business in this segment. These firms compete fiercely for market share. At the same time, the interstate truckload (TL) industry has become more diverse and dispersed. New entrants in the TL segment tend to be small and nonunion carriers, often from the ranks of owner-operators, who are a key part of this trucking fleet. However, to compete successfully as individual entrepreneurs, owner-operators must drive long hours and accept TL backhauls at low rates, circumstances that create physical, psychological, and economic hardships. Factors are at work to tip the balance of TL operations toward larger carriers with more capital to invest. Successful TL operations currently stress high-quality service, using high-capacity, specialized equipment and utilizing their assets and labor productively to serve targeted market niches. Concerned about the reliabiliy of leased equipment and drivers, carriers with sufficient resources buy their own equipment and employ company drivers. Others, such as automobile carriers, select and train drivers carefully to handle safely their highly specialized, complex equipment that is difficult to lease. Productivity is high enough that shippers pick these highISSUES Photo credit: Karen Mathiasen, OTA staff Automobile carriers train drivers to handle special equipment and valuable cargo. service carriers for both service and unit price, and they become core carriers, capturing a large portion of the TL freight from major shippers. Owneroperators face continued business pressure from these trends. Profits Profit margins have fallen even for the most successful carriers, a product of intense price competition caused partly by changes in manufacturing and partly by continuing overcapacity. Carriers expenses per ton-mile are up 75 percent since 1978, while revenues have increased only 54 percent. General freight revenues per ton-mile have increased slightly more than the consumer price index since 1978, but have not matched price increases in the general economy, particularly for large shippers and those in highly competitive city-pair traffic lanes. Carriers that serve small shippers and those in less competitive markets have fared better. Capacity One major reason for the high number of motor carrier failures over the past 8 years was the overcapacity that existed in the regulated environment. Despite the failures, however, industry analysts indicate that for several reasons, some overcapacity
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27 persists. While the number of heavy trucks registered nationwide has declined slightly, trailers used now are longer and wider, and double trailers, which have significantly greater carrying capacity, have become commonplace on the Interstate system. In addition, industry data show all trucks are being used more productively; they are driven more miles annually and spend longer hours traveling each day. Rate discounting has made low labor costs and high productivity essential to survival; thus carriers have found it difficult to increase driver wages and improve arduous work conditions. Nonetheless, the need to keep trucks moving has made many carriers focus on ways to make driving a more attractive occupation. Many successful companies have had to provide extra incentives to attract enough drivers, since the traditional driver pool has been shrinking. Longer vehicles, double trailers, heavier weights, a shortage of qualified drivers, and a competitive marketplace, all have important implications for heavy truck safety. Overcapacity leads to price discounting and shrunken profit margins, creating difficult economic trade-offs for decisions about investment in safety-related equipment and safety-conscious hiring and scheduling practices. Competition, increased operating costs, and low, erratic profit margins create a need to control costs that can lead to shortchanging safety-related driver training, truck maintenance, and equipment improvements. Carriers are, in general, interested in safety, but they will measure investments in new safety equipment and technologies against tangible economic rewards. Cost and safety trade-offs are particularly problematic for owner-operators and small carriers, who have to generate revenue regularly to stay in business and may have no regular operations base or maintenance facility. OTA concludes that Federal safety regulations will affect carriers economically with varying severity, depending on their financial reserves and stability. Congress will want to keep this in mind as it weighs policies related to safety.
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Chapter 2 The Motor Carrier industry-A Profil e Photo credlt: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff Photo credit: Land Line Bobtail tractor Flatbed trailer i { Photo @v&t: Iomn Math&an, OTA staff Conventional tt*tO# Photo credit: Freightliner Corp. Cab-over-engine tractor I Photo cradt: Land Line l%oto cmdlt: Karen Mathiamn, OTA staff Tanker Automobile carrier
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. CONTENTS Page The Nations Truck Fleet . . . . 31 Number of Trucks. . . . . . 31 Heavy Trucks... . . . . . 32 Industry Characteristics . . . . 34 ICC-Regulated Carriers . . . . 36 Intrastate Intercity). . . . . . 36 Intrastate (LocaI) . . . . . 36 Exempt Movements . . . . . 36 Private Carriers . . . . . . 37 State Requirements for Truckers . . 37 Hazardous Cargo.. . . . . . 38 Other Industry Characteristics . . 38 The Nations Buses.. . . . . . 39 Bus Deregulation in 1982. . . . 39 Safety `Aspects ., .. .. .4 . . . . 40 Forces for Economic Change in Trucking 41 Regulatory Shifts . . . . . 41 Motor Carrier Act of 1980 . . . 41 Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 .......+...*** *..*..... 41 The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987 . . . 42 Other Forces for Change. . . . 42 Competitive Conditions and Industry Trends . . . . . 42 For-Hire Carriers,. . . . . . 43 State Requirements . . . . . 43 Market Share . . . . . . 44 Market Competition.. . . . . 44 Profit Margins and Overcapacity . . 44 Business Failures . . . . . 45 Heavy Truck Sales . . . . . 45 Trailer Size..... . . . . . 45 Specialization and Concentration. . . 46 Conclusions . . . . . . . 49 Safety Implications . . . . . 51 Boxes Bo x Page 2-A. Small Less-Than-Truckload (LTL) . . . . . . . ., 48 2-B. A Truckload Carrier . . . . 50 Figures Figure Page 2-1. 2-2. 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 2.6. 2-7. 2.8. 2-9. 2-lo* 2-11. Table Truck Types.... . . . . . 33 Motor Carrier Industry Organization. . . . . . 35 Number of ICC Motor Carriers by Revenue Category, 1978-86 . . 43 Net Profit Margin, 1978-87 . . 45 Motor Carrier Failures, 1971-87 . 45 Sales of Trucks Weighing Over 33,000 Pounds, 1978-87 . . . . . 46 Median Age of Trucks, 1978.86 . 46 Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length 47 Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Width.... 47 General Freight Trucking Industry Total Revenue, 1978-87 . . . 49 LTL/TL Tonnage, Adjusted Seasonally . . . . . . 49 Tables Page 2-1. Total U.S. Truck and Bus Registrations, 1979-86 .. .. .. .. ... ... .....;. ... ...:. 31 2-2. New Truck Sales . . . . . 34 2-3. Number of Trucks Owned and Operated by Commercial Enterprises, Selected Data for Largest Weight Classes, 1986 34 2-4. Intercity Bus Industry in the United States . . . . . . . 40 2-5. Number of ICC-Regulated Motor Carriers and Freight Forwarders . . 43
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Chapter 2 The Motor Carrier industryA Profile The motor carrier industry moves goods and materials between shippers and receivers all across the Nation and carries passengers between large and small cities. Motor carriers are our most ubiquitous freight mode, using the extensive U.S. highway network to link markets of all types, sizes, and locations and serving many points that lack rail or air service. The numbers of motor carriers grew dramatically during the 1980s, with many carriers of all sizes moving to specialize in different segments of the market. This wide variety of activities makes the industry difficult to categorize. Nonetheless, motor carrier safety concerns and issues are best viewed in their industry context, so that policy changes to improve safety recognize and address the economic and physical characteristics of the industry. Motor carrier accidents have immediate economic impacts on carriers, drivers, and shippers of the freight being transported. However, motor carrier safety is also a prime governmental THE NATIONS Number of Trucks Industry-wide data on the domestic trucking fleet are available from several sources, although data on the entire population of trucks, including both interstate and local carriers, suffer from severe shortcomings (see chapter 7). The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) compiles and publishes data on all motor vehicle registrations by State. Its most recent statistical report shows a total of 176.2 million motor vehicles of all types, of which 77 percent and public concern, because carriers share the roads with automobiles and other personal-use vehicles. Moreover, the societal costs of traffic accidents are heavy. The Secretary of Transportation recentl y projected that the annual economic cost of highway accidents could be $65 billion in the year 2000. This chapter presents an economic and business profile of the motor carrier industry, describing the vehicle fleet, industry characteristics, competitive conditions, industry trends, and major policy developments. The information focuses on the large, heavy trucks that are a prime safety concern and provides a framework for evaluating specific safetyrelated issues. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Public Ytorks and Transportation, The Status of the Nation High\& a~s: Concilrions and Performance, Report of the Secretary of Transportation (Vashlngton, DC: L1.S. Government Printing Office, 1987). Cost projections are In constant 1985 dollars. TRUCK FLEET were automobiles, 0.3 percent were buses, and about 23 percent were trucks. 2 The number of commercial and private truck-tractor registrations declined by over 20 percent between 1979 and 1986. Selected registration figures are presented in table 2-1 for 1979-1986. Light truckspickups, panel trucks, and delivery vans, generally of 13,000 pounds or less gross vehicle weight (GVW)dominate the population of registered trucks, making up 83 percent of Federal Highway Administration, Highway Sratisr~c-ZW?6 (Yiashington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1986). Table 2.1 .Total U.S. Truck and Bus Registrations, 1979-86 a (in millions) Total State motor Total commercial and vehicle registration Total truck private truck-tractor Private and Total commercial Year all vehicles registrations registrations commercial trailers bus registrations 1986 . . 176.2 40.2 1.1 3.4 0.11 1985 ......, . 171.7 39.0 1.2 3.4 0.11 1984 . . 166.5 38.0 1.1 3.2 0.11 1983 . . 163.9 36.5 1.2 3.1 0.11 1982 . . 159.5 35.3 1.2 0.11 1981 . . 158.5 34.5 1.2 3.0 0.10 1980 . . 157.3 33.6 1.4 3.3 0.10 1979 .., . . 153.6 33.3 1.4 3.3 0.10 aData have ~O~e limitations, such as possible double Courrting for multiple registrations and reporting lag times of 16-18 months. Data are compiled by States and are supplemented by the Federal Highway Administration to reduce double counting. bpredominantly Ilght trucks (included 36 million pickup trucks in 1~). SOURCE Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics (Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, 1979-66), 31
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32 the 40.2 million truck fleet. Only 1.1 million trucktractor power units and 3.4 million commercial-type trailers and semitrailers were counted in 1986. The Bureau of the Census has conducted surveys roughly every 5 years of various transportation activities, including a Truck Inventory and Use Survey (TIUS) as part of the Census of Transportation. The TIUS is currently underway, and while data from the 1982 TIUS are somewhat outdated, they are the most recent available. Heavy Trucks Most heavy commercial trucks travel close to 100,000 miles per year and dominate commercial interstate traffic. The small trucks and vans that comprise the vast majority of truck sales play only a minor role in interstate commerce. Figure 2-1 presents a selection of heavy truck types in silhouette, and illustrates the diversity of commercial vehicles in use on our highways. Many heavy commercial trucks employ a tractor-trailer configuration, as reflected by all but one of the truck types shown, although numerous straight trucks and dump trucks are also included in this category. The definition of a heavy truck varies for regulatory and legislative applications by the various State and Federal authorities concerned with motor carriers. Most industry observers categorize trucks by weight rather than by actual size, because heavy trucks pose special engineering problems (mainly high axle and wheel loadings that stress the roadway) and safety hazards. Federal statute suggests one definition, because the Federal Government imposes a heavy vehicle use tax on vehicles that exceed 26,000 pounds GVW, and most loaded vehicles operating in interstate commerce exceed that level. Total truck sales numbered 3.8 million in 1987. Trucks are categorized by various weight classes, and the two heaviest are Class 7 (26,001 to 33,000 3U.S, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 7_ruck IrJventory and Use Sur\ey (Washington, DC: various years). pounds) and Class 8 (33,001 pounds and over). Two relatively comprehensive sources provide data on these trucks. First, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) reports on retail sales of trucks by weight class selected MVMA data are presented in table 2-2. Sales of the heaviest class have fluctuated substantially over the past few years, reflecting business conditions and regulatory changes. After a slump in sales of heavy trucks in 1986, sales rebounded in 1987 and 1988, reflecting fleet renewals with more fuel efficient, durable vehicles. A trucking industry profile presents more detailed data on trucks owned and operated by commercial enterprises (see table 2-3). Over 1.8 million trucks of Classes 6 (19,501 to 26,000 pounds), 7, and 8 were operated by more than 343,000 commercial enterprises in 1986. Just over 1 million Class 7 and 8 trucks are operated by about 180,000 businesses. Table 2-3 also shows two other descriptive classifications for users of Classes 7 and 8, by type of enterprise and by fleet size. Vehicles used in the trucking business are classified as for hire, while trucks used to transport company-owned goods as part of an overall commercial enterprise are classified as private. About two-thirds, or over 681,000, of the heaviest vehicles are classified as private and are operated by over 81 percent of the companies owning large trucks. The remaining one-third of the heavy truck fleet is for-hire. Private and for-hire fleets own roughly equal numbers of tractor-trailer combinations. In general, however, companies whose primary business is to provide trucking services for hire operate only about one-third of the largest trucks. Over 84 percent of the establishments that operate Class 7 and 8 trucks own fleets of only one to five large trucks; thus a high proportion of small enterprises operate the largest trucks. A few large companies with fleets of 100 or more vehicles own nearly 40 percent of the Nations Class 7 and 8 trucks, yet constitute only 0.4 percent of all trucking companies. These large firms include the major national for-hire trucking companies, the large private carriers, and the few large specialized carriers.
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33 Straight truck l 25 40 1 4-axle tractor-semitrailer l 38 48 1 5-axle tractor flatbed trailer l 38 48 I Figure 2-1 .Truck Types Twin trailer or double l 28 l l 28 1 3-axle tractor-semitrailer 1 24 28 [ 5-axle tractor-semitrailer I 4 0 5 3 ~ 5-axle tractor tank trailer l 35 40 1 Rocky Mountain double (operated only in certain States) I 45 48 I 1 1 Turnpike double (operated only in certain States) I 45 48 I I 4 5 4 8 t ~ Triple (operated only in certain States) l 28 l 28 1 1 Lengths shown are typical; shorter or longer lengths are possible depending on carriers needs and State laws. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on American Trucking Associations
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34 Table 2-2.New Truck Sales (by gross vehicie weight, in pounds) 6,000 6,001 10,00114,001 16,001 19,501 26,00133,001 Year and less 10,000 14,000 16,000 19,500 26,000 33,000 and over Total 1978 . 1,231,559 1,990,547 74,938 5,989 5,476 178,992 41,151 177,587 3,706,239 1979 . 1,014,016 1,594,060 19,163 2,399 4,611 163,304 46,264 192,889 3,036,706 1980 . 592,339 794,184 5,661 362 2,946 91,119 58,846 121,826 1,667,283 1981 . 629,030 816,373 311 591 2,764 85,000 52,264 114,575 1,700,908 1982 . 917,908 803,639 280 58 1,556 47,330 58,498 77,186 1,906,455 1983 . 1,370,395 849,498 223 2 1,252 47,648 59,026 85,653 2,413,897 1984 . 1,707,301 1,061,974 1,631 4 5,713 60,457 87,396 150,849 3,075,325 1985 . 1,988,434 1,057,556 19,463 0 5,345 53,471 98,406 134,230 3,356,905 1986 . 2,130,874 997,272 0 0 5,931 45,333 96,998 116,477 3,392,885 1987 . 2,475,402 1,052,958 0 366 6,085 46,473 103,188 136,938 3,821,410 SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Facts& Figures (1978-1987). Table 2-3.Number of Trucks Owned and Operated by Commercial Enterprises, Selected Data for Largest Weight Classes, 1986 Commercial Truck Ownership for Largest Weight Classes Number of Number of companies trucks Classes 6, 7,and8 a . . . . . . . . . 343,176 1,806,488 Class 6 0nly . . . . . . . . . . 259,691 785,698 Class 7and8: (by company type) private . . . . . . . . . . . 151,326 681,153 for-hire . . . . . . . . . . 28.651 339.637 Fleet Size for Companies Operating Class 7 and 8 Trucks Number of Percent of Fleet size companies companies 1-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 151,455 84.2% 6-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,379 8.5% 11-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,855 4.9% 26-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,523 1.4% 51-100 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,004 0.6% 100 or more . . . . . . . . . . 761 0.4% asrandarddesignations fortru~k ~eightclasses aree~pressedin grossvehicleweight as follows: Class6 is 19,501 to26,000pounds; Class 7is26,001 to33,000pounds; Class 8is 33,001 pounds and over. SOURCE: Dun& Bradstreet Marketing Service, Profi/e of the Commercia/ Heavy Truck Markel An /ndustry Update (compiled from Trinc Transportation Consultants database) (W. Newport Beach, CA: Newport Publications, 1966) INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS Trucking is a service activity comprising many varied market segments, with the two broadest categories defined as l) private and 2) for-hire carriers. Private carriers transport their own freight as an adjunct to their basic business and are not always considered in discussions of the trucking industry. A local baker using a delivery truck is engaged in private carriage, and so is a national chain, such as Sears, when it distributes goods in its own trucks. For-hire carriers are always considered trucking cornpanies and are engaged to haul freight belonging to another party. For-hire carriers are subject to Federal and State economic regulations, while private carriers are normally exempt from most of those economic regulations. Figure 2-2 portrays the traditional division of the key types of trucking companies by primary market orientation. Changes in trucking laws and regulatory approach have blurred some of the distinctions, but the categories remain basically valid because most trucking businesses have a market specialty. However, since deregulation, a truck normally engaged in private carriage maybe operated for hire under certain circumstances. Similarly, a truck may carry products exempt from regulation, then later
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35 I I L t I I 1 L a) .L ~wl 0.!!! v= > L.o-w 00 z w I L
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36 be leased to a carrier that has interstate to carry regulated commodities. ICC-Regulated Carriers authority Carriers operating for hire in interstate commerce generally require Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) authority and are subject to Federal economic regulations related to markets and commodities served, tariff filing, and financial responsibility. Regulated interstate for-hire carriers may operate as common carriers or as contract carriers. Common carriers are expected to provide authorized movements to any shipper requesting service according to publicly available tariffs (price lists). Contract carriers may provide services to shippers with whom they have a written contractual agreement, which normally includes service and volume commitments and a schedule of charges. With the appropriate ICC authority, carriers may function both as common carriers and as contract carriers. Interstate transport refers to product movements whose origin and destination are in different States, whereas intrastate shipments have both origin and destination within a single State. Interstate movements b y for-hire carriers may be carried in all types of equipment, but long-distance, high-volume shipments generally move in tractor-trailer combinations. Intrastate (Intercity) Shipments carried for hire between two points within a State are not subject to ICC economic regulation. However, the majority of States impose economic regulations governing certification (entry), tariffs, and other requirements on intrastate motor carriers. The intensity of regulation varies by State; two States have never imposed economic regulations on truckers, and several States, Arizona and Florida for example, have completely deregulated intrastate trucking. Carriers may operate both intrastate and interstate, if properly authorized. Very few data exist regarding the operating practices and financial health of intrastate carriers. Intrastate (Local) Local movement of goods for hire are usually not subject to either State or Federal economic regulations if both origin and destination are within the same locale. Information about local trucking is limited; much local movement is private in nature, and no comprehensive data exist about local forhire trucking. ICC has stipulated areas surrounding jurisdictions, termed commercial zones, in which ICC regulations do not apply, even if the movement is interstate in nature. The geographic coverage of these commercial zone exemptions has been expanded over time, and further revisions are currently being considered. Until recently, the Department of Transportation (DOT) safety regulations exempted movements within commercial zones from some safety requirements, although a different definition of commercial zone was used for safety. After substantial evidence accumulated of a high number of safety violations among carriers in commercial zones, Congress began to consider legislation to eliminate these exemptions to safety regulations. DOT issued a rule in May 1988, ending the exemptions in November 1988. Exempt Movements Several significant segments of interstate trucking are exempt from ICC economic regulations for example, carriers transporting such commodities as unprocessed agricultural products, livestock, periodicals, decorative stone, and wood chips. This group of carriers typically specializes in exempt agricultural produce and seasonally shifts trucking operations from one producing region to the next. They are not required to conform to the entry or pricing requirements applied to other interstate for-hire carriers. Photo credit: Land Line Although livestock carriers are exempt from ICC economic regulations, many must comply with Federal safety regulations.
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37 However, the exemption from economic regulation is dependent on the commodity being hauled, not the nature of the carrier organization or equipment. These carriers must still comply with DOT safety regulations and insurance requirements (if interstate carriers) and with various State trucking laws. Private Carriers A large number of manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers operate private (not for hire) trucking fleets as an adjunct to their regular business activities. These private fleets are a substitute for, and compete indirectly with, for-hire trucking services. Private fleet operators value their control over service, schedules, and equipment. In the 1980s, some corporate managements began to scrutinize traffic management and private fleet operations more closely as profit centers. Private fleets var y from large trucking operations of Fortune 500 firms to small one or two truck fleets used to transport goods to and from vendors and customers. These fleets dominate the portion of the carrier industry using heavy straight trucks. Smaller trucks in private fleets are apt to serve mixed purposes beyond freight movement. For example, a van or pickup truck may be used for commuting or to make sales calls. Very little aggregate data is available on the operating practices or financial conditions of private carriers. Trucks operating as private carriers are not subject to ICC economic regulation. However, private carriers are now permitted to offer certain intercorporate and for-hire services with ICC approval. Private carriers are subject to DOT safety regulations and to various State trucking laws. State Requirements for Truckers Every State has its own set of requirements for truckers engaged in freight movements, whether the movements are intrastate or interstate in nature. Historically, Federal policy has left many aspects of trucking under State jurisdiction. Each State may impose its own requirements in at least six areas, and these requirements often overlap and differ from the requirements of other States and the Federal Government. Vehicle Registration Motor vehicles, including trucks, are generally required to be registered in the State of owner residence. Registration provides for vehicle identification plates (license plates) and ownership verification (title), and generates a registration fee to the home State. Commercial trucks crossing State lines encounter a variety of different registration requirements, and cannot assume reciprocity treatment as is the case for automobiles. Fuel Taxes Each State may impose its own fuel tax, and such taxes represent an important source of State revenue. States generally have sought to devise collection methods that are not dependent on location of fuel purchase, but reflect fuel used and/or mileage traveled within the State by large commercial trucks. However, State requirements for the payment of fuel taxes differ substantially. Other Taxes A number of States impose taxes on interstate motor carriers in addition to or in place of registration fees and fuel taxes, commonly called third-structure taxes. Third-structure taxes are usually truck-mileage taxes that may also increase with vehicle weight. These taxes are based on the finding that heavy trucks create wear and maintenance costs for the highway system that increase more than proportionately with fuel used. Eleven States imposed thirdstructure taxes in 1987. 4 Economic Regulations Most States place economic requirements on intrastate freight movement; many still require carriers to file for rate increases. Carriers must seek certification to operate under various State laws governing the public convenience and necessity of their services. Safety and insurance requirements are often incorporated in these State regulations. Size and Weight States have their own size and weight restrictions that apply to State and local roads not on the desAmerican Trucking Associations, Department of State Laws, State Taxes, unpublished manuscript, January 1987.
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38 ignated map of the National Truck Network (including the Interstate system and other specified routes). Indeed, no Federal size and weight statutes existed prior to the 1956 designation of the limited-access Interstate system. States often evaluate road conditions and route configurations as suitable for vehicles smaller in size and lighter in weight than those now allowed by Federal law. This has raised many issues about the access of large, heavy vehicles to commercial locations in a State. (See chapters 3 and 5 for further details.) Hazardous Cargo Each State has concerns about hazardous cargo moving within and through the State, and a variety of State laws to regulate these movements. To qualify for Federal motor carrier safety program funds, States must adopt Federal hazardous materials regulations or similar ones and apply them to intrastate transport. Local governments have also become increasingly active in regulating the movement of hazardous cargo. Other Industry Characteristics Equipment Type Equipment type varies for each form of carriage, and with market conditions, cost considerations, and fleet available. The conventional combination truck in interstate service is a tractor pulling a 45to 48-foot dry van trailer or twin 28-foot trailers. Certain Western States allow triple 28-foot trailers and a few Western and Northeastern States permit longer combinations (such as twin 45-foot trailers) on designated highways, often requiring the carrier to obtain a special permit. All States allow oversized vehicles if a special permit is obtained, although most States will grant overweight permits only for nondivisible loads. Among the many other specialized trailer types are tank trailers, flatbed trailers, refrigerated trailers, automobile rack trailers, hopper trailers for grains and ores, pole trailers, and a variety of special-purpose trailers. Trailers are not normally dedicated to run in combination with a particular tractor or driver. Equipment Ownership Truck-tractors, trailers, and other carrier equipment may be owned by the carrier or leased from other sources. Equipment may be leased, with or without drivers, from truck leasing firms, from a separate for-hire or private carrier, or from an independent owner-operator. Each of these sources may provide one or more trucks on a permanent lease for a period of time and/or for a trip-lease for the duration of the trip. Responsibility for maintenance services varies considerabl y from one lease to another. The variety of ownership and leasing arrangements has grown considerabl y over recent years. Enforcement of safety and other requirements becomes more complex when the truck owner differs from the company using and/or driver operating the truck. Owner-Operators Owner-operators are independent trucking contractors who offer their services to a variety of customers. These small operators may haul exempt commodities, work for certificated carriers under lease arrangements, or transport regulated commodities under their own ICC operating authority. About 80 percent of all owner-operators own and drive just one truck 5 and often have no fixed place of business, no maintenance shop, and very limited capital. The remaining 20 percent of independent truckers operate small fleets of up to 20 trucks and hire other drivers, even though they continue to think of themselves as owner-operators. About 75 percent of all owner-operators are leased to ICCregulated carriers and private carriers, and about 25 percent haul exempt commodities. A 1986 survey of more than 5,300 independent truckers found that over 78 percent surveyed owned their power units or tractors, while only 26 percent owned trailers. G Prior to regulatory reform in 1980, owneroperators typically did not possess ICC operating authority, and were not directly regulated by ICC. Over the past 8 years, many owner-operators have obtained ICC interstate authority for moving regulated commodities, comprising a major part of the 5James Johnston, Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Oversight Hearing on the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, September 1985. 6Road King, Drivers Opinion Survey VI, sponsored by Associates Commercial Corp. and Unocal, unpublished manuscript, June 6, 1986.
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39 Photo credit: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff Owner-operators often have their cabs equipped with sleeping berths that become the drivers home away from home. dramatic increase in the number of ICC-regulated carriers. Several studies in the last two decades have attempted to estimate the total number of owneroperators and to assess their financial and operating results. Because data are imprecise, these studies have produced quite different results and a wide range of estimates. Most industry observers believe that a substantial number of independent truckers have left the industry in recent years as a result of competitive pressures leading to long and arduous working hours. Various sources indicate that at least 100,000 owner-operators remain in business. ; Union Representation The trucking industry has a long history of union representation. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) is the major union representing the for-hire segment of the industry, although the unionized labor force has shrunk with the decline of the general freight, common carrier segment of the business. Slightly less than half of all truckload carriers and other parts of the trucking industry that rely on independent owner-operators employ union drivers. Private carriers, if organized, employ members of other unions as well as IBT members. Since the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, new entrants have used predominantly nonunion drivers. 7Marshall Seigel, Independent Truck Owner-Operators Association, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, O\ersight Hearing on the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Sept. 21, 1983. THE NATIONS BUSES The bus industry is the passenger-carrying segment of the motor carrier industry. Buses were not major passenger carriers even in their prime, and were hit hard by increased automobile ownership and use, competition from subsidized passenger rail, and deregulation of the airlines in 1978. Competition among air carriers for intercity travel brought lower air fares that have proven a major attraction for price-sensitive passengers on long distance trips. The bus industry has several clearly defined major segments. One large group provides intercity and interstate regular passenger route service under ICC regulation, and several other segments provide other important passenger services. These include charter operators, who offer group and tour service, school bus operators (both school district and contract service), and local transit agencies. The intercity bus industry includes large and small carriers and a few very large, Class I carriers (see table 2--4). Industry-wide data are difficult to obtain, because regulatory changes have reduced bus company reporting requirements. The bus industry has declined nationwide over the last 10 yearsbusmiles, passengers-carried, and employee numbers all trend downward, and total operating revenues have declined since the early 1980s. For Class I carriers the decline is more striking, with the number of bus passengers declining 37.5 percent between 1980 and 1986. The largest interstate bus companies have suffered the most severe financial reverses. Greyhound, by far the biggest bus operator, with 6,800 drivers for 3,500 buses, took over the nearly-bankrupt Trailways operation in late 1987. Both carriers had regularly reported operating losses in recent years; those losses widened in early 1987, triggering their merger. Bus Deregulation in 1982 Competition from other travel modes continued after regulatory reform for interstate buses in 1982 brought needed flexibility for bus operators. Because bus ridership had declined significantly, major national operators considered the right to withdraw
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40 Table 2-4.lntercity Bus Industry in the United States (including operations of all carriers reporting to the interstate Commerce Commission and intrastate carders) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 Number of companies . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 950 1,330 NA NA Number of buses . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,000 20,500 21,400 20,100 19,100 Number of employees. . . . . . . . . . . . 49,500 46,600 49,100 43,300 40,600 Total bus-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . . . 1,209 1,120 1,162 997 945 Revenue passengers (millions). . . . . . . . . . 401 354 365 353 346 Revenue passenger-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . 25,300 25,600 27,400 23,800 22,500 Operating revenues, all services ($ millions) . . . . . . 1,165 1,943 1,898 1,838 Operating expenses (millions). . .. .. ... ... .....O. ...... 812 1,098 1,811 1,839 1,781 Net operating revenue, before income taxes ($ millions) . . . 89 68 132 59 57 Class 1 interstate carriers only (over $5 million annual revenue) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 Number of companies . . . . . . . . . . . 71 84 46 43 29 Number of buses . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,158 9,800 8,427 7,240 6,230 Number of employees. . . . . . . . . . . . 34,383 35,140 30,950 24,210 21,090 Total bus-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . . . 871 849 771 580 524 Revenue passengers (millions). . . . . . . . . . 174 152 132 91 83 Revenue passenger-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . 17,900 18,200 17,080 12,510 11,117 Operating revenues, all services ($millions) . . . . . . 722 955 1,390 1,270 1,168 Operating expenses($ millions). . . . . . . . . . 639 893 1,311 1,212 1,115 Net operating revenue, before income taxes ($ millions) . . . 83 62 79 58 53 Operating ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 94 94 95 95 SOURCE: American Bus Association and Interstate Commerce Commission data. Photo credit California Department of Transportation The intercity bus industry has faced fierce competition for passengers from private automobiles, Iow cost air travel, and Amtrak. from markets, not entry, as the key regulatory isriers to provide low-cost service was also projected sue. States, in particular had resisted discontinuing as a benefit of regulatory reform. bus services, and Congress found that: State regulation of the motor bus industry has, in certain Safety Aspects circumstances, unreasonably burdened interstate The number of buses operating on the highways commerce. . 8 Permitting smaller, regional caris so much smaller than the number of trucks that Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pubhc Law 97-261, SCc. 3. bus accidents do not figure prominently in national
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41 accident data. However, because passengers are intive, the industry has recommended additional Fedvolved, the safety record of the bus industry is highly eral safety regulations for interstate buses, includin g visible, and buses are subject to broad State controls. extension of coverage for Federal safety provisions Interstate operators encounter numerous complex to private and not-for-hire bus operators. Proposed and conflicting State requirements and could benlegislation calls for the establishment of an office of efit from more uniform treatment at the State level. bus safety in FHWA, and would At the initiative of the American Bus Associauniform Federal requirements on tion, the major intercity bus industry representapassengers. impose relatively motor carriers of FORCES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN TRUCKING Several powerful forces have changed the trucking industry, including regulatory evolution, legislative mandates, and shifts in economic structure. This section briefly highlights these forces, focusing on developments over the past decade. Regulatory Shifts Interstate for-hire trucking is and has been for years subject to regulation by ICC. In earlier years, entry, markets served, and rates were subject to detailed ICC examination and control through a complex approval/disapproval process, which came under severe criticism during the 1970s. ICC began to shift away from many regulatory strictures, especially after Presidents Ford and Carter strongly urged less regulation and made their Commission appointments accordingly. ICC interpretations became significantly less restrictive in the years just prior to 1980. Operating permits (authority to engage in interstate transportation) became much easier to obtain and collective rate-making practices by interstate motor carriers were reviewed. These ICC actions were controversial and stimulated congressional hearings and eventual passage of motor carrier legislation in 1980. Motor Carrier Act of 1980 The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA) represented the first major change in the statutes since 1935 and has profoundly influenced the interstate motor carrier industry by significantly altering the ICC regulatory framework. Like most major legislation, the MCA reflected years of hearings, several Administration proposals, and extensive committee deliberations. Congress found, as stated in the act, that the motor carrier regulatory statutes were outdated and required revision. The intent of the act was to reduce unnecessary regulation and to provide explicit direction to ICC, which had been deregulating independently. Key areas of change for the federally regulated segment include reduced requirements for new entrants, fewer restrictions on expansion by existing firms, and greater pricing freedom. However, interstate motor carriers remain subject to ICC regulation, although in a much relaxed framework. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), omnibus highway and transit authorizing legislation, contained provisions affecting truckers in two important economic areas, motor carrier user taxes and truck size and weight. Under the STAA, fuel taxes were increased sharply to 9 cents per gallon, from the 4-cent level that had been in effect since 1959. Moreover, the STAA enacted increases in the heavy vehicle use tax applicable to vehicles exceeding 26,000 pounds GVW. After much controversy over the heavy vehicle tax, a differential of 6 cents per gallon additional tax on diesel fuel was enacted, and the heavy vehicle use tax was rolled back. Thus, diesel trucks experienced a fuel tax increase from 4 to 15 cents per gallon in mid-1984. In 1956, Federal law restricted vehicles using the Interstate system to 73,280 pounds, but Federal legislation passed in 1974 permitted States to raise truck weights. As a trade-off to industry for higher fuel taxes, truck size and weight restrictions were
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42 amended in 1982 and 1983 to permit larger, heavier trucks to use the Interstate system. The STAA mandated that States allow trucks with gross weights up to 80,000 pounds to use the Interstate system, overriding lower, more restrictive weight limits in several States. The 1982 act also initiated Federal length limitations for commercial vehicles; States now cannot limit semitrailer lengths to less than 48 feet nor second-trailers in combination units to less than 28 feet. In 1983 Federal legislation prohibited States from restricting truck width below 102 inches (up from 96 inches) on the Interstate system. The 1982 act further limited State laws by providing that no State could deny reasonable access for large trucks to reach terminals and other facilities from the Interstate network. That is, States must allow large, heav y trucks not only to use the Interstate but also to get on and off the Interstate and use State roads. The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987 This 1987 legislation provided funding for Federalaid projects over the next 5 years and extended user taxes at current levels. No major provisions affecting motor carriers or changing their treatment were incorporated. Other Forces for Change Legislative and regulatory actions are an important force affecting the trucking industry, yet they are but one component of the business environment. Other economic aspects of trucking operations are briefly outlined below. l Energy Costs. Fuel prices shot upward in the late 1970s, but have declined and stabilized in recent years. Diesel fuel used b y most combination trucks more than doubled in price between 1978 and 1981, and in 1986 remained l l l l about 73 percent higher than 1978 including the higher Federal and State taxes. 9 Inventory Policies. Many companies have adopted just-in-time inventory policies, spurred on by high interest rates and a need to reduce carrying costs, putting a premium on service quality and reliability. Pressure for ontime deliveries has increased, and for-hire trucking companies have responded by stressing service, including reliable deliveries. Import Growth. Imports of manufacturer and consumer goods have grown phenomenally, while domestic production levels have been disappointing. This changes the market orientation for trucking services and equipment. Container traffic has grown rapidly, originating at ports and major rail hubs. Insurance Crisis. The cost of insurance for motor carriers rose rapidly in the mid-1980s and availability of insurance coverage became a problem. Insurance costs are a small percentage of total operating costs, but that percentage almost doubled between 1984 and 1986, to reach 3.6 percent. 10 Highway Conditions. Traffic growth over the past decade outpaced highwa y improvements. In fact, completion of the Interstate system, originally planned for 1969, has just now become a possibilit y with the funding provided by the 1987 act. As a result of inflation and funding constraints in the late1970s and early1980s, highway pavement conditions deteriorated and volume/capacity ratios increased. Poor pavement and heavy congestion pose special problems for the operation of large trucks. 11 Increased Federal aid in the mid1980s brought some improvements. American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends, 1987 (Alexandria, VA: 1987), P 44. Ibid., p. 28. 1 IFedera] Highway Administration, Sfafus of rhe Nations H~ghway~ (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, various years), COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS AND INDUSTRY TRENDS Regulatory reform and economic shifts led to draand 1982. Statutory changes in user tax levels and matic changes in the motor carrier industry; these in allowable vehicle size and weight have also led changes were magnified by the recession in late-1981 to important industry shifts.
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43 For-Hire Carriers The total number of for-hire carriers rose from 67,038 in 1978 to 89,677 in 1987, a 34 percent increase. : The primary focus of the MCA was regulator y reform for inter-state for-hire carriers, the group subject to Federal regulation. Easier entry was in fact accomplished, and the number of ICC-regulated carriers increased markedly in the late1970s, then steeply in the 1980s, more than doubling to almost 37,000 in 1986 (see table 2-5). The growth has been primarily among Class III carriers, small carriers reporting revenues less than $1 million annually. The number of Class III carriers rose from 12,900 in 1978 to 33,903 in 1986 (see figure 2-3). These numbers are dramatic, even if adjusted for company withdrawals and growth out of Class III. Meanwhile, over the same period the number of Class I and II carriers declined slightly. State Requirements State requirements for interstate motor carriers are gradually becoming more uniform and less burdensome. Congress encouraged this process through provisions of Section 19 of the MCA, which required a study of State regulations and the prospects for uniformity. 13 With support from DOT, the National Governors Association undertook a multiIJDun & Bradstrcxx Marketing Service, Profile of rhe Commercial Hea\r\ Truck ,Uarker: An lndusrry Update, compiled from Trinc Transportation Consultants database (W. Newpcn-t Beach, CA: Newport PubIlcations, 1986). 1L1.S. Department of Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Cc,mmission, Llnlform State Regulations, Section 19, Report to Congress, n.d. Figure 2.3.Number of ICC Motor Carriers by Revenue Category, 1978-86 Revenues under $1 millio n ----Revenues over $1 million 1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 Year KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission. SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, Trucking: An Overview and Focus on Recent Times, unpublished manuscript, September 1987, chart 14. year information gathering and consensus-building project that has resulted in a set of recommendations for more uniform State requirements. 14 lNat10na] Governors Association, Vorking Group on Stare M~tor Carrier Procedures, Consensus Agenda (Ames, IA: Iowa Department of Transportation, 1986). Policy endorsing the recommendations (conrlnued on next page) Table 2-5.Number of ICC. Regulated Motor Carriers and Freight Forwarders Revenue classification Freight Year Class I Class II Class Ill Other a forwarders Total 1987 . . . . 956 1,266 35,505 711 b 38,438 1986 . . . . 947 1,387 33,903 71 l b 36,948 1985 . . . . 1,013 1,489 30,337 444 265 33,548 1984 . . . . 1,088 1,554 27,370 469 261 30,742 1983 . . . . 1,139 1,631 24,411 336 231 27,748 1982 . . . . 1,144 2,139 22,059 380 241 25,963 1981 . . . . 1,031 2,293 18,563 383 244 22,514 1980 . . . . 947 2,164 14,610 324 193 18,238 1979 . . . . 992 2,754 13,337 184 17,267 aclass I and class II carriers relieved of reporting requirements. blncludes freight forwarders. SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar, 16, 1986. 87-004 0 88 2
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44 Market Share 15 Domestic freight volumes and the importance of trucking may be measured in several ways. Total U.S. domestic intercity freight tonnage was relatively unchanged over the period 1980-86. However, trucks increased their share from 36.5 percent in 1980 to 40.1 percent in 1986, after some declines in the late1970s when railroads successfully captured growth in heavy freight such as coal. Domestic intercity tonmiles reflect both weight and distance moved; in 1986 intercity ton-miles exceeded 1980 levels for the first time since sharp declines in 1981 and 1982. Trucking increased its share of intercity ton-miles from 22.3 percent in 1980 to 25.3 percent in 1986. Trucks have traditionally carried high-value freight over shorter distances than rail and earned higher than average freight tariffs per ton-mile. In contrast, railroads carry large amounts of low-rated heavy bulk commodities such as sand, gravel, and coal. Thus, trucking revenues comprise 76 percent of all intercity freight revenues, a percentage that has gradually increased since 1980. While deregulation of both railroads and trucking occurred in 1980, motor carriers have continued to increase market share, although at a slower rate. Many motor carriers now use their fleets very productively and at low unit costs. Moreover, truck service characteristics are well-suited to the growing use of light density, high value components and the decline in traditional heavy manufacturing. Intermodal traffic is growing, and trucks play an indispensible role in it. Goods move by rail over high-density routes in double-stack containers from U.S. ports to inland intermodal transfer terminals, where distribution is completed by truck. Market Competition The amount of actual and potential competition in individual markets has grown to a much greater extent than indicated by the number of certificated carriers. The authority conferred by ICC to trans(conrinued fi-om previous page) was adopted by the Governors on Feb. 26, 1986. The Working Group relied in part on the comparative information in Harrison Boyd & Associates, Organizational Frameworks for Interstate Motor Carrier Regulation, prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, unpublished manuscript, April 1987. 15A1] domestic freight totals are from Transportation PolicY Associates, Transportation iii America (Washington, DC: 1986). port interstate freight is now much broader and has fewer restrictions limiting points served, commodities carried, or routes used. It has become commonplace for ICC to grant motor carrier authorit y to serve all points in the United States for general commodities, whether or not the carrier has applied for the broad authority. Profit Margins and Overcapacity The motor carrier industry has continued to gain market share over the past 10 years, but profits have been elusive for many firms in the face of an increasingly competitive transportation marketplace. Regulatory reforms eased entry and permitted better capacity utilization for some carriers, while the 1981-82 recession damped factory production and shipment levels. However, the issue of capacity is complex. The number of tractor-trailers on the road dropped over 1 percent, and the number of single-unit trucks declined 8 percent between 1980 and 1986. At the same time truck tonnage increased almost 11 percent. Truck-miles traveled increased nearly 30 percent per vehicle, and trailer capacity increased as wider and longer vehicles were allowed. Thus, each truck is dispatched more frequently, spends more time traveling, and carries more. Moreover, carriers seeking backhauls offer very low rates rather than return empty, so that capacity is frequently readily available at low cost. The amount of freight carried in each average truckload has remained constant (13.6 tons in 1980, declining to 13.3 in 1986). These facts all imply that despite the drop in the number of trucks, substantial unutilized trailer capacity has remained available. l6 The result has been higher operating ratios (ratio of operating expenses to revenues) on average, including sharp rises in operating ratios from 1978 through 1982, followed by modest, uneven improvements in the mid-1980s. Profit margins measuring net income as a percent of sales show deterioration from 1978 through 1982, followed by irregular recovery since that time until 1987 when rate cutting was severe (see figure 2-4). 16 Rona1d D. Roth, American Trucking Associations, Overcapacit y unpublished manuscript, July 1987.
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45 Figure 2-4.Net Profit Margin, 1978=87 (all carriers) ( 197879 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 Year SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, Trucking: An Overview and Focus on Recent Times, unpublished manuscript, September 1987, chart 14. Business Failures The intensel y competitive atmosphere and continuing overcapacit y in for-hire trucking is reflected in the large number of motor carrier failures. Failures for all for-hire trucking companies, including local and household, have risen dramaticall y from under 200 annually in 1978 and 1979 to over 1,500 in 1986. The pattern of failures between 1971 and 1987 is shown in figure 2-5. The failure rate remained high in the mid-1980s even during periods of sustained economic growth, and the number of failures showed its first decline in recent years during 1987. Even so about 150 of every 10,000 trucking companies failed in 1987, exceeding the rate of 115 failures for every 10,000 companies for all businesses. Both large and small trucking companies have failed. ITRonald D, Roth, American Trucking Associations, personal communication, July 22, 1988. Figure 2.5. Motor Carrier Failures, 1971-87 750 500 250 00 0 750 500 25 0 0 I I 1 I I I I I 1 I ( I 1 ( 1 I 1 1 1971 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 Year SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar. 16, 1988. Heavy Truck Sales Annual sales of heav y trucks have been relativel y stagnant as shown in figure 2-6. Sales of Class 8 trucks, with gross weight capability of over 33,000 pounds, remain below the 1979 level and showed declines even in the relatively prosperous years of 1985 and 1986. Such flat sales contrast sharply with record sales levels for small trucks, pickups, and vans, which have lifted the overall truck sales market. The sales trends suggest that the increased market share and expanded number of carriers have not required growth in the number of trucking units. The median age for all trucks has increased slightly from about 6 years in 1978-1979 to 7.7 years in 1986 (see figure 2-7). Fleet purchases lowered this figure slightly in 1987. Trailer Size The changes in size and weight restrictions in 1982 and 1983 allowed carriers to expand capacity and
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46 Figure 2-6.Sales of Trucks Weighing Over 33,000 Pounds, 1978-87 00 5 0 0 1 1 1 I 1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 Year SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar. 16, 1968. increase labor productivitylarger trailers and heavier cargo loads, where possible. Trailer producers and purchasers responded very rapidly to reconfigure the Nations fleet of trailers. Figure 2-8 shows that 95 percent of all trailers produced in 1980 (based on samples of production shipments) were between 40 and 45 feet in length, while almost none were longer. By 1984, over 58 percent of new trailers produced were longer than 45 feet, mostly 48 feet. As of 1986, over 56 percent were over 45 feet, while 29 percent were exactly 28 feet in length, reflecting the increased use of tandem (double) trailers on the Interstate system. Increases in trailer width have been even more dramatic. Almost all trailers produced in 1980 and 1982 were exactly 96-inches wide, as shown in figure 2-9. In 1984, less than a year after wider trucks were permitted on the Interstate system, over 70 percent of the trailers produced were 102-inches wide or more, most exactly 102 inches. In 1986, 76 percent were 102 inches or more. The trucks encounFigure 2-7.Median Age of Trucks, 1978-86 9. 0 8. 5 8. 0 5. 5 I 0.0 1 t I I 1 1 1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 Year SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar. 16, 1988. tered on our highways are indeed larger than those of just a few years ago. Specialization and Concentration ICC regularly reports operating results for the 100 largest regulated motor carriers; as a group, their performance has been weak, reflecting financial pressures of recent years. Data for 1981, a good year relative to the recession that followed, show that tonnage fell almost 4 percent, while net operating income declined by over 26 percent. In 1982, revenue tons hauled fell by 11 percent, operating revenues fell by 4 percent, and net operating income fell by 62 percent. Of the 100 carriers reporting, 81 showed declines in tonnage and net operating income, and the largest carriers showed a perilous aggregate operating ratio (operating expenses divided by operating revenues) of 98.7. Since the recessionary period of the early 1980s, motor carrier traffic and finances have improved,
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47 Figure 2-8.Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length Figure 2-9.Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Width 100 90 80 70 I 40 30 20 10 0 1980 1982 1984 1986 Year 1980 1982 1984 1986 Year L I Longer than 45 . :., SOURCE: Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Van Trai/er Size Report, various years. SOURCE: Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Van Trai/er Size Reporf, various years. but not by much, In 1986, the 100 largest carriers hauled less tonnage than in 1981 but realized slightly higher net income. In 1987, tonnage increased to 181 million revenue tons, roughly the 1981 level, but profit margins were squeezed. Net income was down 48 percent, and the operating ratio reached 96.6 percent. 18 dustry revenues from about 13.5 percent in 1978 to about 16 percent in the mid-1980s. 20 The three largest carriers (excluding United Parcel Service, which dwarfs them all) are all nationwide LTL specialists: Consolidated Freightways, Roadway Express, and Yellow Freight. This Big Three is gradually capturing more traffic, showing more revenue growth, and reporting lower operating ratios relative to other large carriers on average. During the 12 months ending September 30, 1987, for example, the Big Three increased their total revenues by 5.4 percent while revenue for others in the largest 100 carriers increased an average of 3.1 percent. z However, size alone is not a determining factor for profits, and well-managed small LTL carriers can also do well (see box 2-A). Less-Than-Truckload Carriers A small number of the very largest trucking companies have expanded their scope and scale of operations since 1978. The ten largest carriers, by revenue, are predominantly less-than-truckload (LTL) l9 carriers, and they have increased their share of inlncersca[e Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Large Class I Motor Carriers of Propertv, Selected Earnings Data, unpuhIlshed data, n.d. 1Less-than-truckload carriers transport cargo that mav come from several shippers in units that may weigh anywhere from roughly 250 pounds up to as much as 12,000 pounds. PForrune, Blessings by the Truckload, Nov. 11, 1985, p. 138. ] Interstate Commerce Commission, op. cit., footnote 18.
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48 Established General Freight Carriers The general freight trucking sector as a whole has been caught between rising costs and competitive pressures on rates. The Regular Common Carrier Conference (RCCC), an association with approximately 400 members, includes most of the large, established interstate common carriers. RCCC members transport general freight and earn about 80 percent of their revenues hauling LTL. According to RCCC data, more than half (53 percent) of the full service general freight carriers went out of business between 1978 and 1986. However, truckload (TL) 22 and LTL revenues for the RCCC group differ dramatically (see figure 210). Revenue on LTL traffic has increased slightly, while TL revenue has decreased sharply. Tonnage carried by RCCC carriers has dropped, but again with sharp differences between categories. From 1978-86, LTL tons fell 31 percent, while TL tons plummeted 63 percent. ~Truckload carriers transport goods for a single shipper in full loads weighing from about 12,000 pounds to the legal maximum for their vehicle. This established carrier group has seen its traffic erode significantly. Figure 2-11 shows that LTL-TL tonnage movements for a regularly-surveyed segment of RCCC carriers did not rebound when industrial production expanded in the mid-1980s. Presumably much of the business was captured by other carriers. Net income for 1986 was at the highest level in 10 years, but was barely above the 1978 level and has fluctuated dramatically over the period. Net income for the first 6 months of 1987 was down 61 percent compared to a year earlier. Truckload Carriers TL operators easily obtained operating authority in the less regulated environment of the early 1980s and grew impressively, with owner-operators providing a large portion of capacity. TL operations are simpler than LTL and do not require intermediate handling and shipment consolidation en route to make up a trailer load. Many TL carriers have minimal communications, management, sales forces, and terminal facilities. Carrier facilities are likely to be few in number, sparsely staffed, and removed
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49 Figure 2-10.General Freight Trucking Industry Total Revenue, 1978-87 KEY: LTL = less-than-truckload; TL = truckload. SOURCE Regular Common Carrier Conference, testimony of James C. Haskins before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar. 16, 1988. from shipment origins and destinations. However, a new operating strategy is evolving in the TL marketthe high-service carrier serving targeted market niches. These TL firms provide high-capacity or special equipment and utilize their assets and labor very productively (see box 2-B). To compete successfully, many owner-operators must drive long hours and accept backhauls at low rates, circumstances creating physical, psychological, and economic hardships. Several factors are at work to tip the balance of TL operations toward larger carriers with more capital to invest. Concerned about the reliability of Figure 2.11 .LTL/TL Tonnage, Adjusted Seasonally . . . . .0 y \ -. -. .. 4 . . .. . industrial production o. -- LTL tonnage ...........TL tonnage .. . .. .. 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 Year KEY: LTL = less-than-truckload; TL = truckload. SOURCE: Regular Common Carrier Conference, Quarterly Survey of General Freight Carrier Operating Results, 4th Quarter, 1988. leased equipment and drivers, carriers with sufficient resources bu y their own equipment and emplo y company drivers. Many carriers, such as automobile haulers, operate highly specialized, complex equipment that is difficult to lease. Productivity is high enough that shippers pick high-service carriers for both service and unit price. Such carriers become a core carrier, taking a large portion of the freight from major shippers. Observers predict an acceleration of the core carrier concept. 23 } William M. Legg and John M. LarkIn, High-Ser\,ice Truckload Carriers Prospering, Industr y Week, Apr. 4, 1988, Special Supplement; and Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., Wrap-up of the October 29 Truckin g Seminar, unpublished manuscript, December 1987. CONCLUSIONS Trucking is a tremendousl y complex industry that alizations are tenuous at best. A highly competitive defies easy classification. Numerous market segments market environment in the trucking industry conare served by a variety of motor carriers, and generfronts carriers of all sizes with constant financial pres-
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50 sure and forces difficult choices between offering rate discounts to attract business and maintaining rates to generate revenue. Changes in economic regulation affected market entry, operations, costs and pricing, employment policies and labor relations (including wage levels), and technology development. The distinctions between various types of regulated motor carriers greatly diminished after deregulation, and entry opportunities for private carriers and owner-operators improved. The nature and volume of the business conducted b y various segments of the trucking industry has changed, becoming less predictable. Large general commodity carriers tend to specialize in LTL shipments. While many large LTL carriers have failed, a few of the largest nationwide LTL carriers have expanded and prospered. Few newly formed carriers have entered the LTL business; existing LTL carriers have competed fiercely for each others markets. Small carriers and owner-operators have captured a larger portion of the TL market, in part because of lowered entry barriers and more pricing freedom. New entrants tend to be small and nonunion, often coming from the ranks of owner-operators, a key part of this fleet. The interstate portion of the TL industry has become more diverse and more dispersed. Profit margins have fallen, even for the most successful carriers, under pressure from intense price competition that is partly a result of changes in manufacturing and partly of continuing overcapacity. Expenses per ton-mile are up 75 percent since 1978, while general freight revenues per ton-mile have increased only 54 percent. Freight rates have also fallen behind price increases in the general economy, particularly for large shippers and those in highly competitive city-pair traffic lanes. Carriers that serve small shippers and those in less competitive markets have fared better. Other factors have also changed the framework in which carriers compete. l Unregulated commercial zones have been greatly expanded, opening larger areas to local carriers.
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, ., Chapter 3 Federal and State Regulatory Programs Photo credit: California Department of Transportation
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CONTENTS Page Federal Safety Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . .......55 The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. . .. .. .. .. .. ... ... .....55 Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 . . . . . . . .. ... ... .....5? 1986 Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act. . .. . .. . . .......57 Multiple Federal Roles . . . . . . . . . . . ..,+.... 58 Department of Transportation: Federal Highway Administration . . .......58 Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ..61 Equipment Regulations.. ., + . . . . . . . . . . . ..61 Department of Transportation: Research and Special Programs Administration ...61 Interstate Commerce Commission . . . . . .....+... National Transportation Safety Board . . . . . . Motor Carriers Exempt From Federal Safety Regulations . . State Programs . l ......* . . . . . . . . Improving State Capabilities . . . . . .....**. . The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program . . . . Regulatory Consistency . . . . . . . . . Highway Access. . . . . . . . . . . . Data Collection and Analysis . . . . . . . . Inspection and Audit Programs . . . . . . . . Buses . .*.*... . . . . . . . . . . Commercial Vehicle Safety AIliance . . . . . . . Personnel and Training . . . . .. ............+.. . Enforcement Issues . .*.*.... . . . . ....+*.. . Conclusions and Policy Options . . . . . . . . Appendixes Appendix 3-A. Chronology of Federal Legislation Relating to the Motor Carrier (1935-87) . 3-B. The Historical Box 3-A. Selected State . ..*...* . . . . . . . . Framework . . . . . . . . Boxes Audit Programs.. . . 3-B. A Sample of State Training Programs . Figures Figure 3-1. Legal Trailer Length, by State . . . 3-2. Motor Carrier Inspections and Out-of-Service Tables Table ,...,. . . . . . . . . . . 61 . . . 62 . . . 62 . . . 63 . . . 63 . . . 64 . . . 66 . . . 66 . . . 69 . . . 69 . . . 71 . . . 72 . . . 73 ,...,,. . 75 l . . . 78 Page Industry . . . 80 . . . 81 Page . . . 70 . . . 74 Page . . . 56 . *..+* 71 3-1. 3-2. 3-3. 3-4. 3-5. 3-6. Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety . Summary of DOT Motor Carrier Safety Regulations in Title 49 0f the Code of Federal Regulations . . . . ..+. . . . l . ,.,..... Federal Highway Administration Inspections and Audits, Fiscal Years 1980-87. Regulatory Exemptions to Title 49 0f the Code of Federal Regulations . . Agencies Administering Motor Carrier Requirements in Selected States . Reasonable Access Provisions . +..;....+ . . . . . . . 59 60 60 63 64 67
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51 Shippers now frequently utilize fewer carriers with comprehensive operating territories to take advantage of cumulative discounts and service commitments in return for guaranteed freight volumes. Truckload carriers establish defined traffic lanes with certain shippers (e. g., between two plants of the same shipper) and capture a steady, balanced volume of business under contract. The traditional driver pool has been shrinking, and carriers have had to provide incentives to attract drivers. Rate discounting, however, has made low labor costs and high productivity essential to survival, so carriers find it difficult to increase driver wages and improve arduous work conditions. Safety Implications Trucks have become significantl y bigger and heavier since deregulation, primarily in response to Federal legislation requiring States to allow longer, wider trailers and heavier gross weights. For similar reasons, double trailers are rapidly becoming commonplace on the Interstate System. These changes in truck equipment have not been matched by upgraded roadway design and capacity, and as automobile traffic has increased, urban peak-hour congestion has become severe in many jurisdictions. Such road and traffic conditions increase the likelihood of an accident. Price discounting and low profit margins create difficult economic trade-offs for investments in safety-related equipment and maintenance. These trade-offs are particularly problematic for owneroperators and small carriers, who have to generate revenue regularly to stay in business and ma y have no regular maintenance facility. Carriers are, in general, interested in safety, but will measure investments in new safety equipment and technologies against tangible economic rewards. Competition, increased costs, and low, erratic profit margins create a need to control costs that may lead to shortchanging truck maintenance and equipment improvements. OTA concludes that Federal safety regulations will affect carriers economically with varying severity, depending on their financial reserves and stability. Requirements to operate trucks safely should not depend on commodity, corporate form, or destination of the cargo, the traditional basis of ICC regulation. Safety regulations have gradually been extended to trucks operating in intrastate, private, and exempt services, and these perform a large share of the Nations highway transportation. OTA coneludes that the need for safety does not vary with the type of operation, and that no exemptions from safety regulations are warranted.
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Chapter 3 Federal and State Regulatory Programs Highway safety, particularly for motor carriers, has long been a Federal and congressional concern. Multiple regulator y programs, administered by different agencies within the Department of Transportation (DOT) set minimum standards for vehicle equipment, driver qualifications, and commercial motor carrier operations, and for the highways on which the vehicles operate. The Federal Government also provides funds to State and local jurisdictions for construction and maintenance of highways, bridges, and tunnels, and for State highway safety programs. Although Federal economic control of the trucking industr y has dwindled significantly since deregulation in 1980, some years ago Congress began a series of legislative steps toward a comprehensive Federal motor carrier safety program. Systematic efforts to improve highway safety are limited b y interjurisdictional issues and conflicts at many governmental levels, however. Moreover, numerous Federal agencies and congressional committees share responsibilit y for creating and enforcing safety legislation, creating further complications. Because the efforts of these groups are difficult to coordinate, and no single group has ultimate responsibility, addressing truck safety in a systematic, integrated way has to date proven an unachievable task. In addition, many States impose substantial economic and safety requirements on intrastate carriers. Yet, while Federal grants for State programs have greatly enhanced State inspection and enforcement capabilities, the scope of these programs varies significantly. Despite this extensive Federal and State regulatory and enforcement framework, heavy vehicle transportion has grown annually, and safety issues persist. This chapter describes the Federal laws and regulatory programs governing motor carrier operations and the efforts of the Federal Government and the States to improve safety. Policy options are identified in the final section. A chronolog y of motor carrier legislation (appendix 3-A), and a brief histor y of motor carrier regulations (appendix 3-B) appear at the end of this chapter. FEDERAL SAFETY LEGISLATION Commercial motor vehicles are defined by law as those: 1) weighing 10,001 pounds or more, 2) designed to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver, or 3) used to carry hazardous materials in quantities requiring vehicle placarding. (Lightweight vehicles are those weighing 10,000 pounds or less.) Although economic regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) of the motor carrier industry was substantially reduced in 1980, the regulatory changes did not encompass Federal safety regulations. Laws enacted since 1980 have strengthened and expanded coverage by Federal safety standards, and Congress has promoted greater national uniformity by establishing consistent size and weight laws, and by encouraging States to adopt Federal regulations. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 The primar y goal of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) was to fund improvements to the Nations highways, bridges, and mass transit facilities by raising and restructuring existing highwa y taxes. 1 As a concession to the commercial motor carrier industry, the statute also called for uniform weight, length, and width limitations on trucks and buses using major, federall y finded highways. Overriding existing State laws, the STAA prohibited States from setting a maximum gross vehicle weight limit under 80,000 pounds for Publlc LauT 97-+24, 96 Stat. 2097 (Jan. 6, 1983). 55
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56 vehicles operating on any portion of the Interstate system. Additionally, the act prohibited States from denying trucks reasonable access between these highways and facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest; and to points of loading and unloading (for household goods carriers). In 1984, the STAA was amended to allow Governors to seek exemptions for Interstate highway segments in their States that could not safely accommodate longer trucks. 2 Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984, Public Law 98-554, 98 Stat. 2829. The act also modified the reasonable access provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act to include 28-feet by 102-inch singletrailer units; this amendment was made to codify existing industry practice, as 28-foot trailers are replacing the standard 48-foot trailers for pickup and delivery service. In addition, States were prohibited from barring trucks with twin trailers from Interstate highways or certain Federal-Aid Primary routes designated by DOT. 3 States also were required to permit truck semitrailers of 48 feet in length for one trailing unit and 28 feet each for two trailing units on these roads. Maximum length limits were not set, however, and legal trailer lengths vary significantly among the States (see figure 3-l), with many States permitting trailers even longer than 48 feet. States were also required to establish and enforce a vehicle width limit of 102 inches for Interstate highways or any other Federal-aid highway designated by DOT, pro~See 23 CFR 658, app. A. Figure 3-l. Legal Trailer Length, by State u 48-foot trailer s ; 50-foot trailers HI NOTE: Semitrailers in Wisconsin, Indiana, and California must conform to a State specified king-pin-to-rearmost axle distance to operate without a permit. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, based on the 53 federal Register 19 (Jan. 19, 1988).
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57 vialed that the traffic lanes were designed to be at least 12-feet wide. Procedures allowing a State Governor to notify DOT of highway segments not capable of accommodating 102-inch-wide vehicles and to request an exemption, identical to those relating to truck length, were established by Congress in 1984. 4 The safety issues associated with longer, wider trucks are extremely controversial. Some segments of the trucking industry argue that longer trucks are needed to improve productivity. Other industry groups and many States and safety advocates believe that such vehicles pose a safety hazard even when operating over designated highways and access routes. Chapters 4 and 5 contain more detailed assessments of the performance and operation of longer combination vehicles on the existing highways. A discussion of State access requirements is presented later in this chapter. The STAA also authorized funds for State inspection and enforcement programs through a Federal grant programthe Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP)to improve State capabilities to inspect heavy vehicles and enforce motor carrier safety regulations. Under this program, some DOT control over intrastate carriers was initiatedto qualify for MCSAP funds, States were required to adopt the Federal motor carrier safety regulations or compatible State requirements. MCSAP has become an important part of overall truck safety efforts in recent years, promoting uniform regulations, enforcement activities, and Federal-State coordination. The program is detailed later in this chapter. Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 Concerned about inconsistent State laws and regulations and about the adequacy of existing Federal regulations, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984. 5 Specifically, the act directed DOT to promulgate revised Federal regulations establishing minimum standards to ensure that: commercial motor vehicles were safely maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated; l the responsibilities imposed upon operators of commercial motor vehicles did not impair their ability to operate such vehicles safely; +Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984, op. cit., footnote 2 Public Law 98-554, 98 Stat. 2832 (Oct. 30, 1984). l l the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles was adequate for them to operate such vehicles safely; and the operation of commercial motor vehicles did not have deleterious effects on the condition of such operators. Before issuing revised regulations, DOT was required to consider costs and benefits as well as State laws and regulations to minimize Federal preemption. Furthermore, Congress requested a 5-year review of State motor carrier laws to identify those differing substantially from Federal requirements. Additional provisions of the 1984 act called for annual commercial motor vehicle inspections, the establishment of Federal inspection standards, a comprehensive study on the safety characteristics of heavy trucks, and an investigation and study of crash protection for truck occupants. 1986 Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act The adequacy of requirements for drivers of commercial motor vehicles has been a primary concern of safety-conscious officials. A key element of the 1986 act is that truck drivers are prohibited from holding more than one State license, a provision that became effective on July 1, 1987. 6 The act also directed DOT to establish minimum written and road tests for drivers by July 15, 1988. Motor vehicles covered by the act are those weighing 26,001 pounds or more; however, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to lower the threshold to 10,001 pounds. Motor vehicles used to carry hazardous materials or designed to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver, are also included. Under the provisions of the act, a driver must be road-tested in a vehicle representative of the type he or she will operate, and minimum passing scores for written tests must be established. Furthermore, drivers taking these tests must have a working knowledge of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) and vehicle safety systems. DOT must also establish a blood-alcohol concentration Drivers are also required to notifi employers if they have been disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle, and employers and States must be notified of all traffic violations, except parking infractions. (49 CFR 383.)
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58 (BAC) standard by October 1988, and is currently considering a BAC level of 0.04 percent. p To support an effective single-license system, DOT must establish a Commercial Drivers License Information System by January 1, 1989. 8 Data in the system, including the information required on licenses and driver compliance records, will be available to DOT, States, employers, and employees. States are not required to have fully operational programs until 1993. Grants will be made available to develop testing and licensing programs, to test operators of commercial motor vehicles, and to participate in the national information clearinghouse.g However, a State that fails to comply with the requirements of this act will lose 5 percent of its Federal-aid highway funds in 1994 and 10 percent of its funds in subsequent years. To support this rulemaking effort, the Department of Transportation requested a study by the National Academy of Sciences to assess the differences between 0.10 and 0.04 blood-alcohol concentration levels. For further details, see ch. 6. The Department of Transportation has the option of operating this system in-house or using another system employed by one or more States. Between 1987 and 1991, $5 million of the Motor Carrier Safet y Assistance Program funds has been earmarked for basic grants. Supplemental grants, using $3 million of the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration highway safet y funds, will be made available to States eligible for basic grants. An additional $5 million, also from the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program will be used to support information clearinghouse programs. MULTIPLE FEDERAL ROLES As the trucking industry has expanded over the past 50 years, Congress has gradually allocated safety responsibility for motor carriers to a variety of agencies. Authority for safety-related issues such as highway design, equipment regulation, hazardous materials transportation, driver qualifications, and enforcement was divided among different Federal agencies, making a systematic approach to safety an elusive goal. Attempts to improve motor carrier safety after deregulation have been further hampered by historical carrier exemptions from regulations and the lack of reliable data on the number of operators and trucks doing business. Currently, three DOT agenciesthe Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)share responsibility for ensuring motor carrier safety table 3-1). Department of Transportation: Federal Highway Administration (see Within FHWA, the Office of Motor Carriers (formerly the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety) issues and enforces the FMCSR. 10 These regulations, IOUnder a reorganization plan announced in October 1986, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety was replaced by the Office of Motor Carriers. summarized in table 3-2, govern the operations of commercial motor carriers and truck drivers. FHWA is responsible for setting minimum levels of financial responsibility for commercial motor carriers (49 CFR 387) and administering MCSAP. Data systems maintained by FHWA contain enforcement and accident statistics (see chapter 7). In addition, interstate commercial motor carriers public and privatemust be assigned one of three safety fitness ratings by FHWA to acquire ICC approval. However, carriers may operate with temporary ICC approval while awaiting an FHWA fitness rating. At the end of a terminal inspection, known as a safety review, FHWA rates carriers satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or conditional. DOT has dropped the insufficient information rating it used to give when it lacked the information on which to base a rating .11 The factors in determining safety ratings include any violations discovered during safety management audits and driver equipment compliance reviews in the previous 5 years, the operators record of improvement over that period, the I lprior t. 1983, an insufficient rating was automatically elevated to a satisfactory rating after 1 year from the date it was assigned, if the rating was not, in that time, changed to unsatisfactory or conditional. Until recently, carriers assigned an insufficient information rating retained such a rating until the Department of Transportation received definitive positive or negative information on which to change a rating. See 48 Federal Register 22565 (May 19, 1983).
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59 Table 3-1 .Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety Department of Transportation Administration Senior Official Responsibilities Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) National Highway Associate Administrator > for Engineering and Program Development Associate Administrator P for Research, Development and Technology Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers > Associate Administrator P for Policy Traffic Safety > Administration (NHTSA) Research and Special Programs > Administration (RSPA) SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1988 Determines how truck access affects the highway system Manages research on the adequacy of highway design to accommodate trucks Establishes and enforces operating regulations for commercial motor carriers; includes driver and maintenance requirements Studies the implications of longer combination vehicle used on the Nations highway system Establishes regulations for the manufacture of new vehicles and related equipment; investigates safety-related equipment defects Establishes and enforces regulations for containers used in transportation of hazardous materials operators accident record, and violations of Staterelated laws or regulations. l2 FHWA plans to assign safety fitness ratings to the 185,000 unrated carriers within the next 3 to 5 years, 13 and recently, FHWA hired 150 new field safety investigators to conduct safety reviews and provide technical assistance to carriers. As of July 1988, ratings of 58,270 motor carriers (see table 3-3) had been completed. FHWA rated 8 percent of the carriers unsatisfactory, 40 percent conditional, and 52 percent satisfactory. To reduce the risks associated with preventable accidents, FHWA plans to work with individual :49 CFR 385.3. These factors were formally codified in 1982 in response to industry criticisms pointing to the lack of objectivity in the factors, the lack of notice to carriers of their safety ratings, and the lack of an appeals procedu~e. See 47 Federal Register 26135 (June 17, 1982). ] Gerald J. Davis, chief, Federal Programs Di\ision, Office of Motor Carriers, Federal Highway Admlnlstration, personal communication, Mar. 25, 1987. companies that have poor safety records and will meet with industry associations to discuss the use of countermeasures. This type of program was successful in FHWAs northwest region, and a small national effort has been started. Each of the nine FHWA regional offices has an Office of Motor Carrier Safety. These regional offices investigate accidents and provide technical support and direction to safety investigators who conduct audits of motor carriers and vehicle inspections. Under MCSAP, however, States have assumed lead responsibility for roadside inspections, and most State MCSAP agencies have focused initially on developing and implementing vehicle and driver inspection programs. FHWA has greatly reduced its roadside inspection activities while increasing carrier terminal audits (see table 3-3). FHWA has also been responsible for developing a highway access policy for large trucks, and issued a rulemaking in 1982 permitting the trucks author-
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60 Table 3-2.Summary of DOT Motor Carrier Safety Regulations in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 325: Compliance With Interstate Motor Carrier Noise Emission Standards. Establishes procedures for inspection, surveillance, and measurement of motor vehicles to determine compliance with noise emission standards. Part 350: Commercial Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program. Establishes guidelines for the development and implementation of State programs for the enforcement of Federal motor carrier safety regulations. Conditions, objectives, and funding of the program are also detailed. Part 383: Commercial Drivers License Standards; Requirements and Penalties. Requires that drivers have a single commercial motor vehicle drivers license, and that drivers provide employers with information about previous employment and previous violations and suspensions. Also prohibits an employer from allowing a person with a suspended license to operate a commercial motor vehicle and sets penalties for violations. Part 385: Safety Ratings. Prescribes procedures for issuing motor carriers ratings of satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or conditional. Also lists the factors to be considered in determining a safety rating and sets procedures for notification and review. Part 386: Rules of Practice for Motor Carrier Safety and Hazardous Materials Proceedings. Authorizes the Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to determine whether a motor carrier or person subject to the jurisdiction of FHWA has failed to comply with motor carrier safety regulations. Also authorizes the Associate Administrator to compel compliance, issue a civil penalty, or both. Part 387: Minimum Levels of Financial Responsibility for Motor Carriers. Establishes minimum level of financial responsibility required by motor carriers and mandates that motor carriers must have proof of insurance and authorization from the Interstate Commerce Commission in order to operate. Part 388: Cooperative Agreements With States. Authorizes any State to enforce FHWA safety regulations, and establishes terms of eligibility, cancellation, exchange of information, and requests for assistance. Part 389: Rulemaking Procedures Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Establishes rulemaking procedures that apply to the issuance, amendment, and revocation of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Part 380: Federal Motor Carrier Regulations, General.Establishes definitions and applicability of regulations. (For list of exemptions, see table 3-5.) Part 391: Qualifications of Drivers. Establishes minimum qualifications for motor carrier drivers (i.e., to qualify to drive a commercial motor vehicle, part 391 states that a person must be at least 21 years old, have a currently valid commercial motor vehicle operators permit, have prepared and furnished the motor carrier that employs him with a list of violations, have successfully completed and been issued a certificate of drivers road test or an equivalent). In addition, part 391 establishes minimum duties of motor carriers with respect to the qualifications of their drivers. Part 392: Driving of Motor Vehicles. Establishes driving practices in cases of railway grade crossings, drawbridges, and hazardous driving conditions. Also sets regulations for use of lighted lamps and reflectors, accidents and license revocation, emergency signals, fueling precautions, and specifies prohibited practices. Part 393: Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation. Establishes requirements for motor carriers including lighting devices, reflectors and electrical equipment, brakes, glazing and window construction, fuel systems, coupling devices and towing methods, miscellaneous parts and accessories, emergency equipment, and protection against shifting or falling cargo. Part 394: Notification and Reporting of Accidents. Defines reportable accidents and establishes duties of motor carriers to make reports and keep records of accidents that occur during their operations. Part 395: Hours of Service of Drivers. Establishes hours-of-service regulations for drivers, restricting driving periods of more than 10 hours after 8 consecutive hours off duty, for any period after having been on duty for 15 hours after 8 consecutive hours off duty, or more than 60 hours in any consecutive 7 days. Regulations are also set for recording driver duty status. Part 396: Inspection, Repair, and Maintenance. Establishes requirements for the inspections, repair, and maintenance of commercial motor vehicles. Part 397: Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Driving and Parking Rules. Establishes requirements of transportation of hazardous materials including special parking, route, tire, and smoking regulations. Part 398: Transportation of Migrant Workers. Establishes regulations governing the transportation of migrant workers for more than 75 miles when crossing the boundary of another State, a U.S. territory, or another country. Part 399: Employee Safety and Health Standards. Establishes step, handhold, and deck requirements that apply to drivers of trucks and truck-tractors, having a high profile cab-over-engine configuration for entrance, egress, and back of cab access, manufactured on or after September 1, 1982. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Table 3-3.Federal Highway Administration Inspections and Audits, Fiscal Years 1980-87 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Number of Federal safety specialists. . . . . . 188 162 177 180 178 166 155 241 Number of driver/vehicle inspections . . . . . 31,875 40,872 35,825 26,015 22,590 16,046 10,027 910 Number of motor carrier audits/reviews. . . . . 7,093 9,640 12,095 11,666 13,037 10,492 6,637 23,714 a aThiS substantial InCrease reflects a transition at the Federal Highway Administration from safety audits to less in-depth Safety reVieWS, SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on Federal Highway Administration information, 1988.
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61 ized by the STAA unlimited access on the Interstate system. (For further information, see the section on Highwa y Access later in this chapter.) The Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials has also influenced decisions related to highwa y access because it sets the standards for the construction and reconstruction of national highways. These standards have been determined primarily by the size and maneuverabilit y of passenger cars, and in the case of many parts of the Interstate system, by a tractor pulling a 40or 45foot trailer. Because the standards were set and highways constructed before the size and operating characteristics of the longer trailers authorized by the STAA were known, standards are currently being revised (for further information, see chapter 5). Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NHTSA develops and enforces safety standards for newly manufactured vehicles and equipment, addressing such items as brakes, lights, tires, and seat belts. To support standard development, the agency collects accident data and sponsors research. However, these activities have not led to major new truck safety equipment standards in recent years. (For further details, see chapter 5.) NHTSA enforcement programs focus on vehicle and equipment testing and inspections to ensure compliance with existing standards. The agency also conducts investigations of safety-related defects 14 and issues criteria for inspections of motor vehicles that are used by State highwa y programs. Equipment Regulations Responsibility for developing highway safety standards for use by State agencies is shared b y NHTSA and FHWA: l NHTSA administers the State standards for motor vehicle inspections, registration, driver education, traffic laws, traffic records, police Regulatlons for enforcement of the National Highwa y Traffic Safetv Administration standards and defects investigations are contained in 49 CFR 554. jSubpart B of 49 CFR 570 specifies the criteria for vehicles with gross \chicle weight ratings of more than 10,000 pounds. l traffic service, debris cleanup, and accident investigations and reporting. FHWA set standards for highway design, construction, and maintenance, traffic engineering, and identification and surveillance of accident locations through a number of agency divisions. These groups do not regularl y coordinate with NHTSA or the Office of Motor Carriers. FHWA also has primary responsibilit y for the highway transportation of hazardous materials and enforcement activities for the highway mode. Although FHWA and NHTSA regulations cover comparable areas, the rulemaking efforts of these agencies are distinct from each other. Moreover, historically poor interagency coordination within DOT has led to inconsistent regulations for newly manufactured vehicles and for operating standards for commercial motor carriers. Congressional action was required to resolve conflicting NHTSA and FHWA regulations for front brakes, for example; several inconsistencies in other brake requirements persist. Recently, FHWA published a proposed rule that would require vehicle inspections at least once a year, as mandated b y the Motor Carrier Safet y Act of 1984. 16 Under the new rules, commercial vehicle operators are responsible for having all vehicles inspected, according to explicit standards, by individuals meeting specified FHWA qualifications. Inspectors would be required to complete vehicle inspection reports and operators to retain such reports for 1 year. Special markings on trucks and trailers would indicate the month and year of the last inspection. Operators registered in a State with an inspection program that meets the objectives of the FHWA program would be permitted to comply with State requirements in lieu of Federal regulations. Department of Transportation: Research and Special Programs Administration Regulations governing the transportation of more than 30,000 hazardous materials are issued b y the Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation within 1C52 Federal Register 5913 (Feb. 26, 1987). In an earlier notice, the Federal Highway Administration requested comments on this issue. See 50 Federal Register 1245 (Jan. 10, 1985).
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62 RSPA in DOT. RSPA regulations prescribe requirements for packaging to ensure effective containment during transport, and communication of the hazards posed by these materials through special shipping papers, markings, labels, and vehicle placards. 17 RSPAs authority encompasses requirements for the design and performance of packages used to ship low-level radioactive materials and highway routing of all radioactive materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for containers used to transport high-level radioactive materials. l8 Interstate Commerce Commission ICC regulates the motor carrier industry by granting operating authority to common and contract carriers, collecting economic operating data from the larger motor carrier companies, and monitoring rates. Although deregulation substantially eased the entry requirements for interstate for-hire motor carriers, operating authority must still be obtained from ICC by common and contract carriers and private carriers seeking for-hire authority. 19 Carriers exempt from ICC regulation include those engaged in private carriage, including intercorporate hauling, and in the transportation of specified agricultural commodities. 20 Furthermore, purely intrastate motor carriage and transportation within ICC-designated commercial zones are not subject to ICC regulation. 21 A com1; Hazardous materials regulated by the Research and Special Programs Administration are listed in 49 CFR 171. Regulations for containers are specified in 49 CFR 173, 178, and 179. Specific modal requirements are contained in Parts li (rail), 175 (air), 176 (nonbulk water transport), and 1 77 (highway). Regulations for bulk water shipments, developed by the U.S. Coast Guard, are specified in 46 CFR. Hazard communication requirements are in 49 CFR 172. :Nuclear Regulator y Commission authority is derived from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011. Issues related to the transportation of radioactive materials and hazardous substances were addressed in a 1986 OTA assessment, the Transportation of Hazardous Materials. q Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over motor carriers is specified in 49 U.S.C. 10521. p Carriers exempt from the Interstate Commerce Commissions re g ulations are specified in 49 U.S.C. 10522-10524 and 10526. However, companies that intend to conduct intercorporate hauling must notify the Interstate Commerce Commission as required by 49 CFR 1167. 1149 U.S. C. 10525 and 10526(b). Intrastate transportation that is regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission includes two situations where: 1 ) the normal route of a carrier between two points in the same State includes a highway ourside the State, or 2) transportation between two points in the same State that precede or follow interstate movement are considered interstate in nature because the y pass the essential character of commerce test. Daniel Sweeney et al., Transportation Deregulation: Whats Deregulated and What isnt (Washington, DC: NASSTRAC, 1986), pp. 109-110. mercial zone is composed of a base municipality, all its contiguous municipalities, and all other municipalities and unincorporated areas within U.S. boundaries that are within specified distances of the base jurisdiction. 22 In April 1987, ICC issued a proposal to increase the size of commercial zones substantially and extend economic exemptions. National Transportation Safety Board The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent agency reporting directly to Congress, has issued a number of special studies related to the qualifications of commercial motor vehicle drivers as well as numerous accident investigation reports containing extensive recommendations for amendments to FHWA regulations and industr y practices. NTSB is currently focusing on the effects of drugs and alcohol on driver performance and commercial vehicle safety. Motor Carriers Exempt From Federal Safety Regulations While the FMCSR apply to common, contract, and private motor carriers of property, the y do not cover several other categories of carriers (see table 3-4). Private motor carriers of passengers, such as school buses, are exempt from Federal regulations, while for-hire motor carriers of passengers, like Trailways and charter bus services, are not. Because Federal safety statutes have historically applied only to interstate transportation, many operations conducted solely within the boundaries of a State need not comply with the FMCSR. In addition, vehicles and drivers used wholly within a municipality or a DOT-designated commercial zone, even if State lines are crossed, were for years exempt from Federal safety regulations unless they were transporting large quantities of hazardous materials. 23 In response to pressure from safety advocates, including Congress and industr y organizations, FHWA finally issued a rulemaking that requires vehicles and drivers used in such local operations to comply with Federal safety regulations b y November 15, 1988. : For example, the distance for municipalities with populations under 2,500 is 3 miles, while the distance for municipalities with populations over 1 million is 20 miles. See 49 CFR 1048.101. ]49 CFR 390.16. This exemption did not apply to operations in Hawaii.
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63 Table 3-4.Regulatory Exemptions to Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations Parts (for summary of parts, see table 3-2) Vehicle/driver type 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 Vehicles owned, operated, and regulated by Federal, State, or local governments . . . . . . X x x x x x x Private carrier of passengers (i.e., school buses) . . X x x x x x x Intracity operations . . . . . . . . X x x x x Lightweight mail trucks c . . . . . . . X . . x x x x x Farm custom operations . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . Certain farm vehicle drivers e . . . . . . X . . . . . . . Farm-to-market operations f . . . . . . . . . . x Apiarian industries g . . . . . . . . X . . . 1:11: ::::: I;::: Drivers traveling beyond a commercial zone, transporting cargo other than explosives or other dangerous articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X KEY: X = exemption from requirement. aDri ver ~ in th e following ~ategorie~ am exempt from portions of part 391: drivers regularly employed before Jan, 1, 1971; intermittent or occasional drivers; drivers furnished by other motor carriers; drivers of articulated farm vehicles; intrastate drivers of vehicles tranSPOrfin9 combustible liquid; and drivers operating in the State of Hawaii. The Department of Transportation has ended this exemption effective Nov. 15, 1988. bThi~ exemption applies t. vehicles or drivers wholly within a municipality or commercial zone, unless transporting hazardous MateridS that rr3qUire a placard and weigh 2,500 pounds or more in the case of one dangerous article, or 5,000 pounds or more in the case of more than one dangerous article. The exemption does not apply to drivers in the State of Hawaii. The Department of Transportation has ended this exemption effective Nov. 15, 1986. cThis exemption applies t. motor carriers used exclusively to tranpo~ mail under contract with the I.J.S. Postal Service that have a gross vehicle weight Of 10,000 pounds or less. dThis exemption applies t. drivers who operate motor vehicles controlled and Operated by a person engaged in custom-harvesting, if the vehicle is used tO trWISpOrf farm machinery or supplles to or from a farm for custom-harvesting operations, or used to transpofl custom-hatvested crops to storage or market. eThis exemption applies t. farm vehicle drivers, except those driving rticulted motor vehicles with gross vehicle weights, inCIUrJlrlg 10Sds, of more than 10,000 pounds, fThis exemption applies t. drivers of vehicles controlled and operated by farmer who, as a private carrier, iS using the vehicle to transport agricultural products frOnl his farm, or to transport farm machinery, farm supplies, or both to his farm. Drivers transporting hazardous materials that require a placard are not exempt. gThis exemption applies to drivers operating motor vehicles controlled and operated by a beekeeper engaged in the seasonal transportation of bees. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on 49 CFR 390.33. STATE PROGRAMS State economic and safety regulatory programs governing the operations of motor carriers are extensive. States require motor carriers to register their vehicles, obtain operating authority and insurance, pay a variety of taxes, adhere to truck weight and size limitations, and comply with safety regulations, including special routing or scheduling restrictions. In most States, multiple agencies are responsible for administering these programs. For instance, departments of finance or revenue assess taxes, departments of motor vehicles or transportation register vehicles, and a public utilities commission or commerce department may grant operating authority. Safety regulations, including those for the transportation of hazardous materials, maybe issued and enforced by departments of transportation, public safety, health, or environment, or by the State police (see table 3-5 for a sample of State agency authority). Improving State Capabilities Beginning in the late1960s, FHWA entered into cooperative agreements with States to bolster roadside inspection activities. However, no Federal financial support was provided, limiting the effectiveness of most State programs. Ten years later, FHWA funded demonstration programs in Alaska, Idaho, Michigan, and Utah to improve safety inspections and to monitor truck size and weight. These States were encouraged to adopt the FMCSR, and State inspectors were trained to enforce them. The data collected underscored the importance of effective State enforcement as an accident prevention tool. For example, in the year Utah increased its inspections by 330 percent, a 43-percent reduction in accidents involving commercial motor vehicles occurred. Similarly, Idaho experienced 37 percent fewer commercial accidents in the year that it increased its inspections by 268 percent and its weighings by 218 percent. 24 Many State motor carrier safety programs have altered significantly since 1980. At that time, reducNU s Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Adminstra. tion, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Interim Report, Commercial Motor Carrier Safetv Inspection and Weighing Demonstration Program, unpublished manuscript, August 1981.
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64 Table 3=5.Agencies Administering Motor Carrier Requirements in Selected States State motor carrier requirements Arizona New York Virginia Iowa Minnesota Registration and taxes Vehicle registration . . . . . . . . MVD DMV DMV MVD DPS Fuel use tax . . . . . . . . . . MVD TAX DMV MVD DOR Fuel sales tax . . . . . . . . . . TAX DMV Out-of-State fuel tax.... . . . . . . . TAX MVD Fuel surtax . . . . . . . . . . scc a Gross receipts tax . . . . . . . . . TAX b Weight/distance tax . . . . . . . . MVD TAX Economic regulation initial ICC regulation . . . . . . . . DOT Sc c MVD DOT Supplemental ICC registration . . . . . . MVD DOT Identification stamp . . . . . . . . DOT Sc c MVD DOT Other regulations Certificate of insurance. . . . . . . . MVD DMV SCC MVD DOT Safety issues . . . . . . . . . . MVD DMV SP MVD DOT Hazardous materials . . . . . . . . DHS DEC DOH TRA DOT Size and weight . . . . . . . . . MVD DMV DH&T MVD DOT KEY:DEC = Department of Environmental Control DPS = Department of Public Safety DH&T = Department of Highways and Transportation ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission DHS = Department of Health Services MVD = Motor Vehicle Division DMV = Department of Motor Vehicles SCC = State Corporation Commission DOH = Department of Health SP = State Police DOR = Department of Revenue TAX = Department of Taxation and Finance DOT = Department of Transportation TRA = Transportation Regulatory Authority avirginia considers this a second structure tax. bNew York also imposes a Franchise Tax. SOURCE: Office ofTechnology Assessment, adapted from National Governors Association Working Group on State MotorCarriers Issues, Current Effortstolmprove the Administration of State Motor Carrier Requirements, Report No.7: November 19S5, pp. 11-17. tions in Federal inspection activities, major changes in the motor carrier industry, and concerns about truck-related accidents, all pointed to the need for stronger State enforcement. With Federal support, State inspection and enforcement programs expanded, and a higher percentage of trucks and drivers are placed out of service for violations. However, until the STAA was passed in 1982, requiring States accepting Federal funding for enforcement to adopt Federal regulations, no formal means of coordinating Federal and State regulations existed. With the participation of State-based organizations, such as the National Governors Association, some progress has been made in coordinating State economic and safety regulatory policies and activities. Nonetheless, varied and changing State regulations still affect interstate carriers. The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program Based on the success of these demonstration programs, State commercial motor vehicle safety programs have been federally supported by MCSAP since 1984. 25 The primary goal of MCSAP is to increase and improve State capabilities to enforce uniform motor carrier safety and hazardous materials regulations for both interstate and intrastate motor carriers and drivers through safety inspections of commercial motor vehicles in terminals and along roadsides. Data collection and analysis is a secondary goal, and States may use grant funds to develop an accurate database on regulatory compliance. Currently, all States except Alaska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming participate in MCSAP. 26 Because recent legislation intended to phase in the FMCSR in Texas was challenged by industry, Texas is not qualified to receive funds from MCSAP, at least for the present. Two types of State grantsdevelopment and implementation are available under MCSAP. 27 Development grants, available for a maximum of The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program was authorized under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Public Law 97-424. % addition, participating U.S. territories include American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. ~TRequirements for State participation in the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program are contained in 49 CFR 350.
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65 3 years, may be used by States to establish or substantially modify an enforcement program. Development activities include program planning, initiating legislative or regulatory action, formulating a budget, designating the State agency responsible for administering MCSAP, and preparing a State Enforcement Plan (SEP). FHWA guidelines require that an SEP cover the following: l l l l l l current status of commercial motor carrier operations, including traffic volume, seasonal patterns, and accident statistics; current enforcement efforts, including the role of State agencies, the personnel involved, the facilities and equipment utilized, and the number of inspections and audits conducted; evaluation of the current motor carrier safety program and the identification of problem areas; objectives and goals of the State program, such as hiring and training additional staff, increasing the number of inspections and audits, and revising legislation; description of how resources will be used to accomplish objectives; and method for evaluating program effectiveness. 28 Development grants were awarded to 21 States and territories during fiscal year 1985. By 1987, however, most States had progressed to the implementation phase of MCSAP. Implementation grants provide funding for States ready to initiate enforcement programs or enhance established ones. Activities may include recruiting and training of personnel, acquiring and maintaining equipment, conducting new or expanded inspections, and establishing an out-of-service and compliance enforcement system. To qualify for an implementation grant, a State must: agree to adopt and enforce the FMCSR (49 CFR 390-399), including highway-related portions of the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR 171-173 and 177-178) or compatible State rules, regulations, standards, and orders applicable to motor carrier safety; submit an SEP and designate a lead agency for administering the plan; CFR 350.13, app. A, and U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Adminstration, Suggested Standard Implementation Grant Application, unpublished manuscript, April 1986. l l l l agree to devote adequate resources to administration of the program and enforcement of rules, regulations, standards, and orders; have established statutory authority to enforce Federal or compatible State regulations, regulate private and for-hire carriers, and provide for right-of-entry into vehicles and facilities; agree to adopt uniform reporting requirements and submit reports as requested by FHWA; and require registrants of commercial motor vehicles to declare knowledge of applicable Federal or compatible State regulations. MCSAP is financed by the Highway Trust Fund and State appropriations. Federal grants of 80 percent must be matched by 20 percent from States. 29 Initially, incremental funding for MCSAP was authorized over a 5-year period: $10 million was authorized for fiscal year 1984, and $10 million was to be added each year, up to a maximum of $50 million by fiscal year 1988. However, grants awarded in 1985 and 1986 were significantly lower than authorized funding levelsless than $15 million in 1985 and approximately $17 million in 1986. For fiscal year 1987, the Secretary of Transportation requested that the $50 million maximum funding level for MCSAP be authorized to meet the needs of expanding State programs; State grant requests for 1987 exceeded $44 million. Due to budget cuts for fiscal year 1988, State grant requests were just under $42 million. While a primary objective of MCSAP is to encourage States to adopt uniform regulations and implement consistent inspection and enforcement policies and procedures, significant differences among State programs persist. Among the factors affecting the scope and effectiveness of State programs are: l l the degree to which State legislation allows compliance with MCSAP, including the authorit y to regulate for-hire and private carriers; the adoption of Federal regulations or compatible State rules; ~9Funds available to any State for proposed program dmelopment may not exceed $50,000 per year. Implementation grant funds are distributed to the States according to an allocation formula based on the following factors in equal proportion: road mileage (all highways), \chicle-miles traveled (all vehicles), number of commercial vehicles over 10,000 pounds, ~pulation, and special fuel consumption (net reciprocity adjustment). See 49 CFR 350.21.
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66 l l l l the extent to which accident and inspection data are collected, analyzed, and used to support regulatory and enforcement policies; the extent to which States conduct safety audits at carrier facilities, in addition to roadside inspections; the number of inspectors employed, the ability of State agencies to compensate employees for overtime, and the availability and quality of inspector training programs; and the ability of enforcement officers to issue citations for violations and the issuance of penalties sufficiently high to be a deterrent to noncompliance. 30 Regulatory Consistency States participating in MCSAP often must pass enabling legislation authorizing the adoption and enforcement of Federal motor carrier safety and hazardous materials regulations or compatible State regulations. In addition, State regulations must apply to both private and for-hire carriers, and State enforcement personnel must have authority to conduct inspections of both intrastate and interstate motor carriers. Yet, despite these Federal requirements, laws in a number of States continue to limit the scope and applicability of motor carrier safety programs. FHWA has under way a review to determine the status of motor carrier safety legislation in each Statea task that FHWA officials estimate will take more than a year. In addition, some States restrict the activities of law enforcement personnel. Kentucky prohibits audits of motor carrier operations, and Mississippi inspectors received authorization to inspect carriers other than for-hire carriers of property or persons as recently as July 1, 1988. Enforcement officials in Maryland are limited b y State legislation prohibiting adoption of hours-of-service regulations for intrastate drivers working within a 100-mile radius. 31 State hazardous materials transportation laws also vary, with some States exempting specific commodiFor further information, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Moror Carrier Safery Assistance Program (MCSAP): Options intended To Improve a Generally SuccessfiIl and Cooperative Federal/State Partnership Promoting Truck and Bus Safety (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1988). ] Ron LIpps, Maryland State Department of Transportation, Safety Division, personal communication, Oct. 8, 1987. ties, while others apply hazardous materials regulations only to quantities that require placards under Federal law. J2 To address the issue of regulatory consistency, Congress requested a 5-year review of State commercial motor carrier safety laws and regulations. 33 A panel convened by the Secretary of Transportation is determining whether State laws and regulations are more or less stringent than Federal requirements. State laws and regulations that are found to be less stringent than their Federal counterparts will be preempted and may not remain in effect after October 30, 1989. A State law or regulation that is more stringent will not be preempted unless there is no safety benefit associated with it, the law is not compatible with Federal regulations, or enforcement of it causes an undue burden on interstate commerce. Highway Access Highway access policies differ markedly from State to State. FHWA was instructed to develop rules and guidelines for a National Truck Network for the larger trucks authorized under the STAA. FHWAs rulemaking authorized trucks that met the uniform size and weight limits to travel on all Interstate highways and designated State primary highways and to have reasonable access off these highways to terminals and to facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest. 34 Because States resisted Federal limitations on their authority to restrict movements of these trucks, States were allowed to interpret the terms reasonable access and terminal. 35 This permitted significantly varying State interpretations (see table 3-6), leading inevitably to industry appeals for uniform Federal standards. Carriers protest limits on access to shippers and terminals, and drivers claim that inadequate signage and complex route listings hamper their ability to travel legally. : Placards are symbols placed on the ends and sides of motor \ehicles indicating the hazards of the cargo. Shipments of some hazardous materials, such as etiologic agents and consumer commodities, do not require placards. In addition, shipments of less than 1,000 pounds of certain types of hazardous materials do not have to be placarded. See 49 CFR 172.504. ]The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, Public Law 98-554 (Oct. 30, 1984), 49 U.S.C. 2501 et seq. 3423 CFR 658. 1~Porter K. Wheeler, State Regulatory Programs for Motor Carriers, OTA contractor report, !vlay 1987.
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67 Table 3-6.Reasonable Access Provisions Access policy State 1/2 m i Ie 1 mile 3 miles 5 miles 10 miles Unlimited Comments Alabama. . . . . x . . . . . . . . From identified designated interchanges. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Width restrictions. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . x Unless otherwise posted. California . . . X . . . . . . . . . . Terminal access beyond 1/2 mile by signed routes from identified access points. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . x Unless otherwise posted. Connecticut . . . . X . . . . . . . . Special driver license needed for twins. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . By permit only. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . By permit only. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From identified interchanges: rural mile (2 Iane) and 3 mile (4 lane); urban mile on crossroads with 12-foot Ianes; carriers must petition terminals outside above limits, Georgia . . . . . X . . . . . . . . From identified interchanges: 60-foot limit. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Length restrictions. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Illinois . . . . . . . . . X . . . . State highways and local roads to facilities. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . x lowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . All U.S. and State routes. 5 miles from National Truck Network; all streets served by designated routes and 3-10 miles outside cities, depending on population. Kansas . . . . . Kentucky . . . . Louisiana . . . . Maine . . . . . All U.S. and State routes. 2 miles in rural areas; 1/2 mile in urban areas. Shortest possible route to terminals. By permit only. Maryland . . . . Massachusetts . . . Michigan . Minnesota . . . . To facilities or for route continuance. Mississippi . . . . Missouri . . . . . Montana . . . . . Nebraska . . . . Nevada, . . . . . New Hampshire.,..,.. . New Jersey . . . . New Mexico . . . . All U.S. and State routes. By permit only for twins. By permit only for twins. 20 miles from Interstate, designated roads Permit required beyond 1,500 feet. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x North Carolina . . . North Dakota . . . Ohio . . . . . Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . x . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . All U.S. and State routes. Reasonable access (up to the discretion of enforcement officers). (table continued on next page)
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68 Table 3-6.Reasonable Access Provisionscontinued Access policy State 1/2 mile 1 mile 3 miles 5 miles 10 miles Unlimited Comments Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unlimited on all but local roadswidth only; twins, tractor-semitrailers not restricted. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 miles. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Doubles restricted to 1 urban mile; 1 mile on 2-lane roads and 3 miles on 4-lane roads in rural areas; others by permit only. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . x Twins to terminals allowed. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . x Access limited to loading docks, terminals, and maintenance facilities, Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . x Shortest reasonable route. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Unless otherwise posted. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1/ 2 rnile on designated interchanges; further distance by permit only. Virginia . . . X . . . . . . . . . . Perrnit required beyond1/2 mile. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . x West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Within 2 miles of designated route. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . X . . . . Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . x SOURCE: Officeof Technology Assessment, based on Commercia/ Carrier JournaL April 19SS, pp. SO-81. Several States, especially in the East, have relatively restrictive access provisions. In Pennsylvania for example, access to roads off the designated network is limited to 0.2 miles, except on specific routes listed in an 84-page manual. 36 Massachusetts has designated only a portion of its State highways as part of the National Truck Network, and has adopted a $50 permit requirement for carriers who want access to most other roads. 37 Connecticut requires all drivers of twin trailers to be tested and licensed in-State. 38 Many carriers support legislation to amend the STAA, establishin g a uniform J. Terry Tume~ Statementofthe Interstate Carriers Conference on the Matter ofReasonable Access to the Designated Highway System, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Apr. 21, 1988, app. A. ~Duane W. Acklie, president, Crete Carrier Corp., testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Apr. 21, 1988, p. 4. ~homas R. Stedman, vice president, National Private Trucking Association, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Apr. 21, 1988, p. 9. definition of terminal and reasonable access and permitting STAA trucks to travel on most roads and highways, unless a State convincingly demonstrates that a road cannot safely accommodate large trucks. The Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984 authorized universal access by double 28-foot trailers, aiding companies that operate doubles by granting unlimited access for pick up or delivery purposes once the twin trailers were uncoupled. Large carriers have taken advantage of this access provision, building terminals close to Interstate highways where each 28-foot trailer can be attached to a separate tractor, or the contents of the trailers transferred to smaller vehicles. Many small companies, however, claim the y do not have the funds or type of operation necessar y to develop this kind of network. 39 l~Richard D+ Henderson, executive vice president, private Truck Council of America, Inc., letter to Senator Exon, U.S. Congress, Ma y 12, 1988.
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69 Data Collection and Analysis Establishing databases that track motor carrier compliance with safety regulations is an important component of many State programs. Data are used to target carriers for inspections and audits and to support legislative or regulatory actions. Although MCSAP funds maybe used to develop information systems, the extent to which various States collect and analyze data varies, and many States cite inadequate data as a major implementation problem for MCSAP. Enforcement efforts are hampered b y incomplete records of carrier, vehicle, and driver violations. In addition, poor accident data prevent State authorities from identifying carriers with high preventable accident rates and from conducting regulatory compliance education programs. The ability of a State to obtain a complete compliance profile of an interstate motor carrier or driver, by accessing Federal and State databases, is a key element of a current demonstration program. SAFETYNET, a Federal-State automated network, will eventually link FHWAs motor carrier safety database, containing information on more than 200,000 interstate carriers and 25,000 hazardous materials shippers, with State data systems. FHWAs database, described in more detail in chapter 7, includes information on driver and vehicle violations, basic demographic and profile data on interstate carriers and shippers, data from accident reports filed by carriers, and Federal enforcement actions. 40 Approximately 35 States currently retrieve information from the central database in Washington, DC. Of these, 22 States also transmit data to the central computer. 41 Four StatesColorado, Michigan, North Carolina, and Oregonwere selected to participate in a SAFETYNET demonstration program. During the initial phase, users of SAFETYNET will be able to: input driver and vehicle inspection data; update and query inspection data and carrier census data; query safety management audit summary data, accident report summar y data, and inspection work~%ee J.A. Reyes Associates, Inc., SAFETYNET: The Motor Carrier Safety Information Network, prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, November 1984. lAngell A. Sebastian, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, Aug. 4, 1988. load data; and generate system reports. 42 Eventually, all States are expected to participate in SAFETYNET; however, full implementation may take as long as 10 years. Inspection and Audit Programs States conduct two basic types of inspections roadside checks of vehicles and drivers and safety management audits. During a roadside check, an inspector examines a vehicle for mechanical problems and inspects documents, such as a drivers hours-of-service record and license, as well as shipping papers or route plans, if applicable. An audit, which is conducted at a carriers terminal or other business office, involves a review of records on vehicle use and maintenance, driver files and logbooks, and accident and violation reports and records. Management policies and procedures may also be assessed, and any vehicles in the terminal at the time of an audit may be inspected as well. In most States, the development of safety audit programs has lagged behind establishment of roadside inspection programs. Obtaining authority to conduct audits from State legislatures and providing adequate training for State inspectors have proven to be major obstacles. Because uniform standards and procedures for audits have not been established, State audit programs differ in the criteria used for targeting carriers, the analysis of data obtained from a carriers files, and the extent to ~J.A. Reyes Associates, Inc., op. cit., footnote 40. Photo credit: Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Roadside inspections are a critical part of the MCSAP program.
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70 which compliance education and monitoring efforts are undertaken. Examples of well-developed State audit programs are provided in box 3-A. In addition, at least 17 States are assisting FHWA in rating carriers by conducting less in-depth safety and compliance reviews. 43 Many States initially concentrate on roadside inspections, and States that have added enforcement personnel and increased inspections are placing higher percentages of vehicles and drivers out of service (see figure 3-2). For example, in Maine, when five new roadside inspectors were hired with MCSAP funds, 60 to 70 percent of the commercial motor vehicles inspected were placed out of service. 44 Similarly, in 1986, inspection teams in New York State failed 58 percent of approximately 3,200 trucks checked during roadside inspections on the Long Island Expressway and on highways near Albany and Buffalo. 45 In Connecticut, 13 Federal inspectors were hired in 1986 to assist 1 I State officials in conducting roadside inspections. Subsequently, 5,000 motor carriers were placed out of service in fiscal year 1987, an increase of 1,500 over the previous fiscal year. 46 Strategies for selecting vehicles to inspect vary among the States. Some conduct random roadside inspections, while others, such as Maryland, have begun to target trucks that appear to be in poor condition. Under Marylands system, the percentage of vehicles placed out of service rose from 32 percent in 1985 to 63 percent in 1986, and the driver outof-service rate increased from 3.7 to 8.3 percent during the same period. 47 In July 1986, Idaho implemented its inspection saturation program, which concentrates on one area of the State for 3 to 4 days. Officers are dispatched throughout surrounding areas, hindering driver attempts to avoid vehicle inspections. 48 ~lRobert L Bleakley, Federal Highwa y Administration, Personal communication, Oct. 10, 1987. ~4Maine Times, Losing Control: Deregulation May Have Made It Too Easy to Get Into the Trucking Business, May 8, 1987, p. 2. Robert Hanley, % of Trucks Fail New York Area Inspections, IVeu York Times, Oct. 8, 1986, p. B1. ~~wil}lam Shaefer, coordinator, Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, Connecticut Department of Transportation, personal communication, Jul y 22, 1987. ~:OTA research, 1987. L.J. Nickerson, Idaho State Police Department, personal communication, July 21, 1987. Many State inspection programs have strengthened emphasis on the driver, since enforcement officials believe that increased driver surveillance will reduce the number of operator-related accidents.
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77 Figure 3-2. Motor Carrier Inspections and Out-of-Service Violations, 1984.87 1,000 r 500 I 400 300 200 100 0 -1 L inspection drivers of service vehic I es of service s 1984 1985 1986 1987 Yea r SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program: Options Intended to Improve a Generally Successful and Cooperative Federal/State Partnership Promoting Truck and Bus Safety (Washington, DC: US. Govern. ment Printing Office, 1988), Table 3, p 18 Currently, human error accounts for over 60 percent of all commercial motor vehicle accidents (see chapters 4 and 6 for further information). Special efforts aimed at drivers have been instituted in a number of States. Nevadas Driver Check program has resulted in a 3.7-percent decline in accidents caused by driver error. Using a hardwired remote terminal connected to the States mainframe computer, enforcement personnel at fixed locations can check local, regional, and interstate drivers. During these license checks, enforcement personnel can identify cases of suspension, revocation, outstanding warrants, and multiple licenses. 49 Tennessee has a special drug and alcohol enforcement program. Inspectors are taught to recognize probable cause for drugs and are equipped with manuals and a field test kit that help them identify paraphernalia and illegal drugs. 50 Federal Highway Administration, Innovatl\e MCSAP Programs, unpublished manuscript, July 25, 1987, p. 9. Ibid. Photo credit: Rhode Island State Police Once a truck is placed out of service, appropriate repairs must be made before it can be driven again. Buses State officials also have the authority to inspect for-hire, interstate, and intrastate buses. (Private carriage of passengers is exempt from the Federal safety regulations. ) Although all but 11 MCSAP States inspect buses, only a few devote a significant portion of their resources to bus inspection programs; more often, States conduct annual, terminal audits for buses registered in State. In Minnesota, for example, the State legislature mandates that all school buses must pass a terminal inspection each year. 51 States that do conduct bus inspections usually inspect unloaded buses only. Inspectors focus on areas where a number of buses can be inspected at once, such as sports complexes, casinos, and amusement parks. This strategy is considered most efficient because passengers are not inconvenienced and companies usually have the time and resources to get a replacement if a bus is placed out of service. Michigan, for example, routinely inspects buses at Detroits sports facilities; bus drivers are usually cooperativeas well as unaware of safety defects on their vehicles. 52 Under MCSAP, New Jersey has developed a bus inspection team that targets both loaded and unloaded buses, many of them en route to Atlantic City. Of the 8,900 roadside inspections conducted between April 1987 and April 1988, 718 buses were l Larry Klukow, Minnesota State Police, personal communlcat[on, May 27, 1988. : William Murphy, Department of h40tor Carriers, Michigan State Police, personal communication, Apr. 26, 1988.
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72 Photo credit: California Department of Transportation Photo credit: California Department of Transportation Some States have special roadside inspection programs for buses. Brake and steering system deficiencies are frequent safety violations. placed out of service. Officials have reported that since the roadside inspection program began, fewer buses have out-of-service violations. 53 In California, the vast majority of buses receive annual, terminal inspections. However, State officials have also inspected loaded buses since they discovered that the gamblers specials, offering tours to Reno or Las Vegas, Nevada, were often operating illegally and unsafely. Bus companies that advertised 24-hour turnaround operations appeared to be particularly hazardous, and officials discovered that drivers often violated hours-of-service regulations by staying with the tour the entire time. Several highly publicized bus accidents in California were attributed to driver fatigue. To bring these operations under control, State officials created a task force to develop a State roadside inspection program in 1981. Brakes, tires, and defective steering systems as well as driver violations are common safety problems. 54 Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance To promote interstate cooperation and a more efficient motor carrier safety inspection system, agencies in 46 States and 10 Canadian provinces have agreed to adopt uniform truck inspection standards ~Sebastian Messina, chief of Motor Carrier Inspection and Investigation, Office of Regulatory Affairs, New Jersey Department of Transportation, personal communication, Apr. 27, 1988. Charles S. Allen, commander, Department of the California Highway Patrol, Motor Carrier Section, personal communication, May 2, 1988. as members of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA). Formed in 1980 under the leadership of California, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, CVSA is independent of the Federal Government, although FHWA now coordinates closely with CVSA in a major outreach effort. CVSA is organized into four regions, each with its own elected officials who concentrate on local or regional issues. Special CVSA national committees address issues related to data collection, drivers, vehicles, research, training, and hazardous materials. Industry associations and companies are encouraged to express their concerns and to become nonvoting associate members of CVSA. CVSA States and provinces use common inspection standards and out-of-service criteria developed in cooperation with DOT. In addition, members affix and recognize common inspection decals on trucks; the decals are valid for 3 months and indicate the quarter in which the last inspection took place. Vehicles that pass a CVSA North American Standard Inspection can usually pass through member States and provinces without further inspection, unless a readily visible defect is detected or a decal expires. One reason CVSA was formed was to reduce delays caused by duplicative inspections of interstate vehicles; however, many factors undermine the effectiveness of the strateg y to provide uniformity. Because only certain State agencies belong to the CVSA, other State agencies with power of enforce-
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73 Photo credit New York State Department of Transportation Photo credit: New York State Department of Transportation After examining a tanker for safety violations, an inspector applies a Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance decal, good for three months. The decal is proof to inspectors in other and need not ment or inspection sometimes refuse to recognize or issue the decals. In addition, inspectors will not give decals to trucks that pass inspections other than the North American Standard. Standards for issuing the inspection stickers have been inconsistent among the member agencies, though CVSA officials are working to resolve this through better communication. Drivers complain that their trucks are subjected to additional inspections, sometimes as frequently as three times a month, causing costly and unnecessary delays. Independent drivers and owner-operators are particularl y affected because their vehicles are not readily identifiable as belonging to a large fleet whose maintenance practices are known and respected by inspectors. 55 CVSA acknowledges startup problems and claims that the majorit y of complaints have been from drivers in the States that have recently joined CVSA and where personnel need experience with inspection procedures. 55 Personnel and Training State inspection forces var y in size and capability. A majority of States train some members of the highway patrol to be certified MCSAP inspectors. Civilians in a number of States are also empowered to enforce safety regulations and are trained to work with the officers. More ambitious States at55 Rita Bontz, president, Independent Truck Drivers Association, personal communication, Apr. 24, 1988. Russ Fiste, Commercial Vehicle Safety Alllance, personal communication, May 25, 1988. CVSA member States that the truck has passed inspection be rechecked. tempt to instruct most or all members of the highway patrol to recognize fundamental safety violations, usually brakes out of adjustment and hoursof-service violations. For the most part, however, instruction in truck safety is not provided at State police academies, and a limited number of enforcement personnel are responsible for conducting roadside inspections. Unless a State has developed its own program, training is provided either by Federal officials or b y instructors from the Training Safety Institute (TSI) in Oklahoma City. FHWA has divided MCSAP States into nine regions. The Federal employees in each region train inspectors in their States in cooperation with trainers from TSI. Usually two instructors train an average of 30 participants in 4 to 5 days. All State participants are taught to inspect vehicles and cargo and to check driver qualifications. 57 States that have developed notable training programs are highlighted in box 3-B. Instruction provided for FHWA staff is more intensive than the courses offered to State participants, although by October 1988, training courses for State officials will cover the same material taught to Federal officials. FHWA trainees attend 5-week classes at TSI and learn to conduct safety reviews instead of inspections. Between June 1986 and June 1987, the Federal staff of safety specialists doubled when 150 Federal officials graduated from TSI. ; Robert L. Bleakley, Federal Hlghvav Administration, personal communication, Nov. 11, 1987.
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74 Since Federal support for training began in 1984, hazardous materials training, and Federal officials well over 4,000 State inspectors have been who usually train State inspectors have redirected trained. 58 Few regions, however, have the retheir efforts toward these employees. sources to meet all training needs. For example, recently trained Federal investigators need additional Training officers are also unable to meet the de5aWilliam Nalley, Federal Highway Administration, personal command for refresher courses in some regions. Almunication, Nov. 3, 1987. though many inspectors receive on-the-job recur-
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75 rent training, changing procedures and regulations necessitate refresher courses. Regional officials stressed that, in particular, the y lack the capabilit y to provide additional hazardous materials courses. Recognizing that uniform training is an essential basis for consistent commercial vehicle inspections, CVSA, FHWA, and TSI have combined efforts to standardize training courses. In June 1986, a DOT/ State training committee was formed to recommend ways to standardize hazardous materials and vehicle inspection training. Members agreed that both course content and instructors should be certified, training should be accomplished at a local level, refresher trainin g should be conducted annually, and a train-the-trainer program should be created. Many of these recommendations, such as the trainthe-trainer program, are being implemented, although budget and time constraints hamper efforts. In some States, instructors have been told to condense their training and teach the same course in only a few hours. Nevertheless, TSI trainers expect that the number of certified commercial vehicle inspectors should increase significantl y as a result of the program. 59 Recognizing the need for more trained State personnel, CVSA, FHWA, and TSI are cooperating to create a new training package with several levels of training. FHWA contracted with Michigan to complete the package by May 1, 1988; CVSA supervised the project; and members of TSI are incorporating hazardous materials training and will keep material up-to-date. The package includes four courses: l Full Inspection .This duplicates the North American Standard Inspection course currentl y taught, l Walk Around Vehicle Inspection.This course is geared towards highway patrol officers who have man y additional responsibilites. Michigan is currently reviewing the results of a pilot study conducted last spring, when 125 of their patrol officers were given a day and half of trainin g in motor carrier safety. Although lack of time limited their abilit y to enforce safety regulations, most participants felt the y benefited from the course. qFrank Tupper, Training Safetv Institute, personal communication, No\. 2, 1987. l l The Driver Inspection.This driver-only course was developed partly in response to the commercial drivers license law and partly because so much evidence indicates that the majorit y of motor carrier accidents are the fault of the driver. Special Road Inspection.This is a course for special inspections that focus on either a type of truck (i.e., cargo tanks) or one aspect of trucks (i.e., brakes). 60 course package has been submitted to DOT for review and assimilation into MCSAP procedures. Current FHWA plans call for States to dedicate 75 percent of enforcement time to the full inspection course, and 25 percent to the others, The new training package and the train-thetrainer program are also intended to increase each States role in roadside inspections. State officials are now encouraged to attend the MCSAP management course at TSI, a course previousl y limited to Federal employees. Although regional Federal instructors will continue to train State inspectors, the train-the-trainer courses and the MCSAP management course allow for more State control over roadside inspections; Federal officials will focus on au-dits and safet y reviews. Enforcement Issues State officials agree that placing a vehicle out of service is the enforcement measure most likel y to deter drivers and carriers from violating safet y regulations. Most officials have also been responsive to the efforts of CVSA and FHWA to create uniform inspection standards and have adopted the Federal out-of-service criteria. 61 However, State officials acknowledge that personnel limits hamper effective enforcement, and admit that modified inspection procedures and inspection stickers may be necessary to permit more motor carrier inspections and ease the burden on industr y posed by multiple inspections. ~Commercia] Vehicle Safety Alliance, Bylaws and Memorandum of Understanding, unpublished manuscript, October 1986. These inspection levels were adopted at the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance annual meeting at Bar Harbor, ME, Oct. 24, 1986. Taken from an Informal telephone survey of 45 States conducted b y the Office of Technolog y Assessment in October 1987. Unless otherwise noted, information gi~en in this section is derit,ed from this sur~,e},.
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76 Carriers claim, and OTA research confirms that uniform inspections are still the exception rather than the ruleenforcement measures vary among and within States, creating many uncertainties for carriers. For example, enforcement strategies for vehicles that violate safety regulations but do not meet the out-of-service criteria vary. In some States, a fine is issued for each violation. In others, the driver is given an inspection form that must be completed by the carrier, usually within 15 to 30 days, and returned to the enforcement agency when repairs have been made. The most stringent States do both. A driver stopped for any inspection, however, loses precious time needed for load delivery within his deadline, regardless of whether violations are found or penalties imposed. Classifications of safety violations also vary. In many States, the enforcement officer will cite an offender for either a criminal or civil offense, depending on the severity of the violation. Fines and penalties for similar violations often differ, not only from State-to-State, but by jurisdictions, as well. To increase uniformity of penalties, several States now classify motor carrier safety violations as civil penalties with set fines consistent within a State unless contested b y the offender. However, enforcement officials in a number of States claim that offenders who protest tickets are too often rewarded for their efforts. They argue that judges and magistrates are not only inconsistent in their deliberations, but often uninformed about the gravity of safety violations and lenient with violators. For example, in Maryland, drivers with out-of-service violations theoretically can receive $1,000 fines, but fines are often significantly reduced at the judicial level. Moreover, Maryland law prohibits State patrol officers from fining trucks more than $30 for routine violations, and some drivers and carriers consider this just a cost of doing business in Maryland. Other States also find that low fines are not effective deterrents to safety violations. In particular, officials report, judges do not appear to understand the safety implications of weight limit violations, viewing them as minor offenses. In Maine, for example, some judges consistently dismiss charges for overweight vehicles, despite a State statute that sets penalties for these offenses. In some counties in Kansas, officers have stopped citing drivers for excessive cargo because judges invariably refuse to fine them. State officials complain that lack of change at the legislative level hinders improvements in the judicial system. In Ohio, fines have not increased since 1923. 62 Safety officials also complain that legislators place little priority on safety and are reluctant to limit judicial authority by establishing statutes for safety violations. Enforcement efforts are further undermined by lack of communication between judicial and enforcement officials, between members of the trucking industry and enforcement agencies, and between enforcement agencies in the same State. In some States where the Public Utilities Comb; David Leland and staff, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Ohio Transportation Regulation: Back to the Future, unpublished manuscript, 1987, p. 28. Photo credit: Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Penalties for safety violations may vary widely by jurisdiction or, in some States, by officer discretion. Photo credit: Rhode Is/and State Police Temporary scales are used to check compliance with truck weight limits at some roadside inspection sites.
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77 mission has been designated the lead agency, its employees do not work closely with officers from the highway patrol and are unfamiliar with the enforcement efforts of the State police. A number of State enforcement agencies have begun educating legal officials themselves. In West Virginia, for example, a State supervisor meets with local legal officials to explain which violations should be considered most serious before inspections are conducted at a new site. The Department of Safety in Missouri sponsors annual seminars on truck safety for judges in the St. Louis area, and is considering expanding this program to other regions of the State. In Idaho and Ohio, a legal attorney has been hired to assist State prosecutors and judges in cases of violations of motor carrier safety regulations. At a recent conference in Tucson, Arizona, truck safety specialists were given their first opportunity to address State judges. In Rhode Island, the arresting officer must be present at the hearing to explain the circumstances and potential hazards of a safety violation to the judicial authority. Some officials feel that education should be aimed at the drivers, especially in States where Federal safety regulations have been most recently adopted. Delaware sponsored two seminars for members of the industry this year, hoping not only to educate truckers, but also to improve the relationship between enforcement officers and drivers. In New Hampshire, the Department of Safety organizes informal coffee breaks at truck stops to try to increase driver understanding of the Federal regulations and what to expect at roadside inspections. California has a well-established public information campaign that includes presentations to trucking companies as well as efforts to establish a better rapport between truck drivers and members of the California Highway Patrol. Difficulty identifying carriers and drivers with multiple violations is yet another impediment to effective enforcement. Although most States keep records of driver and vehicle violations, few have the capability to identify repeat offenders. In smaller States, name recognition is used to pinpoint carriers with safety records. Rhode Island has begun fining carriers instead of drivers for economic violations to target carriers cited for multiple violations, 63 and can now identify carriers that repeatedly incur or neglect to pay fines. This policy developed when officials decided that responsibility for vehicle maintenance rested with the carrier instead of the driver. One goal is to encourage drivers to alert enforcement officials voluntarily when forced to drive trucks that violate equipment regulations. Arizona adopted civil penalties in 1986 to target repeat offenders. Multiple or hazardous materials violations are automatically subject to higher fines. If a motor carrier is guilty of repeated violations after being informed of noncompliance, the carriers operating license is suspended. Californias new computerized Management Information System of Terminal Evaluation Records contains carrier fleet information, hazardous materials spills, license history, citation information, accident involvement, and terminal ratings. This system identifies carriers and drivers with particularl y poor safety records, and after its first year of operation, officials discovered that some carriers had received between 600 and 800 citations. 64 Whe n SAFETYNET becomes operational, this type of information will be accessible nationwide, In Maryland a special enforcement team, the Bus and Truck Patrol, has been created to increase bus and truck compliance with safety regulations. 65 This seven-person team is dispatched to one area for 1 to 6 months. Plainclothes officers, who are certified MCSAP inspectors using unmarked cars, tr y to reduce the number of moving violations, such as speeding and tailgating; they can place trucks out of service, if necessary, ~William A. Maloney, associate administrator of Motor Carrlcrs, Rhode Island Division of Public Urilitles and Carriers, personal communication, Aug. 4, 1987. Phyllis Myers, California Highway Patrol, personal communication, Nov. 11, 1987. Millard M. Bell, supervisor, Special Trat%c Enforcement, Maryland State Police, personal communication, Oct. 8, 1987.
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78 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS A comprehensive national truck safety program requires continuing emphasis on programs developed over the last 5 years and a more systematic Federal-State approach. OTA concludes that the top priorities are: 1) improving State enforcement capabilities, 2) increasing State regulatory uniformity, and 3) better coordination and cooperation among agencies within DOT at the Federal level. Congressional mandates and DOT actions since 1980, such as requirements for vehicle inspections and national standards for driver licensing, can make major contributions to highway safety if uniformly applied. MCSAP has firmly established the role of States as an essential adjunct to Federal highway safety efforts. OTA concludes that continued Federal financial support at current levels for State inspection and enforcement activities through MCSAP is crucial. Additional trained personnel are needed across the country. Monitoring industry, through State terminal audits and ensuring the safety fitness of all motor carriers, is an important component of a systematic safety program. Because State audit programs are such valuable additions to Federal enforcement efforts, FHWA could be required to develop guidelines and handbooks for States to encourage more States to train inspectors and begin auditing carriers. Efforts undertaken by FHWA to improve regulatory compliance materials for industry would be helpful for the States as well. OTA concludes that industry complaints about inconsistent State inspection and enforcement procedures and penalties are symptoms of the need for stronger Federal-State cooperation for national uniformity. CVSAs goal of establishing uniform inspection and out-of-service criteria provides an excellent model for States to use in working together toward consistent nationwide programs. However, any efforts will be ineffective unless States make the commitment to have their executive agencies cooperate toward this goal. To help resolve conflicts in State agency agendas, strong DOT support for consistent enforcement programs will be needed, once FHWAs review and evaluation of State laws and regulations has been completed. Cooperative efforts with State officials and bar associations are key. State executive agencies, legislative bodies, and law enforcement organizations may accept the need for uniformity more readily if they are involved and informed at an early stage. Congress may wish to consider requiring DOT to provide technical assistance and technology transfer for additional educational materials for State officials, law enforcement personnel, and judges. An enforcement handbook providing general guidance on the safety regulations and safety factors to consider when setting penalty amounts for various types of violations could be helpful. In the Motor Carrier Act of 1984, Congress made clear that decisions on access to State roads for large trucks are the province of the States. However, States have found developing routes and communicating access decisions clearly to industry to be complex and difficult tasks, requiring hard work, patience, good will, and good humor from all parties. Where this process has failed, carriers travel on the routes they deem necessary to reach their destinations, often traveling small rural or urban roads in violation of State law and endangering themselves and other motorists. OTA concludes that varying State access, inspection, and enforcement policies pose significant problems for industry. A national truck safety program should apply equivalent safety requirements to all heavy trucks. This implies that no exemptions to the commercial drivers license are warranted. Congress may wish to encourage States to develop more uniform safety requirements. Congress may also wish to consider eliminating all exemptions from Federal truck safety regulations and encouraging DOT to play a more active and assertive role in facilitating State/industry dialog and resolving difficult access issues. Technology transfer of innovative approaches and working actively with appropriate State and industry organizations are two possible approaches. For further discussion of the technical aspects of the access issue, see chapter 5. Finally OTA finds that the division of responsibility for different aspects of roadway, vehicle, and driver issues among multiple agencies hampers safety problem solving at DOT. The extent
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79 to which DOT will be able to respond effectively to congressional safety directives depends on better cooperation and more systematic coordination among Federal agencies. For example, better accident data analysis at NHTSA could provide information to the Office of Motor Carriers for driver training guidelines or hours-of-service rules. Information about vehicle characteristics and design standards could be exchanged by NHTSA and FHWA to guide program development. Congress may wish to require DOT to develop a plan to integrate the technical expertise now divided between NHTSA and the motor carrier and highway design sections of FHWA to address issues such as roadway and vehicle compatibility guidelines, upgraded safety equipment standards, national guidelines for training for maintenance personnel and drivers, and accident reduction and mitigation strategies. The approach that DOT has taken to developing the commercial drivers license program is commendable; it could serve as a model for efforts to deal with equipment requirements and highway design issues. OTA further concludes that DOT agencies need to cooperate and coordinate in collecting and analyzing data, conducting research programs, and developing regulatory proposals. Establishing special work groups to address issues of common concern, jointly funding research activities, and sharing staff expertise are examples of strategies that could bring benefits at little or no extra cost. Additional DOT technical assistance for State agencies in developing more uniform data management systems and analytical capabilities, especially in tracking preventable accidents and violation statistics, would be an effective use of limited funding. States could use this information to target carriers for audits and inspections. As FHWA and ICC implement new procedures for assessing the safety fitness of commercial vehicle operators, explicit procedures for monitoring ongoing safety performance will be needed. State personnel and FHWA field inspectors alike could benefit from consistent guidelines for deciding whether to initiate a compliance education program or an enforcement action. Improved educational materials on Federal safety requirements that could be distributed to States and motor carriers on model programs for amending laws, implementing Federal standards, and developing an information clearinghouse would also be extremely useful.
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80 APPENDIX 3-A: CHRONOLOGY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY (1935-87) 1935Motor Carrier Act. Formally regulated the motor carrier industry by authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate common, contract, and private carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Granted ICC authority to establish requirements for employee qualifications and hours of service, and safety standards for operation and equipment. 1944Federal-Aid Highway Act. Authorized the designation of a 40,000-mile system of highways, now known as the Interstate Highway System. 1948Reed Bulwinkle Act. Granted Rate Bureaus immunity from antitrust laws, promoting joint service arrangements between competing carriers. Information about rates and classifications, published by Rate Bureaus, were also used by carriers and shippers to negotiate individual rates. 1956Highway Trust Fund. Established a fund comprised of proceeds from Federal motor vehicle fuel taxes and various excise taxes to finance construction of all Federal-aid highways. 1966Highway Safety Act. Directed the Secretary of Commerce to issue standards for driver education and licensing; vehicle registration, operations, and inspections; accident investigations and reporting; and traffic control, highway design, and maintenance. Required States to establish highway safety programs in accordance with these Federal standards and match Federal funds received. Directed the Department of Commerce to expand highway safety research and development activities. 1966National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Mandated the development of minimum manufacturing standards for motor vehicles. Required a new agency, the National Traffic Safety Agency, to issue safety standards for passenger automobiles, trucks, buses, and motorcycles; to conduct research, testing, development, and training necessary to reduce traffic accidents and related deaths and injuries; and to expand the National Driver Register to identify individuals whose motor vehicle operating licenses had been denied, terminated, or temporarily withdrawn. Prohibited ICC from adopting or continuing safety standards for motor vehicles under its jurisdiction that differed from the standards established under this act. Federal-Ald Highway Acts 1954, 1956, 1958, 1!%0, 1%2, 1964, 1966, 1974, 1981, and 1982 are not cietallecl In this appendix; the acts primarily authorized funds for highway construction. 1966Department of Transportation Act. Transferred safety responsibilities of ICC and the Department of Commerce to the Department of Transportation (DOT). Internal agencies created included the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the National Highway Safety Bureau, and the National Traffic Safety Bureau. 1968Federal-Aid Highway Act. Required DOT to establish national bridge inspection standards and a program designed to train employees to carry out bridge inspections. 1970Federal-Aid Highway Act. Created an internal DOT agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to carry out highway safety programs; research and development relating to highway safety, traffic construction and maintenance, traffic control devices, identification and surveillance of accident locations, and highway-related aspects of pedestrian safety. Authorized the creation of a special bridge replacement program. 1973Federal-Aid Highway Act. Authorized funding for highway safety construction programs to reduce roadway hazards such as rail-highway crossings and improve highway engineering standards. Authorized the establishment of a pavementmarking demonstration project to provide greater vehicle and pedestrian safety. Directed DOT to carry out research on drug use and driver behavior and to investigate the use of mass media for informing and educating the public of ways and means for reducing the number and severit y of highway accidents. 1975Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. Authorized DOT to set regulations applicable to all modes of transportation. 1976Federal-Aid Highway Act. Authorized funding for bridge reconstruction and development, and for eliminating hazards of railway crossings. Authorized DOT to provide incentive grants to States that had significantly reduced traffic fatalities and to penalize States with weak safety programs. 1978Surface Transportation Assistance Act. Authorized funds for highway construction. Directed DOT to inventory penalties for weight violations in each State, and required each State to report weight violation penalties annually to DOT. Authorized the establishment of a bridge replacement and rehabilitation program. Appropriated funds to NHTSA and FHWA for safety programs
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81 and to carry out highway safety research and development. 1980Motor Carrier Act. Directed ICC to relax standards for entry into the industry. Established that common and contract carriers needed to show only that they were fit, willing, and able. Expanded the private carrier exemption to allow intercorporate hauling between a parent company and its subsidiaries. Required owner-operators to meet the fitness test only if they haul specified processed food and other commodities and the owner is in the truck during the trip. 1982Bus Regulatory Reform Act. Duplicated the motor carrier act of 1980 for the bus industry by relaxing standards for entry. 1982Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA). Authorized and financed higher levels of Federal expenditures by raising and restructuring highwa y taxes. Established uniform truck weight, length, and width limitations for the Nations highways. Established a new Federal grant program, the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, to improve State capabilities to conduct inspections of vehicles and enforce motor carrier safety regulations. 1984Motor Carrier Safety Act. Directed DOT to promulgate revised Federal regulations, establish fitness standards for commercial motor carriers, and undertake a 5-year review of State motor carrier laws to identify those that are more or less stringent than Federal requirements. 1984Tandem Truck Safety Act. Allowed State Governors to seek exemptions for Interstate highway segments that could not safely accommodate trucks; modified reasonable access provision of the STAA to include 28-foot by 102-inch trailer units. 1986Commercial Motor Carrier Safety Act. Established a new drivers licensing program that prohibits operators of commercial motor vehicles from holding more than one State license and requires drivers to pass a written examination and a road test in a vehicle that is representative of the type that will be operated. 1987Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act. Authorized funds for the construction of highways and for mass transportation programs. Directed DOT to establish a national bridge inspection program. Appropriated funds to NHTSA for purposes of research and development in highwa y safety. APPENDIX 3-B: THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK Although Federal regulation of motor carriers did not begin until 1935, man y States enacted legislation in the 1920s governing various aspects of truck and bus transportation, including economic operations, highway protection, and safety. ] Led by Texas, a number of States established regulatory programs for both common and contract carriers. Requirements for contract carriers, generally less extensive than those for common carriers, were imposed to protect the operations of common carriers. 2 Interstate carriers were not generally subject to State economic regulations; however, several Supreme Court decisions upheld the application of State safety and highway requirements to interstate carriers. 3 ~y 1932, all States except Delaware had attempted to regulate the transportation of passengers, and 29 States had laws controlling the carriage of property bv motor vehicles. Ph]hp D. Lmklln, Econorn]cs of Transportation (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), pp. 673-674. The Texas law required contract carriers to obtain permits, while common carriers were Issued certificates of publlc convemence and necessity. In addition, mimmum rates for contract carriers, which could not be lower than railroad rates, were prescrlhed. It should also be noted that earlier attempts bv State< to regulate contract carriers were struck down b y the U.S. Supreme Court, because thev were not found to he huslnesses prowdlng services w[th a publlc interest. lbld., p. 675. State control otter Interstate carrleri was ln~alldated by a 1925 Supreme Court decmon that ruled that States could not forbid, Ilmlt, or prohlblt competition In Interstate commerce. See Buck v. Kuvkendall, 267 U.S. 307 ( 192 5), The absence of Federal control over interstate carriers encouraged intense competition within the motor carrier industry. Finally, with the support of the railroads and the large, established trucking companies, Federal legislation governing commercial motor carriers was passed in 1935. 4 The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The authority extended to intrastate operators handling shipments moving in interstate and forei g n commerce. 5 Three major categories of motor carriers were addressed by the act: l l l Common carriersfor-hire carriers holding themselves out to serve the public; Contract carriersfor-hire carriers operating under special contracts, usually for shipments over a specified period of time; and Private carrierscarriers transporting goods for their own use or uses incidental to their businesses. Public Law No. 255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935). While the orlglnal act permitted such Intrastate operators to transport persons or property wlthln the State under State authonzatlon, a 1962 amendment to the act eliminated the abd[ty of Intrastate carriers to engage In Interstate commerce. Locklln, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 676.
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82 In addition, requirements for transportation brokers were included. 6 The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 also authorized ICC to establish requirements for driver qualifications and hours of service, and safety standards for operations and equipment. The first set of regulations, issued by ICC in 1940, applied to all common, contract, and private carriers. The Federal-Aid Highwa y Act of 1944 authorized the Interstate Highway Systemeventually to total over 42,000 milesto connect metropolitan areas, serve the national defense, and link U.S. highways with major routes in Canada and Mexico. In 1956, Congress established the Highway Trust Fund, composed of proceeds from Federal motor vehicle fuel taxes and various other excise taxes, to finance construction of all Federal-aid highways, includin g the Interstate Highwa y System. Highway funds could be withheld from States that allowed trucks on the Interstate system with more than 18,000 pounds on a single axle, 32,000 pounds on a tandem axle, and 73,280 pounds gross vehicle weight (GVW). (In 1975, the maximum GVW limit was raised to 80,000 pounds.) However, under a grandfather clause, States could retain limits allowing wider or heavier vehicles that were in effect as of July 1, 1956. Moreover, each State was permitted to set different size and weight standards for other highways within its jurisdiction, As the Nations dependence on motor vehicles for personal and commercial uses grew, so did the number of serious accidents and fatalities. In 1965 alone, 49,000 persons were killed in highway accidents, 1.5 million suffered disabling injuries, and the economic costs associated with these accidents came to an estimated $8.5 billion. ; To address these problems, Congress took a series of steps to improve highwa y safety. The Highway Safety Act of 1966 directed the Secretary of Commerce to issue standards for driver education and licensing; vehicle registration, operations, and inspections; accident investigations and reporting; traffic control; and highway design and maintenance. States were required to establish highway safety programs in accordance with these Federal standards and to match Federal funds received. States that did not implement safety programs were subject to a 10-percent reduction in their Federal highway funds. By 1970, all 50 States, Brokers were required to obtain Interstate Commerce Commission Ilcenses and bonds or other security. In addltlon, the Commission was authorized to specify accounting and recordkeeplng requirements. Senate Pubhc Works Committee Report 1302 to accompany S. 3052, Hlghwav Safety Act of 1966 (June 23, 1966). Publ]c Law 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (Sept. 9, 1966). the District of Columbia, and 4 territories had established highwa y safet y programs. Concerned about the automobile industrys emphasis on style and performance instead of safety and collision protection, Congress also passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safet y Act in 1966, Under this act, a new agenc y within the Department of Commercethe National Traffic Safety Agencywas empowered to issue safety standards for passenger automobiles, trucks, buses, and motorcycles; conduct research, testing, development, and training necessary to reduce traffic accidents and related deaths and injuries; and expand the National Driver Register to identify individuals whose motor vehicle operating licenses had been denied, terminated, or temporarily withdrawn. Although State motor vehicle equipment standards had to be identical to the Federal regulations, stricter standards could be imposed for those vehicles procured by States or the Federal Government. Shortly after safety statutes were enacted in 1966, Congress authorized the establishment of a Federal transportation agencythe Department of Transportation (DOT). While the ICC retained economic regulatory authority over motor carriers, its safety responsibilities and those assigned to the Department of Commerce were transferred to DOT. Within DOT, the Federal Highway Administration was created to administer the regulator y programs related to employee qualifications and hours of service as well as to highway transportation operations and equipment safety. Separate agenciesthe National Highway Safety Bureau and the National Traffic Safety Boardwere formed to implement the provisions of the new safety laws. In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board was established to: 1) determine and report on the cause or probable cause of transportation accidents, 2) conduct special studies on transportation safety and accident prevention, and 3) make regulatory recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation. 13 %surance Institute for Highwa y Safety, .Starus Report, vol. 21, No. 11, Sept. 9, 1986. Public Law 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (Sept. 9, 1966). The National Driver Register, originally estabhshed In 1960 by the Department of Commerce, was a voluntary driver record exchange program. Although all States participated in the program, the program provided only summar y reports of Ilcense suspensions or revocations related to drunk driwng or fatal accidents. The 1966 amendments allowed States to file reports on license denials and withdraws for any reason, except for wlthdrawls of less than 6 months based on an accumulation of minor violations. Senate Commerce Committee Report i301 to accompany S, 3005, Nationa[ Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, June 23, 1966. U.S. Department of Transportation Act, Publlc Law 89.670, 49 U.S.C. 1651. h 1974, the National TransWrtation Safet y Board became an Independent agenc y and Its role was expanded.
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Chapter 4 Motor Carrier . ..-... .. Accident Analysis ... ---t ~-------- -i . Photo credit: Ohio State Police
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CONTENTS Page Methodology . . . . . . . 86 Accident Causes . . . . . 87 Driver Performance. . ...+..... . 88 Driver Training. . . . . . 89 Previous Driving History . . . . 90 Drugs and Alcohol . . . . . 90 Age and Experience . . . . . 90 Fatigue . . +. . . . . 91 Vehicle Factors . . . 4 . . . 92 Braking System . . . . . . 92 Tires . . . ..**.... . . 93 Rollovers and Vehicle Handling and Stability. .. ... .. ........+ . . . 93 Override/Underride .. .. . ........+ 94 Truck Configuration and Utilization.. . 95 Truck Occupant Protection . . . 97 Safety of Nonregulated Carriers . . . 99 Economic Factors .......................10 0 Enforcement l **.... . . . . . 101 Roadway Environment ..................101 Road Type .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ..;. . ..101 Lighting Conditions ...................102 Weather Conditions ...................103 Sharing the Road .. ....................10 4 Conclusions and Policy Options ..........104 Figures Figure Page 4-1. Truck Accidents by Category of Truck . . . . . . . 85 4-2. Vehicles Involved in Fatal Accidents 85 4-3. Fatalities in Combination Truck Crashes . . . . . . . 86 44. Motor Carrer Accident Causal and Prevention Factors. . . . . 87 4-5. Driver-Related Factors as Cited in Heavy Truck Accident Reports . 89 4-6. Injury Severity in Heavy Truck Accidents Relative to Truck Driver Drinking. .. .. ......+. 90 4-7. Relationship of Driver Fatigue to Accidents, by Hour of Day . . 91 4$. Jackknifes Related to Attempted Accident Avoidance Maneuvers . 93 4-9. 4-10. 4-11. 4-12. 4-13. 4-14. 4-15. 4-16. 4-17. 4-18. 4-19. Table Tractors Involved in Fatal Accidents, by Type of Collision. . . . . 94 Accidents and Override/Underride in Reduced Lighting Conditions, by Truck Type . . . . . 95 Truck Driver Seat Belt Use, by Injury Severity . . . . . . . 98 Vehicle Age by Regulatory Status . 99 Truck Inspection and Truck Accident Rates for California State Highways, 1976-85 . . . . . . . 99 Percentage of Trucks That Speed, by Carrier Classification ...............100 Fatal Truck Accidents by Road Classification ......................10 2 Fatal Truck Accidents by Median Control . . . . ............102 Fatal Truck Accidents by Posted Speed Limit . . . . . .........103 Combination Truck Accidents, by Time of Day . . . ............103 Fatal Truck Accidents by Weather Condition . . . + . . ...104 Tables Figure 4-1. Car Occupant Deaths Compared to Truck Occupant Deaths in Fatal Crashes of Large Trucks and Cars . 86 4-2. Accident Causes Assigned in State of Washington Truck Crashes in 1984..... 89 4-3. Single-Trailer Involvement Rate . . 95 4-4. Distribution of Combination-Unit Truck Mileage and Fatal Accident Involvement by Body Type, in Texas . . . 96 4-5. Vehicle Involvement Rates in Fatal and Nonfatal Accidents in 1984. . . 97 4-6. Occupational Fatalities in 1984. . . 98 4-7. BMCS Roadside Inspection of All Carriers . . .....................100 4-8. Single-Trailer Accident Involvement Rates by Highway Functional Class.. ...101 4-9. The Effect of Lighting Conditions on Rear-End Collisions .................103
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Chapter 4 Motor Carrier Accident Analysis Accidents for heavy trucks (those with a gross vehicle weight rating of over 26,000 pounds) have increased over the last few years, reaching an estimated total of 278,322 accidents nationwide in 1986. (See figure 4-1.) Accidents for all trucks over 10,000 pounds increased at a slightl y lower rate. Bus accidents are such a relatively small part of total accidents that accurate comparisons are difficult. Total truck-miles traveled also have risen during the 1980s, but somewhat less than the rise in heavy truck accidents. 1 Of all heavy vehicles, tractor-trailer combinations provide the most difficult driving challenges, and OTA mtlmatcs from the National Accident Sampling System database; also hlatlonal Highway Traffic Safety Administration calculations. California (Mlcials reported a similar rise o~er this period. See California Hlghwav Patrol and State of California Public Utilities Commission, Joint Leglslat]ve Report on Truck Safet~, AB-2678, Final Report (San Francisco, CA: No\ember 1987), p. 19. Figure 4-1 .Truck Accidents by Category of Truck 500 400 300 200 100 0 10,000 to 25,999 pound s --26,000 pounds and over ~.-.----, -------,0 ,# ~ I I 1 I 1 1 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Yea r SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 19@8, based on National Acc!dent Sampllng System data the severity of the accidents in which they are involved reflects their special nature. Roughly 1 to 2 percent of these accidents result in a fatality 2 about double the percentage for automobiles (see figure 4-2). The comparable figure for all other types of motor vehicles (except motorcycles) is well under 1 percent. In the past decade, the average annual death toll from tractor-trailer accidents has ranged between 4,000 and 5,000 fatalities (see figure 4-3), increasing slightly since 1982. About 80 percent of the fatalities in these accidents were pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles, a proportion that has increased gradually over time (see figure 4-2). When single-vehicle truck accidents are eliminated, this proportion is even greater (see table 41). Head-on collisions are particularly severe. The y Based on the National Accident Sampling System (1981-85) cst]mates. Multiple-vehicle accidents comprise 66 percent of all hea\w truck accidents and 72 percent of all hea~~ truck accidents in~oltlng a fatality. Figure 4-2.Vehicles Involved in Fatal Accidents 8 m Combination trucks 7n m Passenger car s 197677 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Yea r SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, based on Fatal Accident Reporting System data 85
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86 Figure 4-3. Fatalities in Combination Truck Crashes Total fatalities ,;;;;:::::;; Fatalities of truck u ..::,..:,:,: .,:, occupants only 197677 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Year SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on Fatal Accident Reporting System data. constitute only 3.3 percent of heavy truck accidents yet account for 29 percent of all fatal accidents involving those trucks. 3 This chapter contains results from OTAs analysis of motor carrier accident data and a review of previous studies of three key accident causal factors: driver performance, vehicle factors, and the roadway environment. Areas needing further research are outlined, and policy options are identified that address accident causes as part of a national motor carrier safety strategy. Based on National Accident Sampling System (1981-85) and Federal Accident Reporting System (1983) data. For further discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these databases, see ch. 7. Table 4-1.Car Occupant Deaths Compared to Truck Occupant Deaths in Fatal Crashes of Large Trucks and Cars Ratio of car occupant fatalities Year to truck occupant fatalities 1977 . . . . 1978 . . . . 1979 ......, . . 1980 . . . . 1981 . . . . 1982 . . . . 1983 . . . . 1964 . . . . 26:1 28:1 29:1 31:1 34:1 28:1 34:1 35:1 SOURCE: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Big Trucks, 1985, p. 8. METHODOLOGY Thorough accident analysis requires accurately identifying the type of heavy vehicle involved, the roadway conditions, and, to the extent possible, the characteristics of the driver. However, determining all events leading to an accident is difficult because of the quality of available databases. 4 Police and insurance claim reports, the most common sources of information, are limited in detail, because the report forms ask for only certain information and investigating officers often do not adequately understand accident causation. The accident cause reported on the form is usually only the last event in a chain that includes interactions between the driver, vehicle, and highway environment as well as weather and location. 4one of the ear]iest systematic studies of the interactions in acci dents examined five major factors: human, environmental, vehicular, loss-limiting, and legal and regulatory. A.D. Little, Inc., The Srare of the Art of Tr&ic Safety (Boston, MA: June 1966). Exploring accident information beyond the detail in accident reports is of critical importance. When reporting accidents, police often must attribute responsibility to one of the parties, and if the accident cause is not clear, the mishap may simply be ascribed to driver error. Thus, the heavy vehicle driver may be blamed more frequently than warranted. 5 For example, in California, accident reports associate driver error with over 90 percent of truck-at-fault accidents. b In contrast, European data indicate multiple causes involving driver error 5 Kenneth Perchonok, Driver and Vehicle Characteristics as Related to the Precipitation of Accidents, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Report No. DOT-HS-802 355, Ma y 1977; and P.P, Jovanis, A Perspective on Motor Carrier Safety Issues in the 1980s, presented at the Conference on Truck Safety, Northwestern University, June 198. California Highway Patrol, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 10.
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87 and defects in road design and the vehicle in a majority of cases. 7 OTA research indicates that while human error is the primary cause of about 65 percent of accidents, other factors also contribute to most accidents. Combining accident and exposure data can clarify the relative importance of vehicle, driver, and environmental factors. Where appropriate, OTA used the Truck Inventory and Use Survey, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) monitoring program, and other survey instruments to estimate exposure. The quality and limitations of this information are discussed in chapter 7. In those cases where exposure data are limited, OTA made inferences about the industry based solely on accident data rather than on both accident and exposure data. In each case, the sources J. Fructus, Highlights on Heavy Vehicle Safet y in Europe, .Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents (Ottawa, Canada: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, April 1987), VO1. 1, P l-~1. of the information are made explicit. Improved data collection methods, such as those proposed in chapter 7, would facilitate more detailed and specific analyses. Accident Causes Accidents usually result from a chain of events, often initiated by a single occurrence, and complicated by a number of interacting factors (see figure 4-4). The potential for an accident is partially a function of the characteristics of the driver, including experience, training, age, attitude, physical condition (fatigue, intoxication, other debilitations), and psychological state. Other factors include the condition of the vehicle, highway design, and roadway characteristics; regulatory oversight, such as licensing and traffic enforcement; and the type of management supervision exercised by the carrier. Still other factors contribute to the disproportionate number of fatalities associated with heavy truck accidents. Because of the size and weight of these trucks relative to cars, truck occupants have more Figure 4-4. Motor Carrier Accident Causal and Prevention Factors ; State and local agency actions Motor carriers Manufacturers ulot~ons \ Vehicle n. -,-1 Accident causal factors a Accidents SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1988,
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88 protection in an accident than car occupants. The mismatch of size and mass between heavy trucks and cars and the special difficulties inherent in controlling a tractor-trailer on a highway designed for smaller vehicles are other major contributing factors to severe accident consequences. According to OTAs review of accident reports, the three factors most frequently associated with heavy vehicle accidents are: 1) speed too fast for conditions, 2) training of the driver, and 3) age of the vehicle. Speed Too Fast for Conditions The phrase speed too fast for conditions on accident report forms masks a variety of interlocking roadway and vehicle-related factors that affect driver performance in ways the driver may not understand and probably is unable to accommodate in any case. Vehicles operating at higher speeds operate closer to the limits of friction and rollover thresholds, and drivers have ver y little time to carry out emergency maneuvers at high speeds. (See chapter 5 for further discussion of the drivers role in this important area. ) Often a posted speed is appropriate for cars and does not adequately consider the inherent incompatibility that exists in many instances between highway design and the large trucks now common. Certain interchange ramps on major highways are examples. Variations in speed among different vehicles increase the likelihood of an accident by providing more conflict situations, such as passing maneuvers and braking. 8 D. Solomon, Accidents on Main Rural Highways Related to Speed j Dri;er, and Vehicle (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, July 1964). Judging the speed suitable for road conditions is a complex task with a high potential for miscalculation, especially for drivers of heav y vehicles. A detailed investigation of the role of human factors in truck accidents in Finland points to failure in controlling the vehicle, in estimating the traffic situation, and in perception as the principal causes when human error is cited as the primary factor. Driver attitude and the physical or mental state of the driver emerge as key accident characteristics when human error is given as a secondary cause. .U. Stocker, Statistical Analysis of HFV Accidents, Symposium on rhe Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 1, p. 2-26. DRIVER PERFORMANCE Speed figures prominently among driver-related factors in accidents. Where details are given on truck accident report forms (45 percent of the time in the National Accident Sampling System (NASS) from the years 1981-85), the most frequently cited include driving too fast for conditions, poor lane changes, and following too closely. (See figure 4-5.) An analysis of heavy truck at-fault collision reports in Oregon indicates that the principal causes cited are improper maneuvers, speed too fast for conditions, and driver fatigue and inattention. O Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) records show that several States have found excessive speed to be the most frequent human factor involved in accident causation. For example, Maryland, Massa1(Oregon Public Utility Commissioner, 1984 Truck Znspecrions and Truck Accidents in Oregon (Salem, OR: July 1985).
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89 0 10 20 30 Percent of accidents SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85. chusetts, Washington, and Oregon cite speeding as the most common accident causation factor. 11 The frequencies of types of driver error for truck drivers in truck accidents in Washington State are shown in table 4-2. Areas of poor performance by the truck driver include inattention, exceeding reasonable speed, following too closely, and improper turning maneuvers. Driver Training Analysis of NASS data for the years 1981-85 indicates that training received by drivers of heavy vehicles involved in accidents is an important factor. Although data are limited, it appears that the majority of all heavy truck drivers have not received extensive or appropriate training. ~~~OcO~ Ca~rler Safety Assistance Program, Annual Reporr (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1986). Table 4.2.Accident Causes Assigned in State of Washington Truck Crashes in 1984 Number of times Percent of Causal factor a assigned accidents Driver errors: Inattention. . . 1,128 22 Failure to yield right-ofway . . . . 513 10 Exceeding reasonable speed . . . 670 13 Alcohol . . . 56 1 Disregard stop sign/signal . . 58 Following too closely 277 5 Exceeding stated speed . . . 55 1 Over center line . 120 2 Improper passing . 71 1 Improper turn . . 271 5 Apparently asleep . 62 Drugs . . . . 1 l b Failed to signal . 22 Disregard warning sign/signal . . 25 Improper parking location . . . 46 Improper signal . 10 No lights/failed to dim . . . 8 Deficient equipment 343 7 Other violations 606 12 No violation 1,674 33 Total accidents. . 5,051 aThe num~r of causal factors does not equal the number of total accidents because several causal factors are assigned in some accidents bLess than 1 percent. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, based on data from the Washington Utilities and Transpoflation Commission, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In an investigation of 35 accidents involving double trailers, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported that the most common training given to drivers consisted of instructions on how to connect the combination units. No driver in the sample had received appropriate, specialized instruction on handling characteristics unique to twin-trailer operations. 12 OTA research indicates that training provided through schools and carriers varies tremendously in quality and duration. Some carriers prefer to hire drivers with over-the-road exzNational Tranqwtation Safety Board, unpublished remarks based on research for the NTSB Heavy Truck Study, presented at the National Motor Carrier Safety Y4orkshop, Washington, DC, Mar. 11, 1987.
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90 perience, rather than hiring inexperienced drivers regardless of training. For further discussion of this important issue, see chapter 6. Previous Driving History Heavy vehicle drivers involved in accidents often have received citations for previous safety violations, particularl y for speeding and other moving violations, and have been involved in previous accidents. Over 40 percent of truck drivers involved in accidents had at least one prior speeding conviction in the previous 3 years. OTAs comparison of NASS (1981-85) and the Federal Accident Reporting System (FARS) (1983) data revealed little difference in the previous violation and accident records of truck drivers involved in nonfatal and fatal accidents. Drugs and Alcohol Truck accident reports often show a low percentage of convictions for driving while intoxicated among truck drivers. Because of the importance of good driver performance for safety and the lack of data on drugs as contributors to accidents, NTSB is conducting a study of fatal truck accidents to determine the extent of driver impairment by alcohol and drugs. The study is expected to be completed in 1989. Heavy vehicle drivers themselves perceive driver drug and alcohol abuse to be relatively frequent. In a 1986 survey sponsored by the Regular Common Carrier Conference of 1,319 long-haul, tractor-trailer truck drivers in Florida, 13 drivers were asked their perception of drug and alcohol use. The average respondent estimated that 36 percent of fellow drivers sometimes drive under the influence of drugs, and 18 percent of drivers sometimes drive under the influence of alcohol. OTA analysis of NASS data indicated that alcohol involvement and accident severity are strongly related. Figure 4-6 shows the severity of injuries as a function of drinking by heavy vehicle drivers. The relationship between drinking and accident severity suggests that alcohol alone is a major factor in fatal accidents. 1]R. Beilock, 1986 Motor Carrier Stiety Survey (Alexandria, VA: Regular Common Carrier Conference, 1987). Figure 4-6.injury Severity in Heavy Truck Accidents Relative to Truck Driver Drinking 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Injury m Drinking involved severity SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85, Age and Experience Young and inexperienced truck drivers exhibit the highest risk of accidents, 14 with those under 25 years of age six times more likely than other heav y 1qI.J. Jones and H.S. Stein, Effects of Driver Hours of Service on Tractor-Trailer Crash Involvement (Washington, DC: Insurance Institute for Highwa y Safety, September 1987) p. 11; M.J. Sanders, Canyon Research Group, Inc., A Nationwide Survey of Truck and Bus Drivers, unpublished manuscript, March 1977; and P. Green et al., University of Michigan, Accidents and the Nighttime Conspicuity of Trucks, unpublished manuscript, Januar y 1980.
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91 truck drivers to be involved in an accident. 15 Drivers with less than 1 year of experience constitute 1 percent of the carrier work force, yet account for 3 percent of the accidents. l6 Fatigue Fatigue reduces a drivers sensorial and motor capacities. Research has shown that truck drivers are susceptible to both sudden fatigue, due to temporary irregularities of the sleep cycle, and accumulated fatigue, due to long working hours. Significant increases in driver errors and decreases in alertness have been noted as early as the fourth hour of shift driving time and generally increase throughout the trip, except for a slight recovery near the end of a trip. 17 The lowest levels of alertness occur for most drivers between 2:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. Moreover, the adverse effects of prolonged driving are probably more pronounced for drivers aged 45 or older than for young drivers. 18 Drivers on irregular schedules experience more fatigue than drivers on regular schedules, and the effects occur earlier. 19 A recent study using a case-control design to establish comparable samples for 300 truck crashes indicated that the relative risk of crash involvement for truck drivers driving more than 8 hours is almost twice that for drivers driving fewer hours. 20 Moreover, drivers using a sleeper cab for rest periods experience greater fatigue than relay drivers. 21 ;K.D. Hackman et al. (eds.), Ana)ysis of Accicienr Data and Hburs of Service of Interstate Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers (Washington, DC: U.S. Bpartment of Transportation, Ftderal Highwa y Administration, August 1978). Jovanis, op. cit., footnote 5. TWilliam Harris et al., Human Factors Research, Inc., A Stud y of the Relationships Among Fatigue, Hours of Service, and Safery of Operations of Truck and Bus Drivers (Washington, DC: U.S. D.e~~rtment of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, November 1972). 1Ibid. Robert T. Mackie and James C. Miller, Human Factors Research, Inc., Effects of Hours of Service, Regularity of Schedules and Cargo Loading on Truck andl?us Driver Fatigue (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highwa y Traffic Safety Administration, October 1978). pJones and Stein, op. cit., footnote 14. ) Mackie and Miller, op. cit., footnote 19; and Robin P. Hertz, Sleeper Berth Use as a Risk Factor for Tractor-Trailer Driver Fatality, presented to American Association for Automotive Medicine, New Orleans, LA, September 1987. Accident data involving interstate commercial motor vehicle drivers show fatigue-classified accidents as proportionally higher during the hours between 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., suggesting an impact due to circadian rhythm (see figure 4-7). 22 NTSB also notes fatigue or hours-of-service violation as a factor in over 30 percent of its accident investigations. 23 Long hours of driver duty time, some as long as 26-31 consecutive hours prior to accidents, have been documented, often a result of carrier dispatch, delivery, or other requirements. Road and vehicle visibilit y are major contributing factors to accidents when a driver is fatigued, as is speed too fast for conditions. A study of truck drivers in France found that fatigue is a major problem for drivers on the road for several days in a row. These drivers worked as fre2~Hackman et al., op. cit., feotnote 15. ~~National Transportation Safety Board, op. cit., footnote 12, p. 2. Figure 4-7.Relationship of Driver Fatigue to Accidents, by Hour of Day t I I --Accidents classified as non fatigue related Accidents classified as fatigue related I 1 I 1 I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I i I 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 a m pm Hour of day SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from K.D. Hackman et al, (eds.), Analysis of Accident Data and Hours of Service of /rrterstate Cornrnercia/ Motor Ve/rlc/e Drivers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, August 1978), 87-004 0 88 3
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92 quently as other drivers during the day, yet remained on duty, driving and performing other tasks after normal business hours. This pattern led to both sudden fatigue and accumulated fatigue. 24 The study used a survey of truck driving patterns to ~qPatrick Hamelin, Truck Drivers Involvement in Traffic Accidents as Related to Their Shiftworks and Professional Features, Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 2, p. 3-107. measure exposure; periods of high accident risk were determined by comparing accidents with exposure. Data indicate that accident involvement rates generally increase throughout the day, reaching peaks at mealtimes, at the end of the afternoon, into the evening, and late at night. A risk peak in the first hour of any shift has been reported by other heavy truck safety research. 25 jovanis, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 8, VEHICLE FACTORS Vehicle design and performance affect truck safety, just as maintenance and operating practices do. Design and performance issues involve brake system capabilities, handling and stability, vehicle crashworthiness, and truck occupant protection. Maintenance practices include preventive maintenance as well as replacement of inoperable or worn parts. Vehicle operating practices include cargo loading, cargo tiedown, overall weight, and weight distribution. The role of vehicle factors in an accident may be more subtle than that of the driver. While vehicle factors may not precipitate a crash, they can reduce the vehicles performance capabilities below the threshold where safety can be maintained when traffic or roadway conditions require an emergency maneuver. These factors thus play a significant role in highway environments, such as heavy traffic, steep grades, curves, or narrow roadways, where peak vehicle performance is needed. The subtleties of the role of the vehicle in accidents are emphasized in Oregon accident records for heavy trucks. Vehicle defects were cited as the accident cause in only 6.7 percent of all cases. 26 However, when truck at-fault accidents were disaggregate, over 20 percent were linked to mechanical defects, highlighting the potential for vehicle factors in preventing accidents as well as for mitigating severity. Problems associated with vehicle equipment show up in MCSAP inspection reports. Although the number of out-of-service citations resulting from vehicle inspections varies among States, a significant hOregon Public Utility Commissioner, op. cit., footnote 10. number of trucks (ranging from 30 to 60 percent) are placed out of service for equipment violations immediately. 27 Braking Systems Defective brakes were the most common equipment violation cited in the MCSAP reports, followed by poor lighting and tire condition. Brake system failures were the single largest group of causes cited for large truck accidents associated with mechanical defects, constituting 31 percent of the total. 28 The nature of brake problems has been documented in greater detail by the Oregon Public Utility Commission, 29 which found that over 60 percent of all violations related to brakes being out of adjustment; another 14 percent related to problems with the brake lining. Therefore, roughly three of every four brake-related citations identified problems that normal brake maintenance could easily detect and correct. NTSBs investigations reveal that in many cases the truck driver had responsibility for proper brake adjustment, but the carrier had not required or furnished appropriate training. 3 0 ~;The process of selecting vehicles for inspection varies among States. Out-of-service citations are likely to be high (greater than 50 percent) when the selection process is nonrandom, based on inspecting vehicles that outwardl y appear to have problems. Random selection yields out-of-service citation rates closer to 30 percent. Paul Melander, Tennessee Public Service Commission, personal communication, Mar. 23, 1988. ~Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 1976-1978 Analysis ofhfotor Carrier Accidents Involvin g Vehicfe Defects of Mmhanical Failure (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, November 1979). ~oregon Public Utility Commissioner, op. cit., footnote 10. ~~)National Transportation Safety Board, opi cit., footnote 12, P. 3.
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93 Poor brake adjustment and maintenance coupled with sudden braking or other avoidance maneuvers can increase the possibility of jackknifing, 31 a significant problem as shown in figure 4-8. Jackknifing potential is exacerbated by wet road conditions 32 and is especially prevalent among lightly loaded or empty vehicles. 33 A comparison of accident-involved articulated vehicles from the NASS (1981-85) and FARS (1983) databases does not, however, show jackknifing to be overrepresented in fatal accidents. Jackknifing 1s also discussed in ch. 5. ~H.S. Stein and 1.]. Jones, Crash involvement ofbrge Trucks by Configurat~on: A Case Conrrol Srudy (Washington, DC: Insurance Institute for Hlghwav Safetv, January 1987). C. Winkler et al., Parametr~c Analysls of Heaty Duty Truck Dvnam~c Stablliry, Report No. DOT-HS%06-411 (Vrashington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, h4arch 1983). Braking and steering Steering Other I I I o 10 20 30 40 Percent of Jackknifes a These numbers do not add to 100 since some jackknifes are attributed to multiple maneuvers. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85 Tires Data from Oregon indicate that in 1984, 9.9 percent of truck at-fault collisions were attributed to mechanical causes, although for single-vehicle truck crashes 21 percent were attributed to mechanical causes and 24 percent of these to tires. Other data indicate tires to be the second leading cause of crashes in which mechanical defects were primar y contributing factors. ~4 Tires have not been examined as extensively as other factors as a cause of accidents. Tire specialists indicate that a single tire blowouteven on the steering axleshould not result in total loss of control by the driver, unless other circumstances or equipment problems exist. Looseness in the steering system, striking a curb, or panic braking may, in combination with a blowout, cause the driver to lose control. Because specifying an accident cause is complicated, and the tire blowout is easily remembered and identified, 35 it is difficult to determine whether a blowout preceded a crash or occurred as a result of it. Rollovers and Vehicle Handl and Stability Rollovers often occur on curved roads, : ing and vehicle factors include handling characteristics and sta~ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Big Trucks (Vashington, DC: 1985). Christopher G. Shapeley, A Comparison of Car and Truck Safet ~, presented at the American Societv of Ci\il Engineers Symposium on Accommodation of Trucks on the Highvav: Safety in Design, Nashville, TN, May 11, 1988. Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff Vehicle handling skills are challenged when drivers transport especially wide loads.
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94 bility as well as load shifting, deficient brakes, and deficient tires. (For information on roadway contributory factors see chapter 5.) Driver-related factors include inattention, falling asleep, loss-of-control/skidding, speeding, and avoidance maneuvers. Operational factors, such as unbalanced cargo loads and trailer loads with high centers of gravity, also affect vehicle stability. Poor handling and vehicle instability often lead to vehicle rollovers, which, in turn, strongly correlate with accident severity. Rollovers are more likely to be associated with accidents involving a driver fatality relative to all heavy truck accidents (see figure 4-9). OTAs NASS (1981-85) and FARS (1983) analyses also show that rollovers occur in 7.6 percent of all heavy truck accidents, but are a characFigure 4-9. Tractors Involved in Fatal Accidents, Rollover onIy a) Frontal and rollover Other by Type of Collision 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Percent a Percentage of all tractor accidents. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment j 19SS; based on Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association data, 1987. teristic of 16.5 percent of truck accidents involving a fatality. Other studies substantiate the relationship between rollover and fatal accidents 36 an d show that the risk of injury is higher in rollover accidents involving a single vehicle relative to multiplevehicle accidents. 37 Rollovers are a particularly acute problem for double-trailer combinations. Although the sample of doubles accidents in the NASS database is quite small, the incidence of rollovers in doubles accidents is very high. Studies show that doubles are three to four times more likely to overturn than singles in noncollision accidents 38 and that rollover occurred in close to 70 percent of twin-trailer accidents. The most common occurrence was rollover of the rear trailer. 39 Override/Underride When accidents occur between large trucks and cars, the mismatch between truck and car bumper heights causes trucks to override smaller vehicles or smaller vehicles to underride trucks. Override/ underride accidents occur more frequently at night, when darkness reduces visibility for all drivers. Figure 4-10 shows that the override/underride prob~hNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Truck Qcupanr Projection, Prepred in response to the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Washington, DC: December 1986). ;Stein and Jones, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 13. *Oliver Carsten, U.S. Accident Experience of Single and Double Trailer Combinations, Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Trafic Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 1, p. 2-80, table 5. qNational Transportation Safetv Board, op. cit., footnote 12, p. 1. Photo credit: Land Line Flatbed trailers are particularly difficult to see, creating the potential for severe underride accidents.
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95 Figure 4-10. Accidents and Override/Underride in Reduced Lighting Conditions, by Truck Type Platform Dropframe Livestock carrier al Dumptruck Q % x Closed u top van Refrigerator Tank Garbage Tractor (no trailer 1 1 All accidents / Override underride accidents I I o 1,000 2,000 3,000 Number of accidents SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85. lem is greater for dump trucks, closed-top vans, or flatbed or platform trailers; platform trailers present the most problems. 40 A comparison between fatal and nonfatal car-intotruck accidents shows that fatalities occur more frequently in underride accidents, including many from contact with the side of the truck. Trucks and trailers with devices to prevent underride were more likely to be involved in nonfatal accidents, 41 highlighting the value of such protection. Truck Configuration and Utilization Accident rates and types vary for straight and combination trucks, for singleand double-trailer Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Proceedings of the Aatjona] Truck Safety Symposium (Mashington, DC: June 1987), PP 8586; Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Moror Truck Research (Nashington, DC: November 1985). 4 1 M otor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Motor Truck R==h J op. cit., footnote 40, pp. 7, 9. operations, and for loaded and empty trucks. The operating characteristics and contributin g factors the number of powered axles, cab configuration, type of trailer, type of cargo, trip length, time of day, road type, and driver age and experience-differ for every accident. Each factor needs to be considered independently and interactively in any comprehensive analysis. 42 In fact, for single-trailer operation alone, involvement rates differed significantly by trailer type and location, as shown in table 4-3. Table 4-4 shows fatal accident involvement percentages (truck driver and other vehicle driver) by truck body type for combination trucks. These data underscore the overinvolvement of tank trucks and the relative severity of dump truck collisions for the other vehicle driver. The relative safety of singleand double-trailer combination trucks is highly controversial, and several studies have examined their relative risks. Each study differs in methodology and sources of data, making a comprehensive and coherent assessment difficult. For example, studies of truck accidents on turnpikes permit consistent accident and exposure information because the intercity operations of doubles are adequately represented. However, the restriction to turnpike operation eliminates consideration of the entire trip from origin to destination. National studies do not allow control for geographic location and roadway type. Thus, study results have varied due primarily to: 1) differences in exposure survey methods and uncertainties in the resulting estimates of exposure, 2) unreliable and missing ac:T. Chirachavala and J. ODay, A Comparison of Accident Characteristics and Rates for Combination Vehicles ~~ith One or Two Trailers, Report No. UM-HSRI-81-41 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, August 1981). Table 4-3.Single-Trailer Involvement Rate (per 100 million vehicle-miles) Trailer type Local Intercity Van . . . . . . 168.0 75.9 Flatbed. . . . . . 69.9 106.8 Tank . . . . . . 142.2 78.1 Auto . . . . . . 241.6 73.6 Dump . . . . . . 46.1 33.1 SOURCE: T. Chirachavala and J. ODay, A CornparlsorI of AccMent Characteristics and Rates for Combination Vehicles With One or Two Trailers, Report No. UM-HSRI-81-41 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, August 1981),
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Table 4-4.Distribution of Combination-Unit Truck Mileage and Fatal Accident Involvements by Body Type, in Texas Percent of Percent of other vehicle combination-unit driver fatalities occurring Percent of truck driver in collisions with Body type miles traveled fatalities combination-unit trucks Van . . . . 45.5 28.1 24.5 Platform. . . . 22.2 25.2 27.8 Tank a . . . . 15.0 33.0 20.8 Dump . . . . 7.3 3.0 11.1 Pole/log . . . 1.2 0.7 1.9 Livestock . . . 1.3 6.7 8.0 All others. . . . 7.2 3.3 5.9 Total . . . 100.0 b 100.0 100.0 alncludes dry bulk, liquid, and gas. bsum does not equal 100 percent due to rounding. SOURCES: Truck Inventory and Use Survey/Texas 1982 and Texas State Accident Data (1981-1983); National Highway Traffic Safety Administration cident data, 3) differences in the definition of an accident and/or large truck, 4) differences in vehicle classification survey methods, 5) differences in driving environment, and 6) inherent stochastic variation associated with small samples. 43 Despite these variations, a summary of study results to date follows. Using accident and exposure data during 196670 on the Indiana Toll Road, one study concluded that doubles had a significantly lower involvement rate than did singles. 44 However, doubles had more injuries or fatalities per accident than singles. No effort was made to separate these data by rural or urban location. In 1977, an FHWA study analyzed the accident experience of seven large motor carriers for a 7-year period and found no significant differences between accident and severity rates of singles and doubles. 45 The carriers surveyed were among the largest common and private carriers in the country; no attempt was made to control for different operating environments. A followup study conducted by FHWA in 1978, using data from California, found that the only sigJG.A. Sparks and J. B[elka, Large Truck Accidcnr Experience in Western Canada: A Case Study of Two Large Fleets, .svmposium on rhe Role of Heatrv Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7. +R.E. Scott and ]. ODay, Srarisrical Anal\sis of Truck Accident lnvo)~ernenr, Final Report (Ann Arbor, MI: Highway Safety Research Institute, December 1971). ~5Federal Highltay Administration, Safety c~mp~ris~fl ofD~ub~ts Versus Tractor Semi-Tra~ler Operatmn (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1977). nificant difference in doubles and singles involvement rates on a vehicle-mile basis, was a higher fatality rate for doubles. 46 However, when a cargo-based exposure measure (ton-miles) is used, the higher tonnage capabilit y of doubles results in a higher accident rate and injury rate for singles. Although there were problems with the accuracy of the exposure estimates in this study, the findings illustrate some of the differences in the way this topic is viewed. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety used a case-control study design to account for differences in operating characteristics between singles and doubles. 47 The study concluded that doubles are two to three times more likely to be involved in accidents than other large trucks on the same type of roadway. This approach preselected locations where accidents have already occurred, perhaps for reasons unrelated to vehicle configuration. The studys findings have generated substantial controversy. Other controlled studies have been conducted for a less-than-truckload carrier by Northwestern University. % Using over 160 traffic links connecting terminal pairs served by both singles and doubles in 1983 and 1984, the studies found no statistically conclusive evidence of differences between the *H McGee ~ al., Comparison of California Accident Rates for Single and Double Tractor-Trailer Combination Trucks, Report No. FHWA-RD-78-94 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, March 1978). ~:steln and Jones, op. cit., footnote 32. Jovanis, op. cit., footnote 5.
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97 accident rates of singles and doubles. A similar study conducted for OTA corroborated these findings; moreover, after an initial driver learning period, the doubles safety record improved sufficiently to exceed that of the singles. 49 An extensive Transportation Research Board study of the relative safety of singleversus doubletrailer trucks concluded that doubles have slightly more accident involvements per mile traveled than singles operated under identical conditions at highway speeds. 50 This and other studies indicate that considerable differences exist in singleand doubletrailer accident involvement rates by road type, emphasizing the importance of the operating environment as well as the configuration of the truck. 51 Accident rates for articulated trucks exceed those for straight trucks by factors of three to four, depending on location and road conditions. 52 The consequences of articulated truck accidents are more serious as well. While single-unit trucks have nonfatal accident rates comparable to nonfatal accident rates for combination trucks (see table 4-5), their rate of involvement in fatal accidents is considerably lower. 53; Whether the tractor is operating as a bobtail (not pulling a trailer) or attached to a semitrailer also affects accident rates. Bobtails are 14 times more likely + P.P. Jovanls and I. Zabaneh, { Anaiysis of Carrier-Based Safetv Data, OTA contractor rept>rK, February 1W!8. Transportation Research Board, Tt{ln Trailer Trucks, TRB Special Report 211 (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1986). Car\tcn, op. cit., footn(xe 18. : Stein and ]onei, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 9. Natmnal Hlgh\\al Traffic Safetv Administration, op. cit., footnote 36. Table 4-5.Vehicle Involvement Rates in Fatal and Nonfatal Accidents in 1984 CombinationSingle-unit unit trucks trucks Vehicles in fatal accidents 4,232 956 Vehicle involvements in fatal accidents (per 100 million vehicle-miles) . . . 5.5 1.8 vehicle involvements in nonfatal accidents (per 100 million vehicle-miles) . 279.0 299.0 SOURCES National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatal Accident Reporting System, National Accident Sampling Systems, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, Truck Inventory and Use Survey to be involved in a fatal accident, and their injury involvement rate is 19 times greater than for the tractor-semitrailer configuration.5q In addition, empty tractor-semitrailer trucks are more likely to be involved in crashes than fully loaded trucks.i This is probably due to the difficulty in maintaining control when braking empty or partially loaded tractor-trailers. (See chapter 5, figure 5-3.) Truck Occupant Protection Less than 1 percent of all medium and heavy truck occupants involved in accidents are killed, and only 10 percent are injured. 56 Nevertheless, truck driving is considered a relatively dangerous occupation. Table 4-6 shows fatality rates for selected occupations, indicating that truck driving and mining are the most dangerous industrial occupations. A truck driver wearing a seat belt is much less likely to be injured or suffer severe injury in an accident, primarily because he is less likely to be thrown out of the cab by the impact. The majority of truck drivers (76 percent) involved in accidents were not wearing seat belts, as shown in figure 411.7 FARS (1984) data indicate that total or partial ejection was involved in 38 percent of combination-unit truck occupant fatalities. Truck occupants were also ejected after an accident more frequently than were passenger car occupants (25 percent). 58 Entrapment, cab crush, and contact with interior surfaces have serious consequences for truck occupants who remain in the cab during an accident. A study of truck occupants in rural accidents identified ejection and steering-assembly contact as the leading sources of injury, followed by contact with 54K, Campbell and O. Carsten, Fleet Accident E\aluarlon of FMVSS 121, Report No. DT-HS-806-261 (Vrashlngton, DC: L1. S. Department of Transportation, National Highwa} Traffic Safetv Administration, August 1981). 55Stein and Jones, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 11. ~Naticlna] Highway Traffic safety Administration, op. ~lt., footnote 36. ;This contrasts somewhat with the safety belt use rate for truck drivers not involved in accidents. A nonobtrusive sur\c} of safety belt usc among combination-unit truck drivers revealed that over 93 percent were not using their belts. P. Alhson and R. Tarklr, Heavy Truck Occupant Restraint Use, prepared for the National Highuay Traffic Safetv Adm]nlstratlon, September 1982. +~atlonal Hlgh\\ay Traffic Safet~ Admlnlstratlon, op. cit., footm}te 36, p. 14.
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98 Table 4-6.-Occupational Fatalities in 1984 Industry group Workers (x 10 3 ) Deaths a Deaths/10 8 workers All industries . . . 104,300 11,500 11 Trade . . . . 24,000 1,200 5 Manufacturing . . 19,900 1,100 6 Service . . . . 28,900 1,900 4 Government . . . 15,900 1,400 9 Transportation and public utilities . . . 5,500 1,500 27 Construction . . . 5,700 2,200 39 Agriculture . . . 3,400 1,600 46 Truck drivers . . . 1,876b 1,087C 58 Mining, quarrying . . 1,000 600 60 aNatlOnal safety council, Accident F8cts 7*. bus, Depa~ment of Labor, Employment arrd ~arfl~flgs, ~anuarY f~. cFederal Accident Reporting SySt&m, IW. SOURCE: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration the windshield and the door area. 59 A study of injury patterns of fatally injured truck drivers con59 H. Robinson et al., Trucks in Rural Injury Accidents, NHTSA Report No. HS-800-232 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, July 1969, Figure 4=11 .Truck Driver Seat Belt Use, by Injury Severity No injury Possible injury L Non incapacitating ~ injury Incapacitating injury Fatality q No belt used o 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of injuries Lap bel t used q Lap/shoulder Unknow n belt used restraint SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85. eluded that severe abdominal injuries in combination with head and/or chest injuries were more likely among combination-unit truck drivers than among drivers of other truck types. 60 The nature of these injuries suggests the steering wheel is particularly dangerous. The steering wheel was also identified as the most prominent source of injury in an analysis of 124 accidents involving Volvo trucks in Sweden. 61 Some information is available on the relative safety of cab-over-engine units (COE) and conventional cabs. For example, the risk of injury to a COE driver is 15 percent higher, and the risk of injury to the nontruck driver slightl y lower, when a COE is involved. 62 FARS data show that COEs have a greater involvement in accidents in which a fatality occurs as well as in accidents involving a truckdriver fatality. The initial stimulus for the COE design was Federal length restrictions that are no longer in effect. Many drivers claim COEs have poorer ride quality and increased vibration that cause discomfort and fatigue. b~~. Karlson et al., Fatally Injured Truck Drivers, Proceedings of the 21st Conference of the American Association of Automotive Medicine (Arlington Heights, IL: American Association of Automotive Medicine, September 1977). blA. Anderson et al. Injuries in Trucks and the Effectiveness of Seat Belts, Proceedings of the 24th Conference of the American Association ofAutornotive Medicine (Arlington Heights, IL: American Association of Automotive Medicine, October 1980). zMotor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, op. cit., footnote 41, p. 11.
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99 SAFETY OF NON REGULATED CARRIERS A substantial safety concern has been the lack of Federal regulatory oversight of carriers operating exclusivel y in commercial zones and in other federally exempt categories. Analysis of NASS (1981-85) data indicates that nearly two out of every five accidents involve a heavy truck belonging to a carrier that is not Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)-regulated. Oregon officials report that in 1984 the highest at-fault accident rate belonged to ICCexempt, interstate carriers. 63 Figure 4-12 shows the age distribution of heavy trucks involved in accidents. Differences in the quality of various truck operations are also apparent Oregon Public Ltillty Commissioner, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 39. Figure 4-12.Vehicle Age by Regulatory Status 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1 i -i Age, in years (6.8) aEstimated average age, in years. KEY DOT = Department of Transportation; ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85 when examining Federal roadside inspection data. Table 4-7 shows that ICC-exempt carriers have somewhat higher violation rates than other carriers and slightly more serious safety problems. Systematic interpretation is impossible because of numerous changes in recent years in coverage by ICC regulations and in the application of Federal safety regulations to previously exempt carriers. Roadside inspections can serve as effective accident prevention measures. A 10-year California State study found a clear inverse relationship between the number of roadside inspections and the number of truck at-fault accidents. 64 (See figure 413.) Although other factors undoubtedly influenced operations over the study period, the apparent correlation between increased enforcement activities and on-the-road safety improvement is hard to ignore. Callfornia Highway Patrol, Crirical Zrem Znspecrion Fac-r Sheet (Sacramento, CA: 1986). Figure 4-13.Truck Inspection and Truck Accident Rates for California State Highways, 1976-85 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 l l 0 # t Inspection s 0 0 # I ~. ---Accident s t I I I I I 1 I I I ( 1976 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Year SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; adapted from California Highway Patrol/State of California Public Utilities Commission, Joint Legislative Report on Truck Safety (San Francisco, CA: November 1987), p. 37
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100 Table 4-7.BMCS Roadside Inspection of All Carriers (in percent) ICC-authorized Private ICC-exempt other 1983 Without violations . . . . 36 25 28 With violations. . . . . 64 75 72 Out-of-service violations. . . 28 25 32 1984 Without violations . . . . 29 21 20 With violations. . . . . 71 79 80 Out-of-service violations. . . 31 29 36 KEY: BMCS = Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety. ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission SOURCE: Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, BMCS Annual Roadside Inspection IW.3 and 1984 (Washington, DC: September 1985). ECONOMIC FACTORS The U.S. trucking industry represents a diverse mix of carriers, drivers, and truck owners operating with a broad range of safety practices and levels of management control. Some limited evidence links the amount of motor carrier investment in safetyrelated activities to the firms overall financial condition. One examination of for-hire, general freight carriers found that the average carrier that eventually goes bankrupt spends less on safety and maintenance, has older equipment, and depends more on owner-operators. 65 However, the basis for this finding was not a comparison of accident rates to carrier profitability, but rather a comparison of expenditures related to safety performance to a weighted combination of financial ratios. Moreover, studies of this kind are hampered by the scarcity of industry financial data maintained by ICC, particularly for new entrants. Furthermore, ICC is eliminating requirements for detailed financial reports from those carriers who must still submit records. The question of whether driver speeding is related to the method of compensation extended to drivers has been hotly debated. Undeniably, drivers paid by the job have an economic incentive to speed to produce more revenue-generating trips within a given time period. However, numerous other factors affect a drivers desire to speed. Figure 4-14 shows the relationship between carrier classification and speeding violations among truck drivers involved in accidents. Although speeding is prevalent across all segments of the carrier industry, excessive G. Chow, Deregulation, Financial Condition and Safety in the General Freight Trucking Industry, presented at the Northwestern University Conference on Economic Deregulation and Safety, Evanston, IL, June 1987. speeding is more frequently found among ICCexempt and for-hire carriers according to accident data. Leased drivers have the highest incidence of previous speeding violations and previous license suspensions and revocations. Furthermore, the Figure 4.14.Percentage of Trucks That Speed, by Carrier Classification Private Non commercial o 10 20 30 40 Percent aMar@t share in percent. KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 198B; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85.
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101 NASS (1981-85) data show that leased drivers and drivers operating for ICC-exempt carriers are disproportionately involved in drunk driving accidents. The validity of these figures is difficult to establish because of the relatively small sample size and because NASS data do not have well-defined driver or carrier classification categories. 66 Furthermore, it The National Accident Sampling System driver classifications are is difficult to delineate the class of driver on a specific trip because the same driver could be leased or not leased in different driver classifications and may drive in many different types of operations during the year. somewhat confusing, since the classification categories do not appear to be mutuall y exclusive (e.g., an owner-operator could be trip leased in some instances). ENFORCEMENT State terminal audits conducted as part of the MCSAP program raise important carrier management safety issues. In Arizona, for instance, the three most common carrier violations are: 1) failure to maintain driver qualification files, 2) hours-of-service violations, and 3) failure to maintain inspection, repair, and maintenance records. Officials familiar with Oregons audit results concluded that carriers do not comply with the requirements because of a lack of knowledge or understanding of the regulations as applied to their operations. Moreover, even when the regulations are understood, the cost of noncompliance is so low that it is not an effective deterrent. These findings point to the need for a better education and enforcement program. In Michigan, a direct link has been established between driver qualifications, hours of service, and vehicle operations and commercial vehicle accidents. Making compliance with driver qualification procedures a direct responsibility of carriers has proven to be an effective accident prevention tool. 67 ; Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program quarterly and annual reports. ROADWAY ENVIRONMENT Roadway environment factors are often listed incidentally on many accident reports. Road design/ geometry, weather, lighting conditions, traffic conflict opportunity, and operating speeds can all create conditions that are unforgiving of errors, making an accident more likely. Road Type The functional class of the roadwa y has a profound impact on heavy truck involvement rates for both fatal and nonfatal accidents 68 (see table 4-8). A similar relationship between rural/urban and Interstate/other roadway fatality rates appears in a corroborating study, although the magnitudes differ somewhat. 69 Figure 4-15 depicts frequencies of heavy truck accidents and fatal heavy truck accidents by road clasU. S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highwa y Administration, Monitoring Operations of Larger Dimension Vehicles Report, unpublished manuscript, Jan. 14, 1987. ~qCarsten, op. cit., footnote 38, table 5. sification. Of particular significance is the proportion of heavy truck, fatal accidents (relative to all large truck accidents) that occur on U.S. and State highways, particularly rural, non-Interstates. Some characteristics of these roads create the potential for severe accidents. Table 4-8.Single-Trailer Accident Involvement Rates by Highway Functional Class Involvement rates (per 100 mvm) Nonfatal Functional class Fatal injury Rural Interstate. . . . 1.87 25.53 Rural-other principal artery. . 3.80 31.43 Rural minor arterial . . . 6.49 41.65 Rural major collector. . . 13.67 50.12 Urban Interstate . . . 2.23 52.73 Urban-other principal artery . 9.52 103.41 Urban local . . . . 27.79 55.59 KEY: mvm = million vehicle-miles, SOURCE: Federal Highway Administration, Monitoring Operations of Larger Dimension Vehicles Report, Jan. 14, 1987.
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102 Figure 4-15. Fatal Truck Accidents State highway Us highway Interstate Country roa d Other by Road Classification o 10 20 30 40 Percent apercent of all truck accidents. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on Nationai Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System data, 1983. For instance, fatalities are far more likely in accidents occurring on roads that are not physically divided and thus provide greater opportunity for head-on collisions (see figure 4-16). Roads with higher posted speed limits are significantly more likely to be the site of fatal truck accidents (see figure 4-17). Slightly less than half the heavy truck accidents (49 percent) occur at intersections, and 80 percent of heavy truck accidents occur on roadway alignments classified as straight according to NASS (1981-85) data. Of all heavy truck fatality accidents, only 34 percent occur at intersections and 81 percent occur on straight aligned roads. Finally, 71 percent of nonfatal heavy truck accidents occur on level ground, 28 percent occur at grade, and only 1 percent at crests or in sags. Fatal heavy truck accidents have a similar pattern, except for a slightly higher proportion of fatal accidents at hill crests. Figure 4-16. Fatai Truck Accidents by Median Controi (32.2 ) One 1 way (13.4 7 o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Percent apercent of ail truck accidents. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampiing System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System data. 1983. Lighting Conditions The impact of lighting conditions on heavy truck accident rates is still imperfectly understood. Several studies find that the risk to truck safety is 1.5 to 2.0 times greater at night than in the daytime. 70 Table 4-9 indicates this is apparently true for rearend accidents. Other studies report a higher truck accident rate in darkness during the summer, but a comparable accident rate for daylight and darkness during the winter season, or find no significant impact of lighting conditions. 71 However, there is cMotor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Proceedings of the National Truck Safety Symposium, op. cit., footnote 40. 71L. Strandberg, On the Braking Safety of Articulated Heavy Freight Vehicles, Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 2, p. 3-28; P.P. Jovanis and J. Delleur, Exposure-Based Analysis of Motor Vehicle Accidents, Transportation Researrh Record, No. 910 (Washington, DC: Trans. portation Research Board, 1983), pp. 1-7; and Stein and Jones, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 12.
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103 Figure 4-17. Fatal Truck Accidents by Posted Speed Limits 70 60 50 : 3 0 20 a 10 0 55 mp h 50 mph 45 mph 40 mph Posted speed limit ap ercen t of all truck accidents. (These numbers do not add Up to 100 because not all posted speed limits are included.) SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System data, 1983. Table 4-9.The Effect of Lighting Conditions on Rear. End Collisions Lighting condition Accident twe Daylight Not daylight Rear end . . . . 27.30/o 72.70/o Other . . . . 49.1% 50.9 /0 SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Proceedings of the National Truck Safety SyrrtposiurrJ (Washington, DC: June 1987), pp. 85-89. a correlation between lighting conditions and fatalities; 50 percent of fatal accidents involving heavy trucks occur at night, in contrast to 27 percent of all heavy truck accidents (see figure 4-18). An official for the largest bus company indicated that nighttime accidents involving a bus running into a flatbed trailer truck were a major concern. 72 : Ro&rt Forman, vice president for safety, Greyhound Bus Co., personal communication, February 1988. Figure 4-18 .Combination Truck Accidents, by Time of Day Total accident s --Fatal accident s t I 1 t I I 1 I SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Highway Traffic Safety Administration analysis of Texas data, 1981-83. Weather Conditions Most heavy truck accidents (80 percent) occur in clear weather conditions (see figure 4-19). However, one study concluded that snowy weather is an important predictor of high accident rates for trucks, whereas rainy days have lower truck accident rates than do clear days. 73 Conspicuous by their absence as accident factors are splash, spray, or wind from passing trucks, likel y due to difficult y in measuring this problem from accident reports. Moreover, research literature does not contain detailed discussion on this subject, although individual carriers, the American Trucking Associations, and others have recognized it as a significant problem. Additional study is needed to determine whether other characteristics, such as wet road conditions described in accident reports, are acting as a surrogate for splash and spray problems. 7]Jovanis and Delleur, op. cit., footnote 71.
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104 Figure 4-19.Fatal Truck Accidents by Weather Condition Clear Rain Snow Weather condition apercent of all accidents. (These numbers do not add Up to 100 because not a~l posted speed limits are included.) SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System data, 1983. Sharing the Road In a majorit y (77 percent) of multiple-vehicle accidents involving trucks, the truck is the striking unit. 74 A subset of the accidents where the truck is the striking unit may be attributable to passenger car maneuvers into a trucks path. Annual studies carried out over the past 10 years by the California Highway Patrol of heavy truck collisions place trucks at fault 43 to 53 percent of the time. 75 TA calculations from the National Accident Sampling System (1981-85) data. 5 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote 36, p. 157. An American Automobile Association-sponsored study of multiple-vehicle accidents involving heavy trucks in Michigan notes that the nontruck driver was considered at fault in 69 percent of fatal accidents and 49 percent of serious injury accidents requiring hospitalization. 76 These results suggest that, in addition to developing policies directed at improving the skills of truck drivers, educating the driving public about truck operations and safety requirements is a priority. dAmerican Automobile Association, Cars and ~ruclcs: Sharing rhe Road Safely (Washington, DC: December 1986). CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS Drivers, vehicles, road design characteristics, and ambient environmental conditions form a system in which motor carriers operate. Accident analysis highlights the interrelated nature of highway transportation. The accident studies referenced in this chapter underscore the complexity of this operating system and illustrate the difficulty of isolating single causal factors. Moreover, the precise role that
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105 each accident causal factor plays in heavy vehicle accidents is difficult to determine from current accident reports. OTA finds that better understand ing by State enforcement officers of accident causation and accident investigation methods is needed. Congress may wish to request the Department of Transportation to add accident investigation to the training provided under MCSAP. OTA analysis of Federal and State data shows that the three most common factors associated with heavy vehicle accidents are speed too fast for conditions, the training of the driver, and age and condition of the vehicle. The appropriate speed for conditions is a function of a variety of factors highway and vehicle design, and environmental and human factorsthat must be evaluated by the driver. Any one of them can create unsafe driving conditions. When heavy vehicles operate at speeds higher than appropriate for the road design, the vehicles are closer to their limits of braking and rollover performance capabilities. The time available to the driver to carry out emergency maneuvers is greatly reduced. Other factors, such as insufficient training, fatigue, road design inadequate for trucks, vehicle overloads, and poor visibility can all interact to limit safe speed, In view of the major role speed plays in fatal truck accidents and the many characteristics of heavy vehicles that make them more difficult and time consuming to stop safely, Congress may wish to reexamine the decision to permit truck speeds of 65 mph at the discretion of States and to explore other methods of controlling excessive speeds for heavy vehicles. The heavy vehicle driver operates a complex piece of heavy equipment on roads designed for and occupied by smaller, more responsive vehicles. The driver is frequentl y the key factor in determining whether or not an accident occurs. However, truck drivers are often ill-prepared or inadequatel y trained for their jobs. Accident results indicate that better driver training could help reduce both the number and severity of accidents. Congress may wish to consider requiring 1) that national guidelines for truck driver training be developed and validated; 2) that States must require evidence of training in a school or carrier program meeting the guidelines for the commercial vehicle drivers license; and 3) that the special handling characteristics of different vehicle configurations be a part of the guidelines. A k e y component of such a program is broad representation on the group developing the guidelines, including Federal and State regulatory and enforcement officers, scientists and researchers who study human fatigue factors, and representatives of trainin g schools, carrier management, labor, and vehicle manufacturers. A large number of heavy truck drivers involved in accidents have poor driving records, including speeding offenses and other unsafe maneuvers that are major causes of accidents. Young, inexperienced drivers are particularly at risk of an accident. There is a strong correlation between truck drivers under the influence of alcohol and increased accident likelihood and severity, Inspection and accident records show that carriers exempt from Federal safet y regulations have more violations both for the condition of the vehicle and the qualifications of the driver. Fatigue can play a major role in accidents, particularly early in a shift and after extended shift length. Older drivers are more affected by fatigue than younger drivers. Drivers of large trucks have shown significant increases in driving errors and decreases in driver alertness due to fatigue well within the current hours-of-service limit. Policy options addressing these driver-related factors may be found in chapter 6. Vehicle design and operating characteristics have a significant impact on safety. Brake systems are most in need of attention, with brake maintenance a principal concern. Tire condition and performance are also key factors in safely handling a heav y truck. Override/underride accidents occur more often under conditions of reduced visibility, and trucks with underride protection are involved in fewer fatal accidents. Bobtails and combination trucks running empty pose higher accident risks, because of the complicated relationshi p between brake systems and truck loads. Poor handling and vehicle stability increase the likelihood of rollover, particularl y for doubles operations. Policy options to address these issues directl y are presented in chapter 5. Studies of the relative safety of single and double combinations are not conclusive about differences
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106 in operatin g safety. OTA finds that different safety problems are inherent in each design, and that driver training and experience with doubles and any other heavy vehicle with special handling characteristics can improve their safe operation. Truck occupants typically do not protect themselves by wearing seat belts. As a result, ejection and contact with the cab interior often occur, leading to serious injur y or fatality. Congress may wish to consider a requirement for heavy trucks to have substantial safety restraints and for drivers to use them. Furthermore, OTA concludes that stepped-up research is needed to improve cab design and safety. A public/private cooperative approach could provide a cost-effective way to integrate public health expertise and manufacturing product development. Although roadway environment is recognized as a key part of the safety equation, U.S. and State highways are significantly overinvolved in fatal heavy truck accidents. Clear median markings and sturdy barriers are key factors in safety, and Congress may wish to encourage DOT action on developing standards for such median devices on State and rural highways heavily used by trucks. Finally, the need for cars and trucks to share the roads safely makes education a top priority for DOT and State governments alike. The driving public must be made more fully aware of the handling characteristics of heavy trucks and the potentially lifethreatening consequences of a multiple-vehicle crash.
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Chapter 5 Technologies To Improve Motor Carrier Safety . . -. --.-. -.
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CONTENTS Page The Motor Carrier Operating Environment . . . . . ..............109 Highway Design . . . . . . . . ........................110 Road Geometry . . . . . . . . .......................110 Requirements of Longer Vehicles . . ................................112 Vehicle Technologies . . . . . . . . ......................114 Truck Brake Systems . . . . . . . . ..................114 Truck Steering and Handling . . . . . . . .................123 Truck Tires . . . . . . . . . . ......................124 Trucks and Other Traffic . . . . . . . . ................126 Override and Underside. . . . . . . . . ...............126 Splash and Spray Protection . . . . . . . . ..............127 Truck Visibility . . . . . . . . .......................128 Motor Carrier Driver Safety . . . . . . . . . . . ...129 Truck Cab Structure. . . . . . . . . ....................129 Post-Crash Fires . . . . . . . . .......................130 Cab Environment . . . . . . . . .....................130 On-Board Recording Devices. . . . . . . . . .............130 Conclusions and Policy Options . . . . . . . . ............131 Boxes Box Page 5-A. Brake Retarders . . . . . . . . ....................119 5-B. Rulemaking History . . . . . . . . ..................122 Figures Figure Page 5-1. Typical Low-Speed Inward Off-Tracking Problem at an Intersection ........112 5-2. Longer Combination Vehicles . . . . . . . . . .. ....113 5-3. Types of Brakes for Medium and Heavy Trucks. .........................116 5-4. Cam Brake Assembly . . . . . . . . . ............117 5-5. Stable Stopping Distances of Heavy Air Braked Vehicles From 60 mph on Dry Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .....117 5-6. Braking Power Necessary To Maintain 55 mph v. Percent Grade.... .......119 5-7. Tractor-Trailer Brake System Schematic Diagram . . ................120 5-8. Stopping Distance of Fully Loaded Truck at Two Brake Adjustment Levels ..122 5-9. Hitching Mechanisms for Twin-Trailer Trucks ...........................125 5-10. Typical Car/Truck Front Bumper Height Differential . . ..............126 5-ll. Organizations Involved in Brake Matters . . ......................133
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Chapter 5 Technologies To Improve Motor Carrier Safety Accident analyses and equipment research demonstrate that appropriate road design and vehicle technologies can help prevent highway accidents and reduce fatalities and injuries. Moreover, recent research shows that some aspects of highway design make driving todays heavy vehicles safely very difficult. Although new technologies cannot eliminate the effects of poor road conditions or unsafe driving, they can reduce the likelihood that a roadway mishap will result in a catastrophe. This chapter examines the relationship between the vehicle, the driver, and the roadway environment, and describes the impact of highway design characteristics, vehicle equipment, and safet y technologies on vehicle performance. As motor carriers of passengers, intercity buses operate under man y of the same rules and regulations as the trucking industry. Certain aspects of truck safety are directly applicable to bus safety. Critical items such as brakes, tires, and lights are important for the safety of bus passengers and the motoring public and must be monitored by bus operators. Thus, although bus safety issues are not addressed separately in this chapter, man y technology issues are applicable to that industry as well. THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT Todays highway environment is substantially different than that of 10 years ago. The increase in automobile ownership, dispersed patterns of work and residence, and the speed and convenience of truck transportation have increased the use of the Nations roads, Traffic on many highways in and around major metropolitan areas is already at or above design capacity, and road congestion is a fact of daily life for millions of Americans. The volume of automobile traffic, combined with large numbers of heavy trucks, has made accidents more likely simply by increasing the opportunities for accidents and exposing drivers to stressful driving conditions. The impact of heavy traffic volume on safety is compounded by the fact that in recent years, passenger cars have become smaller and lighter while commercial trucks and some buses have become longer, heavier, and wider. 1 Combination trucks with 48-foot single trailers or twin 28-foot trailers are permitted on Interstate highways in all States under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA). Segments of the motor carrier industry have mounted intense efforts to expand the network of roads and access points available to these IPatrl~la F. Naller, Hca\} Truck Safct~ ]n a Changing Hlghwa} Transpc~rtatl(>n En\[r(Jnmcnt, prcwntccl at the annual meeting of the American Sc]~[ety of Mechanical Englncers, Phocn]x, AZ, Ncn, 1617, 19s2, pp. 4243. vehicles. However, large portions of the Nations highway system, particularly State roads, were designed primarily for automobiles, not for vehicles with the size and operating characteristics of heav y trucks. Moreover, the geometric design policy by which virtually all highway design is guided in the United States provides for only a slim margin of safety for large trucks. 2 The STAA also created the National Truck Network, which includes the Interstate system and designated Federal-Aid Primary routes. The States must allow the heavy vehicles reasonable access between the National Truck Network and terminals and facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), which establishes design guidelines for highways, . has not adopted a design vehicle that reflects the STAA semitrailer combination. 3 Thus, only portions of the Interstate system and the National Truck Network were designed and constructed to accommodate the larger STAA vehicles. Rohert Er\in et al., lmpxr of.$pec]fic Ce(]metric Features on Truck c ~pcr~rlt>n, and Saktl at Interchanges (Nashington, DC: Federal Hghwa~ Adrninlstratlon, August 1985), p, 1. Federal Hlghwav Admlnl~tra[lon, GuIdc fbr .ilonitor-ing and Enhamlng .%fir} on the ,Yar]c)nal Tru,k ,Net\{ork (Xiashlngton, DC: LI.S. Department of Transpot-tatlon, Oct[]hm 19S6). 109
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110 HIGHWAY DESIGN Highway designs are. developed after considering such factors as traffic volumes, vehicle mix, accident history, turning maneuvers and frequency, economics, and speed. 4 In principle, the design of a highway facility is determined by . the largest design vehicle likely to use that facility with considerable frequency or a design vehicle with special characteristics that must be taken into account. 5 Highway features affect at least four major safety factors including: l l l l the ability of a driver to maintain vehicle control and identify hazards; the number and type of opportunities for conflicts between vehicles; the consequences of an out-of-control vehicle leaving the travel lane; and the behavior and attentiveness of the driver, particularly the choice of travel speed. However, the contributions of even the best highway design to safe vehicle operation can be counterbalanced by variables such as weather, lighting, and traffic. 6 This section examines the interaction between road design geometry and heavy trucks, highlighting potential low-cost countermeasures to dangerous roadway situations. Road Geometry AASHTO design standards guide the construction and reconstruction of highways across the country. In most cases, these guidelines were formulated for the passenger car, the dominant vehicle on the road. 7 Stopping sight distances on hillcrests, for example, were based on the locked-wheel performance of passenger car tires, and the passing sight distance standards for passing lanes were based Ibid., p. 16. American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, A Policy on Geometric Design o~l-fighways and Streets (Washington, DC: 1984), pp. 19-20. Transportation Research Board, Designing Safer Roads: Practices for Resurfacing, Restoration, and Rehabilitation, Special Report (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1987), P 77. Robert Ervin et. al., Truck Control Problems Posed by the Design of Highway Ramps, Vehicle High way Infrastructure: Safety Compatibiiiry, P-194 (Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., February 1987), P 29. on car acceleration capabilities. 8 AASHTO standards for the Interstate highway system can accommodate STAA trucks. However, States are free to choose the design vehicle for highways within their borders, and in fact, used standards for smaller vehicles for many of the segments of the Nations road network that are heavily used by trucks. 9 Thus, despite design efforts aimed at minimizing safety hazards, certain features of the highway system are contributing causes for accidents involving heavy vehicles. Highway standards are evolutionary, and change occurs very slowly. Moreover, the relationship between safety and highway design features is still poorly understood, because statistical correlations have not been determined. 10 Even after new standards are developed, existing roads may not adequately accommodate heav y trucks. Recently released AASHTO highway design standards do not provide fully for the largest trucks authorized by the STAA, for example, since 102-inch semitrailers require wider lane widths than the new standards provide on curves. *l In addition, automobiles need longer passing sight distances and more time to overtake longer tractor-trailer combinations. To make matters even more confusing, the current design manual offers 14 different design vehicles from which States ma y choose. 12 Seven areas of AASHTOs Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets pose concerns for truck operations, including: 13 sight distance and no-passing zones, l grades and climbing lanes, l intersection design and operation ~p,s. F anc h er sight Distance Problems Related to Large Trucks, Symposium on Geometric Design for Large Trucks, Transportation Research Record 1052 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 1986), pp. 29-30. Transportation Research Board, Twin Trailer Trucks: Effects on Highways and Highway Safety, Special Report 211 (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1986), p. 179. ~ransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 6. I ITransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 9, P. 180. ~Larry King, Office of Engineering, Geometric and Roadside Design Branch, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, May 10, 1988. ]J.W. Hall, Introduction, Symposium on Geometric Design for Large Trucks, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 1.
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111 interchange and ramp design, l roadside design and traffic barriers, l traffic control device usage, and l safety. For example, one basic AASHTO design vehicle tractor and an approximately 40-foot trailerwas intended to serve as the model for designing rural, two-lane intersections. However, this vehicle was subsequently widely used for designing intersections in urban areas across the country. Tractors with 48foot or longer trailers making turns in such intersections override all available clearance space between travel lane edge and road edge. 14 Intersections are potentially dangerous in other ways as well. In a turn, the wheels on the rear axle of a vehicle follow a track inside the path of the wheels on the front axlea phenomenon called offtracking. Tractor-trailers making turns begin to offtrack inwardly at slow speeds and trailers often encroach on intersecting traffic lanes, striking other vehicles (see figure 5-1). Low-speed off-tracking can be reduced or eliminated by mechanisms that steer the wheels of each axle, an expensive alternative generally reserved for specialized equipment. Current intersection designs do not satisfactorily accommodate the effects of low-speed off-tracking, especially :~Robert Er~,ln, ~ctlng director, University of Michigan Transpor tatlon Research Institute, persona] communication, Jan. 13, 1988. Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff Large trucks can be hazardous to other vehicles at intersections because the trailers cannot make sharp turns. for the 48-foot semitrailers that are now basic equipment. 15 Highway interchange ramps, even those on many Interstate highways, are especially hazardous locations for trucks. 16 AASHTO geometric design standards for ramps are based almost exclusively on passenger car dimensions. 17 While negotiating curves at high speeds, commercial vehicles exhibit outward off-tracking-each outside wheel of an axle travels a path outside the path of the preceding outside wheel. The outside wheels on a trailer may strike a curb or other object close to the roadway, damaging the curb or object or, worse, causing rollover. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reports that high-speed off-tracking is common, an important safety issue as the population of multiple-trailer combination vehicles increases. 18 No studies have been conducted regarding combination vehicle configuration and accidents due to off-tracking. Particular ramp design parameters make it all too easy for a truck driver to lose control of his vehicle. A truck entering a curving highway entrance or exit ramp at high speed must slow down rapidly on a curving roadway, placing a truck at immediate risk for a jackknife or rollover accident. 19 Compound curves, where the degree of curvature varies throughout the curve, present particularly difficult challenges .20 Drivers often do not understand the dynamic characteristics of the vehicle and the interaction with the changing highway geometry. They thus do not adequately adjust their speed for the situation and are consequently moving too fast IJohn W. Hutchinson et al., Highway Factors in Truck Wrecks, Proceedings, Symposium on Accommodation of Trucks on the Highway: Safery in Design (Nashville, TN: American Society of Ci\il Engineers, May 11, 1988). 1bSnehamay Khasnabis, Operational and Safety Problems of Trucks in No-Passing Zones on Two-Lane Rural Highway s, S}rmposium on Geometric Design for Large Trucks, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 38; and Federal Highway Administration, Longer Comhinqrion l~ehicle Opcrarions in Western States (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, October 1986), p. III-7. ITErvin et al., op. cit., footnote 7, p. 29. INNational Highway Traffic Safety Admlnistratlon, ~eat} Truck Safety Srudy, prepared in response to the Motor Carrier Safetv Act of 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, January 1987), p. 132. !Ervln et al., op. cit., footnote 2, p. 118. ~JJustin True, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, Oct. 21, 1987.
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112 Figure 5-1 .Typical Low-Speed inward Off-Tracking Problem at an lntersection Path of front right tire of r tracto r n n Truck width Path of rear left tire of tractor n wmwmmmmmmmmmmmmmm n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n Stationary automobile in path of off-tracking trailer Path of rear left tire of trailer l n l n n n l n n n n n \ Position at start of turn n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n q Off-tracking of trailer Off-tracking at intersections presents dangers to other drivers because of the wide path covered by the turning tractor-trailer. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment modification of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Federal Highway Administration diagrams. for each succeeding section of the curve. Speed advisory signs compound the problem by giving speeds appropriate for cars not trucks. Requirements of Longer Vehicles Drivers of longer combination vehicles (LCVs) Rocky Mountain Doubles, turnpike doubles, and triples (see figure 5-2)also confront major driving challenges due to highway design. LCV dimensions greatly exceed the dimensions of vehicles that even Interstate highways were designed to accommodate. 21 Problems include off-trackin g at intersections, difficulty staying within travel lanes on tight curves, and the increased distance that other vehicles must travel to pass an LCV on two-lane roads. 22 In metropolitan areas, LCVs greater overall trailer length and inherent handling characteristics further complicate safe operations. Urban freeways also have more crowded travel lanes, reducing distances between vehicles and increasing the need 2iFederal Highway Administration, op. cit., footnote 16, P. -8. ~Ibid., p. III-8.
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113 Figure 5-2.Longer Combination Vehicles Rocky Mountain double (operated only in certain States) I 45 48 I I 1 Turnpike double (operated only uncertain States) I 45-48 I I 45-48 I Triple (operated only uncertain States) l 28 I l 28 l 28 1 Lengths shown are typical; shorter or Ionger lengths are possible depending on carriers needs and State laws. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on American Trucking Association, Inc for rapid steerin g movements. 23 Abrupt turning movements by the driver, such as changing lanes to reach an exit or to avoid slow traffic ahead, create special dangers from rearward amplification and swaying of the rear trailer. States that permit LCVs provide for these large vehicles in several ways to keep them off highways that cannot accommodate them. The most common method is to construct large truck parking or exchange lots at intervals on turnpikes and Interstate highways. Carriers that use turnpike doubles or triples use these lots as assembl y and break up points for the LCVs. Tractors haul single trailers from origins off the Interstate to the lot where the trailers are hitched in tandem to a single tractor for the long haul to a destination lot. There the trailers are broken apart and either hitched to another tandem for Ibid., p. 111-7. a further leg or attached to an individual tractor and hauled to the final destination. A segment of the trucking industr y is pushing for increased productivit y through expanded use of LCVs. However, safety problems and pavement deterioration at the edge of the roadway caused by off-tracking are likel y to result if large numbers of LCVs use inadequate road segments for increased off-highway access. 24 Although research is currently underwa y to identif y major shortcomings in road design, immediate, wholesale reconstruction of the road network is not feasible. Since man y longer trucks are here to stay, some form of interim safety countermeasures are prudent public investments. Countermeasures include selective improvements at high-risk locations, determined by traffic volume q Ibid., p. 111-16.
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114 and accident analysis and aimed at reducing accident frequency and severity. Highway safety can be improved during reconstruction by correcting deficiencies in: 25 l l l l l l l l l lane and shoulder widths, roadsides and sideslopes, bridge entrance widths, road horizontal alignments, sight distances, intersections, pavement edge drops, pavement surface conditions, posted speeds for ramps and curves, and sign design, height, and location. Warning signs that communicate timely and specific safe speed information for trucks on highway entrance or exit ramps are relatively inexpensive countermeasures. Outer curb removal on interchange ramp curves can reduce trailer rollovers. Other safety efforts, such as runaway truck escape ramps, grade-climbing lanes, and better pavement markings can also reduce hazards inherent in truck operations. These vary in cost and scope and illustrate actions that State and local governments can undertake. Some State highway departments have begun to address the special problems of large, heavy trucks in mixed traffic. The California Department of Transportation adapted a computer model to com~fTransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. 105-106. pare data representing the geometry of State roads against the operating parameters of large trucks. The model identified portions of the State road network where STAA trucks would have difficulty negotiating the existing road geometry safely. California chose to use special signs to designate the highways where STAA trucks could travel. 26 The trucking industry found the designated network overly restrictive; efforts to effect a compromise are under way. Other jurisdictions are considering constructing exclusive truck-use lanes on congested highways in urban areas. The State of Texas has undertaken a feasibility study for such lanes focused on the I-35 corridor between Dallas and San Antonio. The study showed that present volumes on 90 percent of the corridor did not warrant exclusive truck-use lanes. The researchers used a computer program to evaluate the study corridor and obtain information on volume-to-capacity ratios and effective median width. Congested segments of the corridor near urban areas contained insufficient roadway median space for truck lanes. However, one of the six design options, elevated truck lanes, was suitable for some segments of the corridor. 27 John Van Berkel, chief, Truck Operations Branch, California Department of Transportation, personal communication, Nov. 12, 1987. ~;Dan R. Middleton et al., Moving Analysis Program to Evaluate Geometric and Operational Feasibilities of Exclusive Truck Facilities, Geomerric Design and Operational Effects, Transportation Research Record 1122 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 1987), pp. 132 and 141. VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES Accident data analyses suggest that improvements in several areas of equipment design and maintenance could enhance heavy vehicle safety. The braking system is foremost among these safety technologies, and brake systems are especially problematic for tractor-trailer combinations. Such issues as handling and steering, occupant protection, visibility and lighting, and splash and spray control also are important for buses and combination and straight trucks. Current technologies are discussed in the following sections. The truck of the future is likely to incorporate advanced electronics, such as monitors for vehicle operation, vehicle controls, drivetrain controls, information displays, electrical systems, comfort and convenience features, and driver performance aids. 28 However, until these technologies are proven and cost-effective, they will not be readily adopted by the industry. Truck Brake Systems U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) inspection data show that the most frequent violation on trucks pulled out of service is poorly maintained or misadjusted brakes. Moreover, OTA found wideNAuromotive News, Heavy-Duty Electrucks, Nov. 24, 1986, p. D14,
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115 spread misunderstanding particularly among owneroperators, about the proper installation and maintenance of brakes. Three basic air brake foundation brake designs are currently fitted to heavy trucks (see figure 5-3): cam brakes, wedge brakes, and disc brakes, Over 90 percent of heavy-duty, air braked vehicles use an S-cam drum brake, which is operated via a push rod from a diaphragm air chamber (see figure 5-4). The wedge drum brake has built-in automatic adjusters. The disc brake provides improved resistance to fade, comes equipped with automatic slack adjusters, and operates more effectively at high temperatures than drum brakes. 29 Disc brakes on trucks presently cost more ($250-$500 per axle) than drum brakes and account for less than 3 percent of the truck brake market. 30 Early problems with truck disc brakes included premature pad wear and rotor failure due to cracking, conditions resulting from design problems and incompatibilities between disc and drum systems. 31 Although many operators of fleets comprised of straight trucks are long-time disc brake users, compatibility problems need to be resolved before disc brakes can be widely used on tractor-trailers. Correct driving practices are also a key issue. Brake System Performance Brake performance is generally evaluated in two dimensionsstopping distance and stability. The ability of truck braking systems to perform according to these criteria has been tested by NHTSA using driver-modulated stops (driver applies brakes to just below wheel lockup and modifies the pressure until the vehicle comes to a complete stop). As figure 5-5 shows, all trucks, regardless of configuration and load, take longer to stop from a speed of 60 miles per hour (mph) than passenger cars and buses. Loaded tractor-trailers perform relatively well, better than empty vehicles, particularly bobtail tractors, since brake systems are typically optimized for loaded conditions. Very short wheelbase bobtail ~Chris Shapeley, A Comparison of Car and Truck Safety, Proceedings, SymPsium on Accommodation of Trucks on the Highway: Safety in Design, op. cit., footnote I 5. W Fleet Owner, Fleets Hold Back From the Next Brake, July 1983. ~lIan Jones, Truck Air BrakesCurrent Standards and Performance, presented at the 28th Annual Conference of the American Association for Automotive Medicine, Denver, CO, October 1984, p. 12. tractors require as much as 500 feet to stop, almost three times more than a passenger car. Truck brakes must be sized to handle vehicle loaded weights that can be up to three times greater than vehicle empty weights. For large combination vehicles, the relationship between a trailers brakes and those of the tractor are critical; incompatible systems create unbalanced braking and excessive 32 wear. Tractors and trailers are manufactured separatel y by different companies in separate industry segments. Broad ranges of performance exist for tractors, trailers, and other components, and some of the ranges may be incompatible with other parts of the vehicle system. 33 Current NHTSA requirements for air brake systems (tractor-trailers have air brakes on each axle) require brake actuation in 0.45 seconds for tractors and 0.30 seconds for trailers. 34 However, many safety experts and industry representatives believe that tractor-trailers should have more evenly matched or synchronized brake actuation times and antilock systems to help maintain stability and control. The effectiveness of truck brakes is determined by many elements within the braking system. They include brake system capacity, brake force distribution, application timing, limiting valves, linings, and maintenance and adjustment. Brake System Capacity Truck brakes rely on friction and brake lining material to provide sufficient torque to slow and stop a vehicle weighing as much as 80,000 pounds within a reasonable distance. Repeated or continuous brake use (such as on long or steep hills) generates high temperatures that cause the brake linings to lose effectiveness either from fading or disintegration. 35 Thus, on a 60 percent grade, an 80,000-pound tractor-trailer requires 167 times more braking power than a 3,000-pound passenger car, even 3~Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Big Trucks (Washington, DC: 1985), p. 12. ~~National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 57. CFR 571.121. ~iNational Highway Traflc Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 59.
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116 Figure 5.3.Types of Brakes for Medium and Heavy Trucks edge brake brake SOURCE: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and G. DeClalre, Vice President of Research and Engineering, Rockwell International Corp.
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117 Figure 5.4.Cam Brake Assembly Brake SOURCE, Off Ice of Technology Assessment modification of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration diagram Figure 5-5.Stable Stopping Distances of Heavy Air Braked Vehicles From 60 mph on Dry Road 4 Car s Buses o 100 200 300 400 500 Stopping distance, in feet Range fo r q : typical vehicles though the tractor-trailer weighs only 27 times more. (See figure 5-6.) 36 To achieve better fuel efficiency, truck manufacturers have worked to reduce vehicle rolling resistance and improve aerodynamics. However, this puts greater stress on truck braking systems. Current truck brakes do not have sufficient heat capacity for all braking requirements, and brake thermal loads may increase in the future. Brake retarders could be useful in lessening thermal loads on brakes, especially in hilly and mountainous terrain. (See box 5-A.) Brake Force Distribution Ideally, distribution of braking energy among the trucks axles matches the load placed on it. However, in normal truck operations, load size and weight distribution vary by shipment, and nothing in current brake systems modulates brake force distribution in reaction to changes in loading. In general, if the braking forces on the tractor and trailer are poorly matched to the way the load being carried SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data, 1987 hlbld., p. 61.
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118 Photo credit: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff A driver demonstrates how to connect brakes when attaching a trailer to a cab. is distributed, the brake components can overheat leading to fading, disintegration, or even fire in very extreme cases. Until new brake technologies become standard equipment on new vehicles, achieving brake force distribution and balance compatible with each of the ways in which trucks can be loaded and operated will be difficult. 3i One method of redistributing brake force as loading changes is a load proportioning valve. The simplest load proportioning device is one that senses whether there is a connection between a tractor and trailer. If the tractor is operated without a trailer, braking effort is shifted to the steering axle from the drive axle. The proportioning valves can reduce the stopping distance for a bobtail tractor moving at 60 mph from 500 feet to about 300 feet. Domestic manufacturers offer this relatively simple and inexpen ; Ibid., p. 91. sive ($50) device 38 as standard equipment on some models and as optional equipment. The device cannot discriminate between a loaded and an empty trailer and benefits onl y a bobtail tractor. More sophisticated load proportioning devices are widely used on heavy vehicles in Europe, in part because European Communit y regulations for truck brakes cannot be met without such a system. These devices continuously monitor the load on each axle b y measuring the deflection of the suspension system. Brake Application and Release Timing Brake application and release times need to be as quick as practical. Although long release times do not affect stopping distance, they do make it difficult to release the vehicles brakes quickly in the bid., p. 91.
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119 Figure 5-6.Braking Power Necessary To Maintain 55 mph v. Percent Grade / / / . / : / l 1 A 1 A 1 1 1 1 80,000 pounds Truc k 3,000 pounds Car 1 234567 8 Percent grade SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data, 1987, event that the driver overbrakes and locks the wheels. The longer the trailer wheels remain locked, the more likely that trailer swing or jackknife can occur. Current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) regulations specify that tractor brakes may take no longer than 0.45 seconds to actuate once the pedal is pushed, but give no minimum time. Consequently, tractor manufacturers have designed their brake systems for the worst casethe longest wheelbase tractor with the slowest actuation times. 39 However, the actuation times may be much less than the maximum, and the tractor brakes may actuate so quickly that the trailer cannot respond effectively. Trailer manufacturers have been unable to design an air brake system that will actuate at the same time as that of the tractor. (See figure 5-7.) Requiring a minimum actuation time as well as a maximum could ensure that tractor brakes do not actuate too quicklyprior to the trailer brakesputting the combination out of balance. One industry group v Larry Strawhorn, American Truckin g Associations, ~rsonal communication, hfar. 4, 1987. holds that a minimum brake actuation time for tractors should be set at 0.30 seconds, 4o and trailer brakes should also actuate and release within a certain time. NHTSA has addressed several of these problems through a notice of proposed rulemaking 41 The goal is a more effective timing balance without an increase in complexity of the system. The notice proposes changing the existing brake application and release timing requirements for trucks, tractors, and trailers, and establishing new timing requirements for the control-line coupling between lead and trailing units. American Trucking Associations, Comments on NHTSA Docket No. 85-0~, Notice 1, 50 Federal Register 20113 (Dec. 30, 1985). ] Docket No. 85-07, Notice 1, Air Brake Systems, 50 Federal Reg~ster 20113 (Ma y 14, 1985).
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120 Brake Chambers supply circuit r] Rear axle circuit r] Front axle circuit Spring brake and trailer supply circuit Antilock Brakes least one domestic manufacturer is already installing a European antilock system on U.S. vehicles. Antilock brakes can prevent the wheels from locking and reduce the potential for directional instabilities that often lead to jackknifing and overturning. An antilock system consists of devices attached to each truck axle that sense when a wheel begins to lock and momentarily release the brakes. As early as 19, a NHTSA study comparing trucks fitted with antilock systems with those without, found that jackknifing accidents were reduced by 29 percent. Second-generation antilock systems are now being developed using recent advances in microprocessor technology. Although no widespread domestic production of antilock systems exists at this time, at Antilock technology has progressed sufficiently so that many safety advocates are calling for a regulation requiring antilock brakes on all new equipment. Brake and tractor manufacturers have developed tractor-only, tandem-axle systems that they believe will be compatible with U.S. industry operations. However, the lesson of FMVSS 121 (see box 5-B) is that the reliability of antilock system technology must be proven before antilock brakes can be mandated. In cooperation with antilock suppliers, truck manufacturers, and motor carriers, NHTSA is testing equipment with antilock systems to acquire performance, reliability, maintainability, and cost data.
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121 Trailer System Automatic Limiting Valves An automatic brake pressure limiting valve (ALV) is used by some operators to reduce brake application pressure to the front axles of combination-unit trucks under all but panic stops. Steering wheel pull during braking is related to poor front brake adjustment and maintenance. Brake experts and manufacturers contend that ALVs may cover up front brake maintenance problems, degrade stopping capability when the vehicle is operating empty or on slippery roadways, and burden other brakes on downhill grades. Proponents among carriers hold that limiting valves on standard front brakes keep the front axle from locking or the vehicle from pulling to one side during a sudden brake application under emergency stopping conditions. 42 Brake Maintenance and Adjustment Appropriate brake adjustment is essential for adequate braking for current systems. NHTSA tests conducted on brakes at different adjustment levels show that stopping distance increases as brake adjustment deteriorates (see figure 5-8). Adjustment of S-cam drum brakes is especially critical because 4~Larrv Strawhorn, American Trucking Associations, quoted in Paul Richards, Point/Counterpoint: Front Brake Limiting Valves, Cornmcrcial Carrier Journal, December 1987, p. 59.
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122 drivers cannot sense brake adjustment when brake systems depends on compressed air for actuation. Steering axle brakes are often poorly maintained only half of trucks randomly inspected had operative front-wheel brakes. Those that were in operaFigure 5-8.Stopping Distance of Fully Loaded Truck at Two Brake Adjustment Leveis +34% cool brakes Hot brakes Fully adjusted At recommended readjustment point I +76% 0 10020030040050060070 0 Stopping distance, in feet SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1986; based on National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data, 1987. tive had missing parts or were so out of adjustment that the brakes did not function, and, in some cases, drivers had detached the front-wheel brakes. 43 Most truck brakes must be adjusted manually, and this requires regular maintenance. However, automatic slack adjusters can take up the slack created by normal wear of the brake shoes. Although early models had problems with overadjustment, causing the brake to overheat and wear excessively, these problems have been overcome. 44 Approximately 20 percent of heavy vehicles are presently using automatic slack adjusters at a cost of $100-$150 per axle, 45 and three tractor manufacturers have announced plans to make these standard equipment within the next year. Even poorly performing automatic adjusters, when properly installed, are improvements over manual brake adjustment. Their potential safety benefits underscore the need to establish a performance test ~~studie~ b y Cunagin (1986), Kirkpatrick (1986), and Smith (1986) as cited in National Highwa y Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 72, Jones, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 13. 5 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 74.
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123 and acceptable performance limits for brake adjustment systems. Such systems could be enhanced by diagnostic devices to indicate when routine brake adjustment maintenance is needed. Brake Linings Brake linings are essential components in providing sufficient braking force. Although Federal regulations specify minimum performance requirements for brakes on newly manufactured trucks, no standards exist for brake linings or replacement linings. In practice, heav y truck operators often do not or cannot obtain linings that match the performance of those that came as original equipment on the vehicle, This is due in part to the difficulty in identifying liningslining codes are hard to read and interpret, and the code is destroyed as the lining wears out. Moreover brake linings vary widely from manufacturer to manufacturer, from formulation to formulation supplied by a single manufacturer, and even within a given formulation from batch to batch. Although equipment as fundamental as brake linings needs quality control and reliability, no immediate solution is available. The Society of Automotive Engineers is currently developing an improved method of rating brake linings, but the time to develop a rating scheme is lengthy, and the precision of the scheme is hard to predict. Truck Steering and Handling Heavy truck sizes and physical properties give them distinctly different and unique handling characteristics. Merging and turning actions, steering around corners, and lane changes present problems not found in car driving that increase the potential for truck accidents. Considerable research has been conducted on steering and handling as well as vehicle design and stability. The engineering details, as summarized below, have been well documented recently by NHTSA. 47 Rollover A rollover is a major risk in truck driving, especially for tractor-trailers. Truck rollovers occur because as a vehicle moves through a turn, centrifuIbld, p. ??. ; Ibid., pp. 96154. gal force acts to roll the vehicle outward from the turn, causing the vehicles inside tires to lift from the ground. If the imbalance is too great, the vehicle rolls over. The ratio of the track width to the height of the trucks center of gravity is the basic determinant of the vehicles stability, although in maneuvers such as lane changes, the dynamics of the vehicle are also important. For example, rollovers can also be caused by rearward amplification through the trailer, caused by inherent properties of the vehicle design. The most effective ways to reduce rollovers would be to lower the center of gravit y and to use wider vehicles. Wider (102-inch) vehicles reduce loading heights and permit wider track and suspension spreads. It has been estimated that if both tractor and trailer were 102 inches wide, the incidence of rollovers might be reduced up to 35 percent for combination-unit trucks operating with medium-density freight. 48 Rearward Amplification Rearward amplification is manifested as rear trailer side-to-side oscillation. It can be caused by slight steering actions, by changes in road surface, or by wind disturbances. A drivers steering maneuver at the front of the vehicle increases in intensity at the rear of the vehicle or combination. Although the oscillations may not be large enough to cause loss of control, they sometimes result in trailing units encroaching on other traffic lanes and endangering other motorists, or moving off the pavement and striking a curb or roadside obstacle. Rearward amplification greatly magnifies the effects of a steering action on the rear trailer of doubles units and LCVs. Furthermore, the driver of a multiple-trailer combination has difficulty avoiding a rollover caused by steering actions, because he cannot feel what the rear trailer is doing and because of the delays between steering inputs and responses at the end of the combination train. 49 A drivers first indication of incipient rollover due to lateral oscillation of a trailer is observation of trailer motion via the rearview mirror, 50 although warning technologies have been developed. 51 Thus, truck{ Ibid., p. 109. 4qIbid., p. 102. 5rRoundtable discussion, Proceedings, S\mposium on Accommoda. tion of Trucks on rite Highway: Safety in Design, op. cit., footnote 15. jlEdward Domenico, Truck Systems, Inc., personal communication, June 1, 1988.
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124 ing industry pressure to improve productivity and efficiency by using longer and multiple-trailer combination vehicles, makes rearward amplification and stability of rear trailers an issue of considerable concern. Research has shown that rearward amplification is strongly related to the type of trailer-to-trailer hitching mechanism. The most common mechanism is currently the A-train, a dolly that is connected to the towing unit by a single pintle hitch (see figure 5-9). Although the A-train provides easy maneuverability at low speed, it is less stable at highway speed than a conventional tractor-semitrailer and has comparatively poor rearward amplification performance. Technical solutions to rearward amplification are under consideration, although current alternatives all have trade-offs in cost, weight, maintenance, and operational difficulties compared with the A-dolly. The most basic innovation to the hitching mechanism has been the introduction of the B-train (see figure 5-9), which greatly reduces rearward amplification. In this design, the pintle hook articulation joint is eliminated and the vertical support and fifth wheel functions of the dolly are incorporated into the rear of the leading trailer. A number of practical problems limit the B-trains use to doubles where the trailers are always used together, are not interchangeable, and do not need to be unloaded from the rear. 52 Some Canadian provinces now give Btrain users a 1,000-pound payload advantage. 53 A popular variation, the C-train, is composed of a tractor-semitrailer towing one or more full trailers made of a B-dolly and semitrailer. Off-Tracking Off-tracking occurs when the wheels on the rear axle of a vehicle do not follow the same track as the wheels on the front axle. (See the section on Road Geometry earlier in this chapter for a more detailed discussion). Off-tracking complicates heavy truck handling and steering for the driver during turning movements and on curved portions of roadways. : National Hlghwav Traffic Safetv Admimstraticm, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 130. ~Ian Jones, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, personal communication, Apr. 19, 1988. Faulty tires and brakes are frequently cited as safety violations during inspections. Truck Tires Tire performance affects the stability and control of trucks. Ultimately, tires transmit all the driving and braking torque, and develop the cornering and directional stability essential to the performance of highway vehicles. Tire manufacturing technology has advanced considerably in the past 10 to 15 years, so that fewer than 5 percent of tire failures are believed to be due to manufacturing or material failures. Accident reconstructions suggest that a tire failure in an accident is more likely to occur than an accident caused by a tire failure. 54 Although metal objects, debris in the roadway, and poor tire maintenance (principally underinflation) are major causes of tire failure, little is known about tire failures that cause accidents. 55 Radial tires have become the standard of the industry although bias-ply tires are used as well. Lifecycle cost analyses have determined that radial tires have longer tread wear, more durable casings, yield greater fuel economy due to lower rolling resistance, and provide better handling. These advantages far outweigh the higher initial costs. 5 6 +David Williams, Smithers Scientific Services, personal communication, May 17, 1988. ~jPeggy Fisher, president, Roadway Tire Co., personal communication, May 17, 1988. ~~homas Fo~ and Joseph Zekoski, Impact of Truck Tire Selection on Contact Pressures, presented at the Paving and Transportation Conference, Symposium on Pavement Rutting, University of New Mexico, Jan. 4, 1988.
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125 Figure 5-9.-Hitching Mechanisms for Twin-Trailer Trucks hitch B-Train hitch C-Train hitch SOURCE: Roads and Transportation Assoclatlon of Canada, Canadian Vehicle Weights and Dimensions Study, Technical Steering Committee Report, 1987
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126 Retread tires are used throughout the industry, although no studies have been completed of the extent of their use or their impact on safety. The retread industry has made considerable advances in product reliabilit y in recent years, due to demands from both the trucking and airline industries, and confidence in the product is high. 57 Trucking firms with successful maintenance programs have found retreading to be safe and cost-effective, and some even find it advantageous to do their own retreading. 58 An industry trend is visible toward use of low profile tires for line-haul trucking. 59 These have a 5; Fisher, op. cit., footnote 55. s Gerald F. Stanley, The Master of Maintenance, Commercial Carrier Journal, May 1988, pp. 73-78. Ford and Zekoski, op. cit., footnote 56, p. 10. TRUCKS AND Collisions between heavy trucks and smaller vehicles, primarily cars, inevitably result in more serious consequences to the occupants of the smaller vehicle. A truck can weigh as much as 40 times more than a car, has a much stiffer structure, and stands higher above the ground. Trucks are designed to carry heavy payloads and have large, stiff frames that do not generally deform much in a frontal collision and therefore absorb little of the kinetic energy generated in a crash. Thus, when cars and trucks collide, practically all of the damage occurs to the car. 62 Override and Underride In a car/truck collision, if the trucks bumper or body structure is too high to engage the cars bumper, the cars primary energy absorption capability is not utilized (see figure 5-10). Either the car strikes the truck and slides underneath it (underside), or the truck strikes the car and climbs over it (override). h] Rear-end collisions in which passenger vehicles underride the rear ends of trucks or trailers are very JNaticmal Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 138. ; Ibid., p. 145. shorter side wall than standard tires, permitting lower trailer floors and greater trailer capacity. Coupled with improved wheel systems, low-profile tires can reduce truck weight, maintenance costs, and recapping costs. 60 Using a single, wider tire to replace a pair of standard tires to reduce both capital and operating costs is also being considered by industry. Safety concerns include the fact that single tires on trucks running empty have less lateral grip, and the tires can bounce sideways. Moreover, heavily loaded single tires do not spread the loaded weight in the same manner as dual tires and may cause additional damage to the road pavement and the roadbed. 61 Overdrive, As the Wheel Turns, September 1987, pp. 14-18. lAsa Sharp, Goodyear Tire Co., personal communication, May 6, 1988. OTHER TRAFFIC Figure 5-10.Typical Car/Truck Front Bumper Height Differential SOURCE: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. likely to cause fatalities. A study of fatal accidents in Texas and Michigan found that underride occurs in more than 90 percent of car/truck rear-end collisions. 64 NHTSA estimates that truck underride accidents account for approximately 300 occupant fatalities per year, or 1 percent of all fatalities. 65 A Federal standard requiring an underride guard on trucks and trailers in excess of 10,000 pounds was originally proposed by NHTSA in 1969. NHTSA subsequentl y amended its proposal b y requiring Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, op. cit., fcotnote 32, p. 7. Jeffrey Miller, deputy administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, March 1986, p. 73.
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127 Photo credit: Land Line Sturdy rear underride guards can prevent a car from sliding under the trucka frequent cause of fatalities in such accidents. trucks and trailers to meet a modified strength test with whatever components were in position to contact the test block. 66 However, NHTSA has neve r issued a final standard. Underride guards for the rear ends of trucks are required by FHWA under Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation 393.86, although many safety experts believe the standards specify guards that are not strong or low enough. In the absence of an adequate Federal standard, the Michigan legislature established a standard similar to the modified NHTSA proposal and required rear underride guards for 53-foot trailers in 1986. 67 NHTSA officials recently stated that alternatives, such as visibility enhancements for the sides and rear ends of trucks, are being tested. 68 These in clude additional lighting and reflective materials that would help drivers avoid collisions altogether. The proposed test block was a rectangle 4-inches high and 12inches wide, and its height was uniformly set with the lower edge 16 inches from the ground. Each truck or trailer had to meet the strength test at all points out to the outermost test points on the vehicle. These changes were made in response to industry concerns about economic and operational difficulties posed by a requirement for a maximum road clearance of 18 inches. 35 Federal Register 12956 (Aug. 14, 1970). ~~Ro&rt E rv i n IJniversity of Michigan, in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Transcript of Proceedings~A Workshop on Technologies Affecting Truck Safety, unpublished transcript, Mar. 10, 1987, p. 210. ~Mi]ler Op ~it footnote 65; and Diane Steed, administrator, Na. tional Hi~hway Traffic Safety Administration, testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, March 1986, p. 73. Researchers in Germany have sought to design truck front-end protection to reduce override impact. The most effective design was found to be an energy-absorbing bumper mounted low; it absorbed energy, and disengaged and deflected the car after initial impact 6 9 Independent tests conducted in Britain showed that a device with certain force and deflection characteristics fitted to the front of trucks, could substantially reduce override and injuries and fatalities. 70 Splash and Spray Protection Splash and spray created by a heav y truck on a wet pavement restricts the view for both car and truck drivers. Section 404 of the STAA directed DOT to establish minimum standards for the performance and installation of splash and spray suppression devices for use on truck tractors, semitrailers, and trailers to improve visibilit y on we t 71 The Statute required the development roadways of these standards within a year. In 1984, Congress extended the industry compliance deadlines in the 1982 act, because standards had not yet been issued by FHWA and NHTSA 7 2 In 1985, NHTSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking requesting comments on minimu m standards and installation requirements for spray suppressant flaps and side skirts. 73 The proposa l M. Danner and K. Langwieder, Association of German Automotive Insurers, Department of Automotive Engineering, Results of an Analysis of Truck Accidents and Possibilities of Reducing Their Consequences Discussed on the Basis of Car-to-Truck Crash Tests, Paper No. 811027, unpublished manuscript, 1984. OS. Penoyre and B. Riley, Transport and Road Research Laboratory, Desirable Structural Features for the Design of Front and Rear Underrun Bumpers for Heavy Goods Vehicles, Report No. C168/84, unpublished manuscript, 1984. ~lsection 414 of th e Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Public Law 97-424, 49 U.S.C. 2314. In 1970, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would have required spray protectors on most heavy trucks; these devices consisted of fenders, modified side skirts, and mudflaps. However, subsequent tests indicated that use of this equipment caused a dangerous level of brake heat buildup, The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration withdrew the proposal in 1973. See 35 Federal Register 14091 (Sept. 4, 1970) and 38 Federal Register 28840 (Oct. 17, 1973). : Section 223 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, Public Law 98-554, 98 Stat. 2847. New trucks were to have been required to comply with splash and spray suppressant standards within 1 year after the y are promulgated. Existing trucks were to be retrofitted within 4 years after the standards were issued. ]50 Federal Regisrer 14631 (Apr. 12, 1985). Spray suppressant flaps han g down behind tires and are designed to reduce the amount of spray. Side skirts are flat surfaces that hang down from the side of a vehicle (continued on next page)
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128 suggested that flaps capable of varying levels of spra y reduction would be required 74 FHWA also pub lished a proposed rule, consistent with NHTSA requirements, requiring the installation of flaps and side skirts on truck tractors and certain semitrailers manufactured on or after 1 year from the effective date of a final rule. Older vehicles would be retrofitted within 4 years. 7 5 The motor carrier industry reacted negatively to the proposed rulemakings, and in late spring 1988, NHTSA formally dropped all proposed requirements for spray reducing materials on heavy trucks. While recent research generally shows that these devices decrease the density of the spray cloud, test results vary according to the type of vehicle used and other environmental conditions. b For example, drop-frame trailers, such as those used by United Parcel Service (UPS) and some household goods moving companies, do not have much distance between trailer and road surface, and the wheel well creates a compact area where the water is con tained 77 Nevertheless, UPS is using effective splash and spray retarding equipment on tractor-traile r combinations. The cost per unit is in excess of $200 ($30 for tractor hardware, $25 for the dolly, $120 for side skirt mounting, $5 per flap, and $40 to install the splash suppressant bristles on the side of the trailer). UPS believes that it provides a safer environment for motorists and improves the publics perception of the trucker. However, maintenance problems are associated with some splash and spra y guards. Rubber flap s tend to break off. 1ce builds up on the flap face and eventually falls onto the roadway in chunks, creating a different safety hazard. On some vehicle configurations, such as tankers, dump trucks, and loggers, plastic bristles do not stay on the flaps of the truck for very long. Perhaps the most pressing ap(continued from previous page) and prevent water coming off the top wheel wells, tires, and vehicles bottom from forming into spray clouds, The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration also stated that when flaps capable of achievin g a 75-percent reduction in spray became available (anticipated within 4 years), new vehicles would be required to have the improved flaps. Federal Register 14630 (Apr. 12, 1985). Miller, op. cit. footnote 65; and Neil Thomas, Office of Motor Carriers, Standards Development Division, personal communication, Mar. 25, 1987. ;Thomas Hardeman, United Parcel Serwce, In Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., foomote 67, p. 161. plication is for splash and spray controls on longer combination vehicles and triple-trailer combina tions, where water is thrown out by additional axles and wheels. Oregon has a regulation that requires all triples to install splash and spray equipment. Tests of aerodynamically-shaped tractors and trailers show that properl y designed side deflectors and dams on tractors and skirts on trailers can substantiall y reduce splash and spray. 78 Open-graded asphalt used in road construction can also decrease splash and spray, give good traction in wet weather, and reduce road noise dramatically. The effective lifetime of this material is around 5 years, yet the cost of laying down the pavement is relatively modest. Truck Visibility Automobile drivers have a difficult time at night correctl y perceiving the shape, road position, location, and speed of poorly illuminated trailers. This problem makes rear and/or side underride accidents even more likely. A NHTSA test using relatively inexpensive reflective markings for the rear ends of trailers showed that the markings significantly reduced rear and side collisions at night. It is estimated that $50 to $100 worth of reflective tape (purchase and installation per traiIer) could produce a 15percent accident reduction. w BFarrel Krall, Navistar International Corp., personal communication, Aug. 5, 1988. q William J. Burger et al., Improved Commercial Vehicle Conspicuity and Si~alling Systems: Task 3, Field Test Evaluation of Ve(continued on next page) Photo credit: Freight/iner Corp. Aerodynamic side deflectors and dams are attached to this cab to increase fuel efficiency and reduce splash and spray.
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129 indust r y has taken its own initiatives in this area as part of corporate marketing. For example, FritoLay places a reflective compan y logo on the rear door of each trailer. However, this can present a separate hazard if other drivers mistake a vehicle for a fixed facility on the side of a roadway. A performance standard that improves luminosity without restricting corporate graphics is likel y to gain industry acceptance Poor l y illuminated trailers can also increase risk of side underride collisions. For example, a trailer being maneuvered into position at a loading dock of an older urban plant or warehouse may briefl y block the travel lanes of a busy city street. Without special measures to increase its visibility at night, the trailer may not be reflected soon enough for the car driver to react. Flatbed trailers pose special problems because their lack of exterior surfaces does not provide sufficient area for extensive safety-lighting fixtures. (continued from previous page) hlcle Reflecrmmzarlon Effec~i;eness (Nrashlngton, DC: National Hlghw.ay Traffic Safet} Administration, September 1985), p. 111-8 per errata sheet. MOTOR CARRIER Although much of the attention to truck safety has focused on the impact of truck safety on other vehicle occupants, the safety of a truck driver is also of concern. Ejection is one of the leading causes of fatalities and injuries among tractor-trailer occ cupants, and all available data indicate drivers sustain proportionatel y more serious injuries if they are thrown from the vehicle 8 4 The simplest way to prevent ejections is through use of safety belts, and a driver that remains seated has a chance to regain control of the vehicle after an accident. Nevertheless, reluctance to use a safety belt remains a major problem among truck drivers: Efforts have been under way since 1980 to encourage more drivers to wear safety belts, and industry groups have assisted motor carriers with programs to convince cab occupants to wear safety belts. Current designs, however, are based upon passenger car standards and National Hghway Traffic Safety Aclminlstration, Truck Occupant Protection, prepared in response to the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Vashlngton, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, December 1986). Color also plays a role in truck visibility at night. It can assist another vehicle driver in determinin g the speed of an approachin g truck. The color green is used in Japan on trucks weighing over 17,600 pounds. A series of green vehicle marker lights signal the speed of a truck; one light indicates the truck engine is running; two lights mean the truck is going more than 25 mph; and three lights indicate the truck speed to be 38 mph or greater. w Colors also cause bias in depth perception, an important factor for drivers of vehicles moving at different speeds at night. For example, the color red is seen before the color blue on a distant object 81 and the ar rangement of lights can also provide cues about an objects proximi t y and its relative speed. 82 More over, ones reaction to lights and colors is somewhat dependent on knowing what one is looking at. 8 3 Jim Winsor, Japanese Trucking: Tougher Equipment Safet}r Regs, F/eaty Dury Trucking, December 1987, p. 16. [Louis Siverstern, research section chief, Systems and Research Center, Honeywell, Inc., personal communication, Apr. 27, 1988. ~Rudolf Mortimer, professor, Department of Health and Safety Studies, University of fllinois, L1rbana, personal communication, Aur. 27, 1988. Ibid. DRIVER SAFETY are not necessarily appropriately designed installation 85 Truck Cab Structure for truck Strengthening the structure of truck cabs could make them more crush resistant and better able to protect occupants. However, many serious injuries sustained by truck occupants who remain inside the vehicle during accidents result from contact with interior components, primarily the steering wheel. Research on cab interiors has focused on materials, fire resistance, noise absorption, and projectile reduction Since the majority of crash-involved truck drivers move in more than one direction during the crash sequence, contacts with the steering wheel, windshield, instrument panel, and surfaces of doors and i Robert E. Heglund, assistant VICC president and manager, Transportation Ser\ices Loss Prmention Department, Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, personal communication, Mar. 22, 1988.
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. 130 door headers are common sources of injury .86 At least one European truck manufacturer uses a steering wheel that is both smaller and more flexible than those typically installed in U.S. trucks. Limited case study evidence has shown that this design causes fewer and less severe driver injuries in crashes. 8 7 Research in this area has lagged in the United States. Post-Crash Fires In most cases, it is extremel y difficult to pinpoint the exact source of truck fires, especially when more than one vehicle is involved in the crash. Fuel from the truck is apparently a primary factor. Improvements to address this issue focus on the concept of cab fireworthiness. Suggestions have been made to incorporate on-board automatic fire suppression equipment; kill switches for electrical systems to eliminate ignition sources; use of flame-resistant, nontoxic materials in the cab; and methods and devices to protect cab occupants during a cab-engulfing fire for a limited time period. At least one truck manufacturer currently locates the batteries under the cab, to try to reduce the likelihood of fire after a collision. Cab Environment The immediate working environment for the truck driver is the truck cab. Equipment manufacturers and the trucking industry have examined seats safety belts, controls, access, and noise to determine the best design for actual drivers use. 88 A properly designed truck cab can . increase the productivity of drivers of heavy trucks by reducing driver fatigue, improving driver satisfaction and morale, and reducing the number of accidents. 8 9 The ambient environment within the truck cab also has an effect on the driver. Tests have shown that contamination from diesel vehicle carbon monoxide is not a problem, but that nitrous oxide levels can be higher than recommended by the Na~Natlonal Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Op. cit., footnote 84,. p. 76. Ibid., p. 78. Mark Sanders, U.S. Truck Driver Anthropometric and Truck Work Space Data Survey, prepared for the Society of Automotive Engineers, January 1983. ~hage Berggren, Equipment Productivity: At What Price? unpublished remarks to the American Trucking Associations Foundation Meeting, Ocean Reef, FL, Apr. 29, 1988. Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff Heat, noise, and vibration in the truck cab contribute to a stressful working environment for drivers. tional Institute for Occupational Safety an d Health 9 0 Ride quality in heavy trucks is sometimes very poor. This complex issue is a product of variations in the truck design including wheel base, axle location, frame stiffness, and suspension type as well as vehicle load and road surface condition. The large engine in close proximity to the cab adds vibration, noise, and heat. Heat and humidity have an adverse effect on driver physiology and performance, nois e levels are often high enough to have adverse effects, and vibrations are at a level that creates fatigue. 91 These pose formidable challenges for researchers and manufacturers. On-Board Recording Devices On-board devices that record engine revolutions per minute, vehicle speed, oil temperature and pressure, cooling system temperature, and so forth are currently available for approximately $1,500 to $2,500. Although the information collected permits the examination of distance traveled, driving time, breaks, daily rest periods, and speed limit compliance, carriers usually purchase these systems to manage fuel efficiency. Safety advocates have proposed Federal Highway Administration, Toxic Gases in ~eavy ~u(Y Diesel Truck Cabs, Report No. FHWA-RD-77-139 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transponation, October 1977). lNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration, A Study of Hear, Noise, and Vibration in Relation to Driver Performance and Physiological Status, Report No. HS-801313 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, December 1974).
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131 using on-board recording devices to improve compliance with hours-of-service rules and speed limits. One firm reports that an on-board device pays for itself in 6 months through cost savings in fuel, maintenance, and driver time (reduced paperwork requirements). 92 It also helps streamline the preparation of reports that must be kept on file by the company for oversight agencies, 93 providing an economic incentive for installing the device. The system also includes an alarm that is activated if a driver operates at speeds greater than 55 mph for more than 1 minute, a capability that made the company decide installation of speed governors was unnecessary. Management made major efforts to gain acceptance from drivers before installing the devices, giving seminars to help drivers understand how and why the organization was going to use the recorders. After initial resistance, drivers understood that the recorders could be advantageous, proving, for example, that a late delivery stemmed from following the rules. 94 Another large transport company reported that since it installed on-board recording devices, fuel mileage has improved by 12 percent, tire mileage has increased to 270,000 miles, brake lining life has increased, and insurance rates have dropped. To gain acceptance among drivers, the company initiated an incentive plan based on the drivers performance evaluation. From information gathered by the recording device, each driver receives a grade based on a cumulative average of all major functions on the trip, such as maximum speed, engine revolu9: Phillip Brown, The Travelers Companies, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, p. 183. ~~The Department of Transportation has accepted recording device output in lieu of logbooks for some carriers. Phillip Brown, The Travelers Companies, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, p. 186. tions, and idle time. The incentive plan pays drivers an extra 2 cents a mile if they receive a performance grade of 10, and 1 cent per mile for a grade of 9. Some drivers now prefer trucks equipped with the devices so that they can earn extra compensation. 95 An insurance case was recently settled on the basis that the tape from an on-board recording device showed that a truck driver had geared down in anticipation of an automobile drivers cutting in front of him to enter a ramp. The device showed that the truck driver did, in fact, gear down, but could not do so fast enough to prevent the accident. The automobile driver lost the case. 96 While several European countries currently require on-board recording devices in their heav y trucks, installation of these devices on trucks in the United States remains voluntary, although their use is increasing. 97 Companies using on-board recorders as standard fleet equipment are doing so for multiple management-related reasons, not primaril y to improve the fleet safety record. 98 Although some devices may not be tamper proof, FHWA has determined that tampering with on-board computers is not a serious problem. 99 Pritate Line, A Driver Incentive Plan, With an On-Board Computer, Rewards Proper Vehicle Operation, October 1986, p. 15. ~Phlllip BroW,n, Th e Travelers Companies, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, pp. 236-237. ; Freightliner estimates that about 5 percent of their new trucks are equipped with electronic recorders at the customers request (Otto Carroll, Freightliner, personal communication, Aug. 3, 1988). Rockwell estimates that on-board electronic recording systems are currently being used on about I percent of the heavy trucks in operation. G.J. Flannery, Rockwell International, personal communication, Feb. 25, 1987. %ictor Jennings, Ryder Truck Rental, in Office of Technolo gy }, Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, pp. 185-186. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Highway Administratmn, Mar. 13, 1988. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS Highway system design issues and heavy vehicle truck sizes and heavier weights safety technologies interact as parts of a system. Yet, faster than changes to highway have occurred far design standards. too frequently, components of the system are treated OTA finds that Congress may wish to require as isolated and separate by government agencies and DOT to develop a systematic Federal approach to the respective industries. While some technical immotor carrier safety. A first step is better coordi provements for heavy vehicles are under developnation on heavy vehicle and highway safety issues ment, major safety issues remain unaddressed. among DOT agencies, including NHTSA and Changes to government policies allowing larger FHWAS Office of Motor Carriers (OMC), high.
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132 way planning, safety, and design offices. Key components include accumulation of objective data to identify highway design problems and aggressive testing programs to determine the point at which equipment technologies and accident countermeasures are reliable and cost-effective. Also important are consistent Federal regulations, long-overdue at DOTNHTSA and OMC brake standards still differ in some respects. Furthermore, OTA finds that resolving conflicts, such as industrys push for still longer vehicles and the limitations of the Nations road network, will require far better communication and cooperation by Federal and State governments and industry. State decisions on permissible vehicle sizes and weights are often not consistent with the ability of the highway system to accommodate the vehicles. Working groups that can focus on setting research agendas and model standards, developing interim countermeasures, voluntary field testing by industry, and the sharing of experimental data can contribute. No governmental mechanism exists currently that adequately deals with such difficult issues, and active participation by Federal and State officials is essential to a systems approach. While the stability and braking characteristics of heav y trucks have been well studied by NHTSA, cab occupant protection and reducing the effects of car/truck collisions are two areas that need additional research. Congress may wish to encourage NHTSA to step up work on these important safety technology issues with the goal of determining and implementing appropriate standards. The Federal Government has a role to play in determining whether safet y technologies should be specified as performance criteria (which state minimum acceptable capabilities) or as mandated design standards (which specify in detail the equipment that must be used). m Vehicle equipment compatibility issues are extremely difficult for industry to resolve without active Federal participation. OTA concludes that Federal agencies such as OMC, NHTSA, and in1m]oe R. Morris, Safety Implications of Changes in Truck Size and Weight Limits, Proceedings of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Trafic (Ottawa, Canada: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Apr. 27-30, 1987), vol. 3, pp. 4-14. dustry must jointly seek solutions to compatibility issues. 101 While truck manufacturers and users agree that upgraded Federal brake standards are needed, they also stress that industry should work with NHTSA and FHWA to test new technologies and to develop appropriate regulations. OTA finds that issuing standards for antilock brakes will be warranted within the next 3 to 5 years. The NHTSA test program for antilock brakes on tractors now underway is an essential step. Antilock systems for tractors and trailers is the ultimate goal. If manufacturers of both tractors and trailers are involved in the rulemaking process, the development and acceptance of compatible and well-balanced braking systems will be accelerated. 102 The Tractor Trailer Brake Research Group, an industry group (see figure 5-11), has been working very slowly toward resolving longstanding brake and compatibility issues. Active participation by NHTSA and OMC could speed the process. OTA concludes that the Federal Government could play an active role in brake lining performance tests and identification methodology, with the goal of issuing performance criteria and compati~ bility standards for both original and replacement linings, Other longer-range brake research activities also warrant Federal support. Examples of basic research include braking b y wire and improving tire/braking force capability. Critical needs exist for maintaining existing technologies even while new innovations are under considerationinitiatives for improving brake maintenance, for example. Widespread misunderstanding of truck brake systems and brake maintenance and adjustment suggests a need for a comprehensive education program for owners and operators of all fleets and mechanics. A training requirement for mechanics could be an important step. Manufacturers indicate that enough is known about vehicle visibility and splash and spray for preliminary equipment standards and performance criteria to be developed. NHTSA may have overlooked some possible splash and spray control options. Congress may wish to request NHTSA to address these issues with renewed vigor and issue regulations in the near future. IOIOffice of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67. 1~Ibid., pp. 32-43.
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I Standard s Council Ad Hoc Technical ~ Advisory Panell: Braking and Handling j Brake : Committee i KEY: NHTSA = National Highway Transportotion Safety Administration; FHWA = Federal Highway Administration; OMC = Office of Motor Carriers SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on information from American Trucking Associations, 1987.
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134 The adoption of safety-related technologies by trucking firms and owner-operators is not an automatic process. The technologies must mitigate a perceived or apparent problem and provide a reasonably shortterm return on investment. Because they do not have economies of scale available to large firms, owner-operators have difficulty realizing economic payback for safety-related equipment. Improved safety equipment that has clear economic benefit will eventually be accepted by industry, 103 as evidenced by purchases of technologies such as automatic slack adjusters. 104 OTA finds that when economic advantages of equipment that has proven safety value are not apparent, setting minimum Federal standards for equipment that apply equally to all motor carriers, regardless of classification, is appropriate. Since many equipment safety issues do not translate directly into improved productivity, industry acceptance of new technologies is slow under any circumstances. The fragmentation of the industry hampers dissemination of safety information on new technologies. OTA finds that a thorough education and information program for new technology requirements could benefit purchasers and users. Congress may wish to allocate resources for such tasks. Video instructional displays at truck stops around the country could inform drivers of the risks they take by operating trucks with deficient brakes, tires, or lights. These displays could also present information on ways to avoid and correct other safet y problems. States could coordinate these activities with their enforcement programs. 1 0] Ibid. {w William Leasure, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, p. 170. Retrofitting trucks with newly mandated safety equipment can have significant costs. Difficulty in designing retrofit equipment adaptable to all older vehicles and the evolutionary nature of technology focus manufacturers R&D efforts toward new vehicles. 105 Congress may wish to consider requiring DOT to develop implementation programs for new and retrofit technologies, and to set deadlines for programs. Finally, the cost of educating drivers to use new safety equipment is one that will have to be accounted for in the marketplace. Although carriers may need to pay drivers and mechanics more for having additional technical skills, the higher costs to shippers and ultimately the public can be more than offset by reduced accident costs. On-board recording devices are cost-effective management tools and can motivate drivers to be more efficient. Their use for driver oversight has also been successful if management followup is appropriate. However, management experience to date shows that careful dialog with drivers to minimize potential adverse reactions is important when introducing the devices. OTA finds that an immediate mandatory requirement for on-board recording devices may be premature. Education for management, labor, and enforcement officers is essential to promote acceptance of these tools as safety devices and prevent abuse. Congress may wish to consider requiring DOT to plan and implement a program to accomplish these goals. 1C5P.A. Gustafson, Cummins Engine Co., Inc., personal communication, Apr. 28, 1987.
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Chapter Human Factors in Truck Safety 6 *89 m@/?: K&&n Mathheen, OTA staff Trainees watch an instructor demonstrate how to back up a truck.
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CONTENTS The Driver . . . . . . . Driver Screening . . . . . Alcohol and Drug Use Among Drivers Drug Testing . . .. ... .......+. Management Approach . . . . Driver Training. . . . . . Training Standards . . . . Training Programs . . . . . Sharing the Road With the Driving Public Hours of Service . . . . . Fatigue and Sleep Needs . . . . Page . . . . . . . . . 137 . . . . . . . . . 137 . . . . . . . . . 140 . . . . . . . . . 141 . . . . . . . . . 142 . . . . . . . . . 145 . . . . . . . . . 145 . . . . . . . . . 146 . . . . . . . . . 147 . . . . . . . . . 147 . . . . . . . . . 149 Technologies to Address Human Performance Issues. ..........................152 On-Board Conclusions Box 6-A.United Figure 62. 6-2 6-3. Recording Devices. . . . . . . . . ...........153 and Policy Options . l . . . . . . . . . 153 Box Page Study of Successful Safety Management ......144 sequence . . . . . Information Processing Incident History of Heavy Truck Drivers Involved in Accidents Truck Accident Risk Compared With Duration of Truck Work Tables Table Page . . . 138 ..139 Shim:::::::..ls l Page 6-1. Drinking-Related Accidents by Driver Classification .......................140 6-2. Drinking-Related Accidents by Carrier Classification . ..................140 6-3. Current and Proposed Hours-of-Service Regulations .......................150
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Chapter 6 Human Factors in Truck Safety Heavy vehicle drivers must continuously process and react to a variety of information, and even momentary lapses in concentration can cause an accident. The behavior of other drivers, the vehicle, roadwa y design, and the traffic environment all can distract the driver, as can other factors such as carrier management attitudes and policies or economic and scheduling pressures. Human error is cited as the cause of over 60 percent of motor carrier accidents. Although the Federal Government has focused on some aspects of vehicle and highway design, it has given inadequate attention to the interacting and subtle human factors that affect motor carrier safety. This chapter describes driver performance and explores the relationshi p between human factors and truck safety, describing industry safety programs and identifying Federal policy options. THE DRIVER The typical human information processing sequence includes receiving information, recognizing and evaluatin g it, reaching a decision, and taking actionall within a ver y short time period. (See figure 6-1. ) An alert driver can process information in less than 2 seconds when confronted with an unexpected hazard in the roadway. 1 However, fatigue or other impairment affects both the speed of the drivers mental processes and the accuracy of his judgment. 2 The continual changes in the roadwa y environment and the special skills required in stopping and maneuvering heavy trucks suggest that a competent heavy truck driver should be well trained, experienced, and alert. Driver Screening Driving a heavy vehicle demands greater skills than operating a passenger car, both in normal driving situations and in responding to potential hazards. 3 Heavy trucks are less easily maneuvered than automobiles, requiring greater distances for passing, stopping, turning, and accelerating, and forcing drivers to anticipate and avoid potential trafP. D. Olsen et al., Parameters Affecting Stopping Sight Distance, NCHRP Report No. 270 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 1984). M. Allnutt Human Factors: Basic Principles, Pilot Error, The Hu man Fac-rors, R. Hurst and L. Hurst (eds. ) (London, England: Granada Publishing, 1983). Transportation Research Board, Zero Alcohol and Ocher Options: L.lm~rs for Truck and Bus Drlters, Special Report 216 (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1987). fic conflicts. Thus, a safety conscious carrier manager will take seriously the task of identifying and hiring drivers with appropriate skills, attitudes, and training. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for carrier hiring procedures are broad enough to permit wide variations in company practices. All driver applicants must complete a written application and must take a road test and a written test. However DOT gives no clear guidelines for what constitutes passing either test. In fact, DOT does not require that the knowledge test be passed, only that the applicant be told the correct answer for the items missed. (For further details on requirements, see chapter 3.) In practice, even these regulations are ignored by some carriers or interpreted with considerable latitude. Commercial Drivers License Program 4 tests will determine whether a prospective driver has the minimal level of skills to operate a heavy truck. However, the carrier managements evaluation of a drivers background and skills will remain the dominant hiring standard. Many carriers devote careful attention to driver hiring, requiring reference checks, referrals, drug screening, and interviews, over and above the backCommercial \ehicle operator licensing was changed dramaticall y by passage of the 1986 Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, but the gradual phasin g in of the program will delay the full impact of the legislation. The Commercial Drivers License Program of the Department of Transportation established fite key dates as milestones for identifying and removing unqualified drivers from the road. For further information on the program, see ch. 3. 137
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138 I _---.I 1 a) -----K L a) -----= L ---------. -1. ------------c 0 2= : c (% & -------------
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139 ground checks and pre-employment physical examinations that DOT requires. Thorough prehiring evaluation can pay major dividends for management. One company uses a carefully developed test to help determine which applicants have the coordination, physical capability, and mental attitude to handle a tractor-trailer combination. The company has found a very strong correlation between the driving skill level exhibited during the evaluation and driver performance after hirings Moreover, when a driver eventually does have an accident, the cause is frequently a driving behavior characteristic that the test had identified as needing improvement. Such a diagnostic tool can provide a carrier with invaluable information to use in both initial driver training and retraining. 6 Automotive safety research shows that those who indicate on a screening test that they are risk-takers are likely to be relatively aggressive in their driving behavior, less mindful of cautions about safety, and more likely to drive longer hours without rest. On the other hand, risk averse drivers, though not necessarily more skilled, are likely to give other highway users a way out in dangerous road situations and to show prudence in their driving decisions. i However, not all carriers understand the benefits of careful screeninga DOT study of carriers rated unsatisfactory in the Pacific Northwest found that 35 percent of the firms had unsatisfactory driver qualification procedures. 8 Although driving a truck requires different skills than driving a car, one study that examined the relationship between a truck drivers driving records in his personal vehicle and in his truck found a strong similarity between the records. OTA analysis of the National Accident Sampling System data also shows that heavy truck drivers involved in accidents have received citations for previous safety violations, particularly for speeding (see figure 6-2). However, the prior record in the truck is a better predictor than either the record in the private vehicle or the John Dannemiller, Leaseway Transportation Corp., in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Transcript of Proceedings OTA Workshop on Human Factors and Truck Safety, unpublished transcript, May 19, 1987, p. 43. Fred E. VanccAa\l, Michigan State University, personal communication, May 18, 1988. Richard Schwing, General Motors Research Laboratories, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5. Robert Bleakley, Federal Highway Administration, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 65. Figure 6-2.-Incident History of Heavy Truck Drivers Involed in Accidents 50 ~ 40 30 20 10 0 Prior incidents u KEY: DWI = Driving while intoxicated. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident Sampling System data. total record including both private and commercial driving. 9 Management interest in more stringent screening procedures ma y be thwarted by demographic and economic pressures. The Department of Labor reports that the truck driving work force is expected to increase 17.2 percent b y 1995, placing truck driving among the 37 fastest growing occupations out of 500 studied. 10 At the same time, industr y analysts forecast that finding qualified truck drivers will become more difficult over the next decade, with a 30-percent reduction in the available driver pool expected by 1992. This reduction will be due to retirements, drug screening, tighter Federal driver requirements and licensing standards, a shrinking national labor force, and the perception that truck driving is a high-stress job requiring excessive time Shirley B. Geissin~r et al., The Relationshi p Between a Truck Driver!s Performance in a Personal Vehicle and in a Large Truck (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Highway Safety Research Center, June 1986). IPNationa] Transportation Safety Board, Training, Licensing and Qualification Standards for Drivers of Heavy Trucks, Report No. NTSB/SS-86/02 (Washington, DC: Apr. 17, 1986), p. 5. 87-004 0 88 4
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. 140 away from home. 11 Truck driver wages rose just over 20 percent between 1979 and 1987, as compared to a rise of almost 50 percent for all occupations. 12 To meet its needs, industry may have to resort to nontraditional labor sources, such as women and minorities, and increase wages. Recent proposals to allow 18to 20-year-oIds to operate commercial vehicles and heavy trucks as on-the-job trainees are a result of the shrinking driver pool. These proposals raise safety concerns, since accident statistics point directly at young drivers as a high-risk group. Thus, although the importance of the selection process in screening out unqualified drivers is well recognized b y many carriers, the need for personnel may cause the numbers of problem drivers behind the wheel to grow. Steps may be required to bolster application of uniform and stringent driver selection practices throughout the industry. Alcohol and Drug Use Among Drivers Although currently being revised, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations now prohibit possessing, being under the influence of, or using an intoxicating beverage or drug while on duty, or consuming an intoxicating beverage within 4 hours of going on duty. Furthermore, a person is not qualified to drive if he or she has a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism or drug dependency. These rules were based on the knowledge that driving performance is directly affected by intoxication or the influence of drugs. While the reaction to the ingestion of drugs and alcohol varies depending on the individual, 13 studies show that, for the majority, human performance is degraded b y blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) levels of 0.05 or even lower. Epidemiological studies also indicate that the risk of being involved, as well as at-fault, in a motor vehicle accident begins increasing at low BAC levels. 14 This is in contrast to a legal standard for intoxication in ] Jim Windsor, Serious Accidents: Manpower Shortages vs. Driver Quality, Heavy Duty Trucking, July 1987, p. 18. 1~Joanne F. Casey, American Trucking Associations, Statistical Analysis Department, An Assessment of the Truck Driver Shortage, unpublished manuscript, Aug. 10, 1987, p. 7. 111. c. Drew et al., Eff&z of SmaIl hses of Alcohol on a Skill Resembling Driving (London, England: Her Majestys Stationary Office, 1959). I+Transportation R=earch Board, op. cit., footnote j! PO q highway driving currently set at 0.10 BAC in most States. 15 Many of these research findings are based on automobile driving performance, and heavy vehicle drivers operate more complicated equipment on roadways often designed for smaller vehicles. Previous studies suggest that although more skilled persons are better able to compensate for the effects of alcohol than those less skilled, even skilled drivers show a decreased ability to handle complex tasks at low BAC levels. 16 Data analysis clearly correlates drinking with truck accident severity (see figure 4-6 in chapter 4). Recognizing the dangers of alcohol consumption and driving, one large petroleum refining company that sells fuel to truck stop operators has written provisions into its service contracts forbidding the sale of alcohol at those stops. 17i Alcohol use is a problem that cuts across driver classifications as shown in tables 6-1 and 6-2. lflf the Secretary of Transportation does not issue a regulation by October 1988, the blood-alcohol concentration for commercial vehicle drivers will automatically drop to 0.04, consistent with present regulations for aviation crews and railroad engineers, lcTransportation Research Board, op. ck., footnote 3, P. 57. TGisela Vallandigham, vice president of membership, National Association of Truck Stop Operators, personal communication, Mar. 15, 1988. Table 6-1.Drinking-Related Accidents by Driver Classification Number of drivers Drinking Drinking involved not involved Noncommercial . . 856 90,234 Full time . . . . 3,555 579,260 Part time. . . . 205 27,100 Owner-operator . . 518 66,996 Leased. . . . . 546 11,832 Other ... . . . 303 2,319 SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment analysis of National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85. Table 6-2.Drinking-Related Accidents by Carrier Classification Number of drivers Drinking Drinking involved not involved Noncommercial . . 856 90,234 For-hire/common . . 856 179,662 For-hire/contract . . 1,258 194,806 Private . . . . 1,932 242,130 ICC Exempt . . . 1,142 51,770 Other . . . . 151 20,163 SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment analysis of National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85.
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141 Evaluations of other drug-related impairment levels are far more primitive. Reliable evidence about the effects of drugs on drivers is sketchy, and most States do not test for drugs other than alcohol. Further research on the subject is needed for marijuana and other controlled substances before adequate impairment guidelines can be established. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) hopes to establish some guidelines for impairment levels as part of its current drug and alcohol study; the study is currently scheduled for completion in 1989. 18 Drug Testing Many carriers require pre-employment drug and alcohol testing. When one company started a drugalcohol testing program 2 years ago, 15 percent of the applicants tested positive in the first year. 19 A year later, only 8 percent of applicants tested positive; this company had sent a signal to prospective drivers that they need not apply if they have a drug or alcohol problem. Such individuals may seek employment from other carriers with different screening policies; indeed, one company in the Midwest reported that 47 percent of the applicants it screened had positive drug screens. Another carrier that conducted drug screening of current employees and job applicants found that 17 percent of the tests were positive. 20 Where management fails to take assertive action, the drug problem among employees can become entrenched. For example, one motor carrier safety director found evidence of marijuana use while making spot checks of his companys tractors. A subsequent investigation led to the discharge of 50 percent of the drivers at the terminal involved. In another instance, a laborator y that performs drug screening for several major carriers found that even for repeat examinations, 13 to 18 percent of the tests were positive. In some cases, this occurred despite the fact that employees were given 30 to 60 days advance notice of the tests. 21 OTA staff found that KPat Loach, project director, National Transportation Safety Board, personal communication, Mar. 18, 1988. Ken Thom~on, Yellow Freight System, Inc., in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 147. ~Richard Landis, Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Feb. 18, 1986. l Ibid., p. 28. drugs are readil y available at truck stops, some of which are well-known among drivers for drug activity, and CB radios are used openly for advertising or soliciting drugs. 22 Appropriate formal procedures for periodic drug and alcohol testing of employees have been the subject of much debate. Many motor carriers conduct testing on a calendar basis for all employees; others test a sample of employees. 23 The International Brotherhood of Teamsters master freight agreement guidelines for physical examinations and for testing urine for marijuana and other classes of drugs generally follow standards set by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Members can be tested during their regular DOT physical examinations and when probable suspicion or cause can be established. 24 Although the Teamsters represent many drivers working for large trucking concerns, the majority of drivers are not subject to this agreement. When an independent driver contracts with a larger carrier, however, he must abide by that companys policy. It has been estimated that carriers large enough to mount their own alcohol and drug abuse programs are responsible for less than onethird of the heavy trucks using the highways. 25 In a survey of 1,762 truck drivers conducted recently in Florida, 33 percent of the drivers reported being previously tested for alcohol, and 38 percent reported being previously tested for drugs by the company they were presently driving for or to which they were leased. Owner-operators reported the lowest frequency of testing, 29 percent for alcohol and 31 percent tested for drugs, respectively. Drivers employed by for-hire carriers reported the largest percentage of prior testing. Attesting to concern about substance abuse among drivers, 73 percent of those surveyed stated that they support mandatory random alcohol and drug testing by employers. 26 The reliability of the testing methods is of special concern for drug tests. The most accurate tests, LAn OTA analyst made several trips with o~.er-the-road drivers in conjunction with this project. ~ Thomas Donohue, President and CEO, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Feb. 18, 1986. i Transportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 132. ~Ibid., p. 132. ARegular Common Carrier Conference, Highway Common Carrier News Release, NOIT. 16, 1987.
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142 which are also the most expensive ($30-$125), can produce 2 to 3 false positives per 100 tests. Because of the likelihood of false readings, laboratory experts urge a followup test. While many cost-conscious employers are not willing to pay for additional tests, others share information with the applicant and will re-evaluate the applicant if he or she takes a second test at personal expense. 27 Some companies are sensitive to the counseling needs of drug and alcohol abusers. One carriers employees are given a drug test as part of their annual physical examination; they are notified of their scheduled appointment 30 days in advance. The company feels a responsibility to assist the driver in obtaining treatment if the employee informs management prior to the physical of a drug or alcohol problem. 28 More stringent methods for detection of alcohol use by truck drivers while on the road have also been iGreg Borzo, Motor Carriers Institute Re-Employment Drug Tests, Trafic World, June 15, 1987, p. 12. BKen Thompson, Yellow Freight System, Inc., in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 147-148. discussed as enforcement measures. A recent study conducted by the Transportation Research Board (TRB) concluded that the technical ability to detect and measure BAC levels of less than 0.05 is available with current screening and testing devices. However, the legal authority of public enforcement officers to enforce a law based on a low BAC standard with breath-screening devices has not been definitively established. If the ability to do so survives legal scrutiny, the TRB report indicates costeffective enforcement could be carried out by screening drivers at truck weigh stations and as part of vehicle safety inspections. Blood tests could be mandatory after injury-producing accidents. TRB estimates that vigorous enforcement of this kind would save between 80 to 140 lives annually at a minimum BAC level of 0.10, 110 to 190 lives at a 0.04 BAC threshold, and 130 to 250 lives at a limit of 0.00 BAC. The total public and private costs for enforcement at each level is estimated at $30 million, $40 million, and $50 million, respectively .29 ~~ransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 3, p. Z MANAGEMENT APPROACH Driver attitude is a major influence on truck safety and that attitude is affected b y company management philosophy and the work environment. A carrier that actively promotes safety and rewards good practices establishes safety as a major driver responsibility. This approach often requires extra effort to develop staff leadership and provide safety incentives; however, under such management, drivers are more likely to view themselves as professionals, accountable for the safe operation of their vehicles. Incentive programs may include cash bonuses, award programs, group recognition, and distribution of patches, pins, wallet cards, rings, and even stock for different levels of achievement. One firm has adopted a formal corporate ap proach to safety that focuses on: 1) driver selection, 2) driver training, 3) driver conditioning, and 4) driver management 31 Communication is an im OJohn J. Killilee, Consolidated Freightways, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 152. Dannemiller, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 42-46. ,, ,, .! I ,.~ Photo credit: Karen Mathlasen, OTA staff Management emphasis on safety can focus drivers on its importance. portant safety ingredient at another firm. For instance, group discussions between management and drivers encourage driver feedback and provide management with constructive information about operations. Good rapport between labor and manage-
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143 ment brings better agreement about organizational goals and how to achieve them. One management consulting company has developed a program to establish a positive corporate attitude toward safety through management strategies, technical training, and operations. The program addresses vehicle inspection, driver selection, drug screening, driver health, hazardous materials hauling, city and over-the-road driving, hours of service, accident reporting, workers safety, and security. 32 Another company that produces industryrelated instructional material is developing a series of video-training programs on trucking. Safety programs will cover driver fatigue, road vision, driving a bobtail with an empty trailer, and professionalism. Technical training programs will include brake systems, motors, truck specifications, and gauges and switches. Numerous other trucking associations and commercial firms also publish training materials. No widely accepted standards exist for evaluating any of these programs. Companies that have mounted carefully structured and intensive safety efforts have found major cost benefits in the quality of customer service, productivity improvements, and accident avoidance leading to lower insurance costs. 34 United Parcel Service (UPS), one of the most successful carriers in the country, is such a company, and its accident rate is one-tenth the national average. Box 6-A describes UPS operations and safety management techniques. Creating an environment that does not compromise safety requires management to balance regulatory requirements, such as hours-of-service rules, and customer service needsjust-in-time deliveries, for example. Intense competition for freight and market share provides a powerful incentive to increase productivity, utilize capacity, and push drivers to the limit of their ability to stay alert at the wheel. Some companies inform customers directly that :Jay Deragon, president, Megasafe, personal communication, Oct. 12, 1987. ] Bernadette Williamson, senior producer, The Kalamazoo Writing and Video Co., Merv Orrs Transportation Training Corp., personal communication, Feb. 25, 1988. qRobert D. Pcnve[l, vice president, Finance, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc., personal comunlcatlon, Jan. 26, 1988. trade-offs exist between costs and quality of service, and that safe, reliable service is worth slightly higher rates 3 5 However, drivers complain that shippers, brokers, and dispatchers often push hard for unrealistic delivery schedules that violate regulations. While an oversupply of carriers in the mid-1980s enabled shippers to shop around for carriers willing to take a load on any terms, this is less true today. Nonetheless, drivers resent being held responsible for violations of weight laws or hours-of-service regulations. The American Trucking Associations, inc. (ATA) advocate placing responsibility directly on shippers for demanding that truckers drive longer or faster than is legal to deliver goods. 36 Others claim tha t the need to use brokers places additional constraints on both shippers and carriers 37 The State o f Rhode Island has acknowledged that drivers are often subject to strong pressure from carrier management and imposes fines and citations for motor carrier owners whenever their drivers are cited. 38 One expert finds that drivers feel less pressured to take loads exceeding weight limits in States where this change in policy has occurred. 3 9 The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA ) has two small, new programs that address similar issues. The Commercial Accident Prevention and Evaluation Program was started in 198? to identify carriers with high at-fault accident rates and develop countermeasures to reduce risks. The Educational and Technical Assistance Program is a nationwide safety information program aimed at carriers drivers, and industry associations. Mass mailings of literature identify highway locations with high accident rates and detail accident avoidance tech niques 40 J5Dannemiller, op. Cit ~ footnote 5, p. 46; and ibid. 3bDonohue, op. cit., footnote 23, p. 50. TJames Johnston, Owner-Operators Independent Dri\ers Association of America, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 240241. 8 William Maloney, associate administrator for motor carriers, Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, personal communication, Feb. 2, 1987. gPatricia Wailer, University of North Carolina, Highwa\ Research Center, personal communication, May 19, 1987. Rolwrt Bleakley, Federal Highway Admirmtration, personal communication, July 6, 1988.
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[Page Omitted] This page was originally printed on a gray background. The scanned version of the page is almost entirely black and is unusable. It has been intentionally omitted. If a replacement page image of higher quality becomes available, it will be posted within the copy of this report found on one of the OTA websites .
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145 DRIVER OTA accident data analysis shows that level of driver training is the second most frequently cited factor for motor carrier accidents. Although reliable statistics do not exist, industry experts estimate that the majority of drivers have not had adequate formal training. Research indicates that experienced drivers often acquire bad driving habits that could be corrected through remedial or inservice training. A number of carriers have recognized the importance of thorough training and have developed their own programs, described later in this section. At present, no Federal requirement exists fo r drivers of heavy trucks to receive formal training, nor does a single State impose a training requirement for all drivers of heavy trucks. 41 Federal regulations for the Commercial Drivers License establish qualifications on the basis of whether a person can safely operate the vehicle and secure the load to be carried, skills that can be acquired through either training or experience. Many motor carriers do not impose specific training requirements, but require applicants to have a minimum of 2 years of on-the-road experience. 42 This poses difficulties for graduates of accredited training programs, since the only way to meet this demand is to drive for a firm that has no such requirement. Formal truck driver education is available through proprieta r y truck driver training schools, nonprofit public education institutions, and in-house motor carrier training programs. The number of proprietary training programs is estimated at around 200, with fewer than 10 being in-house programs. Tuition ranges from $350 to $5,000. Course length, qualifications of the instructors, student/teacher ratios, and, most importantly, time spent on the road driving vary widely among programs. 43 A survey of truckers in Florida indicated that 23 percent of the 1,800 respondents reported receiving formal driver training school instruction prior to becoming a professional driver; the average time as a truck driver was 15 years. 44 4 I ~~at,c)nal Tran~poHatlon safety Board, op. Cit., f[ntnote 1 ~, P 7 Phil MIIIIs, No\lce Finds Emplo}mcnt Catch-22, True-ker.~ L.SA, \ol. +, No. ~~, ]u]y ~ 1, 1987, p. ~~. National Transpm-tatlon Safet} bard, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 9. qRegular Common Carrier Conference, op. cit., footnote 26, p. 1. TRAINING Training Standards Truck driver training schools are subject to oversight from various licensing and accrediting bodies. Some States, such as Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, require driver training schools to b e licensed, although different agencies are assigned this oversight responsibility. While these authoritie s often establish a minimum number of course hours, requirements for course content usually are no t specified 45 Some schools have been accredited by the National Association of Trade and Technical Schools or the National Home Study Council. The vast majority of programs, however, have not been accredited by either organization. DOT issued proposed minimum standards fo r training tractor-trailer drivers in 1984, in an effort to establish guidelines for truck driver training. The standards call for a minimum 320-hour course lasting 8 weeks, if taken on a full-time basis. Course content included basic truck operation, safe operating practices, advanced operating practices, vehicle maintenance, and nonvehicle activities. The standards also covered instructor qualifications, school facilities, graduation requirements, and studen t placement. No final action was ever taken on the proposed standards, although the Office of Motor Carriers (formerly the Bureau of Motor Carrie r Safety) published a ready-made curriculum, Mode l Curriculum for Training Tractor-Trailer Drivers, in jNational Transportation Safetv Board, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 11. Photo credit: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff A driver receives on-the-road instruction.
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146 1984. Included in the 2,500-page document are instructions for the school administrator, instructor, and student. These standards cannot be used for evaluating existing schools until their validity has been tested with actual schools and students, and DOT has not taken steps to do this. The Professional Truck Driver Institute of America (PTDIA) was formed by industry in 1986 to certify acceptable training schools. PTDIA has adopted a curriculum based on the Federal model and started certifying driver training programs in mid-1988. PTDIA is funded entirely by industry and has both carrier and public enforcement representatives on its Board of Directors. The organization emphasizes the critical importance of the number of hours of hands-on, behind-the-wheel driving time a student receives. % While PTDIAs activities have been supported by many in the industry, the Commission of Accredited Truck Driving Schools maintains that driving schools should be free to structure their curricula to meet their educational objectives. 47 Training Programs Although relatively few in number, carriers inhouse training activities can be very effective (see box 6-A on UPS, for an example). 1n 1980, a large general commodities motor carrier implemented a training program to instruct all new drivers in the safe handling of the vehicle and cargo and has reported a 14-percent decrease in line-haul accident frequency despite a 38-percent increase in line-haul mileage 48 In another case, a trucking firms commitment to training led to the provision of a curriculum, equipment, instructors, and course evaluations as aids to outside training schools. 49 Thi s firms screening test for prospective drivers has been carefully crafted to identify driving patterns and habits that have the potential to cause accidents. The insurance industry has also developed training programs to promote safe driving behavior. One insurance company offers a 5-day seminar, open to driver trainers, safety personnel, maintenance supervisors, and to the management of fleet policyholders. It includes both classroom and behind-thewheel experience. The examination of several fleets safety records before and after personnel received training showed consistent reductions in accident frequency and loss rate per vehicle. 5o An alternative approach is developing a truck driver apprenticeship program so that new drivers will receive qualified supervision and develop safe driving habits. In the Netherlands, for instance, prospective new drivers undergo a 2-year apprenticeship. 51 There is currently no organized apprenticeship program for heavy truck drivers in the United States, although the issue has been raised in the past and is again being discussed. Recurrent training of employees is important not only to keep experienced drivers up-to-date, but to identify bad habits that may have developed over time. For example, research in Europe has shown how little perception even experienced drivers have of their actual speed when they are in a monotonous or repetitive driving situation. 52 On U.S. highways, difficulties with speed perception are acute when a driver leaves the Interstate system and moves onto two-lane roads, where speed limits, access, median control, and signs are quite different. 53 Keeping drivers physically fit, through physical conditioning, weight control, and aerobic capacity can reduce fatigue and stress. One carrier is installing a physical conditioning program nationwide for its line-haul drivers to assist them in developing physical and mental stamina to cope with long-haul driving. 54 MThoma~ M+ Strah, Truck Driver Training: A Matter of Stand ards, Transport Topics, Jan. 18, 1988, p. 16. i James J. McAlpin, vice president, Administrative Services, USA Training Academy, personal communication, Feb. 4, 1988. +8 Strah, op. cit., fOOtIIOte 46! p 8 QDannemiller, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 43-44. jOSouthern Motor Cargo Magazine, The Driver is the DecisionMaker, May 1984. 5] National Transportation Safety Board, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 21. 5~David Lowe, The ~achograph (Solihull, England: Fleet Planning Limited, 1982), p. 213. 5]James Johnston, Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 116-117. 5.1 Dannemiller, OP. Cit ) footnote 5, p. 45.
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147 SHARING THE ROAD WITH THE DRIVING PUBLIC Heavy vehicle operators often claim that most automobile drivers are unaware of the limitations and space requirements of heavy trucks. The longer, wider trucks now permitted are difficult to se e around and require longer distances to pass than current highway designs allow. Heavy truck drivers operating in congested areas try to leave enough distance between their own and other vehicles for a complete stop. However, automobile drivers often cut sharply in front of trucks, making it difficult to avoid an accidentfor which the truck driver may be cited, Education programs for automobile drivers could help make them aware of safety issues related to sharing the road with trucks. States such as TenHOURS OF The hours-of-service rules in effect today are essentially the same as those promulgated in 1937 and 1938 by the Interstate Commerce Commission (lCC) 56 The regulations prohibit carriers from requiring or permitting any driver to drive more than 10 hours at a time after being on duty more than 15 hours. Drivers must have 8 consecutive hours off-du t y before driving again. In addition, drivers are prohibited from driving after 60 hours of onduty time in any 7--day period, or 70 on-duty hours in any period of 8 consecutive days. 57 Drivers ar e required to keep records of their driving in a logbook that must be available for inspection by enforcement officers at all times. Complex and difficult to enforce, the hours-ofservice rule is subject to problems ranging from falsification and abuse of logbooks by drivers to loose interpretations of on duty and off duty by management. The 15-hour on-duty period can be accounted for during the course of a drivers overall duty day in any number of ways. For example, the 56Trucking is not subject t. the Fair Labor Standards Act. Carriers do not have to pay time-and-a-half for a greater than 40-hour work u~eek. This creates an incentive for a carrier to hire the fewest drivers possible and to have them work the longest hours possible in order to maximize profits. 5~United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safet}~, Petitioners Brief, No. 81-2283, Mar. 8, 1982. nessee are considering reorganizing their driver licensing programs to include material and questions on truck safety. An information videotape for automobile drivers on sharing the road with trucks is another possibility; 55 it could be shown to people waiting to obtain driver licenses. Education programs to inform small carriers about better road safety have also been developed. Available through the National Safety Council and ATA, these materials describe how a carrier as small as a 10-person trucking company can implement an effective safety program. ~5Paul Melander, Tennessee Public Service Commission, personal communication, May 19, 1987. SERVICE drivers employers may relieve him of duty responsibility for the vehiclefor meals and rest breaks. Tiring and strenuous activities, such as loading and unloading performed by the driver, are not considered part of driving time, although they are considered duty time and usuall y contribute to fatigue. Furthermore, 8 hours of off-duty time often does not afford drivers adequate time to travel to and from their jobs, eat, bathe, and attend to lifes other requirements, as well as to get adequate undisturbed sleep. Finally, the illegal practice of requiring a driver to wait at a terminal in an off-duty status for a work assignment contributes to fatigue prior to the start of a driving tour. 55 These factors help explain why many drivers keep double logbooks (one for enforcement officers and one for themselves) or make false entries. Many drivers are compensated on the basis of how many miles they drive during a pay period. A longhaul driver faces a choice between violating hoursof-service rules and maintaining his income if bad weather, highway conditions, or shipper-related delays prevent him from driving an acceptable number of miles. Drivers risk accidents and deny themselves adequate sleep by accepting loads that require many consecutive hours of driving to reach a final 561bid., p. 9
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148 Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff Federal regulations require drivers to record their hours of service. destination on time. Nonetheless, drivers sometimes boast of their long-distance driving accomplishments and stoically shrug-off unrealistic shipper deadlines. 59 ICC, and subsequently DOT, have recognized that the hours-of-service rules are subject to abuse. In 1972, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS) in DOT initiated a comprehensive study of the relationship between dangerous levels of fatigue among truck drivers and the current hours-of-service regulations. 60 The report compiled and analyzed scientific and medical data reflecting driver perform ance and physiological responses collected during 195 truck and bus runs. A total of 1,550 hours of continuous data was obtained and analyzed on 62,000 miles of highway truck travel in all parts of the country, and in all weather and traffic conditions. The study concluded: 5 An OTA staff member heard one operator in Pennsylvania at 8:00 a.m. admit to having to be in Burbank, California at 11:00 a.m. just 2 days later. In 1985, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety was reorganized and renamed the Office of Motor Carriers. driver performance deteriorates, driver alertness diminishes, rest breaks become less effective, and accident probability increases, all within the current 10-hour daily limitation on driving time. It [the regulation] is further at odds with a good deal of anecdotal evidence from the drivers to the effect that they do suffer from considerable fatigue but are Photo credit: Land Line On duty activities such as loading and unloading, in addition to driving, contribute to driver fatigue.
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149 unwilling to admit it because of the feared economic consequences. 61 This study focused on scheduled relay operations of large common carriers whose drivers were able to plan their rest, 62 and no formal regulatory action was taken. BMCS acknowledged that further research was needed to provide data for revising hours-of-service rules, especially on drivers whose assignments were irregular in frequency, duration, and starting times, and who often could not predict when they would be driving. The second phase of BMCSs fatigue study, issued in 1978, found that relay drivers operating irregular schedules suffered greater fatigue, physiological stress, and performance degradation than drivers working similar hours on a regular schedule. Fatigue effects were evident after about 8 hours of relay truck driving on a regular schedule and considerably earlier when the schedule was irregular. Cargo loading increased the severity of fatigue associated with irregular working schedules. 63 The reported findings were considered conservative, since the drivers in the study were allowed 8 hours of sleep each day. ] William Harris et al., Human Factors Research, Inc., A Study of the Relationships AmoW Fargue, Hours of Service, and Safety of Operations of Truck and Bus Driters, Report No. BMCS-RD-7 1-2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, November 1972), p. xi. b~Robert A. Kaye, Director of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, memo to Arthur L. Fox, II, Esq., Aug. 21, 1973. ]Robert R. Mackle and James C. Miller, Human Factors Research, Inc., Effects of Hours of Service, Regularity of Schedules, and Cargo Loading on Truck and Bus Driver Fatigue, Report No. DOT HS-803 799 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highwa y Traffic Safety Administration, October 1978). A separate, concurrent study of accident data found that the length of driving time by itself was not related to frequency or severity of truck accidents. However, the combination of driving and nondriving time could be related to driver fatigue and play a role in accident occurrence. 64 Following the results of these studies, BMCS subsequently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and conducted public hearings in several cities around the country. By the end of 1978, BMCS had accumulated what it considered to be sufficient information to justify amending the hours-of-service regulations. 65 Table 6-3 provides a summar y of hoursof-service regulation options that BMCS considered. In 1981, however, the agency terminated the rulemaking action and closed the docket, citing the absence of a direct relationship between the hoursof-service rules and accidents. Also, in 1981 BMCS commissioned an economic study of the cost of modifying the hours-of-service rules to conform with Office of Management and Budget and DOT policy requirements. The projected costs of each of the governments three major options were considered to be significantly greater than the projected benefits. 66 Safety Management Institute, Analysis of Accident Data and Hours of Service oflnterstate Commercial Motor Vehicle Dri\ers, prepared for the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (Washington, DC: Aug. 11, 1978). i< United States Court of Appeals, op. cit., footnote 57, p. 18. iBooz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., Assessment of rhe Impacts of Proposed Hours of Service Revisions, prepared for the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (Washington, DC: June 24, 1981). FATIGUE AND SLEEP NEEDS Medically-related sleep disorders and occupationally-induced sleep disturbances seriously impair driving ability. Scientific literature makes clear that human performance is best at moderate levels of arousal. At low levels, the brain loses the capacity to make quick and informed decisions; at high levels, actions may be frequent, but ill-directed. 67 Fatigue and sleepiness are associated with low levels of arousal. Normal fatigue can be exacerbated by three categories of stress factors: 1) physical environment such as temperature and vibration; 2) physiological factors such as poor or inadequate sleep, drugs and alcohol, or irregular eating habits; and 3) psychological factors such as anger, fear, and frustration. 68 A distinction is sometimes made for drivers between single-trip fatigue, where an opportunity for recovery may exist; cumulative fatigue, in which recovery time between trips is not adequate; and chronic fatigue, which usually requires medical assistance. The behavorial symptoms of all three types ;Allnutt, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 13. Ibid., p. 15.
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Table 6-3.Current and Proposed Hours-of-Service Regulations Section Current regulations Option I Option II Option Ill Meal period Driving relief period Intermittent off duty Duty tour limit Sleeper berth Driving time 10 hours On-duty time 15 hours Cumulative on-duty time 70 hours in 8-day period 60 hours in 7-day period Off-duty periods 8 hours 10 hours at home terminal 24 consecutive hours after driving during 6 days None required None required Not prohibited No specific limit 2 periods totaling 8 hours, neither less than 2 hours Time-of-day restrictions None 8 hours 12 hours 70 hours in 8-day period 8 hours at foreign terminal 12 hours at home terminal 24 consecutive hours per 7-day period, or 48 consecutive hours per 14-day period 30 minutes after 7 or more hours on duty (logged as on duty) 30 minutes after 4 hours (logged as on duty), may include meal period Prohibited 15 consecutive hours 2 periods totaling 8 hours, neither less than 2 hours None 12 hours 12 hours 8 hours at foreign terminal 30 minutes after 7 or more hours on duty (logged as on duty) 30 minutes after 4 hours (logged as on duty), may include meal period Not prohibited 12 consecutive hours Any 8 consecutive hours of duty may include sleeper berth time and off duty combined if consecutive None 10 hours 15 hours 70 hours in 8-day period 60 hours in 7-day period 8 hours None required None required Not prohibited No specific limit 2 periods totaling 8 hours, neither less than 2 hours Driving between midnight and 6 a.m. prohibited SOURCE: Office of Motor Carriers, 1988.
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151 of fatigue are similar, however. 69 Sound, adequate sleep is the best way to relieve fatigue, which is an independent variable affecting behavior and performance. Off-duty time, as specified in the regulations, often does not translate into sleep or rest time, as it was intended to do, partly because of the way the body functions biologically. Sleep researchers have shown that the body typically functions according to a circadian, or 24-hour, cycle that includes regular, defined periods of rest. Thus, when a driver starts his off-duty time, he may not be biologically ready to rest. As an example, a driver who begins a driving day at 6:00 a.m. must stop to rest at 4:00 p.m., according to the regulations. However, unless this is his accustomed time for sleep, his circadian cycle is not ready for him to begin prolonged rest. The driver is likely to take a nap eventually, but can begin driving again at midnight, just when the bodys normal circadian cycle prepares him for sleep. 70 As a result, his alertness level and abilit y to operate a vehicle will be severely impaired. The type of rest can affect driver performance as well. One recent study of truck drivers found that sleep disruption associated with sleeper berth use causes fatigue and deterioration of truck driver performance. In fact, the accumulation of 8 hours rest split between two sleeper berth shifts increased the risk of death by a factor of three for truck drivers b!bld., p. 18. dDavid Dinges, University of Pennsyl\ania, in Office of Technolo g y Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 73, 75, 127. Drivers who sleep in sleeper berths do not receive adequate rest, according to recent research. involved in accidents, according to the research resuits. ~ Moreover, research in Europe shows that accident involvement rates for truck drivers increase dramatically as work shift duration exceeds 8 hours (see figure 6-3). 7 Research also shows that no amount of mental or physical conditioning can prepare people to operate at normal levels if deprived of sleep. Reaction times double or triple, and the brain lapses into sleep for fractions of seconds at a time, especiall y during monotonous circumstances, such as driving. Such factors may explain the disproportionate share of iRobin P. Hertz, Sleeper Berth Use as a Risk Factor for TractorTrailer Driver Fatality, paper presented to the American AsscKiatlon for Automotive Medicine, New Orleans, LA, ScPtemlwr 1987, pp. 9-10. zPatrick Hamelin, Truck Driver Involvement In Traffic Accdents as Related to their Shiftworks and Professional Features, S}mlxxslum on the Role oflfeavy Freight Veh]cles in Traffic Acc~&nts, iwl, 2 (Ottawa, Canada: Organisation for Economic CooDeratlon and De\clopment, April 198~), pp. 3-107. Figure 6.3.Truck Accident Risk Compared With Duration of Truck Work Shift 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 u 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1 I 1 1 1 1 <=4 <= 6 <= 8 <=1 o <=1 2 >1 2 Work shift duration, in hours aA ~i~k rate greater than 1.0 means that on average, more accidents occur at those times in a given work shift than would be expected on the basis of the number of truck trips. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from Patrick Hamelin, (Truck Drivers Involvement in Traffic Accidents as Related to Their Shiftworks and Professional Features, Symposium on the Ro/e of Heavy Freight Ve/ric/es in Traffic Accidents (Ottawa, Canada: Organl. sation for Economic Cooperation and Development, April 1987), vol. 2, pp 3.107.
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152 accidents that occur 1 or 2 hours into a driving shift, 73 and the high level of fatal accidents in the early morning hours between 5:00 and 7:00 a.m. According to sleep researchers, these are times when a person is particularly vulnerable to an accidentcausing situation due to lowered alertness. Experts have found that an additional period of decreased alertness also occurs in the mid-afternoon. 74 Drugs and alcohol also affect a sleepy person much more strongly. 75 Overweight, middle-aged males, a description fitting many truck drivers, are primary targets for a sleep disorder known as sleep apnea. A person suffering from sleep apnea rarely knows he or she suffers from the disorder, which is characterized by abnormal breathing at night and results in excessive daytime sleeping. 76 While some companies can schediHertz, op. cit., footnote 71, p. 76. ;~Technolog}, Re\,ic\\, Mathematics of Sleep, February-March 1987, p. 13. ;David Dinges, University of Pennsylvania, testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, May 14, 1987. Da\id Dinges, University of Pennsylvania, personal communication, May 19, 1985. TECHNOLOGIES TO ADDRESS Carriers utilize numerous technologies to address management concerns about driver performance. For example, driving at high speed and the frequency and severity of accidents are strongly correlated (see chapter 4). Many carriers have chosen to install road-speed governors to limit the speed at which their tractors operate. These devices prevent the engine from generating more than the specified revolutions per minute, thus controlling the top speed of the vehicle. If maintained in good working order, governors can keep speed close to the legal limit and improve fuel economy as well. Some States, such as Virginia, have outlawed the use of radar detectors in efforts to curtail speeding. Since the sole function of a radar detector is to recognize when radar is measuring the vehicles speed, the prevalence of these devices in trucks indicates the potential for abusing speed limits. One recent study found that radar detectors encourage speeding, with the vehicles traveling fastest being most likely to be equipped with the devices. Moreover, ule drivers so that their on-duty and rest hours occur at regular 24-hour intervals, others find it difficult. However, driver and management awareness of the reality of the effects of sleep deprivation and the vulnerabilit y to accidents is a first step toward addressing the problem. Management sensitivity to the fact that some drivers may be less alert during driving tours due to a sleep disorder is also important. The development of portable performance devices that detect, in a quick, reliable, and noninvasive manner, whether a person is reacting adequately to the road is a realistic long-term goal. 77 Such alertness devices, however, can create an environment of false security an operator awakened by such a device may conclude that he can continue driving since he is awake. Alternatively, the driver could feel tired but decide to continue driving because he assumed that the alertness device would awaken him if he did fall asleep. The driver remains ultimatel y responsible for driving safely, for not substituting these devices for sleep, and for adhering to hoursof-service regulations. HUMAN PERFORMANCE ISSUES of all vehicles on the road, tractor-trailers are the most likely to be equipped with radar detectors. 78 In another survey, 69 percent of owner-operators responding acknowledged that their vehicles were equipped with radar detectors. 79 Further study of driver behavior in radar detector-equipped vehicles is underway at the Texas Transportation Institute, although results are not yet available. 80 A separate survey of truckers in Florida found that 79 percent use radar detectors. 81 The use of detectable radar by enforcement officers countered by the use of radar detectors and radar jamming devices by drivers reflect the conflicts between a highly competitive market and enforcing safety standards. While some segments of the car7U11HS Status Report, Radar Detectors Spur Speeding, vol. 22, No. 3, Mar. 14, 1987. Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Axociation of America, Survey, unpublished manuscript, Mar. 23, 1988. Dave Seiler, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, personal communication, Apr. 11, 1988. ] Regular Common Carrier Conference, op. cit., footnote 26, p. 2
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153 rier industry oppose legal sanctions against the devices, a joint petition to DOT was filed in spring 1988 by the American Automobile Association, ATA, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, and the National Safety Council, asking that they be prohibited. On-Board Recording Devices Safety advocates have proposed using on-board recording devices to monitor compliance with hoursof-service rules. Units are currently available that can track distance traveled, driving time, breaks, daily rest periods, and speed limit compliance in addition to equipment-related information. These devices are discussed at length in chapter 5. Photo credit: Rockwell International Corp Computers that store driving records and hours-ofservice information can be an efficient alternative to paperwork. Photo credit: Rockwell /nternational Corp. This on-board computer automatically records and stores the drivers hours of service. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS Improving human performance in an industr y that must meet demanding time schedules to prosper is a difficult task. However, since human error is the largest single cause of motor carrier accidents, OTA concludes that an aggressive Federal pro. gram to address human factors issues is a top priority. Legislation passed in 1986 requiring a Commercial Drivers License (CDL) is a major step in establishing uniform truck driver licensing standards and practices. OTA concludes that for public safety, no exemptions to the requirement for a CDL are warranted. Exemptions of any kind would weaken the effectiveness of the legislation. Congress will wish to monitor closely DOTs decisions as the CDL program is implemented. For example, abundant evidence exists that truck driver performance is impaired b y BAC levels below 0.10 percent and that alcohol use increases both the likelihood and severity of accidents. Congress may wish to ensure that DOT sets acceptable BAC levels for truck drivers at 0.04 percent (or lower), corresponding to the levels for airline crews and railroad engineers. Further, OTA concludes that drug abuse by truck drivers is a significant safety factor that deserves substantial study to prepare for regulation. The results of the current NTSB study will provide valuable information on levels of drug use and their contribution to driver impairment. How-ever, more study will be necessar y to determine the appropriate regulator y standards. A requirement for drug and alcohol screening for driver applicants, as part of periodic DOT-required physical examina-
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154 tions, and for probable suspicion or cause, deserves consideration. Furthermore, a DOT pilot demonstration program with one or more States for random drug testing could provide valuable information on the role of such testing in accident reduction and the acceptability of such a program on a national basis. Congress may wish to encourage DOT to act on these options. Since a record of previous violations is characteristic of many truck drivers involved in serious accidents, Congress may wish to monitor DOTs decisions about violations committed during part-time employment or off-duty driving. The contribution that careful, appropriate training can make to accident reduction has been amply documented by industry. OTA concludes that training is an area neglected by DOT and that national guidelines for driver training are needed. (See chapter 4 for policy options that address this issue.) Considerable public and private effort will be required to make any new safety standards effective. Carrier management commitment to safety and to implementing new standards play pivotal roles. A cooperative government-private sector research and education program is one way to address management issues such as driver hiring, screening, training programs, and scheduling revisions to help accommodate circadian rhythm. The hours-of-service regulations, do not adequately account for the effects of operating on the Interstate highwa y system, new vehicle technologies, and advances in understanding of fatigue and sleep needs. OTA finds compelling reasons for DOT to reexamine the hours-of-service rules and, if warranted, to develop revised standards based on current research results and todays around-the-clock operating environment. A carefully phased program to address the issue is essential. Cooperative government-industry studies including independent drivers, private carriers, and large and small for-hire carriers to explore feasible scheduling, training, and education programs are important initial steps. Congress may wish to encourage more DOT research on this issue, to provide funds for the research, and to meet specified deadlines for revised standards. OTA concludes that Federal programs are needed to help management and drivers understand when drivers are most vulnerable to acci~ dents and how alterations to scheduling and other procedures could reduce driver vulnerability. Moreover, a research program to develop simple, effective, and inexpensive techniques to screen drivers who may have a sleep disorder could help identify the high-risk driver. OTA finds that the use of radar detectors by motor carrier and automobile drivers alike promotes speeding and thus increases the likelihood of an accident. Because high speeds are closely tied to accident severity, Congress may wish to consider taking decisive steps at the Federal level to prohibit these devices. Finally, education programs directed at motor carrier and automobile drivers could enhance awareness of safety issues related to sharing the roads. These programs should focus on the handling and stability characteristics of trucks, the need to maintain adequate distance between vehicles, the longer distances required for a heavy truck to stop, and the severe damage that can result from a collision between cars and trucks. Congress may wish to require the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and FHWA to play mutually supportive roles in developing a model program for States to ensure that these messages reach a broad popula~ tion by being incorporated into the driver license and renewal process.
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Chapter 7 Sources of Information for Evaluating Safety
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CONTENTS Page Federal Accident Information Systems . . . . . . t .............157 Federal Highway Administration . . . . + . +. . . ........157 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ............................160 National Transportation Safety Board . . . . . . . . . .161 State Databases . . . . . . . . . ......................162 Industry Sources . . ........+ . . . . . . ...+..... ......163 Other Relevant Databases . . . . . . . . ...............163 The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute . . ........163 Exposure Data.... . . . . . . Truck Inventory and Use Survey . . Commodity Transportation Survey . . Motor Carrier Census Fife............+. Highway Performance Monitoring System Truck Weight Study. . . . . . Industry Sources . . . . . . National Motor Truck Data Base. . . National Truck Trip Information Survey Inspection and Enforcement Data.. Federal Activities. . . . State Programs.. . . . Market and Financial Data. . Interstate Commerce Commission Dun& Bradstreet . . . The Insurance Industry . . Conclusions and Policy Options Accident Data . . . . Exposure Data . . . . Inspectionand Enforcement Data Market Entry, Exit, and Financial Box ?-A. HotShot Trucks . . . Figure ?-I. Motor Carrier Accident Report Data Box l . . Page . . . . . . . . 162 Figures Page Form . . . .. .. .. .. .+. . .158 7-2. A Sample of State Accident Report Forms . . . . . . .. ......164 Table 7-I. Truck Safety Information 7-2. Truck Safety Information 7-3. Truck Safety Information 7-4. Truck Safety Information Financial Performance).. Tables Page Resources (Accident Data).............+. ... ......166 Resources (Exposure Data). . . . . . l ..175 Resources (Inspection and Enforcement). . . ...176 Resources (Market Entry, Exit, and . . . . . . . ..*.*+.. l ..*.*** + 176
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Chapter 7 Sources of Information for Evaluating Safety An essential component of safety measurement and evaluation is a complete and accurate database containin g relevant accident and exposure statistics. Such a database permits identifying causal factors contributing to accident frequency and severity, so that programs and priorities for improving safety can be established. No such database exists for motor carriers, although several public and private organizations collect motor vehicle accident data from which information on heavy truck accidents can be derived. In most instances, however, these reporting systems are designed for general traffic and safet y analysis, and often do not provide detail on heav y truck accident characteristics. This chapter describes and evaluates existing sources of information for evaluating safety, including Federal, State, and industr y accident, inspection, and exposure data and motor carrier market entry, exit, and financial performance data. Gaps in information are identified, and options are presented for strengthening the validity of truck safety data and eliminating redundant efforts. Many interconnecting issues are pertinent to truck safety, and existing data could be used to meet both national and more focused needs. Accident and exposure data have several potential uses: 1) general level, time-histor y trend analysis, 2) analyses of the underlying causes and contributing factors of accidents, and 3) evaluation by Federal, State, and individual carrier management of their respective motor carrier safety activities. FEDERAL ACCIDENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS Because several Federal agencies have different responsibilities related to transportation safety, many accident databases have been developed. Each has different reporting requirements, and integrating information from the forms is not feasible currently. Federal Highway Administration The Office of Motor Carriers of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has maintained a motor carrier accident database, the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), since 1973. Prior to 1986, interstate carriers regulated by the Federal Government were required to report to MCMIS accidents resulting in a fatality, an injury, or property damage of $2,000 or more. In January 1986, the property damage criteria was increased to $4,200; and effective March 1987, increased again to $4,400. It will continue to increase in accordance with the gross national product deflator index to keep the reporting threshold consistent with inflation. Accident reports are filed by carriers on Form 50-T (see figure 7-1), in a format that has remained relatively stable through the years. An FHWA analyst corrects erroneous data on the accident reports received and determines whether the accident meets the criteria for a reportable accident. The report is then forwarded to a contractor for input into the computer. During this phase of processing, validation checks are made for data field compatibility and data input errors. Because of its design, MCMIS provides far more detail on truck accident characteristics than does any other national accident database. It includes carrier identification and address, location of the incident, characteristics of the event, contributing factors, information on the cargo, and consequences of the accident. / However, many operators in the trucking industry, including many private carriers and most intrastate carriers, are not subject to the Federal regulations that require them to report and are 157
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158 Figure 7.1 .-Motor Carrier Accident Report FormPage One Original and two copies of MCS 50-T shall be filed with the Director, Regional Motor Carrier Safety Office, FHWA, as required by 394.9. Copy shall be retained in carriers file. Circle or ( X ) appropriate boxes below. 1. Name of carrier (Corporate business name) 2. Principal Address (Street lndnd lo., City, State, ZIP Code.j (7-21) (22-so) (16-17) ilk. Hours actually driving since last period of 8 consecutive hours off duty q 5 hrs. q 7 hrs. q 9 hrs. (18) ~ 2 hrs. ~ 4 hrs. q 6 hrs. q 10 hrs. ~ Not applicable 1lF. Estimated hours of driving for entire trip or portion of trip, since last period of 8 consecutive hours off duty 1 hr q 3 hrs. ~ 5 hrs. q 7 hrs. q 9 hrs. ~ 11-12 hrs. (19) @ 2 hrs. ~ 4 hrs. ~ 6 hrs. ~ 8 hrs. ~ 10 hrs. ~ Not applicable 11G. Condition of driver ~ Apparently normal q Had been drinking ~ Medical wawer q Dozed at wheel ~ Other (Specify) --. .- 11H. Date of last medical certificate (29-34) . . / ..-
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159 Figure 7-1 .Motor Carrier Accident Report FormPage Two 12. CARRIERS VEHICLE(S) I y l i e d Type Year Make (35-39) (40-41) (42-43) (44-53) A Truck B Tractor C Semi-trailer D Full trailer E Full trailer (2nd) F Other (Specify)__.. 13. Total length of vehicle/comb. 13A. Total width of vehicle (7-9) Ft. (10-11) TYPE OF BODY (70-74) Model Company Auto Van Flat Tank Other Carrier (Specify) (54-63) (64-69) I I I 1 I 1 I 1 x cargo 13B. Weight (cargo) 13C. Weight (gross) Ft. (12-17) Lbs. (1$-23) Lbs. 14. Type Of fuel 1 1 q Gasoline E Diesel q L.P.G. q Other (Specify) (24-29) 15. Cargo at time of accident (Your vehicle) (30-38) 28. Name and title of person signing report 29. Signature I SOURCE: Federal Highway Administration
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160 therefore not represented in the accident statistics. Furthermore, the accuracy and completeness of the accident reports to MCMIS are open to question, given Federal reliance on carriers to file reports and minimal attempts by FHWA to ensure reporting compliance. FHWA officials have publicly acknowledged that underreporting of accidents may be as high as 40 percent, and they look to the full implementation of SAFETYNET 1 and eventual completion of safety fitness ratings for all interstate carriers as remedies. 2 A more recent initiative, started in 1983, is a special monitoring study under which FHWA has enlisted several States to collect data on accidents and exposure for all combination trucks operating on the designated Interstate and Federal-aid highway truck network. The goal is to acquire data for making comparisons between accidents among various truck types and across different road features. Under the program, State highway agencies report accident and exposure data to FHWA every 6 months. Data elements include vehicle-miles traveled b y route, number of trailers and axles, accident involvement by vehicles involved, injuries and fatalities, width and type of lanes, shoulders and medians, degree of access control, and road curvature and grade. 3 This approach represents a reasonable attempt to collect accident and exposure measures from the same population. However, the study is limited both by the relatively small number of participating States and by the accuracy of information provided, particularly the completeness with which truck characteristics are reported and the ways exposure data are estimated. Currently being developed for FHWA is the Commercial Drivers License Information System. This system will eventually provide FHWA with informa!A comprehensive nationwide enforcement data system that will aid State inspection activities and provide additional accident and safety data. John MacGowan, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, Oct. 17, 1986. Problems with reporting accuracy in transportation accident information systems are common, as noted in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Transportation of Hazardous Materials, OTA-SET304 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1986). Director, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Highway Information Management, Monitoring Operations of Larger Dimensioned Vehicles, memo to Regional Federal Highway Administrators, Apr. 23, 1986. tion on persons holding commercial drivers licenses and will be tied to State systems like SAFETYNET. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration The National Center for Statistics and Analysis of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) maintains accident data on policereported accidents, including those resulting in nonfatal injury and/or property damage. Initiated in 1979, the National Accident Sampling System (NASS) is a file of reported accidents that provides an automated, comprehensive, national traffic accident database. The accidents investigated in NASS are a probability sample of police-reported accidents in the United States; the investigations are carried out by NHTSA contractors. These data are subsequently weighted to represent all police-reported motor vehicle accidents occurring in the Nation during the year. To be included in NASS, an accident must: 1) be reported by police, 2) result in property damage and/or personal injury, and 3) involve a motor vehicle in transport on a roadway. 4 A NASS investigation is handled by field staff that examines the vehicle and scene, interviews vehicle occupants, and reviews medical and driver records. Approximately 12,000 cases are investigated each year by 50 teams. The data collected for a NASS-investigated accident include over 300 variables describing characteristics of the accident, driver, occupants, and the vehicle. For heavy truck accidents, several data fields exist that describe truck operations in reasonable detail. They include carrier type; number of trailers and axles; body type; extent of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation; type of brakes and cab configuration; cargo weight; gross vehicle weight; hazardous cargo; vehicle length and width; and jackknife, underride/override, or rollover involvement. Although NASS has several strengths, such as sampling design and comprehensiveness of the accident investigation, one major deficiency is the relatively small number of heavy truck accidents that constitute the NASS sample in a given year. As a +National Highway Traffic safety Administration, ~at;ona~ Accident Sampling System (NASS): Analytical Users Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1985).
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161 result, questions may be raised about the representativeness of the NASS sample for a single year in evaluating national issues involving heavy truck safety, particularly issues that are narrowly focused and require considerable detail. This problem may be further compounded by planned changes in the NASS data collection program. In 1988, two separate data collection systems will be implemented: 1) the Crashworthiness Data System (CDS), and 2) the General Estimates System (GES). CDS will include the more thorough accident investigation described previously, but it will be limited principally to accidents involving cars, light trucks, and vans towed from the accident scene. GES will provide national estimates of accident trends from sampled police reports, using a larger accident sample than in the past and will include all vehicle types. The new approach will meet NHTSAs objectives of preserving crashworthiness information for the vehicles that are most numerous on the highway, while reducing data collection costs. It will also portray more accurately annual trends in the number and severity of accidents involving heavy trucks, but will reduce the ability to conduct detailed analyses of motor carrier safety issues. Accidents that result in the l 0SS of human life are also classified separately in the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), which has been in operation since 1975. FARS contains over 90 variables for describing accidents in which an accident-related death occurs within 30 days of the accident. FARS is not a national sample; rather, it is a census of all fatal traffic accidents reported in the United States. This information is collected by each State, under contract to NHTSA. While FARS is generally accepted as the most complete database for fatal accidents, it is limited to this one category of accidents. Furthermore, because the investigation is not as extensive as that for NASS observations, details on truck operation and motor carrier type are not available. 6 For example, FARS distinguishes only between straight trucks and combinations, and only jNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration, fatal Accident Reporting System: 1986 Coding and Validation Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1986). Joel Dandrea, Truck Accident and Exposure Dara (Washington, DC: American Trucking Associations, June 1986). among several broad weight classes. 7 Details about accidents involving the trucks described in box 7-A could not be extracted, for example. National Transportation Safety Board The National Transportation Safet y Boar d (NTSB) conducts multimodal, on-scene investigations of transportation accidents. NTSBs jurisdiction for conducting an investigation is based on the definition of a major vehicular accident for each mode, as described in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 49. An NTSB investigation begins with a multipleday field investigation involving the shipper, carrier, government agencies, associations, and other interested parties. Its subsequent report goes through several cycles of review and comment before it is final. A major advantage of the NTSB process is that the investigations involve other participants besides the carrier, are extremely thorough, and take place over a longer time frame so that the full impact of the accident can be more accurately identified. Because of the resources required to conduct such a thorough investigation, the number of accidents that are examined is relatively small and findings often cannot be generalized to the national population. Recently, NTSB has embarked on an extended special study of heavy truck safety. 8 The study covers a minimum of 200 accidents involving heavy trucks that meet the following criteria: 1) the accident involves a truck of greater than 10,000 pound gross vehicle weight rating, and 2) the truck receives damage sufficient to require towing away from the scene. NTSB plans to document thoroughly the accident characteristics related to the driver, vehicle, roadway, and motor carrier. This will provide valuable information. However, the NTSB special study will include a static file of 200 cases rather than a continuous database. National Academy of Sciences, Transportation Research Board, Truck Accident Data Systems: State-06 the-Art Report, Transportation Research Circular 231, ISSN 0097-8515 (Washington, DC: September 1981). 8Nationa] Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Heavy Truck Studv: Status Report of NTSB Cases, presented at the National Motor Carrier Safety Norkshop, Washington, DC, Mar. 11, 1987.
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162 BOX 7-A.Hot Shot Trucks Hot Shot Trucks are relatively new phenomena, appearing over the past 5 years as large freight vehicles. 1 Hybrid trucks that do not fit within standard industry classifications, Hot Shots are often modified pickup trucks pulling 48-foot trailers. While heavier trucks are increasingly being built to serve as Hot Shots, some weighing as much as 26,000 pounds, no average weight has been established. They are used to haul light-weight freight, such as insulation, plastic piping, or construction materials. Economics are the major attraction for these vehicles. A Class 8 tractor-trailer purchased for $100,000 may require $1 a mile to move the same load that a Hot Shot, initially costing $50,000 or less, can move for 35 cents. Hot Shots offer the advantages of weights that allow them to avoid Federal Highway Use taxes levied on trucks with taxible gross weights over 55$000 pounds and truck tractor Chassis Excise tax imposed at the time of first retail purchase on vehicles over 33,000 pounds gross vehicle weight rating. 2 While no reliable numbers exist on how many of these vehicles are on the roads, experts estimate that they currently number less than 10,000. Sales of Hot Shots are projected to increase 125 percent over the next 5 years. Because no type of classification exists for these vehicles, no industry or Federal safety standards have been established. Hot Shots have lower centers of gravity than standard tractors, and observers have noted more complete air brake systems, diesel engines, and sturdier suspension systems in recent purchases. Because the trucks do not fall into readily recognizable categories, accident report forms do not have identifying classes for them. Consequently, accumulating data on how many accidents Hot Shots are involved in and how many miles they are driven is next to impossible. IH~~~Y &{ff, MOtOr V&iC[~ Manufacmrers &~iation and willi~ Snow, National Highway Traflic saf~y Adminiswation, Wr~n~ communication% ]UIY 22, 1988. Z&ady Col}lns, Ammican Trucking Asmiations, pCrSOtNd communication, Aug. IOJ 19W+ State Databases responsibilities on the scene related to administerState accident data generally do not use a coming emergenc y first-aid and maintaining traffic flow, often making it difficult to be thorough when common threshold for reporting and therefore do not pleting accident reports. Moreover, few enforcement easily lend themselves to aggregation on a national basis. However, because manv State reports inofficers are well trained in accident investigations. elude more detail on certain types of accidents, analysis of State accident data is extremely useful. Furthermore, as a significant proportion of heavy truck accidents occur in the several large States that have considerable heavy truck populations, analyses of accident data from these States are probably representative of the characteristics of most heavy truck accidents. Finally, because State accident files include reports on accidents of varying injury severity, the full range of accident consequences may be examined. A limitation of State databases is that they are gathered from police reports, which in turn depend partly on drivers statements. Drivers ma y not know the answers to some specific questions or may be reluctant to admit violations or noncompliance with regulations. 10 Furthermore, police have important NHTSA maintains a directory of State accident reporting systems. 11 State reporting systems show wide variation in accident reporting thresholds, reporting variables, and definition of variable fields, particularly for items related to heavy truck safety analysis, where detail on truck configuration and use is essential. To create some consistency in accident reporting at the State level for crash avoidance research purposes, NHTSA developed the Crash Avoidance Research Datafile (CARDfile). It consists of automated police accident reports of six States (Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington). All data contained in CARDfile have been coded in a common format, regardless of the particular format employed by the State from which
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163 the information originated. 12 The file contains information on accident, vehicle, and driver characteristics. However, because States do not yet use common data elements and include limited information about truck configuration and operations, analysis that can be based on CARDfile is limited. The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) is working to establish uniform accident reporting through the design of a report form that includes standard variables and variable fields that all States would use. 13 (See figure 7-2.) This has proven to be difficult, since each State has different means of collecting accident data, different agencies charged with collecting data, and different forms on which the information is reported. Nonetheless, CVSA anticipates that agreement can be reached on data items that focus on issues of major concern. 14 The National Governors Association is also developing recommendations and guidelines for States to adopt for uniform reporting of heavy truck accidents. Their focus includes both reporting criteria and data elements for the accident report form. A preliminary list of 19 data elements has been proposed, covering driver, carrier, vehicle, accident, highway, and environmental characteristics, as well as any hazardous cargo. A survey of existing State accident reporting systems revealed that for every State in the Nation, the majority of data elements are either not presently collected or are not currently collected as prescribed. 15 Industry Sources Many medium and large carriers maintain detailed records of their drivers and vehicles that permit the identification of characteristics affecting truck safety. Carrier accident data has several advantages over public domain databases, particularly because it allows analysis of accidents over time and provides lzN~tiO~~] Hi~hWay Traffic Safety Administration, File Structure: Crash Avoidance Research Datafile (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, May 29, 1986). ljAt a minimum, this would include common use of essential data fields, with each State having the latitude to retain additional data fields for its own use. For further information on the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, see ch. 3. Rick Owens, chairman, Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Data Collection Committee, memo to committee members, Sept. 12, 1986. lsNational Governors AssWiation, Center for Policy Research, Report 2 of the Motor Carrier Accident Reporting Committee, unpublished manuscript, January 1988. consistent exposure data for determining accident rates. Also, some issues, such as driver hours-ofservice and training, are likely to be more accessible and accurate in the carrier database. However, carrier concerns about confidentialit y must be respected, and generalizing the results of such studies to the trucking industry nationwide is risky. Analysis of an individual carrier represents a single data point within the industry. Trade associations, such as the American Trucking Associations and the Private Truck Council of America, periodically collect accident rate statistics from their member carriers. However, this information is reported only as an aggregate rate for the industry (and carrier type), and no information is available for examining an individual accident, its contributing factors, or its severity. Other Relevant Databases Insurance companies that underwrite motor carriers maintain detailed financial and statistical data on insurance policies and claims. Much of this information is also transmitted in aggregate form to the Insurance Services Offices, Inc. (ISO), a nonprofit corporation that makes available advisory rating, statistical, actuarial, policy form, and related services to U.S. property/casualty insurers. 16 The statistical data collected by ISO are quite detailed and permit the investigation of several industry characteristics, such as driver age, vehicle age, size of claim, geographic location, vehicle weight, and zone rating (distance-based). The primary statistic used for safety analysis is a loss ratio. 17 However, because information is reported in aggregate form to ISO, and the insurance industry is interested in financial performance rather than accident causes, this database does not provide useful information for safety analyses. The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute The Universit y of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) has developed a database lbNot all U,S. insurers recognize and participate in Insurance Serv ices Office, Inc. data collection. TAnn Lavie, Insurance Services Office, Inc., personal communication, Apr. 10, 1987. 87-004 0 88 5
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165 that combines the coverage of FARS with the detail of the FHWA motor carrier accident database. All heavy truck accidents in the FARS database (beginning with 1980) are identified and the records matched with the FHWA records for accidents in which a fatality occurred. Police reports of the accidents are reviewed and a single accident record created that includes information from all sources. 18 Because of different definitions of industry coverage and missing items in many FARS reports, a considerable amount of post-accident investigation has been undertaken by UMTRI to complete the information in the database. Followup investigation is handled primarily through telephone conversations with owners of the involved trucks, a painstaking and labor-intensive process. All of the FHWA data and most of the postaccident information depends on the accuracy of the responses provided by the owners. Furthermore, the UMTRI database includes only accidents involving a fatalityless than 2 percent of the overall roadway accidents involving heavy trucks. Thus, while this database represents the most severe occurrences, it may produce findings unrepresentative of most truck accidents occurring in the United States. 19 (See table 7-1 for a summary of accident reporting databases.) a~niversity of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidenrs, 1983, UMTRI-86-24 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, May 1984). Federal Highway Administration, Development of a Large ?_ruck Safety Dara Needs Study Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, February 1986). EXPOSURE DATA To address the truck safety question comprehensively, it is important to derive estimates of both accidents and exposure. Exposure data serve as a denominator in establishing accident rates, and are necessary for determining whether increases in accidents are due to a deterioration in safety practices or an increase in the amount and type of truck travel. Compared with other freight modes, trucking has the poorest available shipment data. Two principal databases are available publicly for analyzing trucking sector flows: the Truck Inventory and Use Survey (TIUS) and the Commodity Transportation Survey (CTS). Neither presents a complete picture of the trucking sector. These databases and other sources of exposure information are described in this section. Truck Inventory and Use Survey The TIUS has been conducted roughly every 5 years by the Bureau of the Census as part of the census of transportation. It includes sample data on the physical characteristics and operational use of commercial and private trucks in the United States, but does not show year-to-year changes or trends. The 1982 TIUS contains data on the character and use of slightly over 120,000 trucks (including light trucks, pickups, and vans), drawn from an estimated Phofo credit: Michael Hines, OTA Staff Exposure data are essential for interpreting and understanding highway accident statistics. total of 33.8 million. The sampling rate is skewed toward large trucks (approximately 5.6 million vehicles) to enhance that portion of the data, but the sample size is still quite small. Among the specific items contained in the TIUS are vehicle identification number, operator class, range of operation, vehicle design characteristics, annual mileage, and commodities carried. The TIUS provides a global assessment of both the number of trucks in use and the mileage they
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Table 7-1 .Truck Safety Information Resources (Accident Data) Database Kept by Years Strengths Weaknesses r 50-T (part of) FHWA, Office of Motor Carriers MCMIS) FHWA, Special Monitoring Study NASS FARS NTSB State databases CARDfile Motor carrier industry insurance companies UMTRI FHWA, Office of Highway Information NHTSA, National Center for Statistics and Analysis NHTSA, National Center for Statistics and Analysis NTSB Various State regulatory agencies NHTSA Individual carriers, trade associations Individual companies, ISO UMTRI 1973 to present l Good detail on truck accident characteristics l Exclusive truck focus 1983 to present 1979 to present 1975 to present 1986 to 1987, single collection 1982 to present 1980 to present Involves accident and exposure data Exclusive truck focus Statistical sampling design l Comprehensiveness of accident investigation Reasonably good detail on truck accident characteristics National estimates of accident frequency l Census of all fatal accidents Comprehensiveness of accident investigation l Comprehensiveness of accident investigation l Good detail on truck characteristics Exclusive truck focus l Census of all accident types l Census from several States l Uniformity in reporting format l Some individual carriers maintain excellent detail on accidents and movements Exclusive truck focus l Detailed financial and statistical data on truck insurance policies and claims Combines coverage of FARS with detail of 50-T Post-accident investigation to complete missing information Exclusive truck focus Missing several portions of the truck population Accuracy and completeness of reports not consistent Relies on carrier participation l Restricted to aggregate accident reporting Limited number of participating States l Missing some truck detail Small number of heavy truck accidents in database l Detailed causal analysis sometimes difficult Limited details on truck configuration and operation Nonfatal accidents not represented Limited sample of accidents under investigation, not representative of truck crashes generally l Based solely on police reports at scene Varying detail on truck accident characteristics Lack of uniformity from State to State l Limited truck detail due, in part, to limited uniform variables listed Based solely on police reports at scene Limited to a few States Individual carrier represents single observation in industry l Access to individual carrier records is not in the public domain Trade associations report accident rates but not details on accident characteristics Aggregate reporting of information by insurers Primary concern over loss ratio rather than accident causation Reliance on information provided by carrier during past-accident investigation Restricted to fatal accidents KEY: MCMIS Motor Carrier Management Information System. FHWA Federal Highway Administration. NASS = National Accident Sampling System. FARS Fatal Accident Reporting System. CARDfile = Crash Avoidance Research Datafile. NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board. NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. ISO = Insurace Services Offices, Inc. UMTRI = University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1998.
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167 accumulate, but lacks any origin-to-destination flow information or precise definition of commodities. The TIUS is based on voluntary responses from the owners of the vehicles selected; a 90 percent response rate has been achieved in the past. Since the TIUS focuses on aggregate activity based on typical yearly vehicle use, it does not provide information about the driver, vehicle cargo weight, number of trailers, road class, and time of day. The TIUS can be a useful source for static data, such as model year and size of carrier operation. Results from the TIUS now under w a y are projected to be ready in summer 1989. 20 Commodity Transportation Survey The CTS was collected by the Bureau of the Census in approximately 5-year intervals starting in 1963. It contains flow data for commodities shipped by manufacturing establishments selected from several hundred industries. Each record lists the total tons shipped from a given origin to a given destination for a specific commodity, mode of transport, weight, and value. The data are based on voluntary responses from approximately 16,000 establishments to which survey forms are sent. Data are checked against the Census of Manufacturers Survey using the value of shipment information to ensure that the expanded value of shipments made corresponds closely to the value of commodities produced. 21 While the census main strength is its multimodal nature, it has real limitations. Shipment data on waste materials, agricultural products, and raw materials are not reported. The CTS also reflects shipments only from point of manufacture to first destination (which many analysts claim is typically a warehouse), missing all subsequent movements in the distribution chain. Data submission is voluntary, creating unknown biases due to nonreporting. Furthermore, the scope of the survey is heavily dependent on Federal budget decisions, and the questions asked are not consistent between surveys, making trend analyses on some issues difficult. Finally, the data are released only at the State-to-State or Robert Crowther, Bureau of the Census, Business Dl\islon, personal communication, Aug. 9, 1988. [Bureau of the Census, Commoci~ry Transportation Sur\ev: SumMarl,, TC~~.CS (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1981). production area-to-production area level; the Bureau omits any flows that would compromise the confidentiality of the surveys respondents. Motor Carrier Census File As part of its MCMIS, FHWA maintains the Motor Carrier Census File. This database contains a basic description of each commercial motor carrier and/or shipper known to FHWA. The unique number assigned to each carrier is included in all forms and records used in the MCMIS. While this database is used primarily to monitor carrier safety and identify problem motor carriers, it could be used to develop measures of carrier activity and travel pattern indicators. The database contains information on each carriers State base of operations; States served; type of commodities carried; carrier classification; miles operated; number of drivers; and number of trucks, truck tractors, and trailers, segmented by type of ownership. Unfortunately, the database is incomplete, owing to the many carriers FHWA has yet to evaluate and locate, as well as to those carriers that are not presently subject to Federal motor carrier safety regulations and FHWA oversight Highway Performance Monitoring System The Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS) is a combined effort of Federal, State, and local governments to collect national data that provide current statistics on the mileage and characteristics of various highway systems. The annual database is derived from general statistics provided b y States for their total system and from more detailed data for a prescribed sample of their highway systems. The sample sections were established using a statistically-designed sampling plan. The plan was based on the random selection of road sections within predetermined average, annual, daily traffic volume groups for each functional highway classification. 22 The primary purpose of this database is to obtain very specific highway and traffic data for a sample JFederal Highway Administration, Highway Performance Monitoring Sysrem Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, January 1984). 87-004 0 88 6
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168 of different highway types. Although area-wide vehicle classification data are reported by the number of axles of single-unit, single-trailer, and multiplecombination vehicles, other vehicle characteristics are not reported. The estimates of truck volumes for these categories are sometimes less accurate for lower functional highway classifications. 23 Truck Weight Study The Truck Weight Study (TWS) is compiled annually by FHWA from information collected voluntarily by the States. It is composed of vehicle classifications and truck weight data, which are collected at preselected sites where such operations can be accommodated. Each State has between 10 and 20 sites, and locations remain relatively constant from year to year. In total, more than 10 million vehicles are classified, and more than 200,000 trucks are weighed on an annual basis. Classification counts are conducted for three 8hour shifts that cover all hours of the day, but are not necessarily consecutive. At each location, all of the vehicles in the traffic stream are counted and classified. Several truck types are included, and for each type, the number of axles and axle configurations are recorded. Weighing operations are a separate activity that occur immediately upstream or downstream from the point of classification. Each } Federal Highway Administration, op. cit., footnote 19. Photo credit: California Department of Transportation Data on vehicle weights are often based on statistics from unsophisticated and temporary State weigh stations. surveyed vehicle is described by vehicle type, body style, fuel type, class of operation, loaded status, commodit y carried, and axle spacing. In those States using weigh-in-motion equipment, survey data are limited to axle spacing and weights, vehicle type, and body type; however, a census of trucks is not always taken, particularly at high-volume locations. In these cases, the more frequently occurring truck types are weighed during one or more 10to 15minute intervals in an hour. Less common types are fully sampled. 24 The main deficiency of the TWS for exposure analysis in the past has been that the counting sites are not statistically representative of the States highway systems and cannot be used to estimate vehiclemiles traveled b y vehicle type. Also the collection stations tend to be oriented toward the Interstate and rural primary systems. Furthermore, many trucks operating in violation of weight standards travel on circuitous routes to avoid weigh stations. FHWA is currently investigating ways to address these concerns and to establish a data collection scheme consistent with the HPMS approach. 25 Evidence of progress to date is the recent FHWA decision to modify TWS site selection guidelines so that States are encouraged to sample from HPMS locations. 26 The method of collection for TWS data is impreciseusing one or more observers to classify vehicles moving in the traffic stream can pose problems in high-volume locations, poor lighting, and bad weather. Furthermore, since each State determines its method for establishing vehicle classification and truck weight (see figure 7-2), the error in the estimates may vary. Industry Sources Trade organizations generally do not keep commodity flow or truck population and mileage data. The American Trucking Associations (ATA), for example, keeps only aggregate statistics on tons and qIbid., p. 20. 5 Federal Highway Administration, Development of a Srarewide Trafic Counting Program on the Highway Performance Monitoring System (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, March 1984), These guidelines have been included in the Federal Highway Administration, Trafic Monitoring Guide (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, June 1985).
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169 ton-miles derived from reports filed with ICC. The firms that submit the data are principally less-thantruckload common carriers, so the data lack information about bulk shipments and private carriage operations. Shipper organizations, like the American Petroleum Institute and the Chemical Manufacturers Association, are in much the same position as ATA. The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association maintains statistics on truck registrations derived from self-reported factory sales data provided by truck manufacturers. Some individual carriers, however, do keep data on their own movements. Large trucking firms generally keep computerized traffic databases that include origin, destination, commodit y (by a variety of codes), shipment weight, and shipment date. Major shippers, like the large chemical and petroleum companies, also keep computerized data on their truck shipments. National Motor Truck Data Base Started under contract with the Association of American Railroads in 1977, the National Motor Truck Data Base contains information on approximately 36,000 movements per year. The data are collected at 18 selected truck stops, typically in the West and Midwest, in an attempt to sample longhaul moves selectively. For the shipments it covers, the database includes origin city and State, destination city and State, commodity, vehicle and o p erator characteristics, and an operator profile. The data are sometimes cross-checked against fuel sales at the truck stops and against volume counts on selected Interstates. 27 Concerns over the utility of this database focus on the sampling approach and the survey design. The survey deals primarily with driver perceptions and statements about what they do and believe; it is thus subject to question as an indicator of actual behavior. National Truck Trip Information Survey UMTRI has recently developed an independent surveythe National Truck Trip Information Survey (NTTIS)-based on information at the trip level rather than at the level of a vehicles annual mileage. The owner of each vehicle in the surve y is contacted by telephone four times a year and asked about the vehicles usage on a random day. The information includes trailer usage, cargo and cargo weight, and driver age for each trip. The trips are split into daytime and nighttime mileage, and each trip is mapped to distinguish urban and rural highway use. Roads are also divided into limited access highways, other major highways, and other roads. By summing the data for all trips, annual mileage can be estimated by company type, power unit, number of trailers, trailer type and body, cargo, actual cargo weight, actual combination gross weight, driver age, and highway type. A sample of 8,144 vehicles was originally drawn from State registration files maintained by a national data firm, R.L. Polk, from which a subsample of 5,000 vehicles was used for the mileage survey. Response rates have been averaging 85 percent, roughly similar to response rates achieved b y the TIUS. 28 Preliminary analysis of the aggregated NTTIS data yields estimates that are roughly comparable to the TIUS in the total number of heavy trucks, configuration, and cab style, validating results of the TIUS and thus providing valuable information. The average daily mileage from TIUS data is slightly higher than similar estimates derived from NTTIS data. ZTOffice of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 2, P 48. 28University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, The UMTR1 Research Review, vol. 17, No. 1, July-August 1986.
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170 INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT DATA Government oversight activities directed at carrier, driver, and vehicle qualifications have grown considerably in recent years, particularly at the State level. In support of these activities, a large amount of data has been collected and maintained for monitoring compliance. This information is also useful in assessing safety in the industry. Federal Activities Inspection, compliance, and enforcement actions taken by FHWA are included in MCMIS. Inspection activities consist of two separate reporting procedures, one for driver-vehicle roadside inspections and the other for motor carrier safety audits. 29 The driver-vehicle inspection report documents findings of roadside inspections of drivers and vehicles conducted by FHWA field personnel and State personnel under the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). The inspection program and reporting form have undergone considerable change since their inception in 1968, making the data inconsistent, a problem compounded by the unequal quality of information collected. For example, the information obtained from drivers is sometimes incorrect and/or obsolete, and many other fields in the report are incomplete, because of the limited information available to investigators at the time of inspection. As of October 1, 1986, safety management audits have been handled through a three step process to 1) provide technical assistance and evaluate safety fitness; 2) assess compliance with recommended changes; and 3) pursue enforcement actions if compliance is unsatisfactory. The new system replaces the previous safety management audit and includes several reporting forms that are coded into MCMIS for later use. The first step, a safety review, is compiled on form SR-1. Carriers are selected using sampling techniques to improve program efficiency and increase the number of safety contacts made annually. The SR-1 is used to determine whether the company has an adequate safety program in place. Additionally, the ~gR.P. Landis, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, Apr. 17, 1987. SR-1 is used to establish safety fitness ratings for the approximately 185,000 motor carriers that have not been previously evaluated by FHWA. To assure the close monitoring of companies identified as having safety problems and to pursue enforcement actions, a selective compliance and enforcement program has also been established. Companies with unacceptable safety fitness ratings are subject to a compliance review, using form CR-1. The compliance review is a followup, on-site assessment to determine if a new rating is warranted or whether enforcement action is necessary. If enforcement action is required, such action is recorded on form 33B. Data from this form supplement an enforcement file, which FHWA has been using for years to track the status of legal actions taken against motor carriers or shippers in noncompliance with the safety regulations. This program also includes a component for monitoring companies that are in compliance, but are overrepresented in carrier/ driver/vehicle at-fault accidents. The goal is to identify problem areas and implement safety countermeasures that could reduce at-fault accidents. State Programs Several States conduct roadside inspections as part of MCSAP. To satisfy reporting requirements to FHWA, these States maintain aggregate records on the vehicles inspected and on related findings. The information collected includes the number of inspections; driver violations, such as hours of service and medical certificate; vehicle defects, such as brakes, coupling devices, and exhaust systems; and proper adherence to hazardous materials regulations. Violations requiring immediate out-of-service action are tracked separately. As MCSAP continues to grow, it will also be possible to track inspection findings to support trend analyses. The level of sophistication in storing and maintaining these data varies considerably across States. A second MCSAP-supported State activity is the conduct of safety management audits (Federal SR-1 and in-depth safety audits) by State inspection personnel. Fewer States conduct audits than do roadside inspections; however, increased emphasis is now being placed on terminals. States with exemplary
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171 Photo credit: California Department of Transportation State inspectors are vital contributors of highway safety data. terminal audit programs include Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska, participants in a pilot Federal program. In Oregon, for example, the audit database includes the number of vehicles each carrier operates, the type of payroll system used by each carrier, time documents or logbooks, hazardous materials transport violations, and maintenance functions. These data are cross-checked to make sure that the companies are not passing off fictitious paperwork as true safety programs. Trucks can be traced and cross-referenced in the database either by their vehicle license numbers or b y the Oregon Public Utilities Commission plates of all vehicles based in Oregon. 30 The current MCMIS has ca p abilities similar to the Oregon systems, with the exception of some design specifications included in Oregon to accommodate State-specific needs. The wealth of information potentially available for State inspection activities will be pooled by FHWA into a national database as part of SAFETYNET, the Motor Carrier Safety Information Network. SAFETYNET is a database management system designed to support MCSAP. The first component of the system will allow States to manage data collected during the inspection process. The key to the system is the development of a standardized format that permits individual States the flexibility to include additional data to satisfy specialized information needs. In theory, an individual State will be able to retrieve from the database a complete record on a carrier that also operates in other States. SAFETYNET is envisioned as a more comprehensive system that could potentially include accident and safety management information. 31 Larry Koeneke, State of Oregon, personal communication, April 1987. Safety Network News, vol. 1, No. 1, fall 1986. MARKET AND FINANCIAL DATA Under the present deregulated environment, tracking carrier entry into and out of the marketplace and tracking the impact of financial performance on safety investment are important for ensuring safety. Several useful sources of information are available for these purposes. Interstate Commerce Commission ICC has long had primary responsibility for moning industry. Prior to 1980, ICC required annual reports from virtually all motor carriers of property, Classes I, 11, and 111. Very small Class III carriers, those with annual revenues under $500,000, were exempted from the annual report filing requirement. Over time and through rulemaking, ICC has reduced reporting requirements for motor carriers of property. Also, revenue levels for the various carrier classes (see below) have been raised over time, also reducing reporting requirements. Further, since itoring economic activities in the interstate truckICC no longer analyzes these data on many of the
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172 carrier segments, it has granted exemptions from the reporting requirements to many firms simply because they asked to be exempted. 32 The first change in reporting requirements affected Class III carriers, and by 1981, Class III firms were no longer required to file any financial reports. In dropping these requirements, ICC relinquished any possibility of tracking progress made by these firms, even if they subsequently grew to Class 1 or II status. All motor carriers granted their initial ICC operating authority are originally classified as Class III. Thus, virtually no data exist for new entrants. 33 Also, in 1980a number of other changes affected reporting requirements. First, ICC raised carrier revenue limits. Class I carriers were redefined from annual revenues of $3 million or more to $5 million or more. Class II revenue levels were raised from the $500,000 to $3 million range to a $1 million to $5 million range. Class III, previously under $500,000 in revenues, was raised to under $1 million. Because of this change, a number of firms previously filing the Class I and II annual report fell back to the (exempt) Class III group. It is estimated that some 500 carriers were lost as a result. 34 During this time, ICC also began granting exemptions to Class I and II carriers from the annual reporting requirements. In 1980 alone, 324 Class 1 and 11 carriers were exempted, and more have been added to this list in recent years. At one time, the data from annual reports provided sufficient detail to track freight activities at several levels by type of carrier, commodities carried, services provided, size of operation, expenditures and income, and vehicle utilization. However, ICC has reduced the amount of information re quired on the report form as well as reducing the reporting population. At the present time, annual report data are collected only from Class I and 11 carriers (those not given exemptions). A recent initiative by ICC to dispense with its accounting system and to reduce annual report forms to one page was contested vigorously by several interest groups. ~JRonald D. Roth, American Trucking Associations, personal communicauon, Mar. 24, 1987. bld. +lbid. However, ICCs proposed rulemaking effectively reduced the number of motor carriers reporting to ICC from 2,500 to 950 and permitted carriers to use alternatives to the uniform accounting system. Since January 1, 1987, the annual report form has contained only 10 pages, a considerable reduction over previous requirements, although the requirements are under review. 35 ICC data are maintained by the American Trucking Associations and include extensive error-checking programs to verify the accuracy of reported information. Dun & Bradstreet The actual number of companies entering and leaving the trucking industry is tracked by Dun & Bradstreet. New entries are monitored by Dun & Bradstreet through sources such as requests made to ICC for operating authority. Carrier failures are monitored by Dun & Bradstreet reporters, who are assigned to local jurisdictions to examine court records daily concerning bankruptcy filings. Companies are categorized by the Standard Industrial Classification system, although the reliability of the process used to assign trucking companies to appropriate classifications is a concern. Because of the structure of the database, mergers and changes in ownership cannot be identified through Dun & Bradstreet. 36 The Insurance Industry The insurance industry is understandably concerned about the financial solvency of the motor carriers its members consider for coverage. Although some financial records exist in-house, the industry also contracts with outside firms to gather additional financial data. This information is drawn from several State regulatory agencies where carriers are registered and from the more limited data available through ICC. 37 ~jTraffjc World, Agency Eases Rules on Accounting, Reporting for Regulated Truck Lines, Apr. 6, 1987; and Ronald D. Roth, American Trucking Associations, internal memo, Jan. 15, 1988. ~T1zlana Mohorol,ic, Dun & Bradstreet, persona] communication, Ju]y 21, 1987. ;Andrew Schindel, Central Analysis Bureau, personal communication, July 21, 1987.
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173 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS Accurate, uniform, and representative information about heavy vehicle safety matters is essential, so that effective programs for improvements can be developed. However, OTA finds that with few exceptions, existing information systems have deficiencies that limit their value in supporting safety policies and programs. In general, data collected are of questionable usefulness for one or more of the following reasons: 1) poor data element design and lack of uniformity, 2) little or no quality control of the data collected, or 3) poor or nonexistent data handling and storage systems. Although it is virtually impossible to design and collect the perfect database, and some of the existing data are useful for analyzing narrow, specific truck safety issues, truck safety information systems lag considerably behind their modal counterparts in coverage and accuracy. Accident Data None of the national accident databases is ideally suited for addressing all the important motor carrier safety issues (see table 7-1). The MCMIS accident file lacks adequate information on the accident experiences of most intrastate carriers. The FARS database is a census for only one small subset of accidents (fatal accidents), and it does not distinguish all truck types. NASS offers the advantage of selecting accidents by a statistically based sampling scheme, permitting the derivation of national accident totals and annual trends. However, the changes made to NASS for 1988 are likely to make it more difficult to conduct detailed motor carrier accident causality studies using this database. State accident reporting systems present several promising alternatives because they can represent a census of accidents, and many States have begun to include additional fields for truck details. However, the lack of uniformity between States data presents problems for extrapolating findings to the national level. The efforts of NHTSA in establishing the CARDfile, and of CVSA and the National Governors Association in striving for more uniform State accident reporting practices are commendable. OTA finds that a NASS-style approach could be a cost-effective base for a truck accident data systern, for it allows a sampling of truck operations by both geography and road use. To provide accurate and comprehensive information, each accident investigation could be handled by a field staff that examines the vehicle and the accident site, interviews vehicle occupants, and reviews medical and driver records. Finally, the report form could include the necessary detail on truck vehicle and operating characteristics to permit the type of study needed for performing component safety analyses. For this option to be effective, additional funds will be needed both to restore the original approach and to expand the system to meet truck safety concerns. Furthermore, OTA concludes that training field teams in truck accident investigation so that vehicle-related factors are examined thoroughly will be necessary. Another alternative is the development of a completely independent truck accident data collection system patterned after the NASS design. This approach would permit selection of sampling units solely on truck criteria rather than for all motor vehicles. Such a program would be more costly because a new, independent system would have to be developed. However, the system could provide the type of detail needed to support better analysis of motor carrier safety needs. NHTSAs advice and expertise would be valuable regardless of whether NHTSA or FHWA took the lead on such an initiative. Congress may wish to consider requiring the Department of Transportation to focus on coordinating and improving existing accident databases and to take steps to develop a NASS focused on heavy vehicles. At a minimum, FHWA programs that encourage States to expand accident report forms to accommodate truck detail and to establish uniform reporting thresholds and forms for a minimum core of data elements could be aggressivel y pursued. This would improve available truck safety information and would move toward a national census of accident histor y that could be used for analysis. OTA concludes that NHTSA analysis of motor carrier accident data has not been sufficient to support regulatory initiatives, particularly
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174 those related to the key areas of driver training and performance. This shortcoming is serious, given the preponderance of human error among accident causal factors. Congress may wish to require DOT to address this issue. Coordination between FHWA and NHTSA is essential. Exposure Data OTA finds that uniformity between accident and exposure data, and accuracy in estimating truck movement independent of accident rate formulation (see table 7-2) are priority needs. Each existing exposure database has a different limitation. However, FHWAs work with the States on exposure has promise. For example, the HPMS and TWS could be merged to form a national exposure data collection system that still meets the original objectives of each database. The level of detail collected by HPMS and TWS is sufficient for a truck exposure database, provided that information on the driver is included in the survey. FHWA is already in the process of resolving some of the issues involved in developing such an exposure system. 38 TWS data could be collected from sample sites drawn from each HPMS functional classification stratum. Classification counts could be scheduled to take place at each site around the clock at periodic intervals. Truck weight sites would be selected from sites identified for vehicle classification, recognizing that some sites are more conducive than others for vehicle weighing and survey administration. Such a program would allow derivation of national exposure estimates by road type, vehicle, carrier, and driver. Also, if the statistical design for both the accident and exposure databases were properly formulated, accident rates could be established without necessarily having the same accident and exposure reporting sites. As an initial step, Congress may wish to consider extending FHWAs reporting requirements to inelude all motor carriers, including intrastate and those currently exempt from Federal reporting requirements. Using SAFETYNET as a model, a Federal-State cooperative truck registration database could be developed. State vehicle registration requirements could incorporate carrier identification ~BFederal Highway Administration, op. cit., footnote 25. and exposure information for entry into the database. An alternate approach could include a Federal requirement for a brief annual report by intraand interstate carriers to FHWA. Useful information would include carriers name, address, telephone number, the number of trucks and buses with identifying numbers, categories of vehicles, and miles traveled annually. The cost to the Federal Government would be minimal; additional staff would be required for information processing. The information would provide valuable data about exposure and distribution. Congress may wish to consider legislation enabling DOT to implement this reporting requirement. The cost of both accident and exposure data collection programs is a function of the desired precision in the estimates. The variance of recorded measures both within and between sampling units has an impact on the number of units and observations required. To achieve reasonable confidence levels for accident rates between truck types, close to 300 sampling units would be required at a total annual cost of close to $2 million. Furthermore, the logistical demands of establishing and maintaining cooperative arrangements with each jurisdiction are formidable. If these obstacles are insurmountable, more economical alternatives can be considered, focusing primarily on expanding existing data collection instruments, such as the Motor Carrier Census, that are producing some useful information. However, the deficiencies that are associated with each of these approaches are likely to persist. OTA concludes that the importance and scale of activity of the trucking industry, and the high costs associated with heavy vehicle accidents make these important issues for Congress to weigh. Inspection and Enforcement Data A wide range of inspection and enforcement data is being amassed (particularly at the State level) that will provide useful information for safety analyses (see table 7-3). Although the process by which vehicles and companies are targeted for inspection varies between States, the inspection results are reported in a uniform way. SAFETYNET must ma-
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Table 7-2.Truck Safety Information Resources (Exposure Data) Database Kept by Years Strengths Weaknesses TIUS Bureau of the Census CTS Bureau of the Census Motor Carrier FHWA Census File (part of MCMIS) HPMS FHWA TWS FHWA Motor carrier industry NMTDB NTTIS Individual carriers, trade associations Transportation Research and Marketing (consulting firm) UMTRI Every 5 years, most recently in 1982 Since 1983, every 5 years Most recent 5 years Annually Annually 1977 to present 1988 to 1987, single collection KEY: TIUS = Truck Inventory and Use Survey. l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l Covers all trucks used in the United States Sample biased toward heavy trucks Exclusive truck focus Multimodal Cross-checked against the Census of Manufacturers Provides flow data Comprehensive listing of carriers and truck fleet operators Exclusive truck focus Statistical sampling design Detail on roadway characteristics Truck classification and weight data Exclusive truck focus Aggregate statistics on tons, tonmiles, and truck registrations Detail flow records from individual carriers and shippers; can merge with similar accident records Exclusive truck focus Focuses on long-distance truck movements Good truck and operator classification detail Exclusive truck focus Good truck and operator classification detail Disaggregate and aggregate analysis possible Exclusive truck focus CTS = Commodity Transportation Survey. MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System, FHWA = Federal Highway Administration. HPMS = Highway Performance Monitoring System. TWS = Truck Weight Study. LTL = less-than-truckload. NMTDB = National Motor Truck Data Base. NITIS = National Truck Trip Information Survey. UMTRI = University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988. l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l No commodity flow data Only rudimentary commodity information Reflects tractor use, not trailer use Based on owner response Shipment data on some products are missing Only shipments from point of manufacture to first destination are reported Nonuniformity between surveys Voluntary data submission Many carriers missing from data base No commodity flow data Limited truck classification detail Counting sites are not statistically representative Method of data collection varies and is subject to observer error Truck data are based principally on LTL carriers Individual carrier represents single observation in industry Access to individual carrier records is not in public domain Purposely excludes short-haul truck movements, especially in Northeast Not in public domain Relatively small number of observations Single collection
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176 Table 7-3.Truck Safety Information Resources (Inspection and Enforcement) Database Kept by Strengths Weaknesses MCMIS FHWA, Office of Motor (driver-vehicle Carriers inspection review, l enforcement) l State programs Various State regulatory l agencies (MCSAP) l Part of comprehensive safety l information system New program initiated in 10/86 l will add safety management audit activities Exclusive truck focus Roadside and safety management audits l Development of uniformity to permit interface at a national level through SAFETYNET Exclusive truck focus In the past, quality of information collected has been poor Quality of new program data collection unknown Not all States currently participate Successful implementation of SAFETYNET unknown at this time l KEY: MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System. FHWA = Federal Highway Administration. MCSAP = Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988 ture before its information can be available in an automated form on a national scale. The new procedure developed by FHWA for handling safety management audits is such a recent development that the contribution of this effort to the quality of available information is largely unknown. OTA concludes that an enforcement information database will provide a valuable resource for Federal and State safety oversight. Congress may wish to continue Federal support for this program. Market Entry, Exit, and Financial Data tion in the past 8 to 10 years has been toward curtailing reporting requirements (see table 7-4). OTA concludes that the ICC reporting system no longer adequately monitors carrier market entry, exit, and financial performance. The current lack of information presents a significant problem for both safety-related and broad policy decisions. A data collection effort that includes Class III carriers, scrutinizes requests for exemptions, and maintains sufficient detail in the data elements to track financial performance would serve a useful purpose for evaluating truck safety. Little information is publicly available on the financial condition of motor carriers, and the direcTable 7-4.-Truck Safety Information Resources (Market Entry, Exit, and Financial Performance) Database Kept by Strengths Weaknesses ICC ICC l l l Insurance industry Individual insurers, l Central Analysis Bureau l Dun & Bradstreet Dun & Bradstreet l l Primary source of financial data on carriers Excellent historical detail Exclusive truck force l l Collectively utilizes best financial l information available for each carrier under evaluation Exclusive truck focus Monitored based on filings for l operating authority and bankruptcy l Exclusive truck focus Intrastate carriers not included; elements of interstate market missing owing to exemptions and changes in reporting requirements Little concern over reporting compliance Diminishing financial detail with new reporting requirements Relies on developing composite picture from variety of sources Aggregate data reporting, classification problems Merger and change in ownership cannot be identified KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.
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, Appendixes
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Appendix A List of Acronyms AADMV A American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators AASHTOAmerican Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ALV automatic brake pressure limiting valve ATA American Trucking Associations BAC blood-alcohol concentration BMCS Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (now OMC) CARDfile Crash Avoidance Research Datafile CDL Commercial Drivers License CDS Crashworthiness Data System COE cab-over-engine CTS Commodity Transportation Survey CVSA Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance DOT U.S. Department of Transportation FARS Fatal Accident Reporting System FHWA Federal Highway Administration FMCSR Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations FMVSS Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard GES General Estimates System GVW gross vehicle weight HPMS Highway Performance Monitoring System IBT International Brotherhood of Teamsters ICC Interstate Commerce Commission IIHS Insurance Institute for Highway Safety ISO Insurance Services Office, Inc. LC V longer combination vehicle LTL less-than-truckload MC A Motor Carrier Act (1935, 1980) MCMIS Motor Carrier Management Information System MCSAP Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program MVMA Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association NASS National Accident Sampling System NGA National Governors Association NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NMTDB National Motor Truck Data Base NPTA National Private Trucking Association NTSB National Transportation Safety Board NTTIS National Truck Trip Information Survey OM C Office of Motor Carriers PCC Private Carrier Conference PMI preventive maintenance inspection PTCA Private Truck Carriers Association PTDIA Professional Truck Driver Institute of America RCCC Regular Common Carrier Conference RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration SEP State Enforcement Plan STAA Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 TIUS Truck Inventory and Use Survey T L truckload TRB Transportation Research Board TSI Training Safety Institute TW S Truck Weight Study UMTRI University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute UPS United Parcel Service 179
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Appendix B Workshop Participants, Reviewers, and Contributors Workshop Participants Participants in Technologies Affecting Truck Safety Workshop, March 10, 1987 George Jennings, Workshop Chairman Manager of Motor Vehicle Operations Mobile Oil Corp. Philip T. Brown Director Marketing Resources Division The Travelers Companies Jerry DeClaire Vice President of Research and Engineering Automatize Operations Rockwell International Corp. Robert Ervin Assistant Head Engineering Research Division Transportation Research Institute University of Michigan Paula Gustafson Director of Product Environmental Management Cummins Engine Co., Inc. Thomas Hardeman Manager of Public Affairs United Parcel Service Robert Heglund Assistant Vice President Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. Jerry Hughes Director of Safety Roadway Express, Inc. James Johnson Automotive Engineer PACCAR, Inc. William Leasure Chief Heavy Vehicle Research Division National Highway Traffic Safety Administration James Lewis Automotive Engineer United Parcel Service William J. Martin Legislative Engineer Navistar International Corp. William J. Morgan Former Vice President of Traffic Frito-Lay, Inc. Brian ONeill President Insurance Institute of Highway Safety Ernie Vaughn Director of Program Development Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America Don Vierimaa Vice President, Engineering Truck Trailer Manufacturers Lyle Walheim Inspector Wisconsin State Patrol 180
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781 Participants in the Human Factors Workshop, May 19, 1987 William A. Maloney, Workshop Chairman Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission Robert Bleakley Office of Program Management Support Office of Motor Carriers Federal Highway Administration Michael Calvin Certification Program Supervisor Professional Truck Driver Institute of America John C. Dannemiller President and Chief Operating Officer Leaseway Transportation Corp. David Dinges Unit for Experimental Psychiatry Department of Psychiatry University of Pennsylvania Robert Inderbitzen Manager Safety and Training Linde Bulk Gases Union Carbide Corp. Henry Jasny Staff Attorney Center for Auto Safety Victor Jennings Director of Insurance Ryder Truck Rental James Johnston President Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America Robert Kelly Deputy Director Tunnels, Bridges, and Waterways Department Port Authority of New York and New Jersey John J. Killilee Vice President of Safety Consolidated Freightways Rodger Koppa Associate Research Engineer Texas Transportation Institute Texas A&M University System Farrel Krall Manager Technical Legislation Navistar International Corp. Paul Melander Manager Transportation Investigation Tennessee Public Service Commission Vernon McDougall Safety and Health Division International Brotherhood of Teamsters Vince Robison President Associated Motor Carriers of Oklahoma Richard C. Schwing Senior Staff Research Engineer General Motors Research Laboratories Patricia Loach Bureau of Safety Programs National Transportation Safety Board Burton W. Stephens Office of Safety and Traffic Traffic Systems Division Federal Highway Administration Ken Thompson Vice President, Safety Yellow Freight System, Inc. Patricia Waller Associate Director Highway Safety Research Center University of North Carolina
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182 Participants in Truck Safety Review Meetings, October 7, 1987 and March 23, 1988 Charles Curtis, Chairman Van Ness, Feldman, Sutcliffe, & Curtis Carla J. Berroyer Deputy Director for Intergovernmental Affairs Illinois Department of Transportation Keith Bissell Commissioner Tennessee Public Service Commission Philip T. Brown Director Marketing Resources Division The Travelers Companies Joan Claybrook President Public Citizen John C. Dannemiller President and Chief Operating Officer Leaseway Transportation Corp. R. V. Durham Director Safety and Health Department International Brotherhood of Teamsters Russ Fiste Executive Director Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance James Johnston President Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America Robert Kelly Deputy Director Tunnels, Bridges, and Waterways Port Authority of New York and Department New Jersey Lillian Liburdi Director Management and Budget Department Port Authority of New York and New Jersey William A. Maloney Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission Paul Melander Manager Transportation Investigation Tennessee Public Service Commission John Meyer James W. Harpel Professor The Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Robert Proulx Manager Corporate Traffic and Fleet Operations Data General Corp. Richard C. Schwing Senior Staff Research Engineer General Motors Research Laboratories Robert Shertz President Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. Dean Stanley Corporate Vice President for Engineering Navistar International Corp. Walter Weiss Safety Director Leaseway Transportation Corp.
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183 Reviewers and Mike Adamy, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc. Charles S. Allen, California Highway Patrol Arthur J. Balek, Federal Highway Administration William Barnett, Independent Truckers and Drivers Association Richard Beilock, University of Florida Jim Bitz, Texas Department of Public Safety William Boehly, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Rita Bontz, Independent Truckers and Drivers Association Guy Boruff, Indiana State Police William Bosserman, Ohio State Highway Patrol William Buckley, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Jack Burkert, Lancer Insurance Co. Joseph Canny, U.S. Department of Transportation C.C. Carter, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc. Joanne Casey, American Trucking Associations William P. Church, Navistar International Corp. Robert Clarke, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Harry Cohen, Transportation Research Board Ron Coleman, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc. Raymond D. Cotton, Maryland State Police Ralph Craft, National Governors Association James E. Daust, Michigan State Police Gerold Davis, Federal Highway Administration Raymond R. Day, Jr., Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission Daniel Dean, California Department of Transportation John Eicher, Federal Highway Administration Nancy Emanuel, Federal Highway Administration Daniel B. Fambro, Texas Transportation Institute Kurt Faxon, Bendix Heavy Vehicle Systems Daniel Folstad, Michigan State Police Robert Forman, Greyhound Bus Lines Arthur H. Fulton, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc. Joseph V. Galati, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation John Grimm, Federal Highway Administration Peter Griskivich, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association Ray Gurney, Land Line Grace Hazzard, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration John Harpe, Federal Highway Administration Doug Harwood, Midwest Research Institute Kevin Heanue, Federal Highwa y Administration Paul Henry, Public Utility Commission of Oregon Richard Hildebrandt, Bendix Heavy Vehicle Systems Contributors Robert A. Hirsch, National Private Truck Association R.L. Hoffman, Arizona Department of Public Safet y Gary Hopkins, Bendix Heavy Vehicle Systems Nancy Humphrey, Transportation Research Board Thomas C. Hutchison, USA Training Academy Alex Jankowsky, Michelin Tire Corp. Harry C. Johns, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc. Will Johns, American Trucking Associations Ian Jones, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety Bill Julian, Consultant, California State Legislature Larry King, Federal Highwa y Administration Michelle King, Michigan Department of State Police Lee Klass, Independent Trucker, Portland, OR Larry Koeneke, Oregon Public Utilities Commission Rodger Koppa, Texas Transportation Institute Richard P. Landis, Federal Highwa y Administration Peter A. Latta, A. Duie Pyle, Inc. Brenda S. Legge, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc. David J. Leland, Ohio Public Utilities Commission Ron Lipps, Maryland Department of Transportation Charles F. Livingston, Highway Users Federation John T. Loftus, USA Training Academy John MacGowan, Federal Highway Administration James W. March, Federal Highway Administration Joe Masquero, Federal Highway Administration James McAlpin, USA Training Academ y Douglas McKelvey, Federal Highway Administration Joe Morris, Transportation Research Board Rudolf Mortimer, University of Illinois at Urbana David Murray, New York State Department of Transportation Phyllis Myers, California Highwa y Patrol William Nalley, Federal Highway Administration Debi Nicholson, Freightliner Corp. L.J. Nickerson, Idaho State Police K. Michael OConnell, Professional Truck Driver Institute of America Susan Perry, American Bus Association Magaly Petersen, Michelin Technical Services, Inc. Larry L. Reynolds, Navistar International Corp. George Ring, Transportation Research Board John R. Risley, Navistar International Corp. Ronald D. Roth, American Trucking Associations Ronald D. Roudebush, Rockwell International Corp. Philip Russell, Federal Highway Administration Richard Schweitzer, Zuckert, Scoutt and Rasenburger Angeli Sebastian, Federal Highway Administration Henry Seiff, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association David M. Seiler, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
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184 William C. Seward, Leaseway Transportation Richard G. Shaefer, Navistar International Corp. Chris Shapeley, Engineering Consultant, Bedford, New Hampshire Asa Sharp, Goodyear Tire Co. Kenneth E. Siegel, American Trucking Associations Louis Silverstein, Honeywell, Inc. Douglas T. Smalls, United Parcel Service Bill Snow, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Robert E. Spicher, Transportation Research Board Walter E, Stone, Rhode Island State Police Larry W. Strawhorn, American Trucking Associations Victor A. Suski, American Trucking Associations Stephen J. Thompson, Congressional Research Service Bill Tracy, American Trucking Associations Michael Trentacoste, Federal Highway Administration Justin G. True, Federal Highway Administration Theresa del Tufo, Delaware Department of Public Safety Frank Tupper, Transportation Safety Institute J. Terry Turner, Interstate Truckload Carriers Conference Gisela Vallandigham, National Association of Truck Stop Operators John Van Berkel, California Department of Transportation Fred E. Vanosdall, Michigan State University Wendy Weingarten, Office of Technology Assessment Brian Wheeler, Volvo-GM Heavy Truck Corp. Dave Williams, Smithers Scientific Services Mike Wright, Great Dane Trailers
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Other OTA Assessments in Progress as of September 1988 Communications Systems for an Information Age Copyright and Home Copying Information Technology and Securities Markets New Clean Air Act Issues Municipal Solid Waste Management Managing Low-Level Radioactive Waste Climate Change: Ozone Depletion and the Greenhouse Effect Potential for Mineral Resources Development in Antarctica and the Convention of the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Infrastructure Technologies: Rebuilding the Foundations Technological Risks and Opportunities for Future U.S. Energy Supply and Demand Increased Competition in the Electric Power Industry High-Temperature Superconductors: Research, Development, and Applications Oil Production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) Technology, Innovation, and U.S. Trade Superfund Implementation Advanced Space Transportation Technologies Maintaining the Defense Technology Base Monitoring and Preventing Accidental Radiation Release at the Nevada Test Site Enhancing the Quality of U.S. Grain in International Trade Grain Quality in International Trade: A Comparison of Major Exporters Agricultural Approaches To Reduce Agrichemical Contamination of Groundwater in the United States Monitoring of Mandated Vietnam Veteran Studies Unorthodox Cancer Treatments Drug Labeling in Developing CountriesPhase I Drug Labeling in Developing CountriesPhase 11 Federal Response to AIDS: Congressional Issues Preventive Health Services Under Medicare Adolescent Health Rural Health Care New Developments in Biotechnology Methods for Locating and Arranging Health and Long-Term Care Services for Persons With Dementia New Developments in Neuroscience Genetic Testing in the Workplace NOTE: For brief descriptions of these studies in progress, see OTAs booklet on Assessment Activities"available from OTAs Publications Office, 224-8996. 185
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Related OTA Reports l l l Safe Skies for Tomorrow: Aviation Safety in a Competitive Environment. OTA-SET-381, July 1988, 196 pages. GPO stock #052-003-01126-3. Transportation of Hazardous Materials. OTA-SET-304, July 1986, 276 pages. GPO stock #052-003-01042-9, NTIS order #PB 87-100 319/AS. Transportation of Hazardous Materials: State and Local ActivitiesSpecial Report. OTA-SET-301, February 1986, 92 pages. GPO stock #052-003-01016-0, NTIS order #PB 87-100 319/AS. NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20401-9325, (202) 783-3238; and/or the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161-0001, (703) 487-4650. 188
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